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Abstract
Trade Frictions, Trade Policies, and the Interwar Business Cycle
by Thilo Nils Hendrik ALBERS
This dissertation is composed of six chapters. Based on a comparison with other
recessions throughout history, the first chapter motivates studying the Great De-
pression from a trade perspective. The second chapter sets the stage for such an
endeavour. It introduces a new macroeconomic dataset for the interwar period
and investigates the prelude and global impact of the Great Depression. High-
lighting the variation of its severity along two dimensions, depth and duration,
within and across countries, it conjectures that trade must have played an impor-
tant role for the global extent of the crisis. The third chapter tests this conjecture
by resurrecting the concept of the trade multiplier. Based on a causal estimate of
the multiplier and auxiliary data, it demonstrates that the trade channel can ex-
plain significant proportions of the initial depth of the Depression in small open
economies. If the fall of trade was important for propagating the Depression,
analysing trade frictions is imperative. The fourth chapter thus turns to the anal-
ysis of retaliatory trade policies in response to currency devaluations. It shows
that tariff retaliation was an important feature of interwar protectionism. Its ef-
fects on trade were large, which casts doubts on the unqualified favourable as-
sessment of unilateral currency depreciations. Relating to the literature on the
post-war distance puzzle, the fifth chapter assesses the relative importance of
tariffs and transport costs during the interwar period. Not only were tariffs the
dominant trade friction during this period, but their increase rendered distance-
related trade costs relatively less important. Finally, the sixth chapter draws im-
plications for the academic and political discourse.
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Introduction
“What distinguishes the ’scientific’ economist from all the other people who think, talk,
and write about economic topics is a command of techniques that we class under three
heads: history, statistics, and ‘theory.’ The three together make up what we shall call
Economic Analysis.”
Schumpeter (1954, p. 12)
Abstract
Why is studying the Great Depression still relevant to the economist and eco-
nomic historian after all these years? How do the only two truly global macroe-
conomic crises in modern economic history compare? Why would we study the
role of trade linkages for the transmission of the Great Depression? How can
we frame the historiography of the Great Depression in terms of focus, method-
ology, and data? The following introduction aims to provide partial answers to
these questions. Apart from outlining the motivation for the research presented
here, it situates the thesis in the large corpus of research on the Great Depression.
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Rather than being a garden-variety recession without far-reaching conse-
quences, the Great Recession of 2007 changed the economic, social, and political
discourse. While some of its consequences are more disputed than others, its
impact on macroeconomic research is undeniable. The crisis has led to the sec-
ond renaissance1 of economic history in recent decades or as Barry Eichengreen
quipped: “This has been a good crisis for economic history” (Jones et al., 2012).
It has sparked renewed data collection efforts resulting in cross-country datasets
covering the late 19th century until today.2 Showcasing the value of economic
history, studies based on these novel datasets have deepened our understanding
of financial crises substantially. They could do so by studying more data, more
countries, and more crises. Without doubt, much is to learn from many data
points rather than a few (Bernanke, 1995). Without doubt, this second renais-
sance has been a success on both counts, for the subject of economic history and
the economics profession. It is now much more common to draw conclusions for
modern macroeconomics from the variations of history.
Why, then, study the Great Depression and not all crises during the last 150
years? When painting crises on the “large canvas” of macroeconomic history
(Schularick and Taylor, 2012, p. 1029) much of the paint comes from two events:
the Great Recession and the Great Depression. While this alone could justify an in-
depth study of the latter crisis, another concern appears to be more pressing. Each
colour represents a different country on the large canvas of crises in economic his-
tory and even though the colours cluster around the two aforementioned crises
on the painting, they are often treated as if they do not blend — or as if the crisis
was not transmitted from one country to the other. Yet, the unifying feature of
the Great Recession and the Great Depression is not their magnitude per se, but pre-
cisely that they dimmed economic prospects around the globe. This makes the
two crises qualitatively different from all the other ones. Neglecting the element
of transmission and pooling all crises together is thus neither innocent nor in-
nocuous. If we want to study global economic crises, the number of observations
is effectively reduced to two. Studying the Great Depression has thus lost none
of its relevance even after almost 90 years.
This thesis shall not be understood as a critique of the admirable studies of
1The recent work in the growth and development literature can be thought of as the first re-
naissance. Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) “Colonial Origins” article has been one of the most-cited
contributions in economics since its publication.
2To name a few: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011); Jordá et al. (2017). Of course, there have been
earlier efforts (see e.g. Bordo et al., 2001; Barro and Ursúa, 2008).
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the second renaissance of economic history. As a complement, it shall be an ex-
ploration into what parts of the picture go missing when drawing on the large
canvas. That much is to learn for the economist from specific episodes or even
cases has led to a renewed interest in studies of such kind.3 One hopes that this
appreciation will ultimately transform into a third renaissance of economic his-
tory and fully restore the missing history edge of the Schumpeterian triangle of
theory, statistics, and history for the scientific economist. This thesis shall be a
modest contribution towards this goal by highlighting the value of studying a
specific episode. Zooming in on the interwar period, its rich historiography, its
contemporary literature, its financial and economic press, and its hidden data
treasures, it focuses on how the colours blend on the canvas of macroeconomic
history in this crisis-ridden episode or, in other words, on how linkages between
countries made the crisis global.
Rather than using the financial or monetary brush, which attracted so much
well-deserved attention, this thesis paints the picture from a trade perspective.
As such, and not at least because of its structure as a collection of articles, it nei-
ther aims nor pretends to be a full account of the Great Depression. Nor shall
the focus on trade obscure my admiration for or imply the invalidity of other ap-
proaches towards analysing the Depression.4 However, I hope to convince both,
the economist and the economic historian, of the value of studying the various
facets of trade during the Great Depression by showcasing five tools from the
economic historian’s paint box:
(i) The power of data
Once we gather and construct new data, we can settle old questions and explore
new lines of inquiry.
(ii) Identification from history
History provides a wealth of cases where relevant elasticities can be identified in
a causal manner because of historical or political accidents.
(iii) Resurrecting old, but relevant concepts
This thesis resurrects the concept of the trade multiplier, initially developed in
the 1930s, and shows its relevance for explaining the transmission of crises.
3An indication of this renewed interest is the publication of such studies in top-5 general inter-
est economics journals. For the Great Depression, see, for example, a study on the 1936 veteran’s
bonus in the United States (Hausman, 2016) and Kris Mitchener’s work on banking in the Great
Depression in the United States (Carlson and Mitchener, 2009; Mitchener and Richardson, forth-
coming). For studies beyond the Great Depression, see for example the recent work on initial
public offerings in late imperial Germany by Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Streb (2016).
4This, of course, echoes Kindleberger’s (1986) scepticism towards monocausal explanations.
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(iv) The case study
Case studies such as the one presented here on retaliatory tariffs can highlight the
potential relevance of largely neglected lines of inquiry.
(v) The time lapse
Some policies such as tariffs, are faster implemented than dismantled. When
assessing their effect we could either analyse the episode during which they are
dismantled or employ the time lapse and thus focus on the period when they are
implemented.
Before we delve into the contribution of each chapter using one or more of
these tools, it is important to situate this thesis in the historiography and macro-
historical research. Providing more evidence on the claims made in the previous
paragraphs, Section 1.1 of this introductory chapter highlights why it is important
to study the Great Depression from a trade perspective. Rather than providing a
full literature review of the Great Depression, Section 1.2 provides an overview
about how different types of data and econometric techniques have been used in
the literature on the Great Depression over time. Section 1.3 outlines the method-
ological approach of this thesis as well as the contribution of each chapter.
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1.1 Why Studying the Great Depression from a Trade
Perspective?
Recessions, small and large, happen relatively frequently. The defining feature
of a global crisis is neither the coincidence of such recessions around the globe
nor their depth per se, but that the recessionary impulses are transmitted from
one or more countries to others.5 If global crises were common events, results
from studying the Great Depression would be much more limited to its historical
value. However, global recessions are rare and, given the criterion that will be
discussed later, global economic crises even rarer. Out of eight relatively global
recessions since the late 19th century, only two qualify as global economic crises
– the Great Recession and the Great Depression. Employing descriptive statis-
tics and informative cross-country correlations for the period from 1870-2016, the
first part of this section highlights the rarity of global recessions. Furthermore,
it shows that the Depression still serves as the benchmark for global economic
crisis. It thus elucidates why understanding the Depression remains the “Holy
Grail of macroeconomics” (Bernanke, 1995, p.1) after all these years.
The second part of the section shifts the focus from the description of crises
throughout time to the explanation of the transmission of the Great Depression
across space. It briefly outlines the related literature, which has identified three
main channels: the monetary architecture, the financial system, and trade inter-
linkages. The review of the contemporary academic discourses, case studies on
small countries, financial and economic newspapers, analyses of trade costs, and
studies on business cycle comovement lead to the conjecture that trade might
have mattered more for the transmission of the Great Depression than reflected
in the historiography. This insight calls for analysing the breakdown of trade
not only as a consequence of the crisis but as a contributing factor to the Great
Depression.6
5This definition inevitably follows from the comparison of the Great Recession and Great De-
pression by Almunia et al. (2010, p. 22).
6In their comparison of the Great Depression and Great Recession Grossman and Meissner
(2010, p. 331) make the same distinction. They argue: “Overall, the collapse of global trade seems
to have been as much a symptom as an important cause in the global Great Depression.”
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1.1.1 The Great Depression on the Canvas of Macroeconomic
History
Looking at the large canvas of macroeconomic history, how was the Great De-
pression different from other crisis episodes? This section recasts some stylised
business cycle facts in light of the Great Depression to elucidate its exceptional-
ism.7 Employing summary statistics about the incidence and depth of crises and
the level of international comovement allows us to distinguish normal recessions
from global recessions, and ultimately global crises. For this purpose, the GDP
per capita data from the Maddison Project Database are an invaluable source (Bolt
et al., 2018). By focusing on growth rates and cyclical fluctuations, we can cir-
cumvent many problems that plague this database8 and fully enjoy the excellent
coverage across space and time. A balanced sample of 27 countries9 with com-
plete annual coverage from 1870-2016 facilitates a relatively global and consistent
comparison of recessions throughout time.
The Globality of Economic Crises
According to the above definition, a global crisis episode occurs when two
conditions are met: (i) a significant part of the world economy is in recession
and (ii) these recessions are not independent but transmitted from one or sev-
eral countries to others. Fortunately, we can test both conditions easily with the
available data. Condition (i) can be expressed statistically by the proportion of
countries in the sample that are in recession. Condition (ii) is likely to be fulfilled
if a high value of average bilateral business cycle comovement is observed in
the data.10 For illustrative purposes and acknowledging its deeply a-theoretical
7Some of the following graphs and tables will not seem completely unfamiliar to the reader.
Statistics, graphs, and tables of similar nature appear in the literature on crisis severity (see e.g.
Bordo et al., 2001), the business cycle comovement literature (see e.g. Baxter and Kouparitsas,
2005; Jordá et al., 2018), and comparisons between the Great Depression and Great Recession
popularised by Eichengreen and O’Rourke (Almunia et al., 2010). Perhaps slightly different from
the aforementioned authors, I recast all these statistics in the light of the Great Depression versus
the Great Recession and all other crisis episodes.
8In particular, the comparability of the GDP-levels across countries, which is very sensitive to
the ppp-adjustment (Bolt et al., 2018).
9See Appendix 1A.2 for a list. According to the new release of the Maddison database (Bolt
et al., 2018), the dataset covers at least 66 % of World GDP in 1929. Unfortunately, it lacks data
for Africa, the Middle East, and large parts of Asia. Nonetheless, it covers both developed and
developing countries reasonably well.
10There are some important reservations against equating comovement with transmission
(Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). Nevertheless, the value of these bilateral correlations will become
apparent. The results presented here would suggest that, at least to some degree, they consti-
tute a summary measure of transmission. Prima facie this is the case because episodes with high
recession incidence, but low global comovement exist.
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nature, a “crisis globality index” can be calculated by multiplying the two mea-
sures.11 Its intuition is straightforward and best illustrated with extreme cases:
the crisis globality index takes the value one if all countries are in recession in a
given year and there exists perfect global comovement. If there is perfect global
comovement but no incidence of crisis, the index takes a value of zero. Finally,
if all countries in the sample are in recession but their economies do not comove,
the index likewise takes a value of zero.12 Finally, to distinguish global economic
crises from global recessions, let us define them as tail events in the distribution of
the value of the globality index. A global crisis is defined as such, if the observed
value in the index lies outside of the 99 % confidence interval of the observed
distribution of crisis globality for 1873–2016, i.e. it deviates 2.58 ∗ σ ≈ 24.9 points
from the crisis globality mean µ = 4.73.13
Figure 1.1 illustrates the incidence of recessions, global business cycle comove-
ment, and the globality index of economic crises. Eight global recessions occurred
during peacetime, two of which were so severe that they could be called global
economic crises. The following paragraphs briefly discuss their significance and
probable causes drawing heavily on the work by Bordo et al. (2001) and Bordo
and Haubrich (2010).
The upper left-hand figure suggests that recessions were very frequent in the
pre-WW1 period. This is not necessarily at odds with previous research, which
found that crises were less frequent in this period than in others (Bordo et al.,
2001). Not every recession turns into what that literature defines as banking, fi-
nancial, or currency crisis. Most likely, the high incidence of recessions pre-1914
simply reflects the fact that many countries were still very much reliant on agri-
cultural produce. A bumper crop would lead to an upswing in economic activity
whereas a failed one would trigger a recession.14 As year-to-year variations in
the harvest are a function of local weather conditions, recessions linked to the
11In a political science context globality seems to have a plethora of meanings, but here it is
supposed to be simply understood as “the quality of having worldwide inclusiveness, reach, or
relevance” (Oxford Dictionary).
12For the precise statistical definitions used for the following figures, the reader is referred to
Appendix 1A.1. Technically, the index can take negative values as business cycle comovement
can be negative. While there are some theoretical possibilities why this might be the case, there is
virtually no practical relevance of this case as can be seen below.
13Strictly speaking, the distribution of recessions is not normal and thus one might want to
interpret this confidence interval with care. For the same reason, global recessions are thus best-
defined by eyeballing rather than attaching too much significance to another confidence interval
boundary (say 68 % as µ+ σ ≈ 14.4).
14For the pre-World War I period, this also holds true for the most developed countries of the
time. See Timoshenko (1930) for an excellent discussion on the reliance of the general business
cycle on agriculture in the United States.
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FIGURE 1.1: The incidence of recessions & business cycle comove-
ment
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c) Crisis globality index
Underlying Data Source: Balanced 27 country sample 1870-2016 from the updated Maddison
database (Bolt et al., 2018). A recession is defined as a year of negative GDP p.c. growth. Co-
movement is measured as the bilateral movement of the cyclical components between the GDP
p.c. series of these countries. For more details, see Appendix 1A.1.
harvests are necessarily idiosyncratic by their very nature. This would also ex-
plain why the average global business cycle comovement, as shown in the upper
right-hand figure, was virtually zero until 1900. In consequence, the crisis glob-
ality index remained at low levels until the crisis of 1907, which earns that crisis
the title of being the first global recession in the sample based on the above defi-
nitions.15
Yet, the Great Depression dwarfs the crisis of 1907 on both counts – the level
15In contrast and perhaps unexpectedly so, the crisis of 1893 does not show up in the globality
measure. See Bordo and Haubrich (2010) for a detailed description of both crises.
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of international comovement and the incidence of recessions around the globe.16
Moving on for the moment, the immediate post-war period was dominated by
the Golden Age of European growth. Except for the recession of 1957/1958,
which was induced by a monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve (Bordo and
Haubrich, 2010), recessions were infrequent. In consequence, the crisis globality
index would remain at low levels until the early 1970s even though comovement
was high due to the fixed exchange rate regime. After this calm period, relatively
global recessions would appear about once a decade. The oil shock of 1973 cou-
pled with interest hikes marked the first global recession in this episode and was
soon followed by another one in 1981. Tight monetary policy by the United States
serves as a possible explanation for this recession (Bordo and Haubrich, 2010). In
the early 1990s, the first gulf war and a monetary tightening by the Federal Re-
serve led to a global recession. Likewise, the bust of the tech bubble in 2001 was a
relatively global event (Bordo and Haubrich, 2010). The Great Recession of 2008
marks the most recent global economic crisis, and according to the index, it was
also the most global crisis since 1870. Compared to the 1930s, this is rather driven
by the unprecedented levels of comovement than the number of countries in re-
cession.17
In sum, there have been eight global economic recessions in peacetime since
1870. Among those, the Great Depression and the Great Recession stand out in
terms of the two defining features of global crises: a high degree of comovement
and a significant portion of the world economy in recession. Global recessions
are rare. Global crises are even rarer. While the graphs presented here reflect this
insight in a new fashion, it corresponds well to the literatures on international
comovement and crises (see e.g. Bordo et al., 2001; Backus and Kehoe, 1992; Jordá
et al., 2018). With two observations for truly global economic crises at hand, the
Great Depression is as relevant as ever for understanding the transmission of
crises. This especially rings true, as the Great Depression has remained the ulti-
mate benchmark case even after 2007.
The Great Depression as a Benchmark of Global Recessions
The previous part of this section identifies the Great Depression and Great Re-
cession as the only two global economic crises. While the globality measure takes
into account whether a recession spreads, it abstracts from other dimensions of
16This resonates well with the study by Mathy and Meissner (2011), who find that trade linkages
and fixed exchange rates can explain much of this comovement.
17For a discussion of this increased amount of comovement and its financial causes, see Rey
(2016), Ward (2017), and Jordá et al. (2018).
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the extent of economic crises. To understand the significance of the Great Depres-
sion as the benchmark case for global recessions, it is useful to compare the initial
depth and length of the Great Depression, Great Recession, and all other reces-
sions from 1870 until 2016. The duration of the initial downturn is defined as the
number of years of negative growth following the peak. Following Harding and
Pagan (2002), depth is defined as the cumulative loss relative to the pre-recession
peak during this period. It can be interpreted as the percentage of peak-GDPs
lost over the spell of the recession.18 Two caveats are worth noting with regard to
these statistics. Using annual data for calculating such statistics is not innocuous
(Chapter 2). Moreover, the definition employed here is most useful to assess the
initial downturn rather than the crisis as a whole.19 Nonetheless, Table 1.1 shows
that these recession statistics are informative in their own right.
It becomes apparent that the Great Depression was a unique event in France,
Germany, and the United States. The differences in duration and depth of the
initial downturn of this crisis relative to all other recessions including the most
recent crisis are so large that they are unlikely to be influenced by the exact def-
initions used. It is only for the United Kingdom that the Great Depression and
Great Recession are comparable in duration and depth. Table 1.1 also provides
the corresponding statistics for the remaining 23 countries in the sample. Like for
France, Germany, and the United States, the uniqueness of the Great Depression
stands out. This holds true when the sample is split by the sample median of the
GDP per capita in 2015 ( ˜GDP pc2015). Yet, the large standard deviations across re-
cessions and measures suggest that this sample is everything but homogenous.20
The heterogeneity of the experience during the Great Depression will be at the
centre of attention in Chapter 3 of this thesis, which investigates the trade chan-
nel of the Great Depression. Like for the large countries, the Great Recession does
not seem all too different from all other crisis.
If so, how was the Great Recession different from all other crises? The final
18To provide the intuition, consider the following example. Country i’s economy goes into
recession for three years. In the first year of the crisis, GDP is 80 % of peak-GDP, in the second
one 70 % of peak-GDP, and in the third one 50 % of peak-GDP. Then country i has lost a full
year of peak-GDP when reaching the trough in year three. Unlike in Harding and Pagan (2002),
the cumulative loss is not calculated using log-differences. This would introduce relatively large
imprecision for the larger crises as log-differences are only an approximation of growth rates. The
Harding-Pagan algorithm is not used to date the recessions as for annual data it would virtually
yield the same results to the ones based on the definition above.
19It does neither take into account the speed of the recovery nor double-dip recessions. In the
case of the Great Depression, France presents such a case. For details and a more meaningful
measure to assess the depth of the Great Depression as a whole, see Chapter 2.
20See also Appendix 1A.2 for the results for each country.
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TABLE 1.1: THE EXCEPTIONALISM OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION REL-
ATIVE TO OTHER RECESSIONS, 1870–2016
Initial Downturn of..
Crisis Great Depression Great Recession All Other Recessions
Variable Duration Depth Duration Depth Number Duration Depth
Unit Years Peak-Trough
Cum. Loss in %
Years Peak-Trough
Cum. Loss in %
Years Peak-Trough
Cum. Loss in %
GDP
Four Large Western Countries
France 3 -30 2 -4 18 1.39
( 0.70 )
-4
( 3 )
Germany 4 -32 1 -5 12 1.33
( 0.65 )
-4
( 5 )
United Kingdom 2 -8 2 -8 14 1.93
( 1.07 )
-4
( 3 )
United States 4 -86 2 -6 22 1.27
( 0.46 )
-3
( 4 )
23 Other Countries
Pooled 2.87
( 1.29 )
-32
( 28 )
1.74
( 1.63 )
-9
( 18 )
18.83
( 5.40 )
1.63
( 0.66 )
-8
( 5 )
Above ˜GDP pc2015 3.25
( 1.60 )
-31
( 28 )
1.75
( 0.87 )
-6
( 3 )
17.42
( 4.42 )
1.41
( 0.26 )
-5
( 3 )
Below ˜GDP pc2015 2.45
( 0.69 )
-32
( 30 )
1.73
( 2.24 )
-13
( 26 )
20.36
( 6.14 )
1.86
( 0.89 )
-11
( 5 )
Trade
World 4 -82 1 -12 11 1.36
( 0.67 )
-6
( 6 )
Note: Own calculation. A recession year is defined as a year of negative growth. The length of a crisis/recession is the spell of consecutive years of negative
growth. The cumulative loss is relative to the peak GDP preceding the first recession year of a crisis spell (see Harding and Pagan, 2002, p. 370 for a discussion).
It can be thus interpreted as the % of peak-GDPs lost in the initial downturn. Where appropriate, the brackets indicate standard deviations. For the basket of 23
“other countries,” these are defined relative to the mean crisis length and depth of the country and not pooled over all crises in all countries. For the individual
results for each county and more details on the computation of the statistics, see Appendix 1A.2. The measures for world trade are computed correspondingly
using a volume index from Federico and Tena-Junguito (2016b).
Underlying Data Source: Balanced 27 country sample 1870-2016 from the updated Maddison Project Database (Bolt et al., 2018). For the volume index of world
trade, Giovanni Federico kindly provided the post-WW II data from his voxeu column (Federico and Tena-Junguito, 2016a). The pre-WW II data is taken from
Federico and Tena-Junguito (2016b).
row in Table 1.1 shows the same recession statistics as before for a volume index
of world trade (Federico and Tena-Junguito, 2016b). Compared to all other re-
versals in the last 150 years, the reversal associated it with Great Recession was
quite severe though not nearly as severe as the one associated with the Great De-
pression.21 As trade links the economies around the world together, these data
provide yet another marker for the globality of the two crises.
More generally, comparing the depth and duration of the Great Recession rel-
ative to all other recessions suggests that the defining feature of this crisis was nei-
ther its depth nor its duration. Instead, it was its global reach that made the Great
21Using annual data underplays the fall of world trade during the Great Recession as it started
in mid-2008 and reached bottom in mid-2009. Naturally, this flattens the amplitude. See Almunia
et al. (2010) for a comparison of high-frequency data.
Chapter 1. Introduction 12
Recession “great.”22 Being just as global, the Great Depression was “greater”
with respect to the severity of the crisis and thus remains the benchmark case.
While global recessions occur once in a while, the number of observations for
truly global crises equals n = 2. Studying the potential transmission channels of
the Great Depression is thus imperative for the economist and economic historian
alike.
22Of course, this point is not entirely new. While not using correlations as I do here, Almunia
et al. (2010) make this observation in their introduction to their seminal comparison of the Great
Depression and Great Recession.
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1.1.2 How Colours Blend - The Transmission of the Great De-
pression
What, then, made the crisis that we now call the Great Depression global? Two
views can be thought of as both opposing and complementary. Eichengreen
(2004) distinguishes the “US-centric” and “global” view on the causes of the Great
Depression. This categorisation proves also helpful for analysing the transmis-
sion of the Depression even though a relabelling to the “centre-periphery” and
the “gold standard” view is more suitable.
On the one end of this artificial spectrum, not quoting the many qualifications
the respective authors make, lies the idea that the crisis spread from the indus-
trialised countries to the rest of the world. In other words: If there had been
another exchange rate regime and more central bank cooperation, there would
have been a similar global crisis. Whether the crisis in the industrial world
was ultimately the consequence of the political, social, and economic disloca-
tions of World War I (Lewis, 1949), the absence of economic hegemony (Kindle-
berger, 1986), the German debt problem (Ritschl, 2002), a classical boom-bust cy-
cle (Eichengreen and Mitchener, 2004), or misled American central bank policies
(Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) followed by the stock market crash and a drop in
consumption (Romer, 1993), appears to be a second order categorisation in this
context. Implicitly, these views have in common that national economic crises in
advanced economies, whatever their origin might have been, spread to the rest
of the world.
In contrast, and again with daring oversimplification, the gold standard liter-
ature proposes a systemic flaw (see e.g. Eichengreen, 1992; Bernanke, 1995). The
monetary regime did not only knit economies around the world together, thus
propelling shocks, but was itself causal to the Depression. The ideological ortho-
doxy of keeping the fixed exchange rate led to high interest rates. The ensuing
deflation depressed the domestic economy through the debt deflation channel
(Fisher, 1933), the sticky wage channel (Bernanke and Carey, 1996), and the bank-
ing crisis channel (Bernanke and James, 1991). For these three channels to work,
no direct contagion is necessary or in Peter Temin’s (1993, p. 90) words: “The
effect of the gold standard at this point [the inception of the Great Depression]
was largely psychological, but - pace Norman - no less real for that.”
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It is clear that the Great Depression does not have one cause. Proponents
of either view simply attach a greater weight to theirs. If we acknowledge, as
proponents of the “gold standard” view typically do (Eichengreen, 2004), some
explanatory power for the “centre-periphery” perspective and recall the global-
ity of the Great Depression, the natural question becomes how the crisis spread.
Typically, researchers ascribe importance to three channels of transmission: the
monetary architecture, the financial system, and trade linkages. Firstly, that
fixed exchange rates cause greater comovement is conventional wisdom. This
insight provides another, though not primary, building block of the gold stan-
dard view of the Great Depression (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985; Eichengreen,
1992).23 Secondly and equally well-proven by now, scholars ascribe great impor-
tance to the financial channel: Sudden withdrawals of positions, public or pri-
vate, from abroad propelled the Depression globally (Temin, 1993; Accominotti,
2012b; Accominotti and Eichengreen, 2016; Accominotti, forthcoming). Finally,
Irwin (2012, p. 110f) and Grossman and Meissner (2010, p. 330-332) highlight
the potential relevance of the trade channel:24 The loss of foreign demand, either
through the fall in income abroad or the increase of trade barriers, would lead to
the fall of income in the domestic economy. In short, the Great Depression was
transmitted through monetary, financial, and trade channels.
Notwithstanding the contributions above and other exceptions,25 the trade
channel has received considerably less attention than the other two. Yet, there
are good reasons to believe that it mattered for the transmission of the Depres-
sion. The following paragraphs summarise these reasons by recalling the aca-
demic discourse of contemporaries, evidence from financial and economic news-
papers from the 1930s, and modern studies of the Great Depression relating to
23The gold standard orthodoxy paired with limited central bank cooperation are the key argu-
ments of the gold standard view. Its architecture as a gold exchange standard makes the interwar
gold standard distinct from its precursor, which broke up in 1914. The differences between ex-
change rate regimes throughout modern economic history is perhaps nowhere better summarised
than in Eichengreen’s (2008) “Globalizing Capital.”
24Both employ back-of-the-envelope calculations for this purpose.
25Two other works from the relatively recent literature provide evidence for the trade channel’s
importance. Kindleberger (1986, Chapter 14) highlights the lack of demand from the advanced
countries as one of five important factors in making the Depression global. However, this point
is a subset of his hegemony-hypothesis. Mathy and Meissner (2011) highlight the importance of
trade links for international business cycle comovement. A number of country-specific studies
point to the importance of the trade for small open economies (see below for details). Beyond
these, there exists a large literature on trade during the interwar years. In contrast to the above
work, however, this stream of literature analyses the fall in trade as a consequence of the De-
pression, not as a contributing factor. It will thus be discussed in detail at a later point in this
thesis.
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specific countries, the analyses of trade costs, and business cycle comovement.
The academic discourse in the 1930s offers both, theoretical and empirical ev-
idence on the role of trade for the Great Depression. On the theoretical side,
Harrod (1933) highlighted the role of trade for short-term business fluctuations
by introducing the concept of a trade multiplier. Neither, the conceptual under-
pinning nor the timing of Harrod’s work can be thought of as coincidental. He
certainly was heavily influenced by Keynes, whom he had met at Cambridge and
who would bring the multiplier concept to economics a few years later through
his General Theory. Moreover, Harrod witnessed the largest fall in trade during his
lifetime while writing his book on international economics. Discussions about the
trade multiplier concept continued and included well-known economists such as
Stolper (1947). The discourse about the role of trade for business cycle fluctua-
tions was not limited to theory. The work by Polak (1939) can be thought of as a
precursor to the modern business cycle comovement literature. Polak analysed
correlations of business cycles across countries and concluded that two factors
spread the Great Depression: trade and the fixed exchange rate regime. A closer
look at the academic discourse of the 1930s suggests that researchers attached
importance to the trade channel.
Contemporary newspapers perfectly mirror this view. The universe of finan-
cial newspapers is large and, back then as today, the news cycle was tainted by
short-term developments. Yet, there are some exceptions to this rule. The editori-
als and yearly supplements of The Economist often take a more long-run view and
are thus an indispensable source. In particular, the Commercial History & Review,
typically published in the beginning of February, provides an overview of the
economic development in the previous year not only for Britain but for a large
number of countries. Especially for small countries, the lack of foreign demand
frequently features explanations for the dire economic situation throughout the
1930s.26 Reports from contemporary newspaper correspondents support the no-
tion that trade linkages mattered for the global spread of the crisis.
Likewise, one cannot avoid this impression when studying the abundant
country-specific narratives of the interwar period. If we look beyond the United
States and other large economies of the time, the importance ascribed to exter-
nal forces increases dramatically.27 Typically, country-specific studies of small
26See, for example, the 1932 report for Norway (The Economist, 1933a, p. 23). At this point, and
given the nature of an introduction, no attempt is made to provide full references that led to my
impression from these reports (The Economist, 1930, 1931b, 1932a, 1933a, 1934, 1935).
27Much of the historiography of the Great Depression focuses on the United States. In the
United States, contagion through trade could not have played an important role simply because
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economies historicise the Great Depression around the question to what extent
the downturn was driven by external macroeconomic forces. The study by Valen-
tine (1987) on Australia is a prime example of such framing, but it is a recurrent
theme (see e.g. Safarian, 1959, for Canada).28 If, at least in parts, the recession
was external for these countries, investigating the trade channel as one of the
three external forces cited above is important.
The modern economic history and economics literatures provide two addi-
tional reasons to investigate the effect of trade on income during economic crises.
Firstly, the late 1920s and early 1930s were marked by ever increasing tariffs.
Based on earlier work (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010), Irwin (2012) provides an
authoritative treatment of commercial policy during this period. The presented
narrative focuses on the role of the gold standard for higher tariffs, but in his ear-
lier work Irwin (1993b) also highlights the advent of “pernicious bilateralism.”
Discrete beggar-my-neighbour policies led to unprecedented protectionism. In-
deed, more technical studies by Madsen (2001) and Jacks et al. (2011) have high-
lighted that much of the trade bust during this period was driven by commercial
policies. If trade matters for income as conventional wisdom holds,29 its demise
could have spread the Great Depression around the world.30 Secondly, a final
clue emanates from a strand of literature that is not particularly focused on the
interwar period. The fact that trade integration leads to higher business cycle co-
movement has transformed from a striking empirical finding (Frankel and Rose,
1998) to conventional wisdom in the business cycle literature (Baxter and Koupar-
itsas, 2005).31 More recently, Mathy and Meissner (2011) have confirmed this gen-
eral finding for the interwar period: stronger trade ties led to higher comovement.
Even if we abstract from definitional and technical issues that plague studies of
exports were such a small part of GDP (Romer, 1993). For Germany, the debt problem takes the
centre stage (Ritschl, 2002).
28The value of such case studies, either in book or article form, also becomes apparent when
reassessing conventional wisdom. Choudhri and Kochin (1980) had posited that Spain never ex-
perienced a Depression to make the point that it was solely the gold standard that drove countries
into recession. This statement has developed quite a legacy in the historiography (see e.g. Temin,
1993). However, the new GDP estimates by Prados de la Escosura (2016) prove this point wrong,
and indeed, the work presented in this thesis will substantiate this impression.
29See, for example, Donaldson (2015), who provides a concise and illuminating review of the
gains from trade literature.
30As Irwin (2012) points out, the question of how much the erection of trade barriers or the fall
in trade more generally affected incomes is never really confronted even though often implicitly
discussed. This is certainly a fair assessment of the literature. Irwin himself provides a back-
of-the-envelope calculation to tackle this question. Other exceptions to the rule are discussed in
Chapter 3.
31This result is not limited to GDP comovement. Likewise, trade links have been found to be
important in spreading currency crises in post-war cross-country studies (Glick and Rose, 1999).
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bilateral cross-country correlations (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) and potential en-
dogeneity issues, this literature suffers from a severe caveat regarding its metric.
It is difficult to interpret the predicted increase in comovement as measured by
the correlation coefficient in a manner that allows us to draw wider conclusions.
What this type of research provides evidence for, however, is that trade linkages
propagate economic crises more generally and that they did so in the case of the
Great Depression in particular.
In sum, the importance of financial and monetary linkages for propelling the
Great Depression is well-established. However, evidence on the trade channel
is much scarcer. Using back-of-the-envelope calculations, Grossman and Meiss-
ner (2010) and Irwin (2012) discuss to what extent the fall of global trade was
a consequence and cause of the Depression. The more indirect evidence cited
above corroborates the potential relevance of the trade channel. Given these in-
dications, the first part of the thesis aims to provide a thorough investigation of
the importance of trade for spreading the Great Depression. Two ingredients are
needed for this analysis. Chapter 2 provides a novel macroeconomic dataset for
the interwar period, which includes estimates of monthly economic activity in-
dices for 28 countries. Unlike existing datasets, it thus provides a large number of
data points in the cross-sectional and time-series dimension. Based on these new
data, Chapter 3 introduces a, to the best of my knowledge, novel empirical strat-
egy to explore the power of the trade channel. The results emanating from these
chapters suggest that the trade channel was more important than reflected in the
historiography. It thus serves as a complementary explanation for the transmis-
sion of the Great Depression.32 If so, studying trade policies (Chapter 4) and
costs (Chapter 5) is imperative. The concluding chapter will tie the first and sec-
ond part of this thesis together by speculating about the role of protectionism for
the global fall of incomes. Before beginning the analysis, however, it is useful to
ask a historiographic question. If the assertions about the literature above and
the evidence presented in this thesis are warranted, why is there relatively little
evidence on the trade channel? The following section of this introduction argues
that this paucity can be understood in light of the historiography’s evolution and
the computational constraints of the past.
32By no means do the results imply that the trade channel is a substitute explanation for the
monetary and financial channels of the Great Depression. It is not useful to think of these channels
as competing or as Eichengreen and Mitchener (2004) put it in a more general context: “a horse-
race is not the appropriate context in which to assess theories of the Great Depression.”
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1.2 Research on the Great Depression - A Method-
ological Perspective
The historiography of the Great Depression is rich, diverse, and not easily sum-
marised. Instead of attempting to provide a comprehensive review of the litera-
ture,33 the following section focuses on how the empirics of the Great Depression
have evolved over time in terms of geographical scope, data, and methodology.34
It highlights, how the recent relaxation of computational constraints has opened
up new avenues to analyse the transmission of the Great Depression.
FIGURE 1.2: Research on the Great Depression by methodology &
data type
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Note: Modified version of Albers (2013).
Figure 1.2 identifies four important waves of empirical research. In prac-
tice, these waves blend into each other and each of them had more qualitative
33Such attempt would be unlikely to add anything to the excellent existing literature reviews.
To get a balanced view of the historiography of the Great Depression, the following set of reviews
is worthwhile reading: Kindleberger’s (1986) introductory and concluding chapter on mono-
causal versus multi-causal explanations with brief references to the large interpretations, the sen-
sible review by Eichengreen (2004) on linking the national and international spheres, and the first
two Chapters of Crafts and Fearon (2013b) as a review with references to the recent crisis. For a
neoclassical perspective, see Ohanian’s (2017) review of Eichengreen’s (2014) “Hall of Mirrors.”
To avoid repetition, I will review the trade literature on the Great Depression in the respective
chapters. For an extensive and excellent review of the existing material on trade during the Great
Depression, see Irwin (2012).
34This classification draws heavily on my unpublished Master thesis submitted to the Univer-
sity of Münster in 2013. I have, however, modified the graph and text to such an extent that this
reference to my earlier work shall not imply that it is a mere restatement.
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harbingers.35 Among the four waves, the Gold Standard Literature is certainly the
most dominant interpretation of the Great Depression nowadays. Much of what
the Contemporary Literature explored has been embedded in the Gold Standard Lit-
erature and the US Depression Literature. The same holds true for the empirical
Transmission Literature, which is, as I shall argue, still in its infancy. Before we
tie the threads together, however, it is worthwhile to look at each of the waves
separately.
The Contemporary Literature focused on the causes of the Depression in small
and large countries. Many authors focused on single countries, in particular the
United States, Britain, and Germany. However, there were also comparative con-
tributions. For example, Lester (1937) compared the recessions in the mid-1920s
and 1930s across Scandinavia. Furthermore, he contextualised the Norwegian
and Danish experience with that of other countries. Beyond such regional ap-
proaches, a truly comparative business cycle literature emerged. The work by
Burns and Mitchell (1946) on the United States, France, Germany, and Great
Britain provided a start. With a strong emphasis on the 1920s, Wagemann (1931)
provides a comparative perspective on business cycles in the industrial and in-
dustrialising world. Beyond the business cycle literature, significant attempts
were undertaken to understand the Depression in its international context and
significance. By using averaged indices of industrial production, Strakosch (1935)
compared the recoveries from the Depression between countries that stayed on
the gold standard and those who left. Polak (1939) even used correlation analysis
and conjectured that the crisis spread through fixed exchange rates and the lack
of foreign demand. Finally, Lewis’ (1949) analysis of the relevance of World War I
as well as Ohlin’s (1931) and Nurkse’s (1944) work for the League of Nations con-
stitute prime examples of early comparative analyses of the Great Depression.
According to Eichengreen (2004), the Gold Standard Literature was preceded
by the US Depression Literature. The unifying feature of this wave of literature is
its focus on the crisis in the United States. In their seminal work “A monetary
history of the United States,” Friedman and Schwartz (1963) provide a monetary
interpretation of the Depression. They draw the picture of the American mone-
tary policy failure by employing the historical narrative, analysing the key play-
ers, and by employing descriptive statistics. Temin’s (1976) early work provides
35Moreover and inevitably, this focus on methodology in combination with a timeline will lead
to some serious thematic omissions. Illuminating research focusing on the US Depression con-
tinues until this day. Romer’s (1993) work on the magnitude of the US shock and the work by
Mitchener and Richardson (forthcoming) on banking are only two of many notable examples.
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the Keynesian antithesis, arguing that an autonomous fall in consumption caused
the variation in the money supply and ultimately the Depression. As opposing as
these views are, they have two common features. They focus almost exclusively
on the domestic economy and policies of the United States (Eichengreen, 2004)
and they broadly share the same methodology.36 Research existed on countries
outside of the United States, but was usually no less nationally focused. In some
of these contributions, the seeds of the cliometric revolution became visible.37 At
the same time, economic historians had started to historicise national experiences
during the Depression. Like Friedman and Schwartz, they would use simple de-
scriptive statistics and the historical narrative to sketch the evolution of the crisis
in the respective country or region.38 Naturally, the comparative element was
stronger than for the US-centred contributions. As mentioned above, the role of
internal versus external factors is a recurrent theme in such histories. Yet, it took
Kindleberger’s (1986) work as a harbinger of the Gold Standard Literature to shift
the focus of the literature back to the international dimension of the crisis.
The Gold Standard Literature pioneered the understanding of the Great De-
pression from a thematic and methodological point of view. Eichengreen’s (1992)
authoritative treatment of the international dimension of the crisis and the role of
the gold standard soon became a reference work of the Great Depression. While
Golden Fetters employs a statistical narrative using descriptive statistics in the
fashion of Friedman and Schwartz, many studies of this wave of research re-
lied on cross-country regressions (Choudhri and Kochin, 1980; Eichengreen and
Sachs, 1985; Campa, 1990; Temin, 1991). Independent of the precise statistical
approach, shifting the focus from one to many countries improved the “ability
to identify — in the strict econometric sense — the forces responsible for the
world depression” (Bernanke, 1995, p. 2). The use of cross-sectional regressions
and later panel approaches became popular in macroeconomics around the same
time. The new technological possibilities enabled researchers of the Gold Stan-
dard Literature to run cross-country regressions and thus illuminate statistical re-
lationships at a much-reduced cost. In contrast to other fields in macroeconomics,
36Unlike Friedman and Schwartz, Temin includes some regression analysis in his work.
37A good example of this is the work by Benjamin and Kochin (1979) on unemployment in
interwar Britain, which tries to make the argument that unemployment was high because of un-
employment benefits. Eichengreen (1987) has largely refuted this general claim with much better
data.
38For example, see Safarian (1959) for Canada, Drummond (1972) for the British Empire, and
Raupach (1972) for Eastern Europe.
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this new freedom was used with care.39 Not only does theory im- or explicitly
guide the gold standard view of the Great Depression,40 but non-historians such
as Bernanke contributing to this literature do get the history right.41 The success
of the Gold Standard Literature as reflected in its importance for modern macroe-
conomics and its dominance as an interpretation of the Great Depression thus
demonstrates the power of the Schumpeterian triangle. Yet, it is not the end of
historiography.
For the succeeding empirical Transmission Literature, Temin’s (1993) influen-
tial article on the transmission of the Great Depression set the stage. Temin ar-
gues that both the gold standard orthodoxy and financial interlinkages spread
the crisis. The Transmission Literature is thus different from the Gold Standard Lit-
erature because it shifts the focus towards direct interlinkages and away from
the “gold orthodoxy.” This view paved the way for a literature that analyses
micro-data on portfolios of central banks and private entities as well as interna-
tional lending more generally to better understand the pathology of financial and
currency crises (Accominotti, 2009, 2012b; Accominotti and Eichengreen, 2016;
Macher, forthcoming; Accominotti, forthcoming). For these purposes, unlike for
the second stream of the Transmission Literature, annual data is often sufficient.
This second stream of literature started to evolve recently. It rests on the
premise that high frequency data is useful to analyse the propagation of crises
for three reasons. Firstly, it easier to account for — or perhaps even abstract from
— feedback effects when using high frequency data. Secondly, more data points
simply provide more variation. As the Great Depression happened in a relatively
short amount of time, high frequency data makes it easier to identify statistical
relationships. Finally, the quality of the variation matters. The summation of data
from monthly or quarterly to annual frequency compresses the variation in time
series data. This can make it challenging to draw inferences for the transmission
of crises.42 In contrast, the time series and cross-country variation inherent in
high frequency panel data has enabled researchers to bring new evidence to old
39In hindsight, the first-generation cross-country growth literature (see Durlauf and Quah,
1999, for a review) presents the opposite case. In the light of the second-generation growth liter-
ature following Acemoglu et al. (2001), much of the earlier work now appears questionable. The
“robust evidence” from the “two million regressions” paper by Sala-I-Martin (1997) serves as the
case in point.
40See, for example, Eichengreen and Sachs (1986) for an explicit theoretical contribution.
41They do so by either informing their work by Eichengreen’s Golden Fetters (see e.g. Bernanke,
1995, for a good example) or joining forces with historians (Bernanke and James, 1991).
42 This was already pointed out by Burns and Mitchell (1946). See Chapter 2 for details and
further references.
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questions and to ask new ones (Mathy and Meissner, 2011; Accominotti, 2012a;
Ritschl and Sarferaz, 2014; Mitchener and Wandschneider, 2015).
While this line of inquiry has produced illuminating results, it is still in its
infancy. The reason is technology. Prior to the advances in computing, large
amounts of data could only be processed in specialised facilities. In consequence,
one could simply not exploit the variation of monthly or quarterly panel data
to analyse the transmission of the Great Depression and thus few such datasets
exist. Chapter 2 shall discuss the shortcomings of the existing materials and pro-
vide a new foundation for research on the transmission of the Great Depression –
The Interwar Macroeconomic Dataset. Perhaps contrary to what one might expect,
the interwar period is a data-rich rather than data-scarce research environment.
Chapter 3 aims to contribute directly to this literature by analysing the trade chan-
nel.
It is only in recent years, that the technological revolution in computing has
made the macroeconometric approach workable. Researchers can now analyse
large datasets much more easily. In many ways, such datasets have the poten-
tial to refine our view of the Great Depression by empirically pulling the threads
together from all waves of research. They can be employed to assess the interna-
tional importance of the American (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Romer, 1993)
and German (Ritschl, 2002) Depressions relative to the systemic forces proposed
by the Gold Standard Literature. Equally important, they will enable researchers to
place case studies in a wider context more easily, thus avoiding the trap of finding
exceptionalism everywhere. Most importantly, however, they provide the foun-
dation to analyse interlinkages in a quantitative manner. While the Contemporary
Literature and Gold Standard Literature are comparative too, the new element of
the Transmission Literature is to analyse the interlinkages rather than comparing
the outcomes.
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1.3 Contribution & Methodology
The previous parts of this chapter make the case for studying the Great Depres-
sion from a trade perspective and place this thesis in the historiography. It is
now time to shift the focus from the motivations to the findings. The following
paragraphs shall highlight the contribution of each chapter, which I aim to make
to deepen our understanding of the Great Depression. As outlined above, eco-
nomic history provides a variety of tools, five of which I employ in this thesis:
the (i) power of data, (ii) Identification from history, (iii) Resurrecting old, but relevant
concepts, the (iv) case study, and the (v) time lapse.
Chapter 2: A New Dataset for Research on the Depression
The methodological review of the empirical Great Depression literature above
reveals that research on the transmission of the Great Depression requires high-
frequency data. Highlighting the (i) power of data, Chapter 2 sets out to provide a
large novel dataset on the Great Depression – The Interwar Macroeconomic Dataset.
Beyond collecting and documenting more than 1,000 monthly macroeconomic
time series, it provides monthly economic activity indices for 28 countries from all
continents. While the chapter focuses mainly on the estimation of the indices and
provides descriptive statistics, the value of the high-frequency data becomes ap-
parent immediately. Burns and Mitchell (1946) had posited that high-frequency
data is necessary to analyse the length and depth of recessions as annual data will
flatten the amplitude and may even hide smaller recessions. Chapter 2 will show
that this is the case indeed. Analysing the prelude to the Great Depression, the
novel economic activity indices reveal that steady growth was far from universal
even in the second half of the 1920s. Unlike an analysis based on annual data
would suggest, two thirds of a sample of 28 countries suffered severe or mild
recessions: Monetary and financial instability, agricultural crises, and labour con-
flict, often related to the direct or indirect consequences of World War I, continued
to plague economies around the globe.
Beyond showing that economic instability was widespread throughout the
1920s, the chapter illustrates the (i) power of data in an explorative manner. The
high frequency of the data facilitates a more sensible global comparison of the
severity of the Great Depression than annual data would do. Specifically, the
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chapter analyses the cumulative loss and duration of the Great Depression. Fig-
ure 1.3 illustrates the variation along these dimensions of the crisis. The cumu-
lative loss is defined as the annual peak-GDPs lost in a period of six years. The
duration of the Depression is defined as the percentage of months in recession
during the same period.
Cumul. Loss in GDP-Multiples
Gain
0.02 - 0.22
0.23 - 0.51
0.52 - 0.70
0.71 - 0.89
0.90 - 1.32
a) Cumulative loss, 6 years into crisis (multiples of peak-GDP p.c.)
Percentage of Months in Recession
22% - 32%
33% - 45%
46% - 49%
50% - 56%
57% - 64%
65% - 81%
b) Percentage of months in recession, 6 years into crisis
FIGURE 1.3: Mapping the severity of the Great Depression
Note: See Chapter 2 for details. In particular, see Table A2.1 in Appendix 2A.8. I thank Peter
Groote (Groningen) for providing me with a shapefile with 1930 boundaries.
What emerges from these maps is a geographical pattern that would be con-
sistent with the view that trade played an important role for spreading the De-
pression. Not only does the cumulative loss exhibit strong patterns of spatial au-
tocorrelation, but the same holds largely true for the duration of the Depression.
While Chapter 2 highlights the potential relevance of the trade channel, Chapter
3 takes this hypothesis to the test.
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Chapter 3: Resurrecting the Trade Multiplier
Beyond the (i) power of data, Chapter 3 employs two further tools from the eco-
nomic historian’s paint box: (ii) Identification from history and (iii) Resurrecting
old, but relevant concepts. The chapter constitutes the first attempt to analyse the
role of the trade multiplier in spreading the Depression in a strictly causal man-
ner. Moreover, it resurrects the concept of the trade multiplier for the analysis
of short-run macroeconomic fluctuations. Contemporaries such as Polak (1939)
were convinced that trade propagated the crisis. Harrod had posited the concept
of a trade multiplier akin to its fiscal counterpart in 1933. Yet, the concept of the
trade multiplier has largely vanished from economics and the economic history
discourse.43 The results of the inquiry render this circumstance unfortunate. The
trade multiplier is large and thus can explain substantial parts of the initial down-
turn in small open economies. If it was not for the fall in export demand, some
of these countries would not have suffered a downturn in the initial phase of the
Depression at all.
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FIGURE 1.4: Varying exposure to foreign demand shocks
Notes: Own calculation. See Chapter 3 for details.
How can we identify the impact of a fall in exports on national income? What
is ultimately needed is an exogenous variation in exports. History can provide
just that. Small countries traded to different degrees with large countries due to
geographical proximity and historical links such as colonial ties. The Great De-
pression evolved differently across the three largest global importers: Germany,
Great Britain, and the United States. Because of the variation in pre-Depression
43There are some notable exceptions that are discussed in the chapter.
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trade links, or more precisely, the varying proportions of exports to Germany,
Great Britain, and the United States, small open economies were exposed to vary-
ing shocks in foreign demand. Figure 1.4 illustrates precisely this variation. It
weighs the quarterly per capita GDP of the three big importers by their respec-
tive share in the export markets of Czechoslovakia, Mexico, and New Zealand.
As a baseline, the “synthetic country” simulates a small country that would trade
to the same degree with the three large ones. The magnitude of the shock can
be thought of as the deviation from the synthetic country. The shocks in foreign
demand were relevant for the export sector of small open economies. The differ-
ential in this shock allows me to causally estimate the magnitude of the foreign
trade multiplier. I find the multiplier to be at least .7. Given the disastrous fall in
trade, this multiplier is large enough to explain significant parts of the beginning
of the Great Depression in small open economies.
If the loss of export markets mattered so much for small open economies,
then investigating trade policies and trade frictions is important. Ultimately, this
could allow us to speculate about the role of protectionism for the depth of the
Depression. Chapter 4 offers a qualitative and quantitative inquiry into retalia-
tory commercial policies, a form of protectionism so emblematic for the interwar
period.
Chapter 4: The Commercial Policy Case - Currency Devaluations
and Beggar-my-neighbour penalties
While Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) had initially cautioned against an unqual-
ified benevolent assessment of the devaluations because of their beggar-my-
neighbour character, the subsequent literature has almost exclusively highlighted
the positive reflationary element for the devaluing countries (see e.g. Campa,
1990; Bernanke, 1995). This might have led to the impression that unilateral cur-
rency devaluations such as those of the 1930s are not costly. However, an im-
portant externality of the currency depreciations in 1931 has not been adequately
accounted for in the cliometric literature. As a (iv) case study of their effect on
commercial policy, Chapter 4 explores their political and economic costs.
In particular, it analyses the importance of the retaliatory motive in the im-
position of trade barriers by gold bloc countries in response to the deprecia-
tions abroad. Demonstrating the (i) power of data, it relies on an existing dataset
on trade costs, and newly compiled ones for Swiss quotas and French tariffs.
These data and the fact that the foreign exit from gold was exogenous to the gold
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bloc countries’ commercial policies allow me to distinguish discriminatory from
general trade cost increases. With (ii) Identification from history, I can thus anal-
yse the absolute and relative importance of discriminatory commercial policies,
which are henceforth referred to as beggar-my-neighbour penalties. The penal-
ties’ magnitude in ad valorem equivalent terms was similar to the tariff reduc-
tions achieved by modern trade treaties such as NAFTA — just with the opposite
sign. According to a back-of-the-envelope calculation, the corresponding effects
on trade were large in absolute and relative terms. The quantitative results thus
indicate that the unilateral currency depreciations came at a high price in eco-
nomic terms.
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FIGURE 1.5: The rhetoric of retaliation
Source: Own calculation from the Manchester Guardian digital archive by ProQuest.
Notes: See Chapter 4 for details.
As such quantitative analysis would fall short to capture the disruption
caused in the commercial policy environment, Chapter 4 also analyses contem-
porary newspaper articles. These allow me to trace the escalation of retaliatory
commercial policies for the Anglo-French commercial relationship. Following the
devaluations, the rhetoric of economic nationalism soon replaced initial leniency
and international understanding. Ultimately, this led to a poisonous tit-for-tat
of retaliatory measures. Figure 1.5 highlights this narrative in a tractable man-
ner. It plots the annual frequency of keywords relating to retaliatory phrases and
tariffs in the Manchester Guardian. Confirming the more detailed analysis of the
newspapers, the coincidence of the peak of retaliatory rhetoric with the wave of
devaluations in late 1931 suggests that the unilateral currency devaluations came
at a high political price.
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The contribution of this chapter is thus twofold. Firstly, it provides a com-
plementary explanation for the rapid rise of protectionism during the 1930s by
highlighting the political economy implications of the devaluations and retal-
iatory tariffs. Secondly, it demonstrates the economic value of cooperation by
showing the cost of non-cooperation. The devaluations were a success for the
countries depreciating and a key to recovery. However, their unilateral nature
imposed large costs on the non-devaluing countries and the commercial policy
environment more generally. The corresponding magnitude of the gap between
the potential benefits to the world as a whole44 and the realised ones thus implies
that the currency depreciations were a success and failure at the same time. While
there might not have been an alternative to their unilateral nature in the 1930s,
this may not hold true for other policy environments in different times.
Chapter 5: Solving Modern Puzzles with Historical Insights
Chapter 5 showcases the final tool from the economic historian’s paint box: the
(v) time lapse. The so-called distance puzzle of international trade has attracted
much attention in the trade literature. Replicating the core finding by Disdier
and Head (2008), Figure 1.7b) summarises its essence. Despite globalisation and
falling transport costs, the sensitivity of trade to distance has increased during
the post-war period.
One way to resolve this puzzle is the following: The distance elasticity mea-
sures the relative rather than absolute importance of distance for international
trade.45 As the fetters of trade put in place during and before the war were slowly
unravelled in the post-war period, distance regained its importance for interna-
tional trade. While transport costs might have fallen, the tariff barriers did so
much faster, resulting in a relative increase in the importance of distance.
If we want to test this proposition, we can employ the (v) time lapse. Chap-
ter 5 analyses the distance elasticity throughout the interwar period. If the above
hypothesis is true, we would expect a reverse distance puzzle in the interwar pe-
riod: As policymakers quickly erected tariff walls, distance should have become
less of an obstacle to trade. This is precisely what happened to European trade as
Figure 1.7a) illustrates: The elasticity of trade with respect to distance decreases
in absolute terms. Interestingly, the magnitudes of the interwar and post-war dis-
tance puzzle as measured by the distance elasticity are very comparable. Because
44As outlined by Eichengreen and Sachs (1985, 1986).
45See also Yotov (2012).
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FIGURE 1.6: The distance puzzle in the short- and long-run
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Note: For details on and sources of Figure 1.7a), see Chapter 5. The data for Figure 1.7b) is from
Head and Mayer (2014) and illustrates the main graph & finding in Disdier and Head (2008). The
solid line is the Lowess curve. Outliers with an elasticity smaller than -3 are excluded to improve
expositional clarity.
tariffs are much faster imposed than unravelled, the (v) time lapse facilitates the
assessment of the relative importance of tariffs and distance for trade.
To back up this prima facie evidence, the chapter seeks micro-level evidence.
After deriving an import demand function to demonstrate the mechanism and to
explore a potential empirical setup, Chapter 5 employs once again (ii) Identifica-
tion from history and the (i) power of data to causally test the proposed mechanism.
While protectionism was widespread, some countries refrained from changing
their tariff codes and instituting quotas in the initial phases of the Depression.
Despite not making any legal changes, Swiss tariffs increased in this period. This
was due to the fact that, unlike today, virtually all tariffs were of specific rather
than ad valorem nature. As a small country Switzerland could not influence
world prices, but the world price levels would exogenously change the effec-
tive protection expressed in ad valorem terms. Employing a novel good-level
dataset allows me to estimate good-specific distance elasticities and analyse how
much they were influenced by tariff changes. I find substantial evidence for the
proposed channel.
Beyond aiming to solve a prominent puzzle in the trade literature, Chapter 5
highlights that it were political trade barriers, not transport costs, that drove the
trade bust associated with the Great Depression.
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1.4 Overall Contribution of the Thesis
This thesis is composed of four stand-alone chapters. By emphasising the role
of trade for the transmission of the Great Depression, the first two chapters con-
tribute to a better understanding of the global nature of the crisis, the interactions
between large and small economies, and the heterogeneity in the severity of the
Great Depression. Based on the premise that trade was important, the remaining
two chapters analyse the role of trade costs in the 1920s and 1930s. They con-
tribute to the trade and Great Depression literatures by qualitatively and quan-
titatively highlighting the costs associated with beggar-my-neighbour policies,
showing that political barriers were important for the fall of world trade during
this period, and analysing the effects of tariff increases on other trade frictions.
The conclusion pulls the threads together by providing a speculative estimate
of the impact of protectionism on incomes during the Great Depression. These
thematic contributions aside, the core contribution of this thesis lies in provid-
ing the economics and economic history research communities with a new data
foundation. These data might facilitate a new type of empirical research on the
transmission of the Great Depression. May they keep the Schumpeterian triangle
in mind and get the history right.
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1.5 Appendices
Appendix 1A Recession Statistics
1A.1 Measuring the Globality of Economic Crises
To operationalise condition (i) in statistical terms, let us define the global inci-
dence of recession GR in t as the proportion of the N countries in the sample that
experience negative growth as indicated by Ri,t.
GRt =
N=27
∑
i=1
Ri,t
/
N (1.1)
To operationalise condition (ii) in statistical terms, let us define the global busi-
ness cycle comovement ρWorldt as:
ρ¯Worldt =
N
∑
i
N
∑
j
ρij,t(CGDPi,t , CGDPj,t)
/
N(N − 1)
2
(1.2)
where CGDPi,t denotes the cyclical component of the logarithmised GDP in
moving window t for country i.46 The moving window of y years centred at year
t. If y = 5 as in the graphs in the main text, the correlation ρij,t(CGDPi,t , CGDPj,t)
of countries i and j is based on data points in t− 2, t− 1, t, t + 1, t + 2. The term
∑Ni ∑
N
j ρij,t describes the sum all off-diagonal elements in the lower triangle of
the correlation matrix ρt at time frame t, which has
N(N−1)
2 elements.
For illustrative purposes, the globality of economic crisis CGt can be sum-
marised as the product of the two measures:
CGt = ρ¯Worldt GRt (1.3)
46The cyclical component is isolated using the HP-filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) with the
parameter λ = 6.25. Using the CF-filter (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003) yields qualitatively
similar results.
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1A.2 Comparing Recessions
TABLE A1.1: COUNTRY RESULTS
Initial Downturn of..
Crisis Great Depression Great Recession All Other Recessions
Variable Length Depth Length Depth Number Length Depth
Unit Years Peak-Trough
Cum. Loss in %
Years Peak-Trough
Cum. Loss in %
Years Peak-Trough
Cum. Loss in %
Australia 5 -46 1 0 20 1.25
( 0.44 )
-5
( 8 )
Austria 4 -58 1 -4 17 1.71
( 1.49 )
-10
( 38 )
Belgium 4 -21 2 -3 15 1.07
( 0.26 )
-1
( 1 )
Brazil 3 -25 1 -1 25 1.56
( 0.71 )
-8
( 10 )
Canada 5 -95 2 -4 15 1.47
( 0.64 )
-5
( 4 )
Chile 3 -93 1 -3 24 1.33
( 0.70 )
-8
( 11 )
Colombia 2 -6 0 0 6 4.50
( 7.15 )
-18
( 36 )
Denmark 1 -4 2 -8 14 1.29
( 0.47 )
-2
( 2 )
Finland 3 -13 1 -9 12 2.08
( 1.44 )
-9
( 13 )
France 3 -30 2 -4 18 1.39
( 0.70 )
-4
( 3 )
Germany 4 -32 1 -5 12 1.33
( 0.65 )
-4
( 5 )
Greece 2 -12 6 -85 21 1.57
( 0.87 )
-10
( 15 )
Italy 2 -12 2 -9 13 1.54
( 0.78 )
-4
( 4 )
Japan 2 -18 2 -7 21 1.29
( 0.46 )
-3
( 3 )
Netherlands 6 -53 1 -4 15 1.40
( 0.51 )
-3
( 3 )
New Zealand 3 -38 2 -3 27 1.37
( 0.56 )
-7
( 7 )
Norway 1 -8 4 -13 14 1.36
( 0.63 )
-3
( 3 )
Peru 3 -59 0 0 19 1.79
( 1.08 )
-18
( 40 )
Portugal 1 -11 1 -3 21 1.62
( 0.74 )
-5
( 5 )
Spain 2 -15 6 -37 19 1.63
( 0.90 )
-11
( 19 )
Sri Lanka 3 -30 0 0 26 1.50
( 0.58 )
-6
( 7 )
Sweden 2 -9 2 -7 16 1.25
( 0.58 )
-3
( 3 )
Switzerland 3 -13 1 -3 23 1.43
( 0.66 )
-6
( 6 )
United Kingdom 2 -8 2 -8 14 1.93
( 1.07 )
-4
( 3 )
United States 4 -86 2 -6 22 1.27
( 0.46 )
-3
( 4 )
Uruguay 3 -75 0 0 26 1.62
( 0.94 )
-16
( 22 )
Venezuela 3 -12 2 -11 24 1.79
( 1.47 )
-14
( 22 )
Note: Own calculation. See above for methodology.
Underlying Data Source: Balanced 27 country sample 1870-2016 from the updated Maddison
database (Bolt et al., 2018).
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Chapter 2
The Prelude and Global Impact of
The Great Depression
Abstract
Based on a novel dataset of about 1150 time series, this study provides monthly
economic activity estimates for 28 countries during the Great Depression. Due to
their high frequency, the indices reveal that steady growth was far from universal
even in the second half of the 1920s. Monetary and financial instability, agricul-
tural crises, and labor conflict continued to plague economies around the globe.
The high frequency of the data also facilitates a global comparison of the severity
of the Great Depression along two dimensions: the cumulative loss and duration.
The variation along these two dimensions across and within countries indicates a
rising importance of the trade channel at the later stages of the crisis. Finally, the
study highlights promising avenues for future research on the Great Depression.
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2.1 Introduction
The Great Depression has served as a yardstick for the depth, speed and interna-
tional extent of all economic crises ever since the early 1930s. While a consensus
on the causes of the crisis has emerged, empirical research on its transmission is
far less developed.1 This incongruity is no coincidence. The absence of an ade-
quate monthly macroeconomic indicator has been a recurring hurdle for the latter
type of research. Such an indicator would be representative of the whole econ-
omy, would come at a monthly or quarterly frequency, and would be available
for a large number of countries. Yet, scholars find themselves in a trilemma as
the current state-of-the-art datasets fulfil at most two of these three requirements.
GDP per capita datasets covering many countries typically come at annual fre-
quency (e.g. Barro and Ursúa, 2010). Monthly panel-datasets are available for
the industrial sector only (e.g. Mitchener and Wandschneider, 2015). Finally, at-
tempts to estimate quarterly and monthly GDP have been limited to the United
Kingdom (Hayes and Turner, 2007; Mitchell et al., 2012), the United States (Balke
and Gordon, 1986), and Germany (Ritschl, 2002). To break this data trilemma, I
draw on a novel dataset encompassing 1149 macroeconomic time series to esti-
mate monthly economic activity indices for 28 countries.
The new economic activity indices are superior to the commonly employed
industrial production indices for three reasons. Firstly, industrialisation levels
were still low in most countries during the interwar period and thus the focus on
the industrial sector might be misleading.2 Secondly, a closer look at the existing
monthly and annual industrial production indices reveals that the statistical ca-
pacity to collect and aggregate data for such indices varied substantially across
countries.3 Finally, Rodrik (2013) and Bénétrix et al. (2015) provide evidence for
unconditional convergence in the industrial sector. This relationship was present
in the interwar period, inherently leading to higher growth rates in this sector in
1For the pivotal role of the gold standard, see for example Eichengreen (1992) and Bernanke
(1995). See Romer (1993) on the Depression in the United States. For two examples of research on
the transmission from a time series perspective, see Mathy and Meissner (2011) and Ritschl and
Sarferaz (2014).
2See Bairoch (1982) for estimates of industrial production per capita and Statistisches Reich-
samt (1936) for industrial employment shares.
3See League of Nations (1933b, p. 157) and League of Nations (1945, p. 144f) for an overview
about the methodologies across countries. For example, the Japanese monthly industrial produc-
tion index is an unweighted average of eight series, whereas the German one contains 60 series
weighted by employment.
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less industrialised countries.4 Naturally, this caveat particularly cautions against
the use of industrial production as a proxy for GDP, especially when comparing
recessions in a cross-sectional manner (such as in Choudhri and Kochin, 1980;
Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985; Romer, 1993). Due to the mechanical “conver-
gence bias,” less industrialised countries would appear to enter the crisis later,
to start the recovery earlier, and to experience less severe crises.5 As a remedy
for these problems, this study offers a new set of monthly economic activity es-
timates building on the long tradition of business cycle research emanating from
the period and carrying importance through to today (Burns and Mitchell, 1946;
Stock and Watson, 1989). The relatively simple algorithm presented here mar-
ries a composite economic indicator based on a large number of high-frequency
(monthly) economic variables with the trend and variance of low-frequency (an-
nual) GDP per capita data.
The broad geographical coverage and the high-frequency nature of the result-
ing indices, interpretable in levels and comparable across countries, make the
reassessment of the prelude and extent of the Great Depression a worthwhile en-
deavour. It allows me to draw new conclusions and highlight promising avenues
for future research. Typically, the second half of the 1920s is thought of as a pe-
riod of growth, which kept the unsolved problems related to the massive social,
political and economic changes after the Great War beneath the surface (Lewis,
1949; Kindleberger, 1986). However, the higher frequency of the data makes it
possible to unearth recessions otherwise hidden in annual summation. In fact,
two thirds of the economies in the sample experienced recessions in the period
1926–1928. They were plagued by labor unrest, agricultural crises, and financial
and currency instability. The problems described by Lewis had thus never really
disappeared from the surface.
While widespread, the recessions of the second half of the 1920s were typi-
cally short. Rarely did they spill over to other countries. In contrast, the onset of
the Great Depression was very synchronised and caught up to most countries in
1929. No country, not even Spain, as frequently suggested (Choudhri and Kochin,
4See Figure A2.1 in Appendix 2A.1. In contrast, GDP data does not suffer from this property
during this or any other period (Roses and Wolf, 2010; Rodrik, 2013).
5Furthermore, macroeconomic policy choices are likely to be correlated with development,
which could result in misleading correlations. For example, Meissner (2005) shows that the adop-
tion of the gold standard was a function of economic development in the classical gold standard
period. This is not to question the finding that gold standard adherence was an important predic-
tor for the depth of the Great Depression. Indeed, a number of panel studies confirmed the initial
result by Eichengreen and Sachs (Bernanke, 1995; Mitchener and Wandschneider, 2015).
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1980; Temin, 1993), could escape the Depression. The high frequency of the in-
dices also allows me to make a sensible comparison of the severity of the Great
Depression along two dimensions: the cumulative loss and duration. Interest-
ingly, a number of countries experienced relatively prolonged recessions without
them being as deep as the Canadian or American ones. This finding coupled with
the global geography of the Depression suggests an important role of the trade
channel, which has drawn renewed interest in light of the Great Recession (see
e.g. Grossman and Meissner, 2010). While the precise identification of the magni-
tude of effect of trade destruction on income goes beyond the scope of this study,
these observations call for a closer analysis of this channel.
This study contributes to the literature of the Great Depression by uncovering
the recessions of the second half of the 1920s and by highlighting the role of the
trade channel. Beyond these findings, the new interwar macroeconomic dataset
will facilitate further research on the transmission of the Great Depression. The
cross-country coverage of annual economic indicators has greatly improved since
the beginnings of the “gold standard” literature. Campa (1990) added ten Latin
American countries to the original sample by Eichengreen and Sachs (1985).
Bernanke (1995) employs a dataset of up to 26 countries in his panel regressions.
Yet the annual frequency of the datasets underlying these studies makes it dif-
ficult to assess the transmission of the Great Depression from a time series per-
spective. Recent research, relying on the limited amount of high-frequency cross-
country data available, has illustrated the potential of such data to settle open
questions and analyse channels of transmission (see e.g. Wolf, 2008; Mathy and
Meissner, 2011; Ritschl and Sarferaz, 2014; Mitchener and Wandschneider, 2015).
The data presented in this study lays the foundation to develop this research fur-
ther by providing high-frequency data for a large number of countries.
The remainder of the paper first introduces the disaggregated dataset, the ag-
gregation method and economic activity indices. It then discusses the prelude,
scale, and extent of the Great Depression. The final section highlights promising
avenues for future research.
2.2 The Interwar Macroeconomic Dataset
While qualitative business cycle chronologies, theoretical explanations for the
movement of the economy, and rudimentary empirical work already existed at
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the end of the 19th century,6 World War I was a watershed moment for business
cycle research. To create business cycle chronologies, Burns and Mitchell (1946)
pioneered empirical business cycle research by rigorously applying basic statis-
tical methodology to a wide variety of series.7 Following the NBER’s efforts,
statistical offices around the world started to systematically collect and publish
business cycle data in an effort to “making the national economy measurable”
(Tooze, 1998, p. 220). This study builds on these developments in at least three
respects. The first part of this section describes the sources of the disaggregated
data underlying the study. The existence of these data is itself a product of the
increasing data collection efforts of the national and international statistical of-
fices of the time. The dataset consists of 1149 series for 28 countries covering the
period between 1925 and 1936.8 It thus provides about 150,000 data points for
future research to analyse the global spread and causes of the Great Depression.
The second part describes the algorithm for estimating indices of economic activ-
ity, a concept itself originating in the interwar period. The final part of the section
discusses the business cycle dating methodology, which can be traced back to the
seminal work of Burns and Mitchell.
2.2.1 The Raw Data
The new dataset is predominantly based on two compendia: the “Statistisches
Handbuch der Weltwirtschaft” by the Statistisches Reichsamt (1936, 1937) and
the “International Abstract of Economic Statistics” by the International Statistical
Institute (Tinbergen, 1934; Methorst, 1938), consisting of two volumes each.9 Both
organisations did not actually create new series, but gathered them from existing
sources such as national statistical offices, League of Nations publications, central
banks, periodicals such as The Economist, and other publications such as Lloyds
Register of Shipping. The editors of the compendia classified the series by broader
categories and, where necessary, documented them in great detail.10 Contempo-
raries praised the Handbuch for its coverage and accuracy (see e.g. Mitic, 1936).
6See for example Mitchell (1913).
7As early as 1927, Mitchell published an extensive monograph discussing business cycles and
setting the agenda for his collaborative work with Burns (Burns and Mitchell, 1946).
8For a few countries the period is shorter, but always covers the immediate run-up to the Great
Depression. Appendix 2A.13 documents the country coverage. All raw data as well as a detailed
appendix are made available online.
9In rare cases, data from country-specific sources were added as documented in the appendix.
10The editors made no attempts to gather the exact same set of series for every country. While
this comes at the cost of a varying coverage across countries, it precludes the possibility that they
estimated proxy series.
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Crosschecks with the original sources did not indicate any inaccuracies. In fact,
some data from this compendium had been used in previous research (Wolf, 2008;
Mitchener and Wandschneider, 2015), but the wealth of data has neither been
sourced nor made available in a digital format. The same holds true for the In-
ternational Abstract (see e.g. Eichengreen, 1982), for which Jan Tinbergen and later
Methorst gathered macroeconomic time series for the International Conference
of Economic Services in London in 1934 and the International Statistical Institute
in The Hague. The editors requested business cycle data from national agencies,
which were then published in the two volumes. Like for the Handbuch, cross-
checks with the statistical yearbooks of the respective countries revealed that the
series included in the International Abstract are the same as in the government
statistics. Both compendia provide a reliable and invaluable source for interwar
macroeconomic time series. They facilitate the estimation of monthly economic
activity indices for a total of 28 countries on six continents. In comparison to
the widely-used annual industrial production datasets (Campa, 1990; Bernanke,
1995), a potential caveat of the novel monthly dataset is the limited coverage for
the Latin American, Asian and African continents. Future research should aim to
improve the country coverage for these continents.
In terms of variables, the coverage of the interwar macroeconomic dataset
spans from bankruptcies to coal production, sales, interest rates, exports, and
unemployment figures. Details for each series such as the unit, source and, if ap-
plicable, minor adjustments are detailed in Appendix 2A.15. The data is perhaps
best described by the following two breakdowns. Of the 1149 time series, about
55 % are expressed in nominal terms such as the total amount of bank clearings
in British pounds. This leaves 45 % of the dataset as real variables such as the
number of unemployed adults and tons of steel exported. Another way to char-
acterise the data is to classify it by type: the group of production, consumption
and unemployment variables, the group of trade variables, and the group of vari-
ables related to money and banking make up about 30 % of the raw data each.
The remaining 10 % are price indices of all sorts.11 In the aggregate, the dataset is
thus quite balanced in terms of nominal and real variables and covers a wide va-
riety of economic sectors. In contrast, the number and nature of series recorded
by the national statistical agencies differed substantially. On average, there are
about 40 indicators available per country, ranging from 17 (Spain) to 127 (United
11For the estimation of the economic activity indices and to verify their robustness, all indicators
but the price indices are used. Nevertheless, I provide and document the latter as they could be
of interest for future research.
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States).
The efforts to collect macroeconomic data depended on the size of the country,
its economic structure, its administrative capacity, and perhaps a historical orien-
tation towards bureaucracy. Unfortunately, it is impossible to gather a large and
identical set of series for each country. This, however, should not deter us from
estimating economic activity indices. Each available series contains information
about the unobserved state of the economy. Robustness checks in previous stud-
ies on historical business cycles typically show that extending or truncating the
number of series has little influence on the final results (see e.g. Sarferaz and Ue-
bele, 2009; Ritschl et al., 2016). Appendix 2A.15 demonstrates that this study is no
exception to this rule by showing how little estimates for each country vary when
extending or truncating the number of indicator series used. Moreover, even if it
were possible, it is not clear to what extent having the exact same series for each
country would improve our ability to measure economic activity. For example,
in countries with low levels of industrialisation, the amount of machinery pro-
duced is not necessarily a meaningful indicator for the state of the economy. In
this sense and given the budget constraints of statistical offices, the fact that cer-
tain economic indicators were collected, and others not provides a contemporary
assessment of what were important determinants of economic activity.
While the robustness checks suggest that the varying number of indicators
collected is not a major concern for the validity of the results, varying adminis-
trative capacity across countries may influence the quality of the collected series
itself. It is certainly true that the level of sophistication of data collection var-
ied across country. For example, Norwegian statisticians would collect data on
bank clearings of banks in Oslo only, whereas the American ones would provide
data for banks in- and outside of New York. Furthermore, some statistical agen-
cies removed seasonal fluctuations from the data while others did not. Finally,
the precision with which the data were recorded might differ across countries.
Some of these concerns are mitigated by the statistical techniques applied in the
next section. For example, seasonal adjustment is performed for all series. Yet,
some differences in data quality may remain. An ad hoc solution to assess their
impact on the results of this study is to relate the outcome variables of interest
to a measure for administrative capacity. The total number of series collected
by country serves as a reasonable proxy for this variable: not only were more ad-
vanced statistical agencies better at collecting data, they would also simply collect
more data. Figure A2.12 in Appendix 2A.5 shows that no meaningful relation-
ship between this proxy for administrative capacity and the outcome variables
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of interest exists. While imperfect, this exercise suggests that even if differences
in data quality were to affect the results across countries, they would do so in a
non-systematic way.12
In sum, this study relies on a large set of macroeconomic data containing in-
formation about specific industries, sectors and prices for many countries. Future
research could capitalise on this wide coverage. As a starting point, however, this
study employs these data to estimate monthly economic activity indicators.
2.2.2 Estimating Economic Activity Indicators
While the estimation methodology has changed over time, the intellectual foun-
dations for the creation of economic activity indices lie in the interwar period.
After Mitchell (1919) had created the first industrial production index in the mod-
ern sense,13 statistical agencies around the world followed suit. Unsatisfied with
the narrowness of these indicators and the time lag of publication, American and
British companies and newspapers became engaged in measuring business ac-
tivity.14 They went beyond production numbers by including measures of unem-
ployment, financial activity, and internal trade. Their objective was “to indicate
the fluctuations in economic activity of the community as a whole” rather than in-
dustrial production only (Crowther, 1934, p. 242 & 243). In condensing the com-
mon movement of their parts through averaging, such indices aimed to approxi-
mate the unobserved state of the economy or the “reference cycle” as Burns and
Mitchell (1946) coined it.15 Soon, these indices gained recognition in academic
12I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this robustness check. The reader may be re-
minded that differences in data quality exist in all cross-country studies, be they modern or his-
torical. This is particularly true for the material underlying historical national accounts, which
are frequently used for cross-country GDP comparisons.
13He did so to distinguish real economic movements from the price fluctuations associated with
World War I (Betz, 1930, p. 288). In contrast, price indices date back to as early as the 18th century
(Mitchell, 1915, p. 6).
14 Crowther (1934, p. 245) provides details on American business activity indices provided
in the New York Times, the Annalist, The Econostat, and by the business forecasting organisation
Babson’s Reports Inc.. See Heard and Beede (1933) for the composition of the index by the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company. See Rhodes (1937) and Mitchell et al. (2012) for a discussion
of the British index of business activity by The Economist.
15Initially, Burns and Mitchell were not too fond of the use of a single index. They considered
GDP the only possible measure that could be used as a single index. As national income measures
were unavailable at a high frequency, they dated the turning points of many series to derive
reference dates (see Burns and Mitchell 1946, p. 72f and Section 2.2.3).
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circles.16 The profound idea of condensing the comovement of many macroeco-
nomic time series into one indicator still lies at the heart of the modern empirical
business cycle literature (see e.g. Stock and Watson, 1989) and the efforts by statis-
tical agencies such as the OECD to provide composite economic indicators. The
algorithm in Figure 2.1 builds on this idea as well as the methodological progress
achieved in the past decades.
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FIGURE 2.1: Aggregation procedure
The algorithm can be separated into two major processes, which are joined
in a final calibration exercise. The operations on the left-hand side of Figure 2.1
aggregate the high-frequency (monthly) raw data into a stationary composite eco-
nomic indicator in four steps. Assessing the resulting aggregate stationary index
of economic activity component for the depth and duration of the Depression,
16See, for example, Heard and Beede (1933) and Rhodes (1937). When the index by The
Economist was first presented at a meeting of the Royal Statistical Society, it was met by both, ad-
miration and skepticism (see the comments to the paper given by Crowther, 1934). Schumpeter
(1939, p. 24) pointed out that the unit of such indices has no meaning as they consist of diverse
series without a common scale. This study overcomes this problem by using a widely-accepted
reference series (GDP per capita) to scale the indices.
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however, would be misleading.17 First, the stationary composite economic indi-
cator is expressed in standard deviations from the trend. This unit is not readily
interpretable. Second, computing turning points and recession statistics based
on data in levels is clearly preferable (Harding and Pagan, 2002). How can we
recover meaningful levels for the economic activity indices? The operations on
the right-hand side of Figure 2.1 extract information about the trend growth and
volatility of economic activity from annual GDP per capita data. Based on the as-
sumption that the annual GDP per capita estimates capture the trend and volatil-
ity reasonably well, this information is then used to calibrate the high-frequency
(monthly) data. This calibration makes it possible to recover an index in levels
and ensures its comparability across countries. Starting on the left-hand side, the
following paragraphs describe each step of the algorithm.18
The first step removes the noise and seasonality from the raw data. Season-
ality might blur the variation of interest and could distort the final index.19 Like
many modern statistical offices, this study thus employs the X-13 ARIMA-SEATS
program by the US Census Bureau to remove such patterns. Beyond season-
ality, the indicators vary in their noise patterns. These differences mostly stem
from measurement error or simply the nature of the series. Thus, their smooth-
ness, or more technically the ratio of the irregular to the trend-cycle component,
varies substantially. A high ratio could either simply conceal the information
contained in a series or, even worse, distort the final index. As a remedy, Burns
and Mitchell (1946, p. 57) had smoothed such series with a moving average.
The OECD adopted this strategy in a more formalised manner called the MCD
(Months for Cyclical Dominance) smoother (Nilsson, 2000; OECD, 2012), which
is the approach followed here. The MCD smoother applies a moving average
17 The aggregate stationary index of economic activity measures economic activity relative to
the overall trend in economic activity. In periods of sustained negative growth, this underlying
trend becomes negative. In periods of sustained positive growth, this trend becomes positive.
Consequently, considerable parts of the information about the severity of the Depression and
the strength of the recovery respectively would be captured by the trend component in such
economic environments. Exclusively focusing the analysis on the cyclical component would thus
be misleading.
18A step-by-step empirical description of the algorithm using French and British data is pro-
vided in Appendix 2A.2.
19For example, similarity in seasonal employment opportunities might lead to spurious cor-
relations in otherwise unrelated series. Such a correlation would influence the weighting of the
series in the final index. While based on less sophisticated methodology, seasonal adjustment
procedures were in widespread use by statistical agencies as early as the 1930s (see League of
Nations, 1936a, p. 167). Because some central bank series have little month-to-month variation,
those are not seasonally adjusted. Appendix 2A.15 provides the corresponding documentation
for every series.
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based on the number of months that are needed for the trend-cycle component
to dominate the irregular (noise) component (see Shiskin, 1973, for a discus-
sion). Hence erratic series such as goods transported on railways are smoothed,
whereas smooth ones such as unemployment remain unaltered.20
In the second step, the algorithm deflates all nominal variables by the re-
spective country’s wholesale price index to avoid combining nominal and real
economic series.21 The third step involves applying a time series filter to the
data in order to separate the trend and cyclical component of each series. This
step is necessary, as the following Principal Component Analysis requires sta-
tionary data. Because the stationary index is later calibrated on the trend and
standard deviation annual data, it is important that the filter extracts the same
trend irrespectively of the frequency of the data. This lies at the core of Ravn’s
and Uhlig’s (2002) approach to adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter for the
frequency of observations.22 It is also a characteristic of bandpass filters such
as the Christiano-Fitzgerald (2003) filter. Given the criticism of the properties of
the Hodrick-Prescott filter in the past and present (see e.g. Harvey and Jaeger,
1993; Canova, 1998; Hamilton, 2017), it is important to point out that neither the
final indices nor the estimated weights vary in an economically meaningful man-
ner with the choice of either of the filters (Appendix 2A.16). After filtering, and
as common in the literature, all cyclical components of the indicator series are
z-standardised. This procedure ensures their comparability by imposing zero
means and unit standard deviations.
In the fourth step, the algorithm creates a stationary composite economic ac-
tivity indicator based on these standardised cyclical components. The OECD
apparently employs simple averages (OECD, 2012, p. 8). This might be a sen-
sible approach if only a few series have been pre-selected by country experts.
However, an agnostic and potentially more reliable way to estimate the weights
is Principal Component Analysis.23 Principal Component Analysis is a way to
20As is common, I cap the maximum MCD parameter at 6 (Nilsson and Gyomai, 2011) and use
a centred moving average. Appendix 2A.15 documents the MCD parameter for every indicator
series. For a discussion of the advantages of noise reduction in a factor model setting, see Dahl
et al. (2009).
21Only central bank series are not deflated. Too often, such a procedure seems to introduce
variation into otherwise relatively constant series (e.g. bank rates). The results are not unduly
influenced by the deflation procedure. Appendix 2A.15 provides an estimate for each country
excluding all deflated nominal variables.
22Ravn and Uhlig develop a rule to adjust the λ parameter for the frequency of observations,
resulting in the parameters λ = 6.25 for annual and λ = 129, 600 for monthly data. These ensure
that the same trend is filtered out at different frequencies, be it monthly or annual data.
23The amount of data to process sets limitations to the model selection and thus this study
does not rely on the most recent advances in this field (see e.g. Otrok and Whiteman, 1998; Kose
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summarise the data and estimate the unobserved state of the economy. This state
is proxied by the principal components of the dataset. The first principal compo-
nent is the eigenvector explaining most of the data’s variance multiplied by the
dataset. The estimated eigenvector containing the coefficients for the first prin-
cipal component indicates which series comove most strongly. When applying
Principal Component Analysis to the interwar macroeconomic dataset, the sign
of the coefficients is almost always as expected. For example, unemployment
would have a negative sign, whereas the coefficient for employment would be
positive. Appendix 2A.15 documents the coefficients for each variable by coun-
try. After z-standardising the first principal component, the algorithm arrives at
a stationary composite economic indicator with zero mean and a standard devia-
tion of one.
The right-hand side of Figure 2.1 describes how to provide this indicator with
a meaningful scale based on annual GDP per capita data.24 While its frequency
is lower, annual GDP data captures the broad trend of the aggregate economic
movement and the general intensity of fluctuations in economic activity reason-
ably well. This insight forms the underlying rationale to use the GDP’s trend and
standard deviation to scale the above index.
The algorithm filters the logarithmised annual GDP data with the Hodrick-
Prescott filter (or alternatively Christiano-Fitzgerald filter), thus expressing the
resulting cyclical component in percentage deviations from trend. The standard
deviation of this cyclical component can be used to calibrate the stationary ag-
gregate index of economic activity (see e.g. in Ritschl et al., 2016, for annual
long-run US data). As mentioned above, the Hodrick-Prescott filter has the at-
tractive property of filtering out the same cycle of a time series across different
frequencies of the data once the parameters suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002)
are used. This makes the standard deviation comparable across frequencies. The
algorithm thus applies the standard deviation of the annual cyclical component
et al., 2003; Ritschl et al., 2016). Mitchell et al. (2012) provide a mixed frequency model to estimate
monthly GDPs for interwar Britain based on the model by Proietti and Moauro (2006). How-
ever, Principal Component Analysis typically yields very similar results and is also frequently
employed in the business cycle literature (see e.g. Stock and Watson, 2002).
24Appendix 2A.13 lists the sources for each country. For many countries, “interwar specific
estimates” in constant prices of the national currency exist. Those were given preference over
commonly used data from Barro and Ursúa (2008) and Maddison (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013).
However, the differences to these datasets are generally small except for Denmark and Switzer-
land. To avoid the endpoint problem of time series filters, I use GDP data for all years between
1920 and 1938 to decompose the GDP into trend and cycle. Naturally, the standard deviation is
only calculated for the period for which monthly data are available.
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as the measure of volatility to the monthly stationary composite economic indica-
tor. By doing this, the algorithm marries the left and the right-hand side of Figure
2.1 and achieves the first aim of the algorithm: it now provides a stationary indi-
cator with an interpretable scale – the percentage deviation from the trend in real
output per capita. However, any such measure of economic activity is incom-
plete. In order to analyse recessions, it is clearly preferable to have an indicator
available in levels (Harding and Pagan, 2002). For this last step, the algorithm
again exploits the annual data. It converts the annual trend component (from
above) into a monthly equivalent by using a cubic spline interpolation. It then
multiplies these synthetic monthly observations describing the broad GDP trend
by the scaled composite economic indicator to arrive at the monthly economic
activity index scaled to GDP per capita central to this study.25
How comparable and robust are these economic activity estimates? In terms
of comparability across countries, the resulting monthly indices are preferable to
the commonly used industrial production indicators. They do not suffer from the
mechanical convergence problem described above. Furthermore, their scale re-
lies on a widely accepted concept - real GDP per capita. In terms of the inclusion
or exclusion of certain variables, Appendix 2A.15 demonstrates their robustness
for every country in the sample. It presents five different estimates of the com-
posite economic indicator, each of which includes certain subsets of the available
series.26 The resulting indices remain very similar across specifications. This also
25An alternative procedure to recover the levels of the economic activity indices would be the
Chow-Lin extrapolation (Chow and Lin, 1971). This univariate method could be used to extrapo-
late the cyclical annual GDP data with the monthly stationary economic activity indicator. There-
after, one could combine the extrapolated monthly data with the trend. This would ensure that
the high-frequency data is fully consistent with the annual national accounts. While such consis-
tency is certainly a desirable feature for modern data, it is not clear that this holds for historical
national accounts. Given the well-known imprecision of historical national accounts with respect
to year-to-year changes, the algorithm applied in this study is preferred. It only requires that the
annual GDP data captures the trend and volatility well rather than the exact GDP in each year of
the sample. Nonetheless and reassuringly, the growth rates of the economic activity indices match
those of annual GDP p.c. data closely when collapsed to annual frequency (see Figure A2.10 in
Appendix 2A.3).
26Indices based on Core Indicators include only real variables from the Production, Sales, Em-
ployment, Transport group. Indices labelled Economic Activity include the Core Indicators and their
nominal counterparts as well as other series strongly related to economic activity such as retail
sales, stock market indicators and certain bank series such as clearings. Moreover, they include
total exports and imports. The preferred index, Economic Activity (excluding potentially collinear
series), is the same as the economic activity one, but excludes potentially collinear series (I thank
an anonymous referee for pointing this out). Two additional versions of the index are estimated.
The Economic Activity & Trade index adds all trade variables to the Economic Activity index. Finally,
the All Indicators index represents a “kitchen sink” approach, including all variables but prices.
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holds true for the exclusion of all (deflated) nominal and trade data. The robust-
ness using a different filter, the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter, is demonstrated in
Appendix 2A.16.27 A main criticism against the Hodrick-Prescott filter is that it
introduces spurious correlations between variables. If so, this might matter for
the weighting as the results of the Principal Component Analysis and thus ulti-
mately the weighting depends on the correlation between variables. Appendix
2A.16 verifies that the estimated weights are not unduly influenced by the choice
of the filter. It compares the weights estimated on the basis of data filtered by the
Hodrick-Prescott filter, Christiano-Fitzgerald filter, and the linear projection ap-
proach suggested by Hamilton (2017). Indeed, the estimated weights differ little
across filters in virtually all cases. Finally, three additional exercises demonstrate
the plausibility of the results. Firstly, Figure A2.10 in Appendix 2A.3 demon-
strates the strong correlation between annual GDP p.c. growth rates and the cor-
responding growth rates of the economic activity indices when collapsed to an-
nual frequency. Secondly, as one would expect based on the historiography of the
Great Depression (e.g. Eichengreen, 1992; Bernanke, 1995), Figure A2.11 in Ap-
pendix 2A.4 shows that prices and economic activity exhibited a strong positive
correlation during this period.28 Thirdly, Figure A2.13 in Appendix 2A.6 illus-
trates that the algorithm yields very similar results to the quarterly and monthly
GDP estimates for Great Britain by Hayes and Turner (2007) and Mitchell et al.
(2012). In sum, the indices are robust against a variety of specifications and with
respect to a number of plausibility checks.
2.2.3 Dating Turning Points & Computing Recession Statistics
There are two main approaches towards dating business cycles: “date then aver-
age” and “average then date” (Stock and Watson, 2010). Burns and Mitchell (1946,
p. 72f) followed the former approach. The NBER research group analysed hun-
dreds of individual series to capture aggregate economic activity and, by continu-
ous re-evaluation, Burns and Mitchell (1946, p. 77) set dates based “on a study of
27At a first glance, the similarity of the results might come as a surprise. When the focus lies
on the cyclical component only, the choice of the filter influences results strongly in other areas of
business cycle research (see e.g. Canova, 1998, for the computation of “business cycle facts”). In
contrast, this study is concerned with estimating an economic activity indicator in levels. While
the dissection into trend and cycle might differ, the combination of the two should be very similar.
This is precisely what the results in Appendix 2A.16 corroborate.
28I thank an anonymous referee for pointing me towards this plausibility check.
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whatever evidence had been marshaled.”29 These dates have to become known
as the NBER reference dates. While this “date then average” approach might be
the adequate strategy for setting reference dates, it prevents the computation of
recession statistics such as the cumulative loss. Furthermore, Burns and Mitchell
(1946) chose their approach precisely because no encompassing measure such as
GDP was available at a high-enough frequency (Harding and Pagan, 2002, p. 73).
As the major contribution of this study is to provide such a measure, the “average
then date” approach is followed using the economic activity indicators calculated
above.
In order to identify turning points, this study adopts the well-established dat-
ing procedure outlined in Bry and Boschan (1971), which Harding and Pagan
(2002) formalised and popularised. It relies on the series in levels rather than
the detrended indicator. It identifies peaks and troughs in the logarithm of the
series, where at any time t a peak in a series is defined by a value that is larger
than the k preceding and following values (or smaller in the case of a trough).
Following Bry’s and Boschan’s initial suggestion for monthly data (Harding and
Pagan, 2016, p. 28), k is set to 5.30 The classification of observations into ex-
pansions, recessions, peaks and troughs facilitates the calculation of two types
of recession statistics. Firstly, this study provides a measure of the duration of
economic downturns. This is simply the percentage of months in recession for a
given period in the 1920s and 1930s. Secondly, it provides a measure of the depth
of the crisis. To make this measure comparable across countries and to abstract
from temporary but short-lived increases in economic activity, I fix the time di-
mension. After indexing the economic activity estimate on its last pre-Depression
peak, I calculate the cumulative loss (or gain) for each country 72 months into cri-
sis as the integral between a horizontal line starting from the pre-Depression peak
and the actual data. Dividing this cumulative loss or gain by 12 (months), I arrive
at the multiple of annual peak-GDPs lost (or gained) during the first six years of
crisis. Figure A2.14 in Appendix 2A.7 provides a graphical illustration as well as
the corresponding formula.31
29See Moore and Zarnowitz (1986) for a concise discussion of the emergence of business cycle
chronologies.
30 Additional restrictions are the following. A phase (contraction or expansion) has to last at
least 5 months. Furthermore, the minimum length for the duration of a complete expansion-
contraction cycle is set to 15 months. For the calculations in this study, I employ Philippe Bracke’s
(2013) implementation of the Harding-Pagan algorithm for Stata.
31I have experimented with other definitions, but this one seems to be the most meaningful in
this context. Short stabilisations make the amplitude or cumulative loss as defined by Harding
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Since Harding’s and Pagan’s (2002) seminal contribution, using an algorithm
rather than expert knowledge to identify turning points has become a staple in
the literature.32 The underlying reason for this development is twofold. Firstly,
applying the same well-defined criterion across a sample of countries ensures
consistency. Secondly and more importantly, the turning points identified by the
Harding-Pagan procedure are typically very close to those provided by the NBER
or similar bodies in other countries. This is no different in the case of this study as
Tables A2.4-A2.10 in Appendix 2A.11 and Table A2.11 in Appendix 2A.12 show.
The turning points identified in this study are consistent with previous chronolo-
gies in the cases where the latter exist. They are also consistent with the clas-
sifications of quarters into expansions and contractions by the League of Nations
and Wagemann (1931), for which the precise methodology and underlying data
are unknown. Hence, not only do the comparisons to the existing material val-
idate the turning points identified in this study, they also highlight this study’s
contribution to the knowledge about interwar business cycles by providing inter-
nationally comparable data on turning points for 28 countries.
2.3 The Scale, Scope and Timing of the Great Depres-
sion
Equipped with the monthly economic activity indices, we can now reassess the
prelude and severity of the Great Depression. The discussion of the results will
highlight the advantages of the new economic activity indices, both in terms of
frequency and coverage of the economy.
2.3.1 The Prelude to the Great Depression
Early research on the interwar period typically split the 1920s into two halves:
whereas the direct effects of the Great War dominated the first one, stable growth
resumed in the second one (Lewis, 1949; Kindleberger, 1986). Lewis (1949, p. 50)
argued that the effects associated with the war had not vanished but were “were
no longer visible on the surface.” This study suggests otherwise. Table 2.1 uncov-
ers a large number of recessions around the globe by widening the geographical
and Pagan (2002, p. 370) a poor measure. One can certainly agree with Bordo et al. (2001, p. 55)
that there is no single best measure for the severity of crises.
32For recent applications to GDP, credit and commodity price cycles, see Bordo and Haubrich
(2010), Jordá et al. (2017), Reinhart et al. (2016).
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scope, relying on economic activity rather than industrial production data, and,
most importantly, increasing the frequency of observations. Columns two and
three show the turning points of the business cycle for the period January 1926
– December 1928. The remaining three columns show how much of the time
was spent in recession during these 36 months. Naturally, the results based on
monthly and quarterly data agree closely. However, if the same data are collapsed
to annual frequency most of the moderate recessions disappear. This highlights
the importance of high-frequency macroeconomic data when analysing reces-
sions: employing annual rather than monthly or quarterly data obscures the more
moderate recessions.33 Linking the results presented in Table 2.1 with country-
specific studies, the following discussion of the recessions in the period 1926–
1928 highlights the origins of the widespread instability of the interwar business
cycle. Contrary to Lewis’ judgement, the various readjustment problems after
World War I had indeed never left the surface. Financial and monetary insta-
bility (Kindleberger, 1986; Eichengreen, 1992; Eichengreen and Mitchener, 2004),
commodity prices and production (Lewis, 1949; Kindleberger, 1986), and labor
conflict (see e.g. Ritschl and Straumann, 2010) continued to plague economies
around the world.
World War I had disrupted the monetary and financial system. The lifting of
wartime controls led to increases in prices and a boom and bust phase in the early
1920s (Eichengreen, 1992, p. 108). Moreover, hyperinflation ravaged the German
and Austrian financial and banking systems. The new data show that the mon-
etary and financial turmoil continued even in the second half of the 1920s by
producing moderate and severe recessions. They were often symptomatic of the
struggle to stabilise money and credit, which were tightly linked during this pe-
riod (Schularick and Taylor, 2012). According to contemporary Austrian thinkers
such as Hayek and Mises, the departure from the gold standard in many coun-
tries allowed banking systems to create excessive amounts of credit in the early
and mid-1920s (see Eichengreen and Mitchener, 2004, for an overview).34 Indeed,
financial and banking crises plagued Austria from spring to autumn in 1926 and
Japan from mid-1926 until early 1927 as Tinbergen (1934) documents. Spain, too,
33See Tables A2.4-A2.10 in Appendix 2A.11 for extensive references to these recessions from
contemporary business cycle chronologists.
34See, for example, Hayek’s (1933) critique of loose monetary policy in the 1920s and in partic-
ular in 1927, which he considered the main reason for the Great Depression.
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TABLE 2.1: RECESSIONS, JANUARY 1926 – DECEMBER 1928
Country Turning points Percentage of time in recession according
(Month) to data frequency: Jan 1926-Dec 1928
Peak(s) Trough(s) Monthly Quarterly Annual
Strong recessions (percentage of months in recession > 30% )
Estonia Jan-26
Jul-28
Jul-27
Feb-29
64 42 67
Australia Nov-26 May-28 50 33 67
Italy Mar-26 Sep-27 50 50 33
New Zealand Apr-26 Jul-27 42 33 67
Great Britain Nov-25
Aug-27
Jul-26
Feb-28
36 42 33
France Aug-26 Aug-27 33 33 33
Germany Feb-25
Feb-28
Feb-26
Oct-28
31 33 33
Moderate recessions (5% < percentage o f months in recession < 30% )
Denmark Sep-25 Oct-26 28 25 -
Norway May-25 Sep-26 25 25 33
Japan Jul-26 Feb-27 19 25 -
Austria Feb-26 Aug-26 17 17 -
Spain Nov-25 Jun-26 17 17 -
United States May-27 Oct-27 14 17 -
Belgium Nov-26 Apr-27 14 17 -
South Africa Aug-26 Jan-27 14 25 -
Finland Sep-28 Mar-32 8 - -
No or negligible recessions (percentage of months in recession < 5%)
Poland Jun-25 Jan-26 3 8 -
Canada - - - - -
Czechoslovakia - - - - -
Hungary - - - - -
Netherlands - - - - -
Sweden - - - - -
Switzerland - - - - -
Notes: Columns 2-3 display turning points relevant for the period 1926–1928. Turning points for
1925 are only shown if the recession lasted until 1926. Columns 4-6 show the percentage of time in
recession in 1926-1928 according to the same data at different frequencies. Shaded rows indicate
whether results for low-frequency (annual) and high-frequency data disagree. Recessions are
defined as discussed in Section 2.2.3. For Australia and New Zealand, the data only starts in 1926.
Hence the GDPs of 1925 and 1926 were compared to judge whether 1926 was a recession year
based on the annual frequency. The corresponding recession profiles with shaded areas for all
countries can be found in Figure A2.15 in Appendix 2A.10. See Tables A2.4-A2.10 in Appendix
2A.11 for detailed references to these recessions from contemporary business cycle chronologists.
experienced a minor banking crisis in 1924–1925 (Martlín-Aceña, 1984), the ef-
fects of which were still felt in 1926 (The Economist, 1927, p. 18).35 Elsewhere
35According to her recession profile (Figure A2.15 in Appendix 2A.10), Spain was in recession
until May 1925, experienced a brief recovery until November, and went to recession again in
December 1925.
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central bankers tried to arrest stock market bubbles by tightening monetary pol-
icy. Such an attempt in May 1927, with some time lag according to the indices
presented here and the NBER’s classification of turning points (Table A2.7 in Ap-
pendix 2A.11), sent the German economy into recession in early 1928 even though
there was no bubble in the first place (Voth, 2003).
Besides financial instability, monetary instability ensued in the second half of
the 1920s. In Belgium and France, fiscal struggles undermined the confidence in
the domestic currency. Inflation and exchange rate crises prevailed. Stabilisation
could only be achieved at the cost of deflation, a trade-off policymakers were ul-
timately willing to accept (Eichengreen, 1992, Chapter 6). Such forced deflations
translated into severe contractions. France was in recession from mid-1926 until
a year later. A slightly milder contraction prevailed in Belgium from the end of
1925 until April 1927 (see also Tinbergen, 1934, p. 18). Although they originated
in the deliberate decision to establish the “old, honest crown” (Lester, 1937, p.
440), the Danish and Norwegian recessions in 1925–1926 also fall into this cate-
gory. Similarly, Mussolini’s effort to return to gold caused a long contraction in
Italy, beginning in early 1926 and lasting until autumn 1927 (Mattesini and Quin-
tieri, 1997, p. 271). In sum, financial and monetary instability led to many of the
recessions displayed in Table 2.1.
As early as 1931, the League of Nations (1931, p. 37) had pointed to another
structural weakness of the interwar economic order. Heavily indebted commod-
ity exporters suffered from falling raw material prices, which often led to balance
of payment crises. The Australian recession from the end of 1926 until mid-1928
(see Valentine, 1987) and the contraction in New Zealand from May 1927 until
July 1927 (see Timoshenko, 1933, p. 63) provide prime examples of such crises.
The heavy reliance on primary exports also caused recessions in European agri-
cultural economies. In Finland, a bad harvest and the subsequent credit tight-
ness marked the turning point of the business cycle in mid-1928 (The Economist,
1929a, p. 22). Estonia likewise suffered from bad harvests two years in a row
such that she spent most of the period 1926–1928 in recession (The Economist,
1928, 1929a). The business cycle of agricultural countries remained tightly linked
to the harvest, debt burden, and the global commodity price level.
Moving from the agricultural to the industrialised parts of the interwar world,
a third set of problems were related to labor conflict. In Germany and the United
Kingdom, real wage growth stripped out productivity growth (Broadberry and
Ritschl, 1995). The growing conflict between labor and capital in the United King-
dom culminated in 1926 with the coal stoppage and a brief general strike (Lewis,
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1949, p. 44), both of which were major causes for the 1926 contraction in Great
Britain.36 The short recession in the second half of 1927 in the United States, of-
ten forgotten because of its brevity, was partially due to strikes (Tinbergen, 1934,
p. 202).37 While the least important of the three factors cited above, labor con-
flict was part of the post-war instability in the industrialised world (Ritschl and
Straumann, 2010, p. 174).
The new economic activity dataset reveals that the problems caused by the
World War I had never really disappeared. It facilitates uncovering contractions
otherwise hidden in annual summation. Agricultural problems, monetary and
financial instability, and labor conflict led to frequent recessions around the globe.
While the transition from the pre-World War I world worked more smoothly for
some countries than for others, stable growth was far from universal even in the
second half of the 1920s. Yet, these recessions were local, their timing mostly
idiosyncratic and they hardly spilled over to other countries. This would only
change when the recession that would become the Great Depression began to
unfold globally in the first half of 1929.38
2.3.2 The Severity of the Depression – A Bird’s Eye View
The new indices also facilitate a more sensible comparison of the severity of the
Great Depression along two dimensions: the depth and duration of the crisis.
Previous research making cross-country comparisons of the depth of the Great
Depression has so far relied on annual industrial production (see e.g. Romer,
1993)39 or GDP data (see e.g. Crafts and Fearon, 2013a). However, the summation
by years flattens the amplitude and precludes a sensible analysis of the duration
36According to Great Britain’s recession profile (Figure A2.15 in Appendix 2A.10), the peak of
the business cycle was reached in November 1925. However, this fluctuation would not have
become a recession if the economy had not fallen off the cliff in April and May due to the coal
stoppage and general strike.
37At least equally important, however, seems to have been the Mississippi flood and the tempo-
rary closure of Ford Motor Company plants. See also Hatton and Thomas (2010) on labor market
institutions in the United States and United Kingdom during the 1920s.
38As previous research has pointed out (see e.g. Romer, 1993), the onset of the Great Depression
was highly synchronised. The business cycle dating documented in Table A2.11 in Appendix
2A.12 puts this finding on a broader empirical footing. Minor differences in the dating expectedly
prevail as Romer relied on industrial production data.
39Table A2.3 in Appendix 2A.9 compares the results of this study to Romer’s (2004) peak-to-
trough values of annual industrial production for 13 countries. The differences in the relative
severity of the Depression indicated are quite stark. According to Romer’s data, for example, the
Depression was most severe in the United States, whereas the economic activity data indicates
that Canada experienced the most severe recession. Such differences are perfectly plausible in
light of the expected “unconditional convergence bias” when using industrial production data.
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(Burns and Mitchell, 1946, p. 204). The analysis of monthly or quarterly data is
thus strictly preferable.40 The duration of the crisis, defined as the percentage of
months in recession in the six years following the last pre-Depression peak, takes
into account the length of the actual crisis and the steadiness of the recovery. The
depth of the crisis, defined as the cumulative loss from this peak in multiples of
the annualised pre-crisis peak-GDP per capita (see Section 2.2.3), is a measure
that combines the length with the amplitude of the crisis. While these measures
are obviously correlated, their graphic comparison in Figure 2.2 highlights differ-
ent types of recessions. While some countries experienced rather prolonged and
mild crises, others experienced deep but relatively short crises. The bar charts
also highlight a second, more pronounced, variation: the variation in the severity
of the Great Depression across countries.
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FIGURE 2.2: The severity of the Great Depression
Note: In both bar charts, countries are ordered by the severity of the Great Depression as mea-
sured by the cumulative loss six years into crisis. See Table A2.1 in Appendix 2A.8 for the exact
figures and the same measures computed for five years into crisis.
Some comparisons help to understand the relevance of these two types of
variation, which is marked even among those countries that had left the gold
standard early or were not adhering to it at all. Six years into crisis and de-
spite having left the gold standard relatively early, Canada had lost 1.32 times
40 If we were instead to use the only other available high frequency indicator, industrial produc-
tion, the results suffer from the problems described in the beginning of this article, the mechanical
convergence bias in particular. Table A2.2 in Appendix 2A.9 provides recession statistics for the
limited number of available industrial production indices and compares them to the ones pre-
sented here.
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its annualised peak-output and spent 68 % of the 72 months after the peak in
recession. In contrast, Chile experienced a similarly deep Depression, but only
spent about a third of the time after the peak in recession. Norway had earned
a cumulative gain of around 6 % of the peak-GDP and spent only 26 % of the
months in recession. While the Spanish Depression was not as deep as the Cana-
dian one, losing cumulatively “only” 80 % worth of the annualised peak-GDP,
she had spent as much time as Canada in recession. This finding is particularly
important as Spain was one of the few countries that had never joined the gold
standard during the interwar years.41 In seminal studies based on industrial pro-
duction data (Choudhri and Kochin, 1980; Temin, 1993), the authors suggest that
Spain had “virtually escaped” the Great Depression because of this. Neither the
monthly economic activity indices nor the contemporary qualitative statements
and raw data by the International Statistical Institute (Methorst, 1938, p. 71) lend
any credibility to this idea.42 In spite of not wearing the “golden straightjacket,”
Spain experienced a relatively persistent and deep Depression before the Civil
War broke out in 1936. How can we reconcile this fact with the importance of the
gold standard channel?
The consensus view among leading contemporary economists was that for-
eign demand played an important role for transmitting the Depression (Polak,
1939, p. 79). Indeed, the crisis had inspired Harrod (1933) to postulate the idea of
a foreign trade multiplier even before Keynes published the General Theory (see
also Stolper, 1947; Polak, 1947, for a discussion). While the focus of the liter-
ature on the Great Depression has shifted towards financial instability and the
currency experiences of the 1930s (Eichengreen, 1992; Bernanke, 1995), Friedman
(1978), Mattesini and Quintieri (1997) and Perri and Quadrini (2002) have under-
lined the importance of the trade channel for small open economies.43 Based on
these insights and surveying the literature on the Great Depression in light of the
41This does not, however, mean that Spain was floating throughout the 1930s. Urban (2009)
shows that Spain was de facto pegged against the French Franc in the mid-1930s. I thank an
anonymous referee for pointing this out.
42Likewise, the annual GDP estimates by Prados de la Escosura (2016, p. 20) suggest that the
Spanish Depression “was milder than in the U.S. but similar in intensity to Western Europe’s
average.”
43 In contrast, similar studies for the United States find only small effects (Crucini and Kahn,
1996; Irwin, 1998). The underlying reason is the relatively small share of trade in national income.
There exists, of course, a large body of literature on the effects of tariffs on trade in the interwar
period as surveyed by Irwin (2012). However, estimates of the effect of trade destruction on
income are scarce. A back-of-the envelope calculation would suggest that a tenth of the fall of in
GDP could be attributed to rising trade barriers, but as Irwin (2012, p. 112) himself points out “it
is hard to put much faith in this number.”
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recent crisis, Grossman and Meissner (2010) conjecture that the drop in foreign
demand through income losses and mounting trade barriers in the large coun-
tries may have been pivotal for the course of the Depression in small countries.
The geographical pattern of the Great Depression is certainly consistent with such
a claim. The countries least affected by the world’s Depression were the Scandi-
navian ones. Their major trading partner, the United Kingdom, was experiencing
a less severe crisis than most other countries. In contrast, the German crisis and
move towards autarky certainly intensified and prolonged the crises in Central
and Eastern Europe, for which Germany was by far the most important trading
partner. In particular, crises in South East Europe tended to be less severe than
the German crisis, but at least of similar length. The same holds true for Spain,
whose trade with Germany, the United States, and France made up about 40 %
of her export market (Statistisches Reichsamt, 1936, p. 283). Likewise, the deep
Depression in the United States is likely to have amplified the Canadian, Mexi-
can and Chilean recessions through the fall in foreign demand from their largest
trading partner (see e.g. Horn, 1984, for Canada). More generally, the spatial pat-
tern of the Depression and its duration in Eastern Europe and Spain lend support
to the trade-channel hypothesis. Perhaps, countries had not only selected them-
selves into currency blocs based on historical trade flows (Wolf and Ritschl, 2011),
but the depth of their crises itself was predetermined by the pre-crisis trade links
and the performance of their main trading partners. Clearly, further research is
needed for making more definite statements.
The discussion of the trade channel should not conceal the importance of
the gold orthodoxy for the length and depth of the Depression (Eichengreen,
1992). Indeed, the gold standard countries France, Belgium, Switzerland, and
the Netherlands suffered prolonged recessions. The inspection of their recession
profiles (see Figure A2.15 in Appendix 2A.10) suggests that a sustainable recov-
ery only began after the exit from gold. Equally consistent with the gold standard
view of the Great Depression, the recessions in the sterling bloc were milder than
elsewhere. Nevertheless, the geographical pattern lends support to the idea that
different channels might have mattered at different times during the course of the
Great Depression.
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2.4 Future Directions
Research on the transmission and depth of the Great Depression has suffered
from the absence of a reliable macroeconomic indicator, which comes at a
monthly or quarterly frequency, is available for a large number of countries,
and covers all sectors of the economy. As a remedy, the present study provides
monthly economic activity data for a large number of countries. The high fre-
quency of the indices allows me to unearth recessions in the second half of the
1920s, which remain otherwise hidden in annual summation. Indeed, the prob-
lems related to World War I had never left the surface. Financial and monetary
instability, labor unrest, and commodity price swings had continued to plague
countries around the globe until the Great Depression began. This finding and
the data acquired for this study provide a foundation for future country case
studies on this period as well as the Great Depression itself. The finding of a rel-
atively persistent Depression in Spain serves as a case in point. However, many
smaller economies, especially in Eastern Europe, also deserve more attention.
The value of the new dataset for future research, however, extends far beyond
case studies. It facilitates a reassessment of the Great Depression from a global
time series perspective. Ben Bernanke (1995, p. 1) once noted that the emer-
gence of the gold standard literature increased our ability, in a strictly economet-
ric sense, to identify the causes of the Great Depression by extending the number
of observations from one country to many. The same shall hold true for further-
ing our understanding of the transmission of the Great Depression by extending
the number of observations in the time dimension. In this vein, a particularly
promising avenue for future research is quantifying the impact of the drop of
foreign demand through income losses and tariffs on small open economies. As-
sessing the severity of the Great Depression along two dimensions, its depth and
duration, suggests that the trade channel was more important in spreading the
crisis than reflected in the literature on the Great Depression. While this insight
remains speculative at this point, the present study lays the foundation to settle
this and other open questions about the Great Depression.
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2.5 Appendices
Appendix 2A Data & Robustness
2A.1 Unconditional Convergence in Industrial Production
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FIGURE A2.1: Beta convergence in the industrial sector
Sources: The industrialisation levels per capita are from Bairoch (1982) and refer to 1928. For the
sources for the industrial production indices, see Appendix 2A.14. The slope of the regression
line is -.018.
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2A.2 Step by step example of the algorithm
This section provides a graphical step-by-step example of the algorithm using the
French (left panel) and British (right panel) data. Corresponding to the discussion
of the algorithm in Section 2.2.2 in the main text, it discusses the aggregation of
the monthly data, the extraction of the trend and volatility information from the
annual data, and the calibration of the monthly data using this information.
Aggregation of disaggregated monthly data
• After adjusting the disaggregated monthly economic indicators for season-
ality, smoothing them where necessary, and deflating them, one has a sub-
stantial number of indicator series per country (subsample used: Economic
Activity without potentially collinear series). To improve the expositional clar-
ity each series has been converted to an index with the base 1925− 1936.
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FIGURE A2.2: Disaggregated indicators in levels
• It becomes apparent that the trends of these indicators series differ substan-
tially. For example, the series that is very different from all the others in the
left plot above refers to the number of un-matched requests by job-seekers,
which grew rapidly from the beginning until the end of the sample. An-
other example for an indicator with such a strong trend would be electricity
consumption as there was a strong positive secular trend in electrification.
When comparing and merging different series, the trends of individual indi-
cators are not meaningful. It is thus necessary to remove indicator-specific
trends, which do not play any role henceforth. The algorithm applies a
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times series filter to remove them (either the HP or CF filter). The plot below
displays the resulting z-standardised cyclical data (mean µ = 0 and standard
deviation σ = 1):
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FIGURE A2.3: Disaggregated indicators - cyclical components
• The z-standardisation makes the data comparable across indicators. For
each series the deviations from the trend are now expressed in terms of
standard deviations.
• On these data, the algorithm runs Principal Component Analysis in order to
extract the monthly aggregate cyclical movement of economic activity rela-
tive to an unobserved trend that the economy is following. I normalise the
first principal component to the mean µ = 0 and the standard deviation
σ = 1.
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FIGURE A2.4: Stationary index of economic activity (first principal
component)
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Trend & Volatility Information from Annual Data
• Annual GDP data capture both the overall trend and the degree of volatility
of economic activity reasonably well.
• The graph below presents the annual GDP data in logarithms, as well as its
broad trend as identified by the time series filter (in this case the HP-filter).
The shaded area indicates the years for which monthly data is available.
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FIGURE A2.5: Annual GDP p.c. - raw data and trend in logarithms
• The algorithm now extracts the standard deviation of the cyclical compo-
nent of the annual GDP data for the window, for which monthly data are
available (σFR = 3.31% and σUK = 2.52%). The algorithm employs this
standard deviation to scale the stationary monthly aggregate index. This
is possible, because the HP- and CF-filter filter out the same trend irrespec-
tively of the observational frequency (monthly, quarterly, or annual). Hence
the standard deviation of the extracted cyclical component does not differ
(in an economically meaningful manner) across these frequencies.
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FIGURE A2.6: Annual GDP p.c. - cycle
• The dissection of the annual data into cycle and trend (Figure A2.5) proves
helpful in a second way. Being a long-term trend, it is reasonable to inter-
polate between the annual data points.44
• This step provides me with a trend estimate of economic activity.
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FIGURE A2.7: Annual GDP p.c. - trend
44The conversion of the trend from ln(GDP) to GDP = eln(GDP) and conversion to an index is
performed for expositional clarity. It has no effect on the results.
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Calibration of the monthly index with annual trend and volatility Information
• As mentioned above, the algorithm employs the standard deviation from
the annual GDP data (% deviation from the trend) to scale the monthly
cyclical index. This is achieved by multiplying the stationary index of eco-
nomic activity shown in Figure A2.4, which is normalised to σ = 1 and
µ = 0, by the standard deviation from the annual data shown in Figure
A2.6 (σFR = 3.31% and σUK = 2.52%). The scale is now interpretable as
percentage deviations from the (GDP p.c.) trend.
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
%
 D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 T
re
nd
 (s
ca
led
 on
 G
DP
 vo
lat
ilit
y)
Deviations from GDP trend
a) France
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
%
 D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 T
re
nd
 (s
ca
led
 on
 G
DP
 vo
lat
ilit
y)
Deviations from GDP trend
b) Great Britain
FIGURE A2.8: Stationary index of economic activity - calibrated on
standard deviation of annual GDP p.c. data
• Multiplying the GDP p.c. trend (Figure A2.7) by 1+ the cyclical component
above (Figure A2.8) results in the final economic activity index in levels.
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FIGURE A2.9: Economic activity index in levels - calibrated on GDP
p.c. volatility and trend
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2A.3 Consistency with Annual GDP Data
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FIGURE A2.10: Consistency with annual GDP p.c. data
Sources: For annual GDP p.c. data, see Appendix 2A.13. The monthly economic activity index
is collapsed to annual data by averaging. For both variables the growth rates are calculated as
log-differences relative to the previous year. The number of observations is 291, the slope of the
regression line is β ≈ .87 and the robust t ≈ 23.
2A.4 Correlation Between Prices and Economic Activity
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FIGURE A2.11: The correlation between prices and economic activ-
ity
Sources: estimates in this paper (cyclical components of wholesale prices and economic activity).
The plot consists of 2622 data points. The coefficient for the cyclical component of the prices
in a regression with country fixed effects is .4 and the R2 ≈ .32. The correlation coefficient is
ρ ≈ .57. These estimates are based on a balanced sample from January 1926– June 1935. Using
an unbalanced sample does not affect this result in a qualitatively or quantitatively significant
manner.
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2A.5 Data Quality and Results
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FIGURE A2.12: Relationship of data quality & outcome variables of
interest
Note: The “Total Number of Series” variable refers to the total number of series collected for the
economic activity indicator based on all available series (see Appendix 2A.15). This variable is
used as a proxy for data quality (see text). The cumulative loss can be interpreted as the multiple
of the annualised peak-GDP lost (see text).
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2A.6 Comparison with High-frequency Estimates for the United
Kingdom
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FIGURE A2.13: Comparison of high-frequency GDP estimates for
Interwar Britain
Note: The figure shows the estimates by Mitchell et al. (2012) and Hayes and Turner (2007). These
estimates are not per capita estimates, but total GDP estimates. For the sake of comparison and
in contrast to the rest of this study, I thus scale the composite economic indicator to the trend and
standard deviation of total annual GDP. The graphs show that the algorithm applied in this paper
yields very similar results. They display two versions, one estimated with the Mitchell et. al data
and one version with the larger new dataset (Albers data). I thank Solomos Solomou for sharing
the raw data from Mitchell et al. (2012).
The figure illustrates the good fit of the index with existing high-frequency
GDP estimates for the United Kingdom. The correlation between cyclical compo-
nents of the Mitchell et al. index and the index estimated in this paper at the typi-
cal frequency of 12-96 months (filtered with the filter by Christiano and Fitzgerald
(2003)) is 97 % (Pearson) and 90 % (Spearman).
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2A.7 Calculating the Cumulative Loss
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FIGURE A2.14: Cumulative loss - Belgium
The index is re-based to the peak in economic activity/GDP yP = 100. The
shaded area, the difference between the peak-economic activity/GDP yP = 100
and the observed economic activity/GDP yP+t in month t, is the integral of in-
terest. The cumulative loss 6 years into crisis expressed in multiples of the peak-
economic activity/GDP yL can be calculated as:
yL =
72
∑
t=1
yP+t − yP
12
/
yP (2.1)
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2A.8 Recession Statistics - Overview
TABLE A2.1: RECESSION STATISTICS
Variable Months in
recession
(1926–1928)
Last pre-
Depression
peak
Cumulative
loss (72
months
after peak)
Cumulative
loss (60
months
after peak)
Months in
recession
(72 months
after peak)
Months in
Recession
(60 months
after peak)
Unit % Month % of an-
nualised
peak value
% of an-
nualised
peak value
% %
Australia 50 Feb-29 49 43 47 57
Austria 17 Aug-29 100 79 60 72
Belgium 14 Jul-29 48 39 56 67
Bulgaria Apr-29 45 37 50 60
Canada 0 Feb-29 132 106 68 82
Chile Dec-29 117 106 31 37
Czechoslovakia 0 May-29 80 61 74 78
Denmark 28 Dec-30 2 8 42 47
Estonia 64 Apr-30 1 13 38 45
Finland 8 Sep-28 12 18 58 70
France 33 Feb-30 62 51 58 68
Germany 31 May-29 85 77 54 65
Great Britain 36 Aug-29 18 21 36 43
Hungary 0 Aug-29 29 28 47 57
Italy 50 Jun-29 37 32 56 67
Japan 19 Nov-29 6 15 35 42
Mexico Oct-29 99 86 50 60
Netherlands 0 Jul-29 68 53 68 80
New Zealand 42 Dec-29 67 67 42 50
Norway 25 Jul-30 -6 5 26 32
Poland 3 Apr-29 98 77 65 78
Romania Dec-29 42 39 63 67
South Africa 14 Jul-29 19 32 49 58
Spain 17 Dec-29 80 61 69 63
Sweden 0 Mar-30 32 37 32 38
Switzerland 0 May-29 69 51 81 77
United States 14 Aug-29 115 96 56 65
Yugoslavia Dec-29 63 52 46 55
Note: Turning points have been calculated with the Stata SBBQ plugin by Philippe Bracke according to the methodology in
Harding and Pagan (2002). The window and phase parameters are set to 5 and the cycle parameter to 15, except for Finland
where the cycle parameter is set to 30. The last pre-Depression peak is defined as the last peak occurring between January 1928
and December 1930 according to the Harding-Pagan methodology.
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2A.9 Recession Statistics - Monthly Industrial Production vs.
Economic Activity Data
TABLE A2.2: RECESSION STATISTICS (72 MONTHS INTO CRISIS)
Industrial Production Economic Activity
Cumulative
loss
Percentage
of months
in recession
Cumulative
loss
Percentage
of months
in recession
Austria 174 56 100 60
Belgium 157 75 48 56
Canada 193 67 132 68
Czechoslovakia 170 74 80 74
Denmark -24 50 2 42
France 146 71 62 58
Germany 170 75 85 54
Great Britain 56 51 18 36
Japan -101 14 6 35
Norway 56 46 -6 26
Poland 219 65 98 65
Sweden 1 17 32 32
United States 199 68 115 56
Note: The loss data can be read in percentages of the peak value. Negative values indicate
that a cumulative gain had been achieved. Turning points have been calculated with the Stata
SBBQ plugin by Philippe Bracke according to the methodology in Harding and Pagan (2002).
The window, phase and cycle parameters are set to 5, 5, and 15 respectively. All industrial pro-
duction data has been seasonally-adjusted and smoothed (see country appendices). The last
pre-Depression peak is defined as the last peak occurring between January 1928 and December
1930.
TABLE A2.3: COMPARISON WITH ROMER’S ANNUAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION DATA
Indicator Industrial Production Economic Activity
Value Relative severity Value Relative severity
Source Romer (2004) This study
Frequency Annual Monthly
Measure Peak-to-
trough loss
Cumulative loss
Unit % % % %
United States 46.8 100 115 100
Poland 46.6 100 98 85
Canada 42.2 90 132 115
Germany 41.8 89 85 74
Czechoslovakia 40.4 86 80 70
Netherlands 37.4 80 68 59
Italy 33 71 37 32
France 31.3 67 62 54
Belgium 30.6 65 48 42
Denmark 16.5 35 2 2
Great Britain 16.2 35 18 16
Sweden 10.3 22 32 28
Japan 8.5 18 6 5
Note: The relative severity is measured as the loss of country i in terms of the loss of the United States. The
cumulative loss refers to the 6 years following the pre-Depression peak.
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2A.10 Recession Profiles
The shaded areas in the following graphs show the results of the dating algorithm
for each country.
FIGURE A2.15: Recession dating
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c) Belgium
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Note: Own calculation (see text). Turning points and recessions defined using the Harding-
Pagan algorithm.
Figure continues on the following page.
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Recession dating continued
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g) Czechoslovakia
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h) Denmark
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i) Estonia
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j) Finland
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k) France
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Note: Own calculation (see text). Turning points and recessions defined using the Harding-
Pagan algorithm.
Figure continues on the following page.
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Recession dating continued
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
Ec
on
om
ic
 A
ct
iv
ity
 (P
ea
k=
10
0)
Economic Activity Indicator
Relevant Pre-Depression Peak
Recession
m) Great Britain
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
Ec
on
om
ic
 A
ct
iv
ity
 (P
ea
k=
10
0)
Economic Activity Indicator
Relevant Pre-Depression Peak
Recession
n) Hungary
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
88
90
92
94
96
98
100
Ec
on
om
ic
 A
ct
iv
ity
 (P
ea
k=
10
0)
Economic Activity Indicator
Relevant Pre-Depression Peak
Recession
o) Italy
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
Ec
on
om
ic
 A
ct
iv
ity
 (P
ea
k=
10
0)
Economic Activity Indicator
Relevant Pre-Depression Peak
Recession
p) Japan
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Ec
on
om
ic
 A
ct
iv
ity
 (P
ea
k=
10
0)
Economic Activity Indicator
Relevant Pre-Depression Peak
Recession
q) Mexico
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
100
Ec
on
om
ic
 A
ct
iv
ity
 (P
ea
k=
10
0)
Economic Activity Indicator
Relevant Pre-Depression Peak
Recession
r) Netherlands
Note: Own calculation (see text). Turning points and recessions defined using the Harding-
Pagan algorithm.
Figure continues on the following page.
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Recession dating continued
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s) New Zealand
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t) Norway
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u) Poland
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Note: Own calculation (see text). Turning points and recessions defined using the Harding-
Pagan algorithm.
Figure continues on the following page.
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Recession dating concluding
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Note: Own calculation (see text). Turning points and recessions defined using the Harding-
Pagan algorithm.
2A.11 Comparison to Earlier Chronologies and Qualitative
Sources on Recessions - 1926–1928
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2A.12 The onset of the Great Depression - Comparison to Earlier
Research
TABLE A2.11: THE ONSET OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION - TURNING POINTS
Country This study Burns and Romer (2004)
Mitchell (1946)
Before mid-1929
Finland 1928-Q3
Australia 1929-Q1
Canada 1929-Q1 1929-Q2
Bulgaria 1929-Q2
Czechoslovakia 1929-Q2 1929-Q4
Germany 1929-Q2 1929-Q2 1928-Q1
Italy 1929-Q2 1929-Q3
Poland 1929-Q2 1929-Q1
Switzerland 1929-Q2 1929-Q4
Mid 1929- December 1929
Austria 1929-Q3
Belgium 1929-Q3 1929-Q3
Great Britain 1929-Q3 1929-Q3 1930-Q1
Hungary 1929-Q3
Netherlands 1929-Q3 1929-Q4
South Africa 1929-Q3 1930-Q1
United States 1929-Q3 1929-Q3 1929-Q3
Chile 1929-Q4
Japan 1929-Q4 1930-Q1
Mexico 1929-Q4
New Zealand 1929-Q4
Romania 1929-Q4
Spain 1929-Q4
Yugoslavia 1929-Q4
After 1929
France 1930-Q1 1930-Q2
Sweden 1930-Q1 1930-Q1 1930-Q2
Estonia 1930-Q2
Norway 1930-Q3
Denmark 1930-Q4 1930-Q4
Notes: The NBER dates are from Burns and Mitchell (1946, p. 78f) for Germany, France, and Great Britain. For the United States,
the official NBER date is shown, which is August 1929 rather than June 1929. Romer (2004) provides turning points for the above
countries in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Most likely, those are based on industrial production indices. Differences of more than
two quarters in the pre-Depression peak between Romer’s study and the dates found in this study are marked in bold.
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2A.13 Annual Data - Per Capita GDPs
For many countries, “interwar specific estimates” in constant prices of the na-
tional currency exist. Those were given preference over commonly used data
from Barro and Ursúa (2008) and Maddison (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013). How-
ever, the differences to these datasets are generally small except for Denmark and
Switzerland. To avoid the endpoint problem of time series filters, I use GDP data
for all years between 1920 and 1938 to decompose the series into trend and cy-
cle. Naturally, the standard deviation is only calculated for the period for which
monthly data are available.
TABLE A2.12: DATA SOURCES ANNUAL
Country Annual Indicator Population
Type Unit Source Source
Australia GDP 2010 Dollars Hutchinson and Ploeckl
(2016)
Hutchinson and Ploeckl
(2016)
Austria GNP (2008 = 100) Barro and Ursúa (2010) Kausel et al. (1965, p. 44)
Belgium GNP 1936-8 m Belgian
Franc
Buyst (1997) Broadberry and Klein (2012)
Bulgaria GDP m 1939 Lev Bank of Greece et al.
(2014)
Bank of Greece et al. (2014)
Canada GNP45 (2008 = 100) Barro and Ursúa (2010) Maddison (2007)
Chile GDP (2008 = 100) Barro and Ursúa (2010) Díaz et al. (2007, p. 124)
Czechoslovakia GDP46 m 1929 Czech
Crowns
Pryor et al. (1971, p. 47) Broadberry and Klein (2012)
Denmark GDP m 1929 Danish
Crowns
Bjerke (1955)47 Hansen (1976, p. 203)
Estonia GDP m 1929 Estonian
crowns
Valge (2003)48 Valge (2003)
Finland GDP 1926 Prices in m
Marka
Smits et al. (2009) Broadberry and Klein (2012)
France GDP m 1905-1913 Francs Mitchell (2003a, p. 909) Broadberry and Klein (2012)
45I calculate the growth rate of the GNP series in 1920 prices to project the GNP of 1925 back-
wards.
46I scale the 1929 benchmark estimate with the GDP volume index. Both are found in Pryor
et al. (1971).
47From 1930 onwards, I splice in the official GDP series in constant 1935 dollars. Bjerke noted
that his deflation method would certainly underestimate the fall in output. Indeed the fall is more
pronounced in the official series.
48The GDP observation for 1923 is excluded in the calculation of the trend. It would imply a
growth rate of more than 30 % from 1923 to 1924.
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DATA SOURCES ANNUAL (CONTINUED)
Country Annual Indicator Population
Type Unit Source Source
Germany GDP (2008 = 100) Barro and Ursúa (2010) Broadberry and Klein (2012)
Great Britain GDP 1938 m Pounds Sefton and Weale (1995, p.
188-189); Thomas et al. (2010)
Broadberry and Klein (2012)
Hungary NNP m 1938/1939 pen-
gos
Eckstein (1955)49 Broadberry and Klein (2012)
Italy GDP m 1938 Lira Baffigi (2011) Broadberry and Klein (2012)
Japan GDP m 1934-1936 Yen O¯kawa et al. (1974), Smits
et al. (2009)
Statistics Japan (2017)
Mexico GDP Millions of Mexi-
can Pesos 1970
Smits et al. (2009) Maddison (2007)
Netherlands GDP m 1913 Guilders Smits et al. (2009) Broadberry and Klein (2012)
New Zealand GNP m 1911 Pounds Rankin (1992, p. 61) Rankin (1992, p. 58)
Norway GDP m Kroner (1938
prices)
Central Bureau of Statistics
Norway (1952, p. 128)
Grytten (2004, p. 275)
Poland GDP50 1990 GKS Roses and Wolf (2010, p.
190), Broadberry and Klein
(2012)
Broadberry and Klein (2012)
Romania GDP m US $ PPP 2000 Savoiu and Manea (2014) Bank of Greece et al. (2014)
South Africa GNP (2008 = 100) Barro and Ursúa (2010). Frankema and Jerven (2014)
Spain GDP 2011 EKS Prados de la Escosura (2016) Prados de la Escosura (2016)
Sweden GDP m Swedish Crowns
(1913 prices)
Johansson (1967, p. 161) Johansson (1967, p. 157)
Switzerland GNP51 m 1925 Swiss
Frank
Gerlach and Gerlach-Kristen
(2005), Historical Statistics of
Switzerland (2016a, Q.16a)
Broadberry and Klein (2012)
United States GDP m 2009 US Dollars Johnston and Williamson
(2008)
Johnston and Williamson
(2008)
Yugoslavia NI m Dinar (1938
prices)
Bank of Greece et al. (2014) Bank of Greece et al. (2014)
49Compounding interpolation for 1921-1923. Data had to be adjusted from fiscal years to cal-
endar years.
50I interpolate between the years 1925 and 1929 as no estimates are available. For this I use the
1922 estimate in Roses and Wolf (2010, p. 190) and GDP data from Broadberry and Klein (2012)
for 1929 onwards. While this linear interpolation is far from perfect, it corresponds well with the
growth path of industrial production estimates (see Mitchell, 2014).
51The official GDP estimate seems flawed as the service sector is deflated heavily, which leads
to real income estimates that are inconceivable given the contemporary description of the Great
Depression in Switzerland (Methorst, 1938, p. 222). Therefore I use Gerlach and Gerlach-Kristen
(2005) estimate of real economic activity (based on National Income from 1930 on) to calculate a
Real GDP in 1925 prices. The nominal GDP for 1925 is from Historical Statistics of Switzerland
(2016a, Q.16a).
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2A.14 Annual Data - Manufacturing / IP indices
All data indices are from League of Nations (1945, p. 134), except for the follow-
ing:
• Bulgaria: Ivanov and Tooze (2007)
• Yugoslavia: Stajic´ (1957)
• Mexico: Mitchell (2014)
• Switzerland: Historical Statistics of Switzerland (2016b)
• South Africa: Archer (1989, p. 18)
2A.15 Monthly Data - Country Sheets
This section provides source sheets for each country. The abbreviation STATI
refers to data from the Statistische Handbuch der Weltwirtschaft, the abbrevia-
tion IAES to those from the International Abstract of Economic Statistics. The
countries are ordered by continent. Column 3 reports whether the series was
seasonally adjusted, which is true for all series but the central bank ones. The
seasonal adjustment has been carried out by using the X-13 ARIMA plugin of
the IRIS toolbox for Matlab. Column 4 reports the MCD-smoothing parameter.
The remaining columns report the coefficients of the first principal component
from the Principal Component Analysis, estimated with the SVD (singular value
decomposition) algorithm. They are normalized by the absolute sum of the es-
timated coefficients. This has no impact on the index, but improves readability.
They can be interpreted as the weights in percentage terms. Indices are only
shown if more than seven series are available for estimating the respective ver-
sion of the index.
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Europe
Austria
TABLE A2.13: DATA AUSTRIA
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Industrial production Index (1923/1931=100) STATI 3 2 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03
Cattle sold at St. Marx 1000s IAES 3 6 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Beer (wort) - production 1000 hl IAES 3 5 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Lignite - production 1000 t STATI 3 4 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Coal - production 1000 t IAES 3 6 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Iron ore - production 1000 t STATI 3 6 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03
Paper - production 1000 t STATI 3 6 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Cardboard - production 1000 t STATI 3 6 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Electricity - production m kWh STATI 3 4 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
Electricity in Vienna - consumption m kWh IAES 3 3 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Iron Industries - orders Index (100=“normal”) STATI 3 3 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Pig iron - production Index (100=“normal”) IAES 3 6 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03
Steel - production Index (100=“normal”) IAES 3 6 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
Semi-processed metal goods - production Index (100=“normal”) IAES 3 6 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
Cotton mills - orders Index (1923/31=100) STATI 3 2 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Capital goods - turnover Index (1923/31=100) STATI 3 1 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03
Consumption goods - turnover Index (1923/31=100) STATI 3 6 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Transported goods - railways Cars per day STATI 3 3 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Transported goods - railways ton-kilometers per day STATI 3 3 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Unemployed - registered job seekers 1000s STATI 3 0 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
Unemployment - benefit recipients 1000s STATI 3 0 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
Unemployed in Vienna 1000s STATI 3 0 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
Unemployment - job hunting advertisements 1000s IAES 3 1 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
Unemployment - job advertisements 1000s IAES 3 5 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Unemployment - filled vacancies 1000s IAES 3 5 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
Overseas emigrants Individuals IAES 3 4 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Company register of Vienna, Lower Austria, Bur-
genland - new companies
Number IAES 3 6 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Company register of Vienna, Lower Austria, Bur-
genland - failures
Number IAES 3 6 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Company register of Vienna, Lower Austria, Bur-
genland - companies dissolved
Number IAES 3 4 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Company register of Vienna, Lower Austria, Bur-
genland - liquidations
Number IAES 3 4 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Bankruptcies Number STATI 3 6 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
Company liquidations - total Number STATI 3 4 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
Trade
Imports - total m Schilling STATI 3 3 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Exports - total m Schilling STATI 3 2 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1914(1-6)=100) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - food Index (1914(1-6)=100) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - industrial goods Index (1914(1-6)=100) STATI 3 1
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - currency in circulation m Schilling STATI 0 0.01
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 -0.01
Central bank - deposits m Schilling STATI 0 -0.01
Central bank - giro turnover m Schilling STATI 3 4 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Private banks - postal cheque turnover m Schilling STATI 3 3 0.02 0.02 0.02
Private banks - interest on 30 day call money % STATI 3 0 -0.02
New capital in GMbH & stock companies m Schilling STATI 3 6 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Stock market - 35 industrial shares Index (1923/32=100) STATI 3 1 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Securities - turnover m Schilling IAES 3 4 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Number of Variables 30 39 31 39 43
Variance explained 50 48 47 48 44
Comments
• Total exports & imports: quarterly values for 1925 have been converted to monthly values
by dividing them by 3.
• Unemployed - registered job seekers: values for January and February 1925 were missing and
assumed to take those of March 1925.
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Belgium
TABLE A2.14: DATA BELGIUM
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Industrial production - general index Index (1923/1925) STATI 3 3 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.03
Glass industry - production Index (1923/1925) STATI 3 3 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02
Coal - production 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
Coal - storage 1000 tons STATI 3 0 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01
Pig iron - production 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02
Crude steel - production 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02
Steel mills - ingots 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02
Steel mills - wrought steel 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02
Shipping - ships incoming (Port of Antwerp) m tons IAES 3 6 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02
Shipping - ships incoming (Port of Ghent) 1000 tons IAES 3 5 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02
Railways - goods transported 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02
Unemployed - full-time workers Individuals STATI 3 6 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02
Insured unemployed - full-time workers % STATI 3 2 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02
Unemployment - working days lost due to unem-
ployment of insured workers
Days IAES 3 2 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02
Unemployed - part-time workers 1000s IAES 3 3 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02
Proportion of applicants to job offers % IAES 3 2 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02
Textiles - production Index (1923/1925) STATI 3 3 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.02
Wool - production tons STATI 3 6 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
Coke - production 1000 tons IAES 3 2 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02
Furnaces in Blast (End of Month) Number IAES 3 1 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02
Tax receipts - direct taxation m Francs IAES 3 3 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Trade
Tax receipts - customs and excise m Francs IAES 3 4 -0.02 -0.02
Total imports (quantity) m tons IAES 3 4 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.02
Total exports (quantity) m tons IAES 3 5 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.02
Imports - raw materials and semi-manufactured
goods (Quantity)
m tons IAES 3 4 0.03 0.02
Imports - raw materials and semi-manufactured
goods (value)
b Francs IAES 3 2 0.03 0.02
Exports - manufactured goods (quantity) m tons IAES 3 6 0.02 0.02
Exports - manufactured goods (value) b Francs IAES 3 6 0.02 0.02
Imports - foodstuffs and drinks m Francs STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01
Imports - manufactured goods m Francs STATI 3 2 0.02 0.01
Exports - foodstuffs and drinks m Francs STATI 3 3 0.00 0.00
Exports - raw materials and semi-manufactured
goods
m Francs STATI 3 4 0.02 0.02
Imports - cotton tons STATI 3 6 0.02 0.02
Imports - wool tons STATI 3 5 0.01 0.01
Imports - coal 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.01 0.01
Imports - coke 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02
Imports - iron ore 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.03 0.02
Imports - pig iron 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.03 0.02
Imports - machines m Francs STATI 3 2 0.02 0.01
Exports - coal 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.01 0.01
Exports - iron bars 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.02 0.01
Exports - zinc tons STATI 3 6 0.01 0.01
Exports - zinc sheets tons STATI 3 6 0.02 0.02
Exports - machines m Francs STATI 3 5 0.02 0.02
Exports - textiles m Francs STATI 3 4 0.02 0.02
Exports - cotton fabrics tons STATI 3 6 0.03 0.02
Exports - Glassware m Francs STATI 3 6 0.02 0.02
Exports - plate glass tons STATI 3 6 0.03 0.02
Exports - chemical products m Francs STATI 3 6 0.01 0.01
Prices
Wholesale prices (general index) Index (April 1914) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - elastic goods Index (April 1914) STATI 3 0
Retail prices Index (April 1914) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices Index (1921) STATI 3 0
Foodstuff prices Index (1921) STATI 3 1
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - currency in circulation m Francs STATI 0 -0.00
Central bank - public deposits m Francs STATI 0 0.00
Central bank - private deposits m Francs STATI 0 0.00
Central bank - bank rate m Francs STATI 0 -0.01
Market rate % STATI 3 1 -0.01
Clearings - Brussels and provinces m Francs STATI 3 4 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
Giro cheques - turnover m Francs STATI 3 2 0.00
Caisse Generale d’Epargne (savings bank) - sav-
ing deposits
m Francs STATI 3 0 -0.02
Caisse Generale d’Epargne (savings bank) - new
deposits
m Francs IAES 3 3 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
Caisse Generale d’Epargne (savings bank) - with-
drawals
m Francs IAES 3 3 -0.02
Registered mortgages m Francs IAES 3 6 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00
Stock market index Index (1928 = 100) STATI 3 1 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
Number of Variables 20 27 18 53 63
Variance explained 59 49 47 42 39
Comments
• Wholesale prices - elastic goods: values for January and February 1931 are linearly interpo-
lated.
• Railways - goods transported: The first 8 months of 1925 were extrapolated by splicing in a
deflated series of total railway receipts.
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FIGURE A2.18: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Bel-
gium (Level)
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FIGURE A2.19: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Bel-
gium (Cycle)
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Bulgaria
TABLE A2.15: DATA BULGARIA
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Coal production (state-owned mines) tons BM 3 6 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.07
Coal production (privately-owned mines) tons BM 3 6 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.06
Government income - direct taxes 1000 Lev BM 3 5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Employed workers 1000s STATI 3 3 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.08
Railway index Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 4 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.08
Trade
Total imports m Lev STATI 3 3 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.10
Total exports m Lev STATI 3 6 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.07
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - foodstuff (excluding meat) Index (1932/34) STATI 3 1
Wholesale Prices - meat Index (1932/34) STATI 3 1
Consumer prices Index (1933/1934) STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - gold stock STATI 0 0.07
Central bank - foreign exchange holdings m Lev STATI 0 0.11
Central bank - bills of exchange and advances m Lev STATI 0 0.07
Central bank - advances to the government m Lev STATI 0 -0.05
Central bank - currency in circulation m Lev STATI 0 0.05
Central bank - deposits m Lev STATI 0 0.06
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 -0.01
Protested bills of exchange m Lev STATI 3 2 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01
Clearings m Lev STATI 3 3 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.08
Number of Variables 4 9 9 9 16
Variance explained 52 36 36 36 32
Comments
• Railway index : two series have been linked via re-basing.
• All price series: series have been linked via re-basing.
• Coal Production (State-owned Mines): Excludes mines other than the one in Pernik from 1934
on. However, those mines produced negligible amounts.
• BM is the abbreviation for the Bulgarian Bulletin mensuel by the Direction Général de la Statis-
tique, various issues.
• The stabilization in 1932 is not visible in the GDP’s by Bank of Greece et al. (2014), but is
very marked in the Maddison GDP estimates (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013).
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FIGURE A2.20: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Bul-
garia (Level)
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FIGURE A2.21: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Bul-
garia (Cycle)
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Czechoslovakia
TABLE A2.16: DATA CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Industrial production (official index) Index (1929) STATI 3 0 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.04
Coal - production 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.03
Lignite - production 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.04
Coke - production 1000 tons STATI 3 0 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.04
Railways - transported goods 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.04
Railways - national car loadings 1000s IAES 3 4 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.04
Railways - international car loadings 1000s IAES 3 3 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.03
Unemployed job seekers Number STATI 3 0 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.04 -0.04
Bankruptcies Number STATI 3 6 -0.10 -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03
Liquidations Number STATI 3 2 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02
Trade
Imports - total m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.04
Exports - total m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.04
Imports - foodstuff m Crowns STATI 3 6 0.02 0.02
Imports - raw materials m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.04 0.04
Imports - fully-manufactured goods m Crowns STATI 3 4 0.04 0.04
Exports - foodstuff m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.02 0.02
Exports - raw materials m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.03 0.03
Exports - fully-manufactured goods m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.04 0.04
Imports - cotton tons STATI 3 4 0.03 0.02
Imports - wool tons STATI 3 6 0.03 0.02
Imports - machines m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.04 0.04
Exports - iron bars 1000 tons STATI 3 5 0.04 0.04
Exports - cotton fabrics m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.04 0.04
Exports - woolen fabrics m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.04 0.04
Exports - leather and leather goods m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.04 0.03
Exports - glass m Crowns STATI 3 5 0.04 0.03
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1 Jul, 1914) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - foodstuff Index (1 Jul, 1914) STATI 3 1
Consumer prices - general index Index (1 Jul, 1914) STATI 3 2
Consumer prices - food Index (1 Jul, 1914) STATI 3 2
Consumer prices - clothes Index (1 Jul, 1914) STATI 3 1
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - bills of exchange and advances m Crowns STATI 0 -0.00
Central bank - currency in circulation m Crowns STATI 0 0.02
Central bank - deposits m Crowns STATI 0 -0.01
Clearings m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Clearings - giro cheques (saving banks) m Crowns STATI 3 6 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Central bank - Bank rate % STATI 0 -0.00
Saving banks - deposits m Crowns STATI 3 0 -0.03
Stock market - industrial and logistics stocks Index (3. January 1927) STATI 3 0 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.03
Bond market index Index (3. January 1927) STATI 3 0 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
Number of Variables 10 16 12 30 35
Variance explained 76 62 63 58 52
Comments
• Consumer prices - general index: There is a new basket from 1930 on, but no apparent change
in the series.
• Central bank - currency in circulation: Excludes 10 and 20 Crowns bills from 1932 on.
• Stock and security market indices: Until 1926 beginning of the month, thereafter end of the
week averages.
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FIGURE A2.22: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
Czechoslovakia (Level)
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FIGURE A2.23: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
Czechoslovakia (Cycle)
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Denmark
TABLE A2.17: DATA DENMARK
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Industrial production Index Klovland
(1998)
3 3 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.05
Shipbuilding - constructions started 1000 register tons STATI 3 5 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.06
Shipbuilding - constructions finished 1000 register tons STATI 3 5 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.06
Shipping - goods incoming 1000 tons STATI 3 0 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.04
Shipping - goods outgoing 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.04
Bankruptcies Number STATI 3 6 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05
Unemployed union members % STATI 3 1 -0.10 -0.11 -0.07 -0.06
Trade
Imports - total m Crowns STATI 3 4 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.06
Exports - total m Crowns STATI 3 5 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.06
Imports - wheat 1000 tons STATI 3 4 -0.02 -0.01
Imports - corn 1000 tons STATI 3 4 -0.04 -0.03
Imports - oil cakes 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.05 0.04
Imports - textiles m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.06 0.05
Exports - cattle 1000s STATI 3 3 0.01 0.00
Exports - butter 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.04 0.03
Exports - eggs m eggs STATI 3 6 -0.03 -0.03
Exports - bacon 1000 tons STATI 3 3 -0.04 -0.03
Prices
Maritime freight rates Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - gold stock m Crowns STATI 0 0.05
Central bank - foreign exchange m Crowns STATI 0 0.03
Central bank - deposits m Crowns STATI 0 -0.02
Central bank - currency in circulation m Crowns STATI 0 0.04
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 -0.01
Commercial banks - bills of exchange m Crowns STATI 3 1 0.01
Commercial banks - advances m Crowns STATI 3 1 0.01
Commercial banks - deposits m Crowns STATI 3 1 0.02
Stocks - general index Index (1/7/1914=100) STATI 3 1 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.06
Bonds - general index Index (1/7/1914=100) STATI 3 0 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
Stocks - turnover m Crowns STATI 3 6 0.00 0.00 -0.00
Bonds - turnover m Crowns STATI 3 6 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02
Number of Variables 7 13 10 21 29
Variance explained 59 46 52 36 30
Comments
• Maritime freight rates: Two indices have been linked via re-basing.
• Union unemployment: Values for April and May 1925 were missing and hence linearly in-
terpolated.
• Wholesale prices: Two indices have been linked via re-basing.
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FIGURE A2.24: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Den-
mark (Level)
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FIGURE A2.25: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Den-
mark (Cycle)
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Estonia
TABLE A2.18: DATA ESTONIA
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Employment - mining and industry Number STATI 3 1 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.08
Railways - transported goods 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.06
Incoming ships - transported goods 1000 net register tons STATI 3 6 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.05
Unemployed Number STATI 3 3 -0.15 -0.15 -0.11 -0.08
Trade
Imports - total 1000 Crowns STATI 3 3 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.08
Exports - total 1000 Crowns STATI 3 3 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.08
Exports - flax tons STATI 3 6 0.02 0.02
Exports - butter tons STATI 3 4 0.06 0.05
Exports - eggs 1000s STATI 3 6 0.05 0.03
Exports - sawn wood 1000 cubic meters STATI 3 6 0.06 0.04
Exports - paper tons STATI 3 6 0.10 0.07
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1913) STATI 3 1
Consumer prices (in Reval) - general index Index (1913) STATI 3 1
Consumer prices (in Reval) - foodstuff Index (1913) STATI 3 1
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - gold holdings m Crowns STATI 0 -0.01
Central bank - foreign exchange holdings m Crowns STATI 0 0.05
Central bank - bills of exchange and advances m Crowns STATI 0 -0.00
Central bank - currency in circulation m Crowns STATI 0 0.04
Clearings m Crowns STATI 3 2 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.07
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 0.03
Commercial banks - bills of exchange and ad-
vances
m Crowns STATI 3 0 0.07
Commercial banks - deposits m Crowns STATI 3 0 0.07
Protested bills of exchange 1000 Crowns STATI 3 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Number of Variables 4 8 8 13 20
Variance explained 66 60 60 47 39
Comments
• Flax exports: Values for July 1928 and October 1930 were missing and linearly interpolated.
• Employment (mining and industry): Values for June - December 1926 have been linearly in-
terpolated.
• In the case of Estonia, it was impossible to find a ninth series for the more restrictive Eco-
nomic Activity indicators. In this case, the two more restrictive indicators rely only on 8
series.
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FIGURE A2.26: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Esto-
nia (Level)
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FIGURE A2.27: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Esto-
nia (Cycle)
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Finland
TABLE A2.19: DATA FINLAND
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Unemployment Index (1932) STATI 3 2 -0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05
Wholesale - turnover m Markkas STATI 3 5 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.05
Railways - transported goods 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.05
Shipping - transported goods 1000 NRT STATI 3 5 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.05
Bankruptcies - total Cases STATI 3 4 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04
Bankruptcies - agriculture Cases STATI 3 6 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05
Trade
Imports - total m Markkas STATI 3 4 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.06
Exports - total m Markkas STATI 3 5 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.04
Imports - coal and coke 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.04 0.03
Imports - cotton Tons STATI 3 6 0.04 0.03
Exports - butter Tons STATI 3 6 -0.02 -0.01
Exports - wood 1000 cubic meters STATI 3 6 0.03 0.02
Exports - cellulose 1000 tons STATI 3 6 -0.01 -0.01
Exports - wood pulp 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.03 0.02
Exports - paper 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.03 0.02
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1926) STATI 3 1
Consumer prices - general index Index (1914) STATI 3 1
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - gold holdings m Markkas STATI 0 0.01
Central bank - foreign exchange holdings m Markkas STATI 0 0.02
Central bank - bills of exchange and advances m Markkas STATI 0 0.01
Central bank - currency in circulation m Markkas STATI 0 0.05
Central bank - deposits m Markkas STATI 0 0.04
Clearings - foreign and domestic stocks m Markkas STATI 3 2 0.08 0.07 0.06
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 -0.04
Commercial banks - bills of exchange and ad-
vances
m Markkas STATI 3 0 0.01
Commercial banks - deposits m Markkas STATI 3 1 0.02
Saving banks - deposits m Markkas STATI 3 0 0.02
New life insurance contracts m Markkas STATI 3 3 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.05
Stocks Index STATI 3 1 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.06
Stock turnover m Markkas STATI 3 3 0.04 0.03 0.03
Protested bills of exchange m Markkas STATI 3 4 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04
Number of Variables 5 13 10 20 29
Variance explained 68 55 57 39 32
Comments
• Gold holdings: First twelve values converted to the 1926 parity.
• Unemployment: I link two unemployment series by rebasing them to a common year. Last
two values for the later series are assumed to take the value of October 1936.
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FIGURE A2.28: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Fin-
land (Level)
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FIGURE A2.29: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Fin-
land (Cycle)
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France
TABLE A2.20: DATA FRANCE
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Industrial production - general index Index (1913) STATI 3 0 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.02
Mining - production Index (1913) STATI 3 2 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02
Iron and steel - production Index (1913) STATI 3 1 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
Metal processing - production Index (1913) STATI 3 0 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
Cars - production Index (1913) STATI 3 0 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02
Rubber - production Index (1913) STATI 3 0 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02
Paper - production Index (1913) STATI 3 0 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
Leather - production Index (1913) STATI 3 0 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01
Textiles (all) - production Index (1913) STATI 3 0 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
Cotton - production Index (1913) STATI 3 2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Wool - production Index (1913) STATI 3 1 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Silk - production Index (1913) STATI 3 0 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Construction sector Index (1913) STATI 3 0 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01
Coal and lignite - production 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Iron ore - production 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Potassium - production 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Pig iron - production 1000 tons STATI 3 1 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
Raw steel - production 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
Cotton mills - spindles employed 1000s STATI 3 3 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02
Cotton mills - production per spindle kg STATI 3 3 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
Cotton Mills - stocks per spindle kg STATI 3 1 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Cotton mills - orders per spindle kg STATI 3 2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Weaving mills - looms employed 1000s STATI 3 2 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01
Weaving mills - production per loom piece of 100m per loom STATI 3 2 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01
Weaving mills - stocks per loom piece of 100m per loom STATI 3 0 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Weaving mills - orders per loom piece of 100m per loom STATI 3 1 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
Wool conditioning 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Silk conditioning tons STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Railways - transported goods 1000s STATI 3 3 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02
Shipping - shipped goods 1000 tons STATI 3 5 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
Unmatched job requests 1000s STATI 3 0 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02
Unemployed on benefits 1000 Individuals STATI 3 0 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
Trade
Imports - total m Franc STATI 3 2 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
Exports - total m Franc STATI 3 2 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02
Imports - foodstuff m Franc STATI 3 2 -0.01 -0.01
Imports - raw materials m Franc STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02
Imports - fully-manufactured goods m Franc STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02
Exports - foodstuff m Franc STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01
Exports - raw materials m Franc STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01
Exports - fully -manufactured goods m Franc STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02
Imports - raw cotton 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.01 0.01
Imports - raw wool 1000 tons STATI 3 5 0.00 0.00
Imports - coal & coke 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.02 0.02
Imports - copper 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.02 0.02
Imports - machines m Franc STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02
Exports - iron goods 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.01 0.00
Exports - machines, vessels and electronics m Franc STATI 3 3 0.02 0.02
Exports - cars (including partial manufactures) m Franc STATI 3 4 0.01 0.01
Exports - non-precious metals m Franc STATI 3 2 0.01 0.01
Exports - cotton fabrics tons STATI 3 6 0.01 0.01
Exports - woolen fabrics tons STATI 3 4 0.02 0.02
Exports - silk fabrics tons STATI 3 6 0.01 0.01
Exports - clothing m Franc STATI 3 3 0.02 0.02
Exports - goods from the chemical industry m Franc STATI 3 3 0.02 0.01
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1926/1928) STATI 3 0
Retail prices (Paris) - general index Index STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - currency in circulation m Franc STATI 0 -0.00
Central bank - private deposits m Franc STATI 0 -0.02
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 0.00
Central bank - market rate % STATI 3 1 0.01
Clearings m Franc STATI 3 2 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01
Real interest rate on bonds % STATI 3 1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Real dividends on shares % STATI 3 2 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
4 large credit banks - cash position m Franc STATI 3 1 -0.02
4 large credit banks - Balance m Franc STATI 3 2 0.02
4 large credit banks - bills of exchange m Franc STATI 3 1 0.00
4 large credit banks - advances m Franc STATI 3 2 0.01
4 large credit banks - deposits m Franc STATI 3 1 -0.01
4 large credit banks - acceptances m Franc STATI 3 1 0.01
Emissions - shares m Franc STATI 3 6 0.02 0.01 0.01
Emissions - bonds m Franc STATI 3 6 0.01 0.01 0.01
Stock market - general index Index (1913) STATI 3 1 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
Bond market - general index Index (1913) STATI 3 1 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
Number of Variables 32 41 20 61 71
Variance explained 53 46 48 41 39
Comments
• From March 1935 onwards many series exclude the Saarland territory.
• Transportation - shipped goods: Excluding coal and traffic within France.
• Wholesale prices: Two series were linked.
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FIGURE A2.30: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
France (Level)
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FIGURE A2.31: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
France (Cycle)
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Germany
TABLE A2.21: DATA GERMANY
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Industrial production - general index Index (1928) STATI 3 1 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.03
Capital goods - production Index (1928) STATI 3 1 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.03
Consumption goods - production Index (1928) STATI 3 1 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02
Paper - production Index (1928) STATI 3 2 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.03
Textiles - production Index (1928) STATI 3 0 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.01
Shoes - production Index (1928) STATI 3 3 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02
Electricity - production Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 1 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03
Retail sales - total Index (1928) STATI 3 3 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.03
Retail sales - foodstuff Index (1928) STATI 3 3 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.03
Retail Sales - clothes Index (1928) STATI 3 4 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.03
Retail sales - household inventories Index (1928) STATI 3 3 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.03
Railways - car loadings for goods 1000s per day STATI 3 1 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.03
Unemployed - recipients of unemployment insur-
ance
1000s STATI 3 0 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00
Bankruptcies Number STATI 3 1 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00
Liquidations Number STATI 3 1 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.00 -0.00
Trade
Imports - total m Reichsmark STATI 3 1 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.03
Exports - total m Reichsmark STATI 3 2 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Imports - foodstuffs m Reichsmark STATI 3 4 0.02 0.02
Imports - raw materials & semi-manufactured
goods
m Reichsmark STATI 3 2 0.03 0.03
Imports - manufactured goods m Reichsmark STATI 3 1 0.02 0.02
Exports - foodstuffs m Reichsmark STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01
Exports - - raw materials & semi-manufactured
goods
m Reichsmark STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02
Exports - manufactured goods m Reichsmark STATI 3 3 0.03 0.02
Exports - capital goods m Reichsmark STATI 3 3 0.02 0.02
Exports - consumption goods m Reichsmark STATI 3 3 0.03 0.02
Imports - oleiferous fruits 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.00 0.00
Imports - cotton 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.00 0.00
Imports - wool 1000 tons STATI 3 5 -0.00 -0.00
Imports - timber 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02
Imports - petroleum 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.03 0.03
Imports - iron ore 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.03 0.03
Imports - copper 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.01 0.01
Exports - coal 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01
Exports - machines m Reichsmark STATI 3 3 0.02 0.02
Exports - electric manufactures m Reichsmark STATI 3 4 0.02 0.02
Exports - paint and lacquer m Reichsmark STATI 3 4 0.01 0.01
Exports - cotton fabrics tons STATI 3 3 0.03 0.03
Exports - woolen fabrics tons STATI 3 3 0.02 0.02
Exports - silk fabrics tons STATI 3 3 0.03 0.02
Exports - clothes m Reichsmark STATI 3 4 0.01 0.01
Exports - glass manufactures 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.02 0.02
Exports - paper and paper goods 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.02 0.02
Prices
Maritime freight rates Index (1913) STATI 3 1
Prices - goods of elastic demand Index (1913) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - general Index (1913) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - agriculture Index (1913) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - industrial raw materials and
semi-processed goods
Index (1913) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - fully-manufactured Goods Index (1913) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - fully-manufactured goods
(capital goods only)
Index (1913) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - fully-manufactured goods
consumption goods only)
Index (1913) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - general index Index (1913/1914) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - foodstuffs Index (1913/1914) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - housing Index (1913/1914) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - heating & light Index (1913/1914) STATI 3 1
Consumer prices - clothes Index (1913/1914) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - miscellaneous Index (1913/1914) STATI 3 0
Prices - construction costs Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 0
Hourly wages in 17 sectors Index (1928) STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - Currency in circulation m Reichsmark STATI 0 0.02
Central bank - giro turnover m Reichsmark STATI 0 0.03
Clearings m Reichsmark STATI 3 2 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03
Giro cheque clearings m Reichsmark STATI 3 2 0.06 0.03 0.03
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 0.00
Market rate % STATI 3 0 -0.00
Interest rate - daily money (demand deposits) % STATI 3 2 -0.01
Interest rate - one month maturities % STATI 3 1 -0.01
Interest rate - trade bills % STATI 3 0 -0.00
Commercial banks - interest rate on debit % STATI 3 0 -0.01
Commercial banks - interest rate on credit % STATI 3 1 0.01
Stock market - emissions m Reichsmark STATI 3 6 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02
Bond market - emissions m Reichsmark STATI 3 3 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Number of Variables 15 21 17 46 55
Variance explained 62 56 53 41 36
Comments
• Many series include the Saarland from March 1935 onwards.
• Shoes - production: New composition of the index from 1935 onwards, but series are broadly
consistent.
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• Prices - construction cost : Two series were linked.
• Unemployment - recipients of unemployment insurance): From October 1936 on, recipients of
the Krisenfürsorge are included in the original series. I deduct their number (454,000) from
the values in the last quarter of this series.
• Hourly Wages: No variation from June 1933 onwards.
• Central Bank - currency in circulation: From 1932 onwards, there is a slight change in the
composition of the series.
• Interest rate - one month maturities: Little variation from 1934 on.
• Interest rate - trade bills: Little variation from 1933 onwards.
• Stock market - emissions: Values for 1925 were recorded as quarterly sums and were simply
split into monthly data.
• Liquidation: Last three values for 1925 were recorded as quarterly sums and were simply
split into monthly data.
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FIGURE A2.32: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Ger-
many (Level)
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FIGURE A2.33: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Ger-
many (Cycle)
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Great Britain
TABLE A2.22: DATA GREAT BRITAIN
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Business activity - general index Index (1935) Economist 3 1 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.02
Insured unemployed (males) - total 1000s IAES 3 1 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03
Insured unemployed (males) - coal 1000s IAES 3 2 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.00
Insured unemployed (males) - iron and steel 1000s IAES 3 1 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03
Insured unemployed (males) - engineering 1000s IAES 3 0 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03
Insured unemployed (males) - shipbuilding 1000s IAES 3 0 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03
Insured unemployed (males) - building and con-
struction
1000s IAES 3 1 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02
Insured unemployed (males) - textiles 1000s IAES 3 1 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02
Insured unemployed (males) - other industries 1000s IAES 3 0 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03
Insured unemployed (females) - total 1000s IAES 3 0 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02
Insured unemployed (females) - textiles 1000s IAES 3 1 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02
Coal - production 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02
Pig iron - production 1000 tons STATI 3 0 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.02
Raw steel - production 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.02
Railways - transported goods (mining others) m tons IAES 3 4 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03
Railways - transported goods (miscellaneous) m tons IAES 3 3 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02
Railways - receipts m tons IAES 3 3 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02
Incoming ships - goods 1000 NRT STATI 3 4 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00
Trade
Imports - total m Pounds STATI 3 4 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
Exports - total m Pounds STATI 3 3 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.03
Imports - foodstuffs m Pounds STATI 3 6 0.01 0.01
Imports - raw materials and semi-processed
goods
m Pounds STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01
Imports - fully-manufactured goods m Pounds STATI 3 5 0.01 0.01
Exports - foodstuffs m Pounds STATI 3 5 0.02 0.02
Exports - raw materials and semi-processed
goods
m Pounds STATI 3 2 0.03 0.02
Exports - fully-manufactured goods m Pounds STATI 3 4 0.03 0.02
Exports - consumption goods m Pounds STATI 3 4 0.03 0.02
Exports - capital goods m Pounds STATI 3 4 0.03 0.02
Imports - wheat 1000 tons STATI 3 6 -0.00 -0.00
Imports - cotton 1000 tons STATI 3 3 -0.00 -0.00
Imports - iron ore 1000 tons STATI 3 1 0.03 0.02
Imports - iron and iron Goods 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.00 0.00
Imports - machines 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.02 0.02
Exports - coal 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.02 0.02
Exports - bunker coal 1000 tons STATI 3 1 0.02 0.02
Exports - iron and iron goods 1001 tons STATI 3 2 0.03 0.03
Exports - cotton yarn tons STATI 3 4 0.02 0.02
Exports - woolen yarn tons STATI 3 4 0.02 0.01
Exports - machines 1000 Pounds STATI 3 4 0.02 0.02
Exports - electric manufactures 1000 Pounds STATI 3 6 0.02 0.01
Exports - ships 1000 Pounds STATI 3 6 0.01 0.01
Exports - cotton weavings m m2 STATI 3 3 0.02 0.02
Exports - woolen weavings 1000 m2 STATI 3 4 0.03 0.02
Prices
Shipping - Maritime freight rates Index (1898/1913) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - general index Index (July 1914) STATI 3 1
Consumer prices - foodstuffs Index (July 1914) STATI 3 1
Consumer prices - textiles Index (July 1914) STATI 3 1
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - reserve holdings m Pounds Howson
(1980)
0 -0.00
Central bank - bills of exchange m Pounds STATI 0 -0.01
Central bank - other securities m Pounds STATI 0 -0.01
Central bank - cash reserve m Pounds STATI 0 0.00
Central bank - currency in circulation m Pounds STATI 0 0.01
Central bank - public deposits m Pounds STATI 0 -0.00
Central bank - deposits by banks m Pounds STATI 0 -0.01
Central bank - private deposits m Pounds STATI 0 0.00
Clearings - London Clearing House (town) m Pounds STATI 3 3 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Clearings - London Clearing House (country) m Pounds STATI 3 2 0.01 0.01 0.00
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 0.01
Interest on call money % STATI 3 0 0.01
Market rate % STATI 3 1 0.01
Interest on treasury bills % STATI 3 1 0.01
Real interest on obligations % STATI 3 2 0.00
Clearing banks - cash reserve m Pounds STATI 3 3 -0.02
Clearing banks - short term loans m Pounds STATI 3 2 0.01
Clearing banks - bills of exchange m Pounds STATI 3 2 -0.02
Clearing banks - securities m Pounds STATI 3 0 -0.01
Clearing banks - advances m Pounds STATI 3 0 -0.01
Clearing banks - deposits m Pounds STATI 3 0 -0.02
Clearing banks - acceptances m Pounds STATI 3 0 0.02
Emissions - total m Pounds STATI 3 6 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Emissions - domestic companies m Pounds STATI 3 6 0.02 0.01 0.01
Stocks - general index Index (1924) STATI 3 2 0.04 0.02 0.02
Bonds - general index Index (1924) STATI 3 2 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
Outstanding treasury bills m Pounds STATI 3 1 -0.01
Number of Variables 17 26 16 49 70
Variance explained 64 50 55 43 33
Comments
• Business activity - general index: The index is taken from The Economist (1933b), and is a
weighted average based on 18 series (4 employment, coal consumption, consumption of
electricity, merchandise on railways, postal receipts, motor vehicle registrations, building
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activity, consumption of iron and steel, imports of non-ferrous metals, exports of British
manufactures, movements of shippings, provincial bank clearings, and London bank clear-
ings).
• Wholesale prices: Two Indices have been linked.
• Railways series: Values for 1932: Thirteen 4-week values were given. Hence the 7th value
was taken, divided by 12 and added to the other months.
• Central bank - reserve holdings: Data after September 1931 was transcribed from Howson
(1980, p. 80) and includes the holdings of the Exchange Equalisation Fund.
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FIGURE A2.34: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Great
Britain (Level)
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FIGURE A2.35: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Great
Britain (Cycle)
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Hungary
TABLE A2.23: DATA HUNGARY
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Mining - lignite 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.03
Mining - iron ore 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.04
Mining - coal 1000 tons IAES 3 5 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
Sugar - production 1000 tons IAES 3 6 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
Alcohol - production 1000 tons IAES 3 6 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.04
Number of applications per 100 job advertise-
ments
number per
100 vacancies
STATI 3 3 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04
Unemployed union members 1000s STATI 3 1 -0.10 -0.08 -0.13 -0.05 -0.04
Railways - transported goods 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.05
Railways - transported goods m ton-km IAES 3 3 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.05
Railways - passengers carried m person-km IAES 3 6 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.05
Railways - car loadings 1000s IAES 3 3 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.05
Bankruptcies Cases IAES 3 6 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02
Liquidations Cases IAES 3 3 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00
Trade
Imports - total m Pengö STATI 3 3 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.05
Exports - total m Pengö STATI 3 3 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.03
Imports - raw cotton t STATI 3 6 0.02 0.01
Imports - wood 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.05 0.04
Imports - coal and coke 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.05 0.04
Imports - machines 1000 Pengö STATI 3 5 0.06 0.05
Imports - cotton materials t STATI 3 5 0.05 0.04
Exports - wheat 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.03 0.03
Exports - flower 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.04 0.03
Exports - cattle 1000s STATI 3 3 0.02 0.01
Exports - pigs 1000s STATI 3 6 0.02 0.02
Prices
Wholesale prices - price-elastic goods Index (1925/27) STATI 3 3
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1913) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices- agricultural goods Index (1913) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - industry Index (1913) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - wheat Pengö per 100 kg STATI 3 4
Consumer prices - general index Index (1913) STATI 3 1
Consumer prices - foodstuffs Index (1913) STATI 3 1
Consumer prices - textiles Index (1913) STATI 3 1
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - gold holdings m Pengö STATI 0 0.03
Central bank - foreign exchange holdings m Pengö STATI 0 0.01
Central bank - bills of exchange and advances m Pengö STATI 0 0.00
Central bank - advances to the government m Pengö STATI 0 0.03
Central bank - currency in circulation m Pengö STATI 0 0.03
Central bank - deposits by the government m Pengö STATI 0 0.02
Central bank - deposits others m Pengö STATI 0 -0.02
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 -0.01
Market rate % STATI 3 1 -0.02
Private banks - current account m Pengö STATI 3 1 0.03
Private banks - savings m Pengö STATI 3 0 0.03
Number of Variables 13 15 11 24 35
Variance explained 52 51 42 46 38
Comments
• Wholesale prices: Prices of “all goods,” “agriculture goods,” and “industry” are based on
a new series from 1929 on. However, the Reichsamt already matched the indices. They
exhibit no structural breaks.
• Central bank - gold holdings: Shows little variation from 1932 on, which might be due to new
regulation.
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FIGURE A2.36: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Hun-
gary (Level)
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FIGURE A2.37: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Hun-
gary (Cycle)
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Italy
TABLE A2.24: DATA ITALY
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Raw steel - production 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.06
Railways - transported goods 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.11 0.17 0.07 0.06
Ships incoming - transported goods 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.09 0.15 0.06 0.05
Ships leaving - transported goods 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.10 0.06 0.06
Unemployed 1000s STATI 3 0 -0.11 -0.15 -0.06 -0.06
Unemployed - agriculture 1000s STATI 3 4 -0.09 -0.05 -0.04
Unemployed - industry 1000s STATI 3 0 -0.11 -0.07 -0.06
Trade
Imports - total m Lira STATI 3 2 0.10 0.16 0.06 0.05
Exports - total m Lira STATI 3 3 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.03
Imports - wheat 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.00 0.00
Imports - raw cotton 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.02 0.01
Imports - wool 1000 tons STATI 3 4 -0.01 -0.01
Imports - wood 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.06 0.05
Imports - coal 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.06 0.05
Imports - scrap metal 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.06 0.05
Imports - machines m Lira STATI 3 3 0.07 0.06
Exports - mandarines, oranges and lemons tons STATI 3 4 -0.01 -0.01
Exports - olive oil tons STATI 3 4 0.03 0.02
Exports - cheese tons STATI 3 6 0.01 0.01
Exports - raw silk tons STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01
Exports - cars Number STATI 3 3 0.05 0.05
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1934 STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - gold holdings m Lira STATI 0 -0.01
Central bank - foreign exchange holdings m Lira STATI 0 -0.00
Central bank - bills of exchange and advances m Lira STATI 0 -0.00
Central bank - currency in circulation m Lira STATI 0 0.04
Central bank - deposits m Lira STATI 0 -0.05
Clearings Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 4 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
Clearings - giro cheques m Lira STATI 3 1 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 0.00
Market rate % STATI 3 0 -0.02
Stock market - IPOs and capital increases for
listed companies
m Lira STATI 3 6 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.03
Stock market - capital decreases and liquidations
of listed companies
m Lira STATI 3 6 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
Number of Variables 7 13 8 25 32
Variance explained 67 43 48 34 29
Comments
• Gold and foreign exchange holdings: Values for the first three years of the series have been
converted to the 1928 parity. I follow the procedure for Article 3 of the decree law No. 253
given in the Federal Reserve Bulletin (Federal Reserve Board, 1928, p. 493).
• Wholesale Prices: Two series were linked via re-basing.
• Clearings: Two series were linked via re-basing.
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FIGURE A2.38: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
Italy (Level)
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FIGURE A2.39: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Italy (Cy-
cle)
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Netherlands
TABLE A2.25: DATA NETHERLANDS
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Coal - production 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01
Construction sector - constructions completed m Guilders STATI 3 6 0.02 0.02 0.01
Incoming Ships - goods 1000 NRT STATI 3 6 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.03
Shipping (ocean vessels) - incoming m tons IAES 3 5 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.03
Shipping (ocean vessels) - cleared goods m tons IAES 3 3 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Shipping (rivers/canals) - cleared goods m tons IAES 3 6 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02
Railways - transported goods 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
Unemployment - total (Insured workers) % STATI 3 2 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03
Unemployment - lost working days (all indus-
tries)
% STATI 3 2 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03
Unemployment - lost working days (coal mining) % STATI 3 6 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03
Unemployment - lost working days (metallurgic
industries)
% STATI 3 0 -0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03
Unemployment - lost working days (foodstuffs
industries)
% STATI 3 1 -0.08 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03
Unemployment - lost working days (textile In-
dustries)
% STATI 3 1 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02
Unemployment - lost working days (construction
industries)
% STATI 3 3 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03
Unemployment - vacancies per 100 Applicants Number IAES 3 1 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.03
Bankruptcies Real Number STATI 3 6 -0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03
Trade
Imports - total m Guilders STATI 3 3 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02
Exports - total m Guilders STATI 3 4 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.03
Imports - Foodstuffs m Guilders STATI 3 4 -0.00 -0.00
Imports - raw materials & semi-manufactured
goods
m Guilders STATI 3 4 0.04 0.03
Imports - manufactured goods m Guilders STATI 3 3 0.02 0.01
Exports - foodstuffs m Guilders STATI 3 3 0.02 0.02
Exports - raw materials & semi-manufactured
goods
m Guilders STATI 3 4 0.03 0.02
Exports - manufactured goods m Guilders STATI 3 4 0.03 0.03
Imports - coal & coke 1000 tons STATI 3 5 0.03 0.03
Exports - butter tons STATI 3 3 0.03 0.03
Exports - cheese tons STATI 3 6 0.02 0.02
Exports - eggs tons STATI 3 6 0.02 0.01
Exports - margarine tons STATI 3 4 0.03 0.03
Exports - coal & coke 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.02 0.01
Exports - artificial silk tons STATI 3 4 0.02 0.01
Exports - cotton fabrics tons STATI 3 3 0.03 0.02
Exports - light bulbs 1000s STATI 3 2 0.02 0.01
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1913) STATI 3 0
Food prices Index (1913 STATI 3 6
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - gold holdings m Guilders STATI 0 -0.03
Central bank - foreign exchange holdings m Guilders STATI 0 0.00
Central bank - bills of exchange m Guilders STATI 0 0.00
Central bank - currency in circulation m Guilders STATI 0 -0.02
Central bank - deposits (total) m Guilders STATI 0 -0.02
Central bank - private Deposits m Guilders STATI 0 -0.02
Central bank - clearings m Guilders STATI 3 3 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.03
Giro cheque turnover m Guilders STATI 3 3 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 0.01
Interest rates - market rate % STATI 3 2 0.02
Interest rates - carryover rate % STATI 3 2 0.01
Saving banks - deposits m Guilders STATI 3 0 -0.03
Stock market - total issuances of obligations and
stocks
m Guilders STATI 3 6 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Stock market - general index Index (21/25) STATI 3 1 0.05 0.03 0.03
Stock market - Index for dutch stocks Index (21/25) STATI 3 1 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.03
Stock market - revenues from stock turnover tax 1000 Guilders STATI 3 6 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01
Number of Variables 15 24 14 39 49
Variance explained 59 48 49 41 38
Comments
• Stock market - revenues from stock turnover tax: values for 10/1925 11/1925 were given as a
sum, which I divide up into the two month into equal proportions.
• Exports - Light Bulbs: Tenfold increase from 1928 on.
• Transport variables: The drop in February and March 1929 is due to severe frost (The
Economist, 1929b).
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FIGURE A2.40: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Nether-
lands (Level)
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FIGURE A2.41: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Nether-
lands (Cycle)
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Norway
TABLE A2.26: DATA NORWAY
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Industrial Production Index Klovland
(1998)
3 1 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.05
Paper and cartons - production 1000 tons STATI 3 0 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.03
Construction sector - new dwellings Number STATI 3 0 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.03
Ship construction - started 1000 BRT STATI 3 6 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.04
Ship construction - completed 1000 BRT STATI 3 6 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.04
Railways - transported goods 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.04
Shipping - ships incoming 1000 NRT STATI 3 6 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.04
Unemployment - number 1000s STATI 3 1 -0.12 -0.09 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05
Unemployment - unemployed union members % STATI 3 0 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04
Bankruptcies Number STATI 3 6 -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03
Trade
Imports - total m Crowns STATI 3 5 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.03
Exports - total m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.04
Imports - coal 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.05 0.03
Imports - machines m Crowns STATI 3 4 0.05 0.04
Imports - textiles m Crowns STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02
Exports - fish 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.03 0.02
Exports - canned fish tons STATI 3 6 0.01 0.00
Exports - cellulose 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.05 0.03
Exports - wood pulp 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.03 0.03
Exports - paper 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.05 0.03
Prices
Shipping - maritime freight rates Index (1923) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - general Index (1913) STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - bills of exchange m Crowns STATI 0 -0.00
Central bank - currency in circulation m Crowns STATI 0 0.02
Central bank - deposits m Crowns STATI 0 -0.02
Clearings (15 banks in Oslo) m Crowns STATI 3 3 -0.03
Bank Rate (Central Bank) % STATI 0 0.02
Commercial Banks - Bills of Exchange m Crowns STATI 3 1 -0.03
Commercial Banks - Advances m Crowns STATI 3 0 -0.04
Commercial Banks - Deposits m Crowns STATI 3 0 -0.04
Saving Banks - Deposits m Crowns STATI 3 0 -0.04
Bonds Return % of face value STATI 3 1 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04
Stocks - Turnover 1000 Crowns STATI 3 3 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
Bonds - Turnover 1000 Crowns STATI 3 4 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03
Number of Variables 10 15 12 23 32
Variance explained 58 51 48 44 39
Comments
• Paper and cartons - production, Construction sector - new dwellings, Ship construction - started,
Ship construction - completed: First I convert the quarterly sums into quarterly averages. I
then employ a cubic hermite spline interpolation to convert them into monthly data.
• Wholesale prices - general index: New composition from 1932 on, but no apparent change in
the series.
• Bonds returns: From 1934 on, new calculation method, but no apparent break in the series.
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FIGURE A2.42: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Nor-
way (Level)
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FIGURE A2.43: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Nor-
way (Cycle)
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Poland
TABLE A2.27: DATA POLAND
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Industrial production - general index Index (1928) STATI 3 1 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.03
Employment in mining and manufacturing 1000s STATI 3 1 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03
Capital goods - production Index (1928) STATI 3 0 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.03
Consumption goods - production Index (1928) STATI 3 2 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.03
Zinc - production Index (1928) STATI 3 1 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02
Metal and machinery industries - production Index (1928) STATI 3 1 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.03
Chemicals - production Index (1928) STATI 3 3 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.03
Textiles - production Index (1928) STATI 3 1 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.02
Construction Index (1928) STATI 3 2 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.03
Coal - production 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02
Pig iron - production 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03
Crude steel - production 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03
Railways - wagons Index (1928) STATI 3 3 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.03
Railways - wagons above 15 tons number per day STATI 3 3 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03
Unemployment - registered unemployed 1000s STATI 3 0 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02
Bankruptcies Number STATI 3 5 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Trade
Imports - total m Zloty STATI 3 2 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.03
Exports - total m Zloty STATI 3 3 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
Imports - foodstuffs m Zloty STATI 3 4 0.03 0.02
Imports - raw materials and semi-manufactured
goods
m Zloty STATI 3 2 0.04 0.03
Imports - fully-manufactured goods m Zloty STATI 3 3 0.03 0.03
Exports - animals m Zloty STATI 3 3 0.03 0.02
Exports - foodstuffs m Zloty STATI 3 5 0.00 -0.00
Exports - raw materials and semi-manufactured
goods
m Zloty STATI 3 2 0.02 0.01
Exports - fully-manufactured goods m Zloty STATI 3 4 0.02 0.01
Imports - cotton 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01
Imports - wool 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.02 0.01
Imports - machines m Zloty STATI 3 4 0.04 0.03
Exports - pigs 1000s STATI 3 3 0.03 0.02
Exports - wheat 1000 tons STATI 3 6 -0.02 -0.02
Exports - rye 1000 tons STATI 3 6 -0.01 -0.01
Exports - coal 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01
Exports - timber 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.02 0.01
Prices
Nominal wages Index (1931) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1928) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - general index Index (1928) STATI 3 1
Consumer prices - food Index (1928) STATI 3 2
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - bills of exchange and advances m Zloty STATI 0 0.01
Central bank - currency m Zloty STATI 0 0.03
Central bank - government deposits m Zloty STATI 0 0.02
Central bank - private deposits m Zloty STATI 0 0.02
Clearings m Zloty STATI 3 2 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
Giro clearings m Zloty STATI 3 1 0.04 0.03 0.02
Drawn bills of exchange Number STATI 3 3 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.02
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 -0.01
Interest rate - bills of exchange % STATI 0 -0.02
Interest rates - real interest rate on government
bonds
% STATI 3 1 -0.03
Joint-stock banks - bills of exchange m Zloty STATI 3 0 0.03
Joint-stock banks - advances m Zloty STATI 3 1 0.01
Joint-stock banks - deposits m Zloty STATI 3 1 0.02
Saving banks - deposits m Zloty STATI 3 0 0.02
Stock market - general index Index (1928) STATI 3 2 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.03
Number of Variables 16 22 15 37 48
Variance explained 69 62 61 50 47
Comments
• Employment in mining and manufacturing: Two series have been merged. One is seasonally
adjusted, whereas the other is not. The algorithm, in principle, should adapt to varying
patterns of seasonality and thus no further adjustment of the raw data is made.
• Nominal wages: Two indices have been linked via re-basing. The value for December 1936
was assumed to equal the one of November 1936.
• Import and export series related to foodstuff, raw materials and semi-manufactured goods, fully-
manufactured goods, and animals: Values for July-September 1936 were given as the sum.
They were hence divided by 3 and allocated proportionally.
• Interest rates - real interest rate on government bonds: Values for November and December
1936 were missing and assumed to take those of October 1936.
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• Series related to the joint-stock banks: Values for January 1925 were missing and assumed to
take those of February 1925.
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FIGURE A2.44: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
Poland (Level)
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FIGURE A2.45: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
Poland (Cycle)
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Romania
TABLE A2.28: DATA ROMANIA
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Oil -production 1000 tons STATI 3 1 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00
Railways - transported goods 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.08
Lignite - production 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.07
Gasoline - production 1000 tons STATI 3 4 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02
Unemployment - unemployed total 1000s STATI 3 1 -0.08 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04
Unemployment - seasonal workers 1000s STATI 3 2 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05
Moratoria Number STATI 3 6 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04
Trade
Imports - total m Lei STATI 3 4 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.05
Exports - total m Lei STATI 3 3 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05
Exports - cattle 1000s STATI 3 2 0.10 0.08
Exports - corn 1000 tons STATI 3 6 -0.02 -0.02
Exports - wood 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.09 0.08
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1935=100) STATI 3 1
Retail prices - general index Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - gold holdings m Lei STATI 0 0.00
Central bank - currency in circulation m Lei STATI 0 -0.04
Clearings (in Bucharest) m Lei STATI 3 3 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.07
Central bank - Bank Rate % STATI 0 0.04
Interest rates - real interest on bonds % STATI 3 2 -0.08
Stock market - new issuances m Lei STATI 3 6 0.11 0.09 0.08
Bond market - general index Index (1926) STATI 3 2 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.06
Stock market - stocks turnover m Lei STATI 3 5 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
Protested bills of exchange m Lei STATI 3 6 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05
Number of Variables 7 14 12 17 21
Variance explained 41 33 31 35 33
Comments
• Retail prices - general index: two series were linked.
• Wholesale prices - general index: Three series were linked. The first two refer two wholesale
prices for petroleum, wheat, and wood, whereas the third is more general, but was only
available for 1935 and 1936.
• Clearings: From May 1931 onwards, clearings declined rapidly. However, there are no
comments on the series that indicate that it is not valid anymore.
• Interest rates - real interest on bonds: From 1934 on, the series does not take foreign treasury
bills into account, which lowers its value by around 2 %.
• Central bank - gold holdings: Values for November and December 1936 have been converted
to the old parity: 0.009 vs the new one: 0.00625174 (Statistisches Reichsamt, 1937, p. 98).
• Additional Data: There is also bankruptcy data for Ilfov county, which was not included as
it does not seem to comove with the rest of the economy and relates only to one county
(not including the capital).
Chapter 2. The Prelude and Global Impact of The Great Depression 119
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
88
90
92
94
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
Ec
on
om
ic
 A
ct
iv
ity
 (G
DP
 p.
c. 
sc
ale
d)
Economic Activity (narrow)
Economic Activity (Excl. Col. Series)
Core Industrial Indicators
Economic Activity (broad)
All Indicators
FIGURE A2.46: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Roma-
nia (Level)
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FIGURE A2.47: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Roma-
nia (Cycle)
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Spain
TABLE A2.29: DATA SPAIN
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Coal and lignite - production 1000 tons IAES 3 6 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Iron ore - production 1000 tons IAES 3 2 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.10
Copper - production 1000 tons IAES 3 6 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
Lead - production 1000 tons IAES 3 6 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Pig iron - production 1000 tons IAES 3 4 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.09
Steel - production 1000 tons IAES 3 4 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.10
Woolen yarn - production tons IAES 3 3 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
Cotton yarn - production tons IAES 3 6 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Trade
Imports (total) m Gold Pesetas STATI 3 4 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.10
Exports (total) m Gold Pesetas STATI 3 3 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.10
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1913) STATI 3 2
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - currency in circulation m Pesetas IAES 0 -0.05
Protested bills of exchange Number IAES 3 4 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05
Clearings (Madrid) m Pesetas IAES 3 3 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06
Clearings (Barcelona) m Pesetas IAES 3 4 0.07 0.07 0.06
Barcelona Stock Exchange - security prices (18 Se-
curities)
Index(1925) IAES 3 1 0.10 0.10 0.10
Barcelona Stock Exchange - 22 Stocks Index(1925) IAES 3 0 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.10
Number of Variables 8 15 12 15 16
Variance explained 38 44 45 44 42
Comments
• Mining series (except for coal and lignite): first value of 1925 was a quarterly sums and thus
simply divided by 3 and allocated proportionally to the first three months.
• Prices of industrial inputs and food prices: Value for December of 1935 was assumed to take
the one of November 1935.
• Clearings (Madrid): series exhibits stark (positive) break in the first quarter of 1927. This is
most likely due to speculation in favor of the Peseta (see IAES - events).
• Trade series: Values until the first quarter 1928 are given in quarterly sums and were simply
divided by 3; the series are monthly thereafter. The values for May 1935 are assumed to be
those of April 1935.
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FIGURE A2.48: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
Spain (Level)
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FIGURE A2.49: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
Spain (Cycle)
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Sweden
TABLE A2.30: DATA SWEDEN
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Industrial production - general index Index Klovland
(1998)
3 2 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.05
Pig iron - production 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.05
Raw steel - production 1000 tons STATI 3 5 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.05
Finished rolling mill products - production 1000 tons STATI 3 5 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04
Railways - transported goods 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.05
Incoming ships 1000 NRT STATI 3 5 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.04
Unemployment - individuals on benefits Number STATI 3 0 -0.12 -0.08 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05
Unemployed Union Members % STATI 3 1 -0.13 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05
Stock market - bankruptcies number STATI 3 6 -0.11 -0.08 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05
Trade
Imports - total m Crowns STATI 3 4 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.04
Exports - total m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.05
Imports - coal and coke 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.03 0.02
Exports - iron ore 1000 tons STATI 3 1 0.06 0.04
Exports - timber 1000 cbm STATI 3 6 0.04 0.03
Exports - cellulose 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.05 0.03
Exports - paper 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.03 0.02
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index 1913=100 STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - raw materials 1913=100 STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - semi-processed goods 1913=100 STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - fully-manufactured goods 1913=100 STATI 3 0
Wholesale Prices - capital goods 1913=100 STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - consumption goods 1913=100 STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - gold holdings m Crowns STATI 0 0.04
Central bank - foreign exchange holdings m Crowns STATI 0 0.03
Central bank - bills of exchange m Crowns STATI 0 -0.02
Central bank - deposits m Crowns STATI 0 0.01
Central bank - currency in Circulation m Crowns STATI 0 0.02
Clearings m Crowns STATI 0 0.02
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 -0.01
Interest rates - real interest rate for government
bonds
% STATI 0 -0.03
Commercial banking - bills of exchange m Crowns STATI 3 1 -0.03
Commercial banking - private debt m Crowns STATI 3 1 -0.03
Commercial banks - domestic deposits m Crowns STATI 3 2 -0.03
Stock market - emissions m Crowns STATI 3 6 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02
Stock market - turnover m Crowns STATI 3 3 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.03
Protested bills of exchange 1000 Crowns STATI 3 4 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04
Number of Variables 9 14 12 19 30
Variance explained 69 58 56 50 39
Comments
• Central bank - gold holdings: From March 1933, the series includes earmarked gold.
• Central bank - deposits: There is a strong increase in 1933, possibly due to change in account-
ing.
• Protested bills of exchange: There is a large outlier in May 1932.
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FIGURE A2.50: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Swe-
den (Level)
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FIGURE A2.51: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Swe-
den (Cycle)
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Switzerland
TABLE A2.31: DATA SWITZERLAND
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Watches - production 1000s STATI 3 3 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.06
Railways - transported individuals 1000s STATI 3 6 0.12 0.08 0.06
Railways - transported goods 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.06
Unemployment - number of job seekers Number STATI 3 1 -0.13 -0.14 -0.09 -0.07
Bankruptcies Number STATI 3 6 -0.10 -0.11 -0.06 -0.05
Trade
Imports - total m Franks STATI 3 2 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.03
Exports - total m Franks STATI 3 2 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.07
Imports - raw and semi-manufactured goods m Franks STATI 3 4 0.07 0.05
Imports- manufactured goods m Franks STATI 3 3 0.06 0.03
Exports - raw material m Franks STATI 3 6 0.05 0.04
Exports - manufactured goods m Franks STATI 3 2 0.09 0.07
Imports - coal 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.04 0.02
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (July
1932/1934 = 100)
STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - general index Index (1914) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - food Index (1914) STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - gold holdings m Franks STATI 0 -0.06
Central bank - currency in circulation m Franks STATI 0 -0.06
Central bank - deposits m Franks STATI 0 -0.06
Central bank - giro transfers m Franks STATI 0 0.05
Clearings m Franks STATI 3 2 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.06
Central bank - turnover of giro and postal checks m Franks STATI 0 0.02
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 0.02
Market rate m Franks STATI 3 0 -0.00
Stock market - returns % STATI 3 1 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.06
Number of Variables 5 9 8 14 21
Variance explained 68 57 56 49 43
Comments
• Gold holdings and deposits: Values for October–December 1936 have been converted to the
new parity.
• Stock market - returns: Change of the composition of the series is reported for 1934. How-
ever, no structural break is apparent. No further adjustment is made.
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FIGURE A2.52: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Switzer-
land (Level)
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FIGURE A2.53: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Switzer-
land (Cycle)
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Yugoslavia
TABLE A2.32: DATA YUGOSLAVIA
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Coal - production 1000 tons STATI 3 5 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07
Railways - transported goods 1000s STATI 3 4 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.07
Unemployment - jobseekers Number STATI 3 2 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07
Bankruptcies Number STATI 3 4 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
Industrial employment 1000s STATI 3 1 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.10
Trade
Imports - total m Dinar STATI 3 4 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.11
Exports - total m Dinar STATI 3 4 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.10
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1926) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - imports Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - exports Index (1926) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - crops Index (1926) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - beef Index (1926) STATI 3 2
Wholesale Prices - minerals Index (1926) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - industry Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - bills of exchange and advances m Dinar STATI 0 -0.11
Central bank - currency in circulation m Dinar STATI 0 0.02
Central bank - private deposits m Dinar STATI 0 0.07
Clearings - giro and postal cheques m Dinar STATI 3 4 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 -0.09
Bond market - value of the 7 % Government Bond
from 1921
Index (1926) STATI 3 1 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.09
Number of Variables 5 9 9 9 13
Variance explained 49 52 52 52 49
Comments
• Industrial employment: Value for December 1936 was assumed to be the same as in Novem-
ber 1936.
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FIGURE A2.54: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Yu-
goslavia (Level)
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FIGURE A2.55: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Yu-
goslavia (Cycle)
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Americas
Canada
TABLE A2.33: DATA CANADA
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Industrial production - general index Index (1926) STATI 3 2 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03
Cereal - sales Index (1926) STATI 3 6 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
Cattle - sales Index (1926) STATI 3 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Forestry - production Index (1926) STATI 3 3 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02
Mining - production Index (1926) STATI 3 5 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02
Other Industries - production Index (1926) STATI 3 2 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02
Construction - activity Index (1926) STATI 3 4 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
Employment - total Index (1926) STATI 3 0 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02
Industrial Employment (total) Index (1926) STATI 3 0 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02
Industrial employment - steel and iron industries Index (1926) STATI 3 1 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02
Industrial employment - car manufacturing Index (1926) STATI 3 3 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
Industrial employment - timber Industries Index (1926) STATI 3 1 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02
Industrial employment - cellulose industries Index (1926) STATI 3 1 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02
Industrial employment - textile industries Index (1926) STATI 3 1 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
Industrial employment - leather Industries Index (1926) STATI 3 1 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Coal - production 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
Pig iron - production 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02
Crude steel - production 1000 tons STATI 3 5 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02
Cars manufactured Number STATI 3 4 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
Lorries manufactured Number STATI 3 4 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
Paper for newspaper - production 1000 tons per day STATI 3 2 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02
Electricity - production m kWh STATI 3 2 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02
Construction sector - finished buildings m $ STATI 3 6 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
Railways - transported goods (wagons) Index (1926) STATI 3 3 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02
Bankruptcies (cases) Number STATI 3 4 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Bankruptcies (volume) m $ STATI 3 6 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02
Trade
Imports - total m $ STATI 3 2 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02
Exports - total m $ STATI 3 4 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02
Imports - foodstuffs and beverages m $ STATI 3 5 0.02 0.02
Imports - raw materials and semi-processed
goods
m $ STATI 3 3 0.03 0.02
Imports - fully-manufactured Goods m $ STATI 3 2 0.03 0.02
Exports - foodstuffs and beverages m $ STATI 3 5 0.01 0.01
Exports - raw materials and semi-processed
goods
m $ STATI 3 3 0.02 0.02
Exports - fully-manufactured goods m $ STATI 3 3 0.03 0.02
Exports - agricultural goods m $ STATI 3 5 0.02 0.01
Exports - non-Agricultural goods m $ STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02
Exports - wheat 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.00 0.00
Exports - wheat flour 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.01 0.01
Exports - paper for newspaper 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.03 0.02
Prices
Wholesale prices - general Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - raw materials Index (1926) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - fully-manufactured goods Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - foodstuffs (excluding meat) Index (1926) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - meat and related products Index (1926) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - non-ferrous metals Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - Non-ferrous Minerals Index (1926) STATI 3 2
Wholesale prices - iron and iron products Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - timber and paper Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - textiles Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - wheat cts per bush STATI 3 2
Consumer prices - general index Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Chartered banks - Holdings of stocks m $ STATI 3 0 -0.02
Chartered banks - business loans outstanding m $ STATI 3 0 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Chartered banks - short-term deposits m $ STATI 3 2 0.01
Chartered banks - long-term deposits m $ STATI 3 0 -0.02
Central bank - currency in circulation m $ STATI 0 0.02
Cheques drawn m $ STATI 3 4 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
Clearings m $ STATI 3 4 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
Interest rates - real interest on bond of the
province of Ontario
% STATI 3 1 -0.01
Stock market - general index Index (1926) STATI 3 1 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02
Stock market - industrial shares Index (1926) STATI 3 1 0.03 0.03 0.02
Stock market - insurance shares Index (1926) STATI 3 1 0.03 0.02 0.02
Stock market - bank shares Index (1926) STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02 0.02
Stock market - turnover Index (1926) STATI 3 3 0.02 0.01 0.01
Number of Variables 25 36 20 47 52
Variance explained 69 65 65 63 60
Comments
• Industrial production - general index, Cereal - sales, Cattle - sales, Forestry, Mining, Other Indus-
tries, Construction, Railways: Seasonal adjustment methodology changed in 1936.
• Pig iron - production: Values for March - May 1933 were missing and assumed to be 0.
• Clearings: Series comprises 32 cities from 1931 onwards, but only 29–31 before.
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FIGURE A2.56: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
Canada (Level)
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FIGURE A2.57: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
Canada (Cycle)
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Chile
TABLE A2.34: DATA CHILE
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Mining - production index Index (1927/29) STATI 3 1 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06
Mining - employed workers in saltpeter industry 1000s STATI 3 0 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.07
Mining - employed workers in copper Industry 1000s STATI 3 0 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.06
Copper - production 1000 tons STATI 3 1 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.05
Coal - production 1000 tons STATI 3 5 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.06
Electric energy - production Index (1927/1929) STATI 3 3 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.07
Tissues - production Index (1927/1929) STATI 3 3 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.05
Shoes - production Index (1927/1929) STATI 3 5 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.06
Glass Manufactures - production Index (1927/1929) STATI 3 3 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.05
Paper - production Index (1927/1929) STATI 3 6 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00
Retail sales (Santiago) Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 2 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.05
Trade
Imports - total m Gold Peso STATI 3 3 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06
Exports - total m Gold Peso STATI 3 3 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
Exports - wool (washed) tons STATI 3 6 -0.00 -0.00
Exports - copper 1000 tons STATI 3 5 0.05 0.04
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1913) STATI 3 1
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Clearings m Pesos STATI 3 2 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.07
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 -0.01
Commercial banks - bills of exchanges and ad-
vances
m Pesos STATI 3 0 0.04
Commercial banks - deposits m Pesos STATI 3 1 0.03
Saving banks - deposits m Pesos STATI 3 0 0.07
Stock market - general index Index (1927) STATI 3 0 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.03
Number of Variables 10 15 11 17 21
Variance explained 55 51 51 46 42
Comments
• Production series: Values for 1927-29 were previously indexed to January 1927. They had to
be re-based to 1927-29 to make them comparable with later values.
• Workers in saltpeter industry: Value for February 1934 was missing and linearly interpolated-
• Retail sales (Santiago): Two indices were linked via re-basing. One is based on 20 companies
and their branches, the other on 18.
• Commercial banks series : Series from the two editions of the STATI differ marginally for
1932–1934. The ones taken from 1937 edition adjust for the value of foreign deposits.
• Wholesale prices - general index: 1927 based on consumer prices from the STATI, which are
based on 1913. This is an imperfect solution, but no wholesale prices have been calculated
for the period prior to 1928 at any frequency. From 1932, a conversion is necessary to reflect
prices in gold pesos rather than paper pesos (the conversion rate is 2:1).
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FIGURE A2.58: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
Chile (Level)
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FIGURE A2.59: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
Chile (Cycle)
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Mexico
TABLE A2.35: DATA MEXICO
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Oil - production 1000 hectoliter STATI 3 2 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04
Copper - production tons STATI 3 6 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.08
Lead - production tons STATI 3 6 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.08
Zinc - production tons STATI 3 6 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.08
Gold - production kg STATI 3 6 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.06
Silver - production tons STATI 3 6 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.08
Trade
Imports - total m Pesos STATI 3 5 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.08
Exports - total m Pesos STATI 3 5 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.06
Exports - vegetables m Pesos STATI 3 6 0.01 0.01
Exports - minerals m Pesos STATI 3 6 0.08 0.05
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1929=100) STATI 3 2
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - currency in circulation m Pesos STATI 0 -0.01
All banks - liquid assets m Pesos STATI 3 1 0.05
All banks - short-term loans m Pesos STATI 3 0 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.09
All banks - long-term loans m Pesos STATI 3 1 0.02
All banks - other loans m Pesos STATI 3 2 -0.06
All banks - sight liabilities m Pesos STATI 3 1 0.00
All banks - future liabilities m Pesos STATI 3 1 0.08
All banks - other liabilities m Pesos STATI 3 1 0.06
Number of Variables 6 9 9 11 18
Variance explained 62 59 59 51 39
Comments
• All banks series: Those include the central bank.
• Wholesale prices - general index: The values for 1927–1929 are based on retail prices from
the League of Nations (1929, p. 277), which have been based on 1929. Values for 1927 are
linearly interpolated from quarterly data. From 1930 on, they are simply wholesale prices.
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FIGURE A2.60: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Mex-
ico (Level)
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FIGURE A2.61: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Mex-
ico (Cycle)
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United States
TABLE A2.36: DATA UNITED STATES
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Industrial production - general index Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 0 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Employment - machinery manufacturing Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 0 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Employment - textile industries Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 0 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
Production - mining Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 3 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
Production - capital goods Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 0 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Production - consumption goods Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 3 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Production - foodstuffs Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Production - petroleum refineries Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 1 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
Production - flat glass Index (1932/1933) STATI 3 3 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
Production - caoutchouc industries Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 2 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Production - tires Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 2 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Production - textiles Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 2 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Production - shoes Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 3 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Production - electricity m kWh STATI 3 1 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Construction - contracts m Dollars STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Warehouses - turnover Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 4 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Warehouses - stocks Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Raw materials - stocks (total) Index (1923/1925) STATI 3 1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
Raw materials - stocks (foodstuffs) Index (1923/1925) STATI 3 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Raw materials - stocks (metals) Index (1923/1925) STATI 3 3 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Raw materials - stocks (textiles) Index (1923/1925) STATI 3 1 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Fully-manufactured goods - stocks (all) Index (1923/1925) STATI 3 1 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Fully-manufactured goods - stocks (foodstuffs) Index (1923/1925) STATI 3 0 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Fully-manufactured goods - stocks (iron and steel
products)
Index (1923/1925) STATI 3 2 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
Fully-manufactured goods - stocks (textiles) Index (1923/1925) STATI 3 1 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Fully-manufactured goods - stocks (caoutchouc-
based products)
Index (1923/1925) STATI 3 1 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Wheat - stocks 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Wheat flower - stocks 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Cotton - stocks 1000 Bags STATI 3 1 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Silk - stocks 1000 Bags STATI 3 2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Crude oil - stocks 1000 tons STATI 3 0 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Railways - transported goods (mean number of
cars per week)
1000s STATI 3 1 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Railways - cargo Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 4 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
Working hours (9000 Firms) Index (1932/1933) STATI 3 3 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Industrial workers - average weekly salary Dollars STATI 3 1 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Wage bill - all industries (excluding mining) Index (1923/1925) STATI 3 0 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Bankruptcies (number) Number STATI 3 2 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Bankruptcies (volume) m Dollars STATI 3 4 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
Trade
Imports - total m Dollars STATI 3 2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Exports - total m Dollars STATI 3 2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Imports - food and beverages m Dollars STATI 3 5 0.02 0.01
Imports - raw and semi-manufactured goods m Dollars STATI 3 2 0.02 0.01
Imports - fully-manufactured goods m Dollars STATI 3 2 0.02 0.01
Exports - food and beverages m Dollars STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01
Exports - raw and semi-manufactured goods m Dollars STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01
Exports - manufactured goods m Dollars STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02
Exports - capital goods m Dollars STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02
Exports - consumption goods m Dollars STATI 3 2 0.02 0.02
Imports - caoutchouc 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.01 0.01
Imports - wool & animal hair tons STATI 3 3 0.02 0.01
Imports - raw silk 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.02 0.01
Imports - copper tons STATI 3 6 0.01 0.01
Imports - paper (newspaper) 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.02 0.02
Exports - wheat and flour 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.00 0.00
Exports - raw cotton 1000 bags STATI 3 6 -0.01 -0.01
Exports - timber 1000 cbm STATI 3 5 0.02 0.01
Exports - refined copper 1000 tons STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01
Exports - cars 1000s STATI 3 3 0.02 0.01
Table continues on the following page.
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Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index (Fisher’s index) Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - agricultural products Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - foodstuffs Index (1926) STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - industrial goods Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - raw materials Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Wholesale Prices - semi-manufactured goods Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - fully-manufactured goods Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Wholesale prices - wheat $ bushel STATI 3 2
Wholesale prices - cacao Cents per lb. STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices -Sugar Cents per lb. STATI 3 2
Wholesale prices - lard Dollars per 100 lb. STATI 3 2
Wholesale prices - cotton Cents per lb. STATI 3 2
Wholesale prices - oxen skins Cents per lb. STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - petroleum Dollars per 42 gallons STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - petroleum (for lamps) Cents per gallons STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - steel Cents per lb. STATI 3 1
Wholesale prices - copper Cents per lb. STATI 3 1
Agricultural prices - general Index
(1909(8)/1914(7))
STATI 3 1
Agricultural prices - grain Index
(1909(8)/1914(7))
STATI 3 1
Agricultural prices - dairy products Index
(1909(8)/1914(7))
STATI 3 1
Agricultural prices - meat Index
(1909(8)/1914(7))
STATI 3 1
Agricultural prices - cotton & cotton seeds Index
(1909(8)/1914(7))
STATI 3 2
Agricultural prices - prices for farm supplies Index
(1909(8)/1914(7))
STATI 3 0
Agricultural prices - purchasing power of agricul-
tural products
Index (1923) STATI 3 2
Consumer prices - general index Index (1923) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - foodstuffs Index (1923) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - property Index (1923) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - clothes Index (1923) STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - lending (total) Index (1932/1934) STATI 0 -0.01
Central bank - discounted Bills of Exchange Index (1932/1934) STATI 0 -0.01
Central bank - acquired bills of exchange m Dollars STATI 0 -0.00
Central bank - government bonds m Dollars STATI 0 -0.01
Central bank - currency in circulation m Dollars STATI 0 -0.01
Central bank - total deposits m Dollars STATI 0 0.01
Central bank - cash in circulation m Dollars STATI 0 -0.01
Clearings - direct debit (New York) m Dollars STATI 3 3 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
Clearings - direct debit (outside of New York) m Dollars STATI 3 2 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 -0.00
Interest rates - bankers’ acceptances % STATI 3 1 -0.00
Interest rates - commercial bills % STATI 3 1 -0.00
Interest rates - call money (daily) % STATI 3 1 0.00
Interest rates - time deposits % STATI 3 1 0.00
Interest rates - debit (New York) % STATI 3 1 -0.01
Interest rates - debit (27 cities) % STATI 3 0 -0.01
Interest rates - real interest rate of 60 bonds (in-
dustrial, railways, public utilities, municipal)
% STATI 3 1 -0.01
Interest rates - real interest rate of 15 industrial
bonds
% STATI 3 1 -0.01
Interest rates - real interest rate of 15 railway
bonds
% STATI 3 2 -0.01
Interest rates - real interest rate of 15 public utili-
ties bonds
% STATI 3 2 -0.01
Interest rates - real interest rate of 15 municipal
bonds
% STATI 3 1 -0.01
Commercial banks (members of the Federal Re-
serve System) - Cash
Index (1932/1933) STATI 3 2 -0.00
Commercial banks (members of the Federal Re-
serve System) - credits with the federal reserve
m Dollars STATI 3 1 0.00
Commercial banks (members of the Federal Re-
serve System) - advances and securities
b Dollars STATI 3 1 0.00
Commercial banks (members of the Federal Re-
serve System) - securities (incl. Government
Bonds)
m Dollars STATI 3 0 -0.01
Commercial banks (members of the Federal Re-
serve System) - net sight deposits
b Dollars STATI 3 1 -0.00
Commercial banks (members of the Federal Re-
serve System) - time deposits
b Dollars STATI 3 0 0.00
Commercial banks (members of the Federal Re-
serve System) - debt with reserve banks
m Dollars STATI 3 6 -0.01
Emissions - new capital (total, excluding convert-
ible issuances)
m Dollars STATI 3 6 0.02 0.02 0.02
Stock market - emissions m Dollars STATI 3 6 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
Bond market - emissions (all bonds) m Dollars STATI 3 6 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Bond market - emissions (companies) m Dollars STATI 3 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Stock market - general index Index (1926) STATI 3 1 0.03 0.02 0.02
Stock market - 347 industrial stocks Index (1926) STATI 3 0 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Stock market - railways stocks Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 1 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
Stock market - 40 Public utility stocks Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 1 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Bond market - government bonds Index (1932/1934) STATI 3 1 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
Bond market - 40 prime bonds Index (1932/1935) STATI 3 2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Bond market - 10 industrial bonds Index (Face
Value = 100)
STATI 3 1 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Stock market - transactions (number) m STATI 3 3 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Bond market - transactions (volume) m Dollars (Face Value) STATI 3 5 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Number of Variables 32 55 49 73 99
Variance explained 47 48 47 49 42
Comments
• For the following indicators, two series have been linked: Industrial production - general
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index, Employment - machinery manufacturing, Production - mining, Production - foodstuffs, Pro-
duction - petroleum refineries , Production - flat glass, Production - caoutchouc industries, Produc-
tion - tires, Production - textiles, Warehouses - turnover, Warehouses - stocks, Railways - cargo,
Central bank - lending (total), Central bank - discounted Bills of Exchange, Central bank - acquired
bills of exchange, Central bank - government bonds, Central bank - total deposits, Stock market -
railways stocks, Stock market - 40 Public utility stocks, Bond market - government bonds, Bond
market - 40 prime bonds.
• Fully-manufactured goods - stocks (iron and steel products) & Fully-manufactured goods - stocks
(Textiles): Values for November & December 1936 are assumed to take those of October
1936.
• Stocks - wheat flower: Values for October, November & December 1936 are assumed to take
those of September 1936.
• Wholesale prices - petroleum (for lamps): Value for December 1935 was assumed to take the
one of November 1935.
• Consumer prices - general, Consumer prices -foodstuffs, Consumer prices - property & Consumer
prices - clothes : Slightly different numbers in the two publications, the latter were assumed
to be correct.
• Indicators of Commercial banks (members of the Federal Reserve System): The series comprise
101 Cities until December 1931, 90 thereafter. Series have been linked via re-basing the
series to a common base year.
• Bond market - transactions (volume): There is a strong increase in 1936, but it does not seem
to be a mis-recording of data.
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FIGURE A2.62: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - United
States (Level)
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FIGURE A2.63: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - United
States (Cycle)
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Oceania
Australia
TABLE A2.37: DATA AUSTRALIA
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Wheat stocks 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
Unemployed union members - total 1000s STATI 3 0 -0.17 -0.09 -0.09
Unemployed union members - mining % STATI 3 0 -0.11 -0.14 -0.07 -0.07
Unemployed union members - metal industries % STATI 3 0 -0.15 -0.18 -0.08 -0.07
Unemployed union members - textile industries % STATI 3 0 -0.13 -0.16 -0.07 -0.06
Unemployed union members - foodstuffs % STATI 3 0 -0.12 -0.14 -0.07 -0.07
Unemployed union members - construction sec-
tor
% STATI 3 0 -0.15 -0.18 -0.08 -0.08
Trade
Imports - total 1000 Pounds STATI 3 3 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.09
Exports - total 1000 Pounds STATI 3 3 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00
Imports - food and beverages 1000 Pounds STATI 3 4 0.09 0.08
Imports - raw and semi-manufactured goods 1000 Pounds STATI 3 3 0.08 0.08
Imports - fully-manufactured goods 1000 Pounds STATI 3 3 0.09 0.09
Exports - food and beverages 1000 Pounds STATI 3 3 -0.03 -0.03
Exports- raw and Semi-manufactured goods 1000 Pounds STATI 3 3 0.02 0.02
Exports - wheat 1000 tons STATI 3 5 -0.04 -0.04
Exports - butter 1000 tons STATI 3 4 -0.06 -0.06
Exports - wool (non-washed) 1000 tons STATI 3 5 -0.01 -0.01
Exports - wool (washed) 1000 tons STATI 3 5 -0.01 -0.01
Exports - gold and silver 1000 Pounds STATI 3 6 0.02 0.01
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1911) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - food prices Index (1923/27) STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - gold holdings mPounds STATI 0 -0.02
Central bank - currency in circulation m Pounds STATI 0 0.02
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 0.00
Number of Variables 7 9 8 19 22
Variance explained 56 51 46 38 33
Comments
• All Unemployed union members series: I employ a cubic spline interpolation to convert mid-
of-quarter data into monthly data. All other series are monthly.
• The results for the Economic Activity Index excluding collinear series are shown despite
being based only on 8 series.
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FIGURE A2.64: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Aus-
tralia (Level)
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FIGURE A2.65: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - Aus-
tralia (Cycle)
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New Zealand
TABLE A2.38: DATA NEW ZEALAND
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Construction permits 1000 Pounds STATI 3 4 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.08
Incoming ships 1000 NRT STATI 3 6 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03
Unemployed Index(1932/1934) STATI 3 1 -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08
Trade
Imports - total m Pounds IAES 3 6 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.09
Exports - total m Pounds IAES 3 6 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03
Exports - butter tons STATI 3 6 -0.02 -0.02
Exports - cheese tons STATI 3 6 0.01 0.01
Exports - meat tons STATI 3 6 -0.04 -0.04
Exports - wool tons STATI 3 6 -0.02 -0.02
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1909/13) STATI 3 1
Consumer prices - food prices Index (1926/30) STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Stock market - general index Index (1926) STATI 3 0 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.05
Mortgages - registered (cases) 1000s IAES 3 2 0.10 0.09 0.09
Mortgages - registered (volume) m Pounds IAES 3 3 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.09
Mortgages - discharged (cases) 1000s IAES 3 2 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.09
Mortgages - discharged (volume) m Pounds IAES 3 4 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.09
Land transfers - registered (cases) 1000s IAES 3 3 0.10 0.09 0.09
Land transfers - registered (volume) m Pounds IAES 3 4 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.09
Number of Variables 3 12 10 16 16
Variance explained 69 68 64 53 53
Comments
• Unemployed: extrapolated with male unemployed from 1935 onwards.
• Stocks: Values for December 1926, 1927, 1928, 1930 were missing and therefore linearly
interpolated.
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FIGURE A2.66: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - New
Zealand (Level)
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FIGURE A2.67: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - New
Zealand (Cycle)
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Asia
Japan
TABLE A2.39: DATA JAPAN
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
General Index of Production Index (1930) IAES 3 2 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.05
Warehouses - turnover m Yen STATI 3 3 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.02
Warehouses - stocks (value) m Yen STATI 3 1 0.02 0.01 -0.00
Warehouses - stocks (quantity) m pieces IAES 3 1 0.04 0.03 0.02
Employment (industry) Index (1926) STATI 3 0 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.05
Coal - production 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.05
Textiles - production Index (1930) STATI 3 3 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.04
Silk - production tons STATI 3 6 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01
Railways - transported goods 1000 tons STATI 3 2 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.05
Trade
Imports - total m Yen STATI 3 3 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.04
Exports - total m Yen STATI 3 2 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.04
Imports - raw cotton 1000 tons STATI 3 6 0.02 0.01
Imports - wool tons STATI 3 6 -0.03 -0.02
Imports - coal 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.07 0.04
Imports - pig iron 1000 tons STATI 3 5 0.05 0.03
Imports - machines 1000 Yen STATI 3 5 0.06 0.04
Exports - raw silk tons STATI 3 4 0.01 0.01
Exports - cotton threads tons STATI 3 2 -0.01 -0.01
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (Juli 1914) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - general index(Tokyo) Index (Juli 1914) STATI 3 0
Wages Index (1926) STATI 3 0
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - gold holdings m Yen STATI 0 0.02
Central bank - bills of exchange and advances m Yen STATI 0 0.01
Central bank - currency in circulation m Yen STATI 0 0.02
Central bank - deposits by the government m Yen STATI 0 0.00
Central bank - deposits by banks m Yen STATI 0 0.03
Clearings m Yen STATI 3 2 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.00
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 -0.04
Market rate % STATI 3 0 -0.05
Interest rates - demand deposits % STATI 3 3 -0.04
Clearing banks - cash position m Yen STATI 3 6 0.01
Clearing banks - stocks m Yen STATI 3 1 -0.01
Clearing banks - bills of exchange and advances m Yen STATI 3 1 -0.05
Clearing banks - deposits m Yen STATI 3 0 -0.04
Saving banks - savings m Yen STATI 3 0 -0.05
Stock market - emissions m Yen STATI 3 6 0.05 0.04 0.03
Stock companies - new investments m Yen STATI 3 6 0.06 0.05 0.03
Stock companies - capital losses m Yen STATI 3 6 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02
Stock market - Index (50 Industrial Shares) Index IAES 3 1 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.03
Number of Variables 7 16 11 23 36
Variance explained 54 38 48 34 31
Comments
• Clearings: Statistisches Reichsamt (1937, p. 134) and Statistisches Reichsamt (1936, p. 385)
report slightly different values for the years 1933 and 1934, which might be due to a revision
of the former statistics.
• Railways - transported goods: The value for December 1936 was missing and assumed to take
the same value as in November.
• Central bank - gold holdings: There is little variation until 1930.
• Central bank - bills of exchange and advances: The series reported in Statistisches Reichsamt
(1937, p. 134) and Statistisches Reichsamt (1936, p. 385) differ slightly in their definition
and were hence linked via re-basing them to a common base year.
• Stock companies - capital losses: Values for November/December 1935 are assumed to equal
those of October.
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FIGURE A2.68: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
Japan (Level)
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FIGURE A2.69: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) -
Japan (Cycle)
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Africa
South Africa
TABLE A2.40: DATA SOUTH AFRICA
Variable Name Unit Source Seasonal
Adjust-
ment
MCD
Parameter
Principal Component Coefficients
Core
Indicators
Economic
Activity
Economic
Activity
(excl. col.
series)
Econ
Activity
& Trade
All
Production, Transport and Employment
Coal - production 1000 tons STATI 3 4 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.06
Employment - employed Europeans in mining 1000s STATI 3 2 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.05
Employment - employed non-Europeans in min-
ing
1000s STATI 3 1 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.06
Employment - employed Europeans in gold min-
ing
1000s STATI 3 0 0.11 0.10 0.06
Unemployment - employed non-Europeans in
gold mining
1000s STATI 3 0 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.04
Ships incoming - transported goods 1000 NRT STATI 3 6 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.03
Unemployment - unemployed Europeans (job
seekers)
number STATI 3 2 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.04
Trade
Imports - total 1000 Pounds STATI 3 2 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.07
Exports - total (excluding bullion and coins) 1000 Pounds STATI 3 6 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.05
Exports - wool tons STATI 3 4 -0.05 -0.03
Prices
Wholesale prices - general index Index (1910=100) STATI 3 0
Consumer prices - general index Index (1910) STATI 3 1
Consumer prices - foodstuffs Index (1910) STATI 3 1
Money, Banking, Stock Markets
Central bank - gold holdings 1000 Pounds STATI 0 0.05
Central bank - foreign exchange holdings 1000 Pounds STATI 0 0.05
Central bank - bills of exchange and advances 1000 Pounds STATI 0 -0.03
Central bank - currency in circulation 1000 Pounds STATI 0 0.05
Clearings m Pounds STATI 3 3 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
Central bank - bank rate % STATI 0 -0.04
Private banking - bills of exchange and advances m Pounds STATI 3 0 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.00
Private banking - demand deposits m Pounds STATI 3 1 0.06
Private banking - long-term deposits m Pounds STATI 3 2 -0.02
Land and agricultural bank - advances 1000 Pounds STATI 3 1 -0.07
Saving banks - deposits 1000 Pounds STATI 3 0 0.05
Stock market - 6 gold mining stocks in London Index (1 Jan. 1923) STATI 3 0 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06
Number of Variables 7 12 11 13 22
Variance explained 61 48 46 46 40
Comments
• Unemployed Europeans: the value for November 1931 was missing and linearly interpolated.
From July 1934 onwards, women are included. There is, however, no structural break in
the series at that point.
• Stock market: the value for December 1936 was missing and assumed to take the same value
as the one for November 1936.
• Wholesale prices - index: Quarterly series was converted into monthly frequency by employ-
ing a cubic hermite spline.
• Additional series: An additional series about gold production is excluded as it would con-
tribute the index negatively. This is absolutely reasonable as the demand for gold (and thus
the incentive to produce more) was growing as the world went into the crisis (and South
Africa, too).
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FIGURE A2.70: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - South
Africa (Level)
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FIGURE A2.71: Economic Activity Index (GDP p.c. scale) - South
Africa (Cycle)
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2A.16 Robustness - Choice of the Filter
The following appendix documents the robustness of the results with regards to the choice of the
filter. For each country, a graph compares the final index based on data filtered by the method pro-
posed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) with its counterpart filtered with the approach suggested
by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). The parameter choices for the Hodrick-Prescott filter follow
Ravn and Uhlig (2002). For the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter, I choose cutoff frequencies of 6 and 96
months. The comparison shows that the differences for the application of this article are indeed
negligible.
The Hodrick-Prescott filter has been subject to critique as it is argued that it introduces spuri-
ous correlations. How important is this concern for the results shown in this study? Ultimately,
the results for the coefficients in the principal component analysis depend on the strength of the
correlation between variables. These in turn form the basis of the weighting for the indices. In
order to show that the weighting of the individual series for the final index does not unduly de-
pend on the choice of the filter, two further graphs compare the weights based on the monthly
data filtered by the (i) HP-filter, (ii) CF-Filter, and Hamilton’s linear projection approach (Hamil-
ton, 2017). A 45◦ degree line illustrates what the perfect match would be. The deviations are very
small for the CF- and HP-filter throughout. The weights also vary little in virtually all cases when
the HP- and Hamilton-filter are compared (please notice the scale).52
Unfortunately, it is not possible to create the level indices based on the approach by Hamil-
ton (2017) in the particular case of this study (combining different frequencies of data). Given
that many GDP series during this period only become available after 1923 (the end of wartime
inflations) and only extend until 1938 (the year before the beginning of WW II), the regression
would rest on 16 observations only with four parameters and a constant to estimate. Even where
more data is available, it is not clear that it is valid to include the war years and or pre-WW I
and post-WW II data as those were structurally different from each other. Given so few observa-
tions, the regression coefficients for the filter are very imprecisely estimated (small t-values for all
lags). This leads to large standard deviations of the cyclical component of the annual data in some
cases. More generally, it makes the cycle estimated from the monthly (disaggregated) and annual
(GDP) data very incomparable. This is further aggravated by the fact that the way the Hamilton
filter is set up, it draws on different information sets depending on the frequency. When filtering
quarterly data, Hamilton suggested a forecast horizon of hq = 8 (2 years) and a lag structure of
p = 4 (1 year). Correspondingly, for annual data ha = 2 and for monthly data hm = 24. How-
ever, the information that is used when using the filter with p = 4 lags stems from the last four
years, whereas for the monthly data it stems from the last 4 months. One could use a different lag
structure for monthly data using the lags t− 3, t− 6, t− 9, t− 12 to mimic the suggestions by
Hamilton for quarterly data. This, however, would not change the fact that the annual prediction
is based on four years versus one year (or in the “normal case” four months).
52This does not necessarily imply that the estimate for the stationary index is exactly the same
in all three cases as the three filters focus on slightly different frequency bands. As I re-combine
the cyclical (high-frequency) with (low-frequency) trend data, however, this is of little relevance
in this context.
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Europe
Austria
FIGURE A2.72: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.73: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Belgium
FIGURE A2.74: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.75: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Bulgaria
FIGURE A2.76: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.77: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Czechoslovakia
FIGURE A2.78: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.79: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Denmark
FIGURE A2.80: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.81: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Estonia
FIGURE A2.82: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.83: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Finland
FIGURE A2.84: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.85: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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France
FIGURE A2.86: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.87: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Germany
FIGURE A2.88: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.89: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936
Year
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
Ec
on
om
ic
 A
ct
iv
ity
 In
de
x 
G
DP
 p
.c
. s
ca
le
d 
(W
ho
le 
Pe
rio
d=
10
0)
Germany
Final Index based on HP-filtered data
Final Index based on CF-filtered data
Chapter 2. The Prelude and Global Impact of The Great Depression 156
Great Britain
FIGURE A2.90: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.91: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Hungary
FIGURE A2.92: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.93: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Italy
FIGURE A2.94: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
-0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
Weights - based HP-filtered data
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
W
ei
gh
ts
 - 
ba
se
d 
Ha
m
ilto
n-
filt
er
ed
 d
at
a
Weight
45° line
a) Weights with Hamilton Filter vs HP Filter
-0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
Weights - based HP-filtered data
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
W
ei
gh
ts
 - 
ba
se
d 
CF
-fi
lte
re
d 
da
ta
Weight
45° line
b) Weights with CF Filter vs HP Filter
FIGURE A2.95: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Netherlands
FIGURE A2.96: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.97: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Norway
FIGURE A2.98: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.99: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Poland
FIGURE A2.100: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.101: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Romania
FIGURE A2.102: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.103: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Spain
FIGURE A2.104: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.105: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936
Year
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
Ec
on
om
ic
 A
ct
iv
ity
 In
de
x 
G
DP
 p
.c
. s
ca
le
d 
(W
ho
le 
Pe
rio
d=
10
0)
Spain
Final Index based on HP-filtered data
Final Index based on CF-filtered data
Chapter 2. The Prelude and Global Impact of The Great Depression 164
Sweden
FIGURE A2.106: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.107: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Switzerland
FIGURE A2.108: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.109: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Yugoslavia
FIGURE A2.110: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.111: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Americas
Canada
FIGURE A2.112: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.113: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Chile
FIGURE A2.114: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.115: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Mexico
FIGURE A2.116: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.117: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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United States
FIGURE A2.118: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.119: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Oceania
Australia
FIGURE A2.120: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.121: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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2A.17 New Zealand
FIGURE A2.122: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.123: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Asia
Japan
FIGURE A2.124: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.125: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Africa
South Africa
FIGURE A2.126: Estimated Weights & Choice of Filter
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FIGURE A2.127: Final Index in Levels (HP vs. CF Filter)
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Chapter 3
The Trade Channel of the Great
Depression
“It is a well-known fact that nearly every country is, in its economic position, highly
dependent on these two factors: economic conditions in all other countries and the relative
height of its currency in terms of other currencies”
Polak (1939, p. 79)
Abstract
How do macroeconomic crises spread from developed economies to the rest of
the world? To what extent does the fate of small open economies depend on
the economic powerhouses of the world? Drawing on evidence from the mother
of all modern economic crises, the Great Depression, this study sets out to shed
light on these questions. Making use of cross-sectional and time-series variation
deeply rooted in the history and geography of trade, a causal estimate of the
foreign trade multiplier allows me to assess the role of trade destruction in the
fall of incomes during the 1930s. Indeed, the trade channel can explain large parts
of the downturn in small open economies. If there had not been a fall in export
demand, some countries would not have suffered a downturn in the initial phase
of the Depression at all.
Chapter 3. The Trade Channel of the Great Depression 177
3.1 Introduction
The Great Depression spread through three channels: the gold standard,1 finan-
cial linkages,2 and trade.3 While the first two channels have been the focus of
much attention in the empirical literature, much less is known about the relative
significance of the trade channel. Resurrecting the concept of the foreign trade
multiplier, this study sets out to test its predictive power in a causal manner. The
insights (i) that three economic powerhouses (Germany, Great Britain, the United
States) absorbed a third of world imports,4 (ii) that the extent of the crisis varied
substantially across them, and (iii) that small open economies traded to varying
degrees with them, allow me to isolate the importance of the trade channel. In-
deed, much of the fate of the small open economies in terms of the initial depth
of the crisis can be explained by the loss of export markets. No domestic policy
change could have made these countries immune to the global economic crisis
emanating from the large economies.
Research on the international extent of the Great Depression in recent decades
has focused on the gold standard channel. Not only did the gold standard trans-
mit the crisis through monetary policy shocks, but the gold orthodoxy across
the world was itself causal to the severity of the Depression (Eichengreen and
Sachs, 1985; Bernanke, 1995). In an effort to defend their gold parities, central
banks around the world had kept interest rates at high levels and caused defla-
tion (Eichengreen, 1992). Typically, the gold standard literature has highlighted
two mechanisms through which deflation depressed the respective countries’
economies. Firstly, wages were particularly sticky during this period. Falling
prices translated relatively constant nominal wages into increasing real wages,
which depressed output (Bernanke and Carey, 1996). Secondly, debt deflation
translated into financial crises (Fisher, 1933). Not only had the gold standard ulti-
mately caused the crisis, but its architecture also prevented the appropriate policy
response. Because of the widespread prohibition of open market operations due
to the hyperinflation experience in the early 1920s, central banks around the globe
1See, for example, Eichengreen (1992) and Bernanke (1995).
2See, for example, Temin (1993) and Accominotti (2012b, forthcoming).
3For the potential relevance of the trade channel, see the back-of-the envelope calculations by
Irwin (2012, p. 110f) and Grossman and Meissner (2010). The “lost” gains from trade during this
period in the long-run study by Federico and Tena-Junguito (2017) can be interpreted in a similar
manner.
4Own calculation based on League of Nations (1937, p. 214f).
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were unable to act as a lender of last resort. The resulting unfettered banking
crises deepened the Depression in many countries (Bernanke and James, 1991).
Like the sticky wage mechanism, the financial crisis mechanism does not take
into account the international contagion of the crisis per se. The crisis impulse,
while rooted in the constrains of the international monetary system, originates in
domestic monetary policy.
Yet, international financial linkages mattered for the spread of the Depression.
Temin (1993) speculates about the importance of global financial linkages, espe-
cially with regards to the European financial crisis of 1931. Indeed, Accominotti
(2012b, forthcoming) provides balance sheet evidence that international financial
contagion mattered a great deal.5 There is little question about the relevance of
the financial contagion channel and the gold standard channel for propelling the
Great Depression around the globe. However, these explanations do not include
another important link for the internationalisation of the crisis.
Beyond the gold standard channel, contemporaries such as Polak (1939)
pointed to a non-monetary and non-financial channel of the Depression. Based
on the insights from Harrod’s (1933) foreign trade multiplier, they attributed the
severity of the Depression in small countries in part to the loss of export mar-
kets.6 Both the fall in income in the trading partners’ economies and the increas-
ing prevalence of protectionism led to decreasing export opportunities. Given
its relevance to contemporary scholars, it is surprising that the trade multiplier
5For more empirical evidence on the importance of international capital flows at the macro
level, see also Accominotti and Eichengreen (2016). By focusing on the transmission rather than
the causes of the Depression, the financial contagion view accommodates a host of other expla-
nations for the crisis in the advanced countries beyond the gold standard. For example, Romer
(1990, 1993) on the stock market crash, Ritschl (2002) on the German transfer problem, and recent
work on banking in the United States (Mitchener and Richardson, forthcoming).
6See in particular the more general outline of the argument by Harrod (1933, p. 143f). The
historiographical journey of the foreign trade multiplier from its inception by Harrod until today
is an intellectual curiosity. Harrod had postulated it in the early 1930s based on the short-run
macroeconomic fluctuations surrounding him. It was fiercely debated in the 1950s by eminent
economists such as Stolper (1947) and Polak (1956). Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) linked the
export multiplier to the development economics debate and focused on long-run effects. At the
same time, a negligence of the short-term dynamics, the initial explicandum, started to prevail
and carries on until today. This is even more surprising given the importance typically attached
to trade in the business cycle comovement literature (see e.g. Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005).
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features relatively little in the historiography of the Great Depression.7 The back-
of-the-envelope calculations by Irwin (2012, p. 110f) and Grossman and Meiss-
ner (2010) provide notable exceptions highlighting the potential relevance of the
trade channel. However, the very nature of such calculations warrants closer ex-
amination.
Most likely, the lack of a thorough empirical assessment emanates from three
factors. Firstly, the view that the fall in world trade and rise of trade barriers
were ultimately a consequence of the Depression, and not its cause, might have
tamed the appetite to deal with this question.8 However, even if we were to ac-
cept this view generally, it does not follow that trade destruction had no impact
on incomes. More generally, analysing contributing causes of the Great Depres-
sion has led to valuable insights in the past.9 Secondly, the lack of high-frequency
macroeconomic data has so far provided little variation to exploit. Thirdly, severe
endogeneity problems loom large when dealing with the question of the effect of
trade on income.10 This study provides a remedy for the last two factors. Rely-
ing on additional data collection and the dataset presented in Chapter 2, it pro-
vides the necessary macroeconomic data for the empirical analysis. Furthermore,
I propose a novel identification strategy to estimate the causal effect of the loss of
export markets on income.
Figure 3.1 provides a first informative correlation regarding the importance of
foreign markets for the severity of the Depression. The x-axis shows the foreign
demand that the small country faces. It is defined as the cumulative GDP loss in
the big three importing nations (Germany, Great Britain, and the United States),
weighted by their respective pre-crisis shares in the export market of the small
7This is not to say that there is little research on trade in the 1920s and 1930s. Researchers have
investigated the role of trade blocs in great depth (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1995; Wolf and Ritschl,
2011; Gowa and Hicks, 2013), accounted for the role of income, tariffs, and non-tariff barriers in
the fall of world trade (Madsen, 2001), analysed determinants of tariff setting (Eichengreen and
Irwin, 2010), and highlighted the economic policy dimension of the “trade policy disaster” (Irwin,
2012). Put simply, the effects of the Depression on trade are well-researched. However, we know
much less, in particular empirically, on the opposite direction of causation.
8This view is best-reflected in Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) and Irwin (2012), who link the
rise of trade barriers and fall of trade to the gold standard. It is important to point out that the
work by these authors does not preclude the possibility that trade was a contributing factor. Irwin
(2012) even provides a back-of-the-envelope calculation for the potential role of trade destruction
on income.
9Romer’s (1990) treatise on the effects of the stock market crash serves as a case in point. For
the transmission of the crisis, see, for example, the analysis of business cycle comovement by
Mathy and Meissner (2011).
10In this context, the conflicting results in the tariff-growth paradox debate may serve as a
reminder (Clemens and Williamson, 2004; Schularick and Solomou, 2011).
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FIGURE 3.1: The loss of foreign demand and the severity of the Great
Depression in small open economies
Note: The axes are scaled in percentages of the corresponding June 1929 GDP. The trading part-
ners’ GDP is the weighted average of the GDP of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany
according to the corresponding trade shares in 1927.
country.11 The y-axis displays the cumulative GDP loss for the small country.
The regression line provides a first indication that the varying exposure to the
global crisis was an important predictor for the severity of the Depression in the
small countries. This correlation is informative and yet unsatisfactory. It neither
provides causal evidence nor does it highlight the precise mechanism. To do so,
high frequency data and a precise empirical modelling of the export channel is
needed.
Using a panel of quarterly data for 23 small economies from Chapter 2, I esti-
mate the effect of exports on GDP. History and geography allow me to deal with
the looming endogeneity concerns, in particular omitted variable bias. A quar-
terly measure of foreign demand based on the same principle as in the figure
above serves as an excellent instrument for a country’s total exports. It is safe
to assume that economic fluctuations in a small country do not affect the busi-
ness cycle of either of the three large countries.12 At the same time, variations
in foreign demand exerted strong influence on a country’s export opportunities.
Like in the figure above, the variation in foreign demand originates in pre-crisis
11Note that all variation on this axis thus originates in the export weights.
12This assumption is a staple in the literature on small open economies (see e.g. Gali and Mona-
celli, 2005).
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trade patterns. These patterns are themselves a function of history and geogra-
phy and thus reasonably exogenous in the short-run. The panel setup also allows
me to control for the world demand itself at any given point in time and thus
identify the causal effect from the variations around it. Satisfying the exclusion
and relevance criteria, foreign demand from the large countries thus serves as an
instrumental variable for the ability to export.
In a framework akin to the fiscal multiplier literature (Barro and Redlick,
2011), I then estimate the trade multiplier. The estimated impact (contemporane-
ous) multiplier is around 1.2, signalling that for every 1 % decrease in exports (in
terms of GDP), 1.2 % of GDP are lost. Most conservatively, assuming full future
balancing of trade beyond the contemporaneous adjustment and neglecting any
potential dynamic effects caused by the multiplier, the estimate reduces to 0.7.
This is still a very sizeable multiplier effect solely based on the (lost) gains from
trade. The logic of the instrument provides a straightforward way to verify the
results through a placebo study. Using a miniature version of the gravity model,
I predict trade shares in 1927 in the absence of (colonial) history and rotating the
geography of the main trading partners. Shutting down history and reversing
geography, the results of the model become insignificant, as they should be.
What are the implications of the causal estimate of the multiplier for the course
and spread of the Great Depression? How much of the Depression was due to
the loss in foreign demand? Combining the multiplier estimates with data on
the loss of exports and the initial depth of the Depression allows me to account
for the share of income destruction due to the loss of foreign markets. For most
countries, the trade channel explains more than 50 % of the initial downturn. For
a small number of countries, it over-explains the initial crisis. Put differently, in
the absence of the loss of export markets and all other things equal, some coun-
tries might not have suffered a downturn in the initial phase of the Depression at
all.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the
literature on trade and the Depression through the lenses of the research question
put forward in this study. Section 3.3 outlines the empirical framework and data
sources, including newly collected price indices for exports and trade patterns.
Section 3.4 discusses the results. Section 3.5 concludes and highlights potential
avenues for future research.
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3.2 International Trade and the Great Depression
What was the relative importance of income, trade policy, geography, and history
for the breakdown in world trade? How did they influence each other? The brief
review of the literature in light of these questions suggests that loss of foreign de-
mand and tariffs were of similar importance for the breakdown of trade. Tariffs,
however, changed the geographic trade patterns only to a limited degree. Fur-
thermore, the review highlights an important void in our understanding of the
Great Depression. With few exceptions, studies on the course of interwar trade
focus on trade as an outcome, not a contributing factor to the Great Depression.
Evidence on the reverse direction of causation remains very limited and consti-
tutes a major gap in the research on the Great Depression.13
The focus of the literature on the Great Depression has long been on its ul-
timate causes in the United States and abroad (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963;
Eichengreen, 1992; Bernanke, 1995). Because the breakdown in trade is not con-
sidered to be part of this set of causes, it is mostly analysed as a consequence of
the Depression rather than a contributing factor. Given its link to the monetary
system, the dominant explanation for interwar protectionism falls at least par-
tially into this category. According to Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) and Irwin
(2012), policymakers found themselves in a trilemma. They could only choose
two of the following three options: independent monetary policy, sustaining the
gold standard parity, and open trade.14 As the Depression deepened those poli-
cymakers who were bound by the infamous gold orthodoxy (Eichengreen, 1992)
resorted to protectionist measures. In contrast, those who had left the gold stan-
dard were relatively less inclined to increase trade barriers.15 What, however,
was the effect of these trade restrictions on the volume and geography of trade in
the interwar period? How does their effect compare to the losses in trade induced
by changes in national income?
The 1930s saw a massive fall in world trade. From its peak in 1929 until its
trough in 1932, real world trade fell by about 25 % (Irwin, 2012, p. 102). Tariff
13Irwin (2012, p. 110), too, makes this point. The application of closed economy DSGE models
to obviously open economies such as Belgium provides another example (e.g. Pensieroso, 2011).
14As such, it is related to the macroeconomic policy trilemma (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997).
15 Given the many parallels drawn between the Great Recession and Great Depression, it is
worthwhile to point out that this constitutes a unique feature of the crisis of the 1930s (Irwin,
2012). One reason making Eichengreen’s and Irwin’s argument so compelling is that it can explain
both, the emergence of the protectionism in the 1930s and the absence of it in the current crisis. As
today’s international macroeconomic environment is governed by flexible exchange rates, there
was simply less need to resort to 1930s style protectionism.
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and non-tariff barriers can explain around 14 % of this drop, whereas the other
11 % are accounted for by income losses. Trade barriers continued to grow in the
recovery period of 1932–1935. In the absence of a further increase of trade restric-
tions compared to 1932, trade would have grown by 8 % due to the recovery of
incomes around the globe. However, the recovery of world trade only reached
6 % due to ever growing trade restrictions.16 It is clear that restrictions and in-
come changes alike mattered for the fall and tame rebound of world trade. The
effect of trade barriers on the geography of trade, however, is less clear-cut.
Recently, Bromhead et al. (2017) and, to a limited extent, Gowa and Hicks
(2013) have resurrected the role of policy for the reorientation of world trade.
Both contributions point out that British imperial trade policies redirected trade
to within the empire. Likewise, Chapter 4 of this thesis emphasises the role of
policy. Indeed, French policymakers were able to change the direction of trade.
Yet, these findings do not call into question the general finding of the gravity
literature that geographical and historical links between countries are strong pre-
dictors of trade flows at any point in time (Head et al., 2010; Head and Mayer,
2014).17 This was no different for the interwar period as Eichengreen and Ir-
win (1995) demonstrate. Wolf and Ritschl (2011) argue that this persistence is so
strong that taking it into account can nullify the effects found for common cur-
rency areas. The gravity literature thus provides little evidence that the oft-cited
regionalisation of trade actually took place in the 1930s. These “gravity-based”
conclusions are almost certainly too strong as recent evidence presented in this
thesis and elsewhere (Bromhead et al., 2017) suggest. What remains undisputed
though, is that the geography of trade flows is relatively persistent, at least in the
short run. This insight will be important for the empirical specification in this
study.
While the effect of policy on trade volumes and its geography is well-studied,
the effect of trade destruction on incomes remains a relatively blind spot in the lit-
erature on the Great Depression. Income usually features in accounting exercises
to explain the fall in world trade, not vice versa. In the analysis of protectionism,
the magnitude of the effect of protectionism on income through falling demand is
almost never explicitly tested (Irwin, 2012, p. 110). This is all the more surprising
16These are the calculations by Irwin (2012, p. 104), which are based on the decomposition by
Madsen (2001).
17 Indeed, Frankel and Romer (1999) use this insight to investigate the impact of trade on in-
come. They separate the “geography component” of trade and use it to instrument for actual
trade. This allows them to provide an estimate of the long-run relationship between income and
trade. See also Irwin (2012) for a discussion. See Head et al. (2010) on the persistence of the effect
of colonial ties in the post-war period.
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as we know that trade links influenced the transmission of the Great Depression.
In the vein of the post-war analysis by Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), Mathy and
Meissner (2011) establish that bilateral trade was an important determinant for
business cycle comovement during this period. Unfortunately, this tells us lit-
tle about the magnitude of the effects the trade channel ought to explain. The
same holds true for many country case studies based on descriptive data, some
of which will be discussed in Section 3.4.2.
While no comprehensive empirical cross-country study for the interwar pe-
riod exists, a few country-specific studies quantify the effect of trade destruction
on income. Crucini and Kahn (1996) and Eichengreen (1986) find small effects
of the Smooth-Hawley tariff on the American GDP (though with opposite signs).
Irwin’s (1998) study supports this notion by showing that the impact of the tariff
on trade itself was not as large as one might expect. However, the focus of these
studies on the closed and large economy of the United States precludes any ex-
trapolation to the world as a whole. In contrast, two case studies on the Italian
Great Depression, using a VAR analysis (Mattesini and Quintieri, 1997) and gen-
eral equilibrium model (Perri and Quadrini, 2002), indicate the importance of the
loss in foreign demand for amplifying the Depression.
Beyond these studies, we have to rely on back-of-the-envelope calculations.
Using an estimate of the elasticity of income with respect to trade based on mod-
ern data, Irwin (2012, p. 112) presents such a calculation for the world as a whole.
Abstracting from changes in income, he conjectures that trade barriers could ex-
plain about a tenth in the fall of global income during the Depression. Grossman
and Meissner (2010) take income into account and use the trade multiplier. As-
suming a trade multiplier of 3, they argue that the fall in trade could have ex-
plained a large part of the Depression experience in a small open economy such
as Canada (25 % of the 30 % fall in GDP). While illuminating the potential mag-
nitude of the effect of trade destruction on income, such back-of-the-envelope
calculations necessarily remain speculative as long as no causal empirical esti-
mate of the foreign trade multiplier is available.18 This study closes this gap and
thus allows us to account for the impact of trade destruction on incomes.
The paucity of evidence on the importance of the fall of foreign demand for
18The only ones available are those by Friedman (1978) for 12 European countries. They suggest
a much lower value for the multiplier than Grossman and Meissner (2010) assume. They are
based on estimates of the marginal propensity to consume (see Section 3.3.1 for a short discussion
of such an approach). Given the lack of sufficient data on which these estimates are based upon
and the use of the marginal propensity to consume for their calculation, however, the literature
seems to have largely ignored these estimates.
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the severity of the Depression motivates this study. The existing research on trade
and the Great Depression informs the empirical strategy in at least three respects.
Firstly, the strong persistence of regional trade patterns as suggested by the grav-
ity literature paves the way for a clean identification of the effect of trade shocks
on income. Secondly, the heterogenous tariff responses to the Great Depression
have to be accounted for. Finally, with an estimate of the foreign trade multi-
plier at hand, the relative importance of the trade channel in explaining the Great
Depression in small open economies can be measured directly.
3.3 Framework, Data & Empirical Strategy
Before delving into the data description and presenting the precise estimation
framework, it is worthwhile to fix the ideas that will guide the empirical analy-
sis. The framework presented in the first part of this section links the domestic
economy with foreign demand through the general level of exports, export shares
with other countries, and the respective GDPs of these countries. The following
discussion of the data sources quantifies these trade linkages and highlights the
importance of trade for small countries during the interwar period. It also high-
lights the significant variation in trade shares across the three most significant
economies during this period. In turn, this variation motivates the construction
of the foreign demand measure, which is used as an instrumental variable in the
2SLS regression framework. After discussing the role of tariff rates, a placebo
approach is presented to demonstrate the robustness of the estimation results. Fi-
nally, a simple accounting framework is presented to assess the magnitude of the
effect of trade destruction on national incomes.
3.3.1 Fixing Ideas
As for fiscal multipliers, we could, in principle, calculate the multiplier based
on the marginal propensity to consume and import.19 However, estimates for
the marginal propensity differ so greatly even for modern data that they hardly
present a satisfying basis for the calculation of multipliers.20 Alternatively, we
19Specifically, mx = 1(1−mpc)+mpm .
20For example, Sahm et al. (2010) estimate it to be .3 based on survey data for the United States,
whereas a clean quasi-natural experiment in Singapore suggests .8 (Agarwal and Qian, 2014).
However, the variation in the estimates is not limited to methodologies or countries. As Shapiro
and Slemrod (2003, p. 394) point out, it is very likely that the marginal propensity to consume is
“contingent on aggregate conditions in ways that are difficult to anticipate.”
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can think of the trade multiplier and foreign demand in terms of the framework
outlined by Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005) in connection with the Asian crisis.21
In their setup, country i in an n-country world has the following output:
Y = X + A (3.1)
in which the subscript i is omitted, Y is the output, X denotes export component
of output, and A the non-export component of output. We can rewrite X as the
sum of i’s exports Xj to j countries (with j 6= i throughout the following equa-
tions):
Y =
n
∑
j=1
Xj + A (3.2)
expressing the above equation in growth rates yields:
dY
Y
=
1
Y
[ n
∑
j=1
dXj + dA
]
(3.3)
From this equation, we could, in principle, estimate the elasticity of income
with respect to changes in aggregate exports ( ∑nj=1 dXj ). However, Abeysinghe
and Forbes (2005) further link the exports to each trading partner’s economy in
the following way. i’s ability to export goods in the value of Xj to j depends on
j’s income such that:
Xj = Xj(Yj) (3.4)
with the derivative:
dXj =
∂Xj
∂Yj
dYj (3.5)
summing over all trading partners and expressing changes in terms of GDP
as in 3.3:
dX
Y
=
1
Y
n
∑
j=1
∂Xj
∂Yj
dYj (3.6)
21The equations presented follow their study closely but constitute only a small part of their
whole argument.
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and this can be rewritten as:
dX
Y
=
1
Y
n
∑
j=1
∂Xj
∂Yj
dYj
Xj
Xj
Yj
Yj
X
X
(3.7)
denoting the elasticity of i’s exports to j with respect to j’s income with ηj =
∂Xj
∂Yj
Yj
Xj
and inserting the above term into equation 3.3 yields:
dY
Y
=
X
Y
[ n
∑
j=1
ηj
Xj
X
dYj
Yj
]
+ d
A
Y
(3.8)
and then assuming that the elasticity η does not vary by trading partner, the
equation becomes:
dY
Y
=
X
Y
η
[ n
∑
j=1
Xj
X
dYj
Yj
]
+ d
A
Y
(3.9)
This final equation provides the link between country i’s economy with the
rest of the world. While obviously an abstraction,22 three insights stem from this
equation. These motivate the empirical setup and hence guide the data collection.
First, the term XY , the overall export to GDP ratio, is an important determinant of
how much the export sector can influence the domestic economy. The second
important insight is that the income elasticity η links exports with the domestic
economy. Third, the term
Xj
X
dYj
Yj
illuminates that the influence of a certain export
market j for i’s GDP depends on its weight relative to i’s other export markets
(
Xj
X ) and the GDP growth in j. With this wish list of variables at hand, we can
now turn to the data collection.
3.3.2 GDP, Exports, Prices, and Trade data
The estimation of an export multiplier requires data on GDP, exports, and prices
for the sample of 23 small economies.23 Furthermore, data on trade flows are
essential for the construction of the measure of foreign demand. This section
briefly discusses the sources for and construction of the corresponding variables.
22While the above equations ignore many relevant relationships and implicitly make theoreti-
cally indefensible exogeneity assumptions, they are still useful to organise the thoughts.
23The database is limited to the 28 countries for which data has been gathered in Chapter 2.
The United States, Germany and United Kingdom are excluded as they are considered large
economies. Furthermore, I exclude Japan and France being neither small enough countries nor
large enough importers.
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While quarterly GDP data are mostly unavailable for this period, the eco-
nomic activity indices estimated in Chapter 2 provide a close-enough proxy. This
is particularly true as they are scaled on the volatility and trend of the annual per
capita GDP data.24 For the purpose of this study, employing these indices might
be even preferable over actual national accounts. The new database presented
in Chapter 2 contains a version of the economic activity index that, unlike actual
GDP data, excludes all trade data.25 In a robustness test, this allows me to ensure
that the estimates are not driven by the fact that exports, in principle, enter the
model on both sides of the equation.26
To facilitate the interpretation as a multiplier, it is important to express the
economic activity and export data in terms of GDP. I thus rebase the real economic
activity indices to 1929 nominal GDP per capita data (see Appendix 3A for the
country-specific sources) such that:27
GDPt =
EACt
(
∑1929Q4r=1929Q1 EACr
4 )
GDP1929 (3.10)
GDPt thus provides a quarterly measure of real national product per capita in
1929 prices. As is common for quarterly national accounts (see e.g. OECD, 2017),
the quarterly values are expressed as annualised equivalents.
Correspondingly, I rebase the quarterly nominal exports per capita on their re-
spective per capita annual total of 1929. Finally, equation 3.11 divides the result-
ing term by the price index P with the base year 1929. This yields real quarterly
per capita exports in 1929 prices:28
24In fact, Mitchell et al. (2012) conducting a similar study refer to such indices as high-frequency
GDP estimates. Quarterly rather than monthly data is used to abstract from very short-term
fluctuations.
25The trend on which it is scaled should not be influenced much by trade data as trade balances
over the medium term.
26In principle, this is also true for all estimates of the fiscal multiplier known to this author. In
these study, spending enters the equation as part of GDP as well as the variable of interest on the
right-hand side.
27As the estimations in this paper will be made in per capita terms (such as in Barro and Redlick,
2011, for estimating fiscal multipliers), I convert all variables into per capita by dividing their
value by the population estimates (see Chapter 2 for the relevant sources). The annual population
data is converted to monthly frequency by a spline interpolation. Given the steadiness of popu-
lation growth, this is a quite reasonable procedure. To simplify the notation, I omit the per capita
term in the rest of the study.
28The quarterly nominal export data is derived from the smoothed and seasonally-adjusted
monthly export data in Chapter 2. The smoothing and seasonal adjustment procedure is the same
as outlined in that Chapter. The high (quarterly) and low (annual) frequency export data are
typically fully consistent. However, in some countries such as Chile the introduction of a new
nominal currency requires conversion. To ensure full consistency, I take the 1929 annual export
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XPrealt =
XPnominalt
(
∑
1929Q4
r=1929Q1 XP
nominal
r
4 )
XPnominal1929
Pt
(3.11)
Unfortunately, the choice of the deflator P is not straightforward. Contempo-
rary export price indices have severe limitations, especially regarding the weight-
ing (see League of Nations, 1939a, p. 67 for a discussion). This can have severe
implications for the interpretation of the real series. If the export price index is
based on very few agricultural commodities, the prices of which fell rapidly dur-
ing this period, increasing real exports could signal a flourishing export business
when in fact farmers sell their harvest in large quantities at dumping prices. As
we are interested in the impact of the foreign demand shock on the domestic
economy, a GDP deflator provides an alternative. It expresses the income gained
from exports in terms of the average price basket of the economy. Finally, whole-
sale price indices provide a compromise between the export and GDP deflators
as they typically contain a number of export and domestic goods (League of Na-
tions, 1939a, p. 67). Because of this feature and their availability at a quarterly
frequency (see Chapter 2), they constitute the preferred deflator for this study. To
ensure that the choice of the deflator does not have an undue influence on the re-
sults, the robustness of the results against using either of these deflators is tested
(and confirmed).29
Having gathered real export and GDP data, we can assess the importance of
exports relative to GDP. However, as we will identify the export multiplier from
the variations in foreign demand based on trade flows, bilateral export data is
needed. I derive these from the Statistisches Handbuch der Weltwirtschaft (Statistis-
ches Reichsamt, 1936).30 As all data were given in millions of national currencies,
the flows were converted by the dollar exchange rate from the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System (1943).31 This provides me with cross sections
values from the sources described in Appendix 3A rather than deriving them by summing the
quarterly data.
29Unlike for wholesale prices, neither export price indices (with one for Belgium being the
exception) nor GDP deflators exist at a monthly or quarterly frequency for the countries in the
sample. An alternative is to employ annual export price indices and convert them to quarterly
frequency. Using a spline interpolation, I create quarterly price indices from the annual indices,
base them to 1929 = 1, and convert the nominal to real per capita exports in 1929 prices. Appendix
3A reports all sources.
30For Bulgaria, there was no trade flow to the United States given in the source. I assume this
flow to have been half of the export flow to the United Kingdom.
31For Estonia, a cross calculation with Germany was necessary based on the exchange rate given
in Statistisches Reichsamt (1936). For Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, the rate for the
British Pound was used as these were pegged 1 : 1. The dollar conversion is only important for
the estimation of the gravity model.
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for 1927 and 1933 with 23 ∗ 3 = 69 exports flows each. These data will be used
for the creation of the foreign demand variable and the miniature gravity model
to create the placebo study.
3.3.3 The Importance of Trade for Small Economies
While the Great War had taken its toll on the achievements of the first era of
globalisation, the global degree of trade openness as measured by the trade
(exports+imports) to income ratio during the 1920s was comparable to that of
the Bretton-Woods period (Klasing and Milionis, 2014). However, when looking
at the construction of the weights for such global measure, the large and rela-
tively closed economy of the United States dominates. In contrast, the focus of
this study is the export sector of small countries. Table 3.1 thus provides country-
specific export and GDP data for them.
Indeed, for many smaller economies the exports to GDP ratio in 1927 alone
surpassed 20 % as the column XGDP of Table 3.1 demonstrates. New Zealand,
Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands even exported more than 30 % of their
GDP. Prima facie, this provides us with an idea of how much of a role the loss
of foreign demand could have played during the Depression. It also raises the
question to which countries most of the goods were exported.
For the world as a whole, the top three importers, the United States, Germany,
and the United Kingdom, absorbed around a third of the exports.32 Because of the
centre-periphery relationships, their share in the exports of the small economies
in the sample was much larger for most countries (see column
XTop3
XTotal
).33 For exam-
ple, the share of Chilean exports, typically mining and agricultural commodities,
that went to the three economic powerhouses of the world amounted to 78 %.
Combining this share with the data from the previous column means that around
16 % of Chile’s GDP was exported to the three largest importers of the interwar
period. Hence, many small countries were relatively open and their exports con-
centrated, making the conditions in the three large markets an important factor
in a small country’s GDP.
32Specifically, the world import value in 1929 was 35,595 m US-Dollars (1929 value), of which
m $4, 339 were consumed by the United States, m $5, 407 by the United Kingdom, and m $3, 203
by Germany. The fourth largest importer was France with m $ 2,282 (League of Nations, 1937, p.
214f).
33The division of Austria and Hungary obviously led to a reclassification of internal to foreign
trade in the two countries. Yugoslavia traded mostly with Austria and Italy due to its geographic
(and historical) proximity.
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TABLE 3.1: EXPORT SHARES OF SMALL COUNTRIES
Country XGDP
XTop3
XTotal
XGermany
XTop3
XUnited Kingdom
XTop3
XUnited States
XTop3
1927 1933 1927 1933 1927 1933
Australia 13 52 17 15 73 81 10 4
Austria 23 25 73 68 15 21 12 11
Belgium 43 37 45 37 30 44 24 19
Bulgaria 11 25 94 95 4 5 2 0
Canada 19 76 5 2 44 53 51 45
Chile 21 78 14 14 47 50 39 36
Czechoslovakia 28 37 66 61 21 14 14 25
Denmark 32 83 26 16 73 83 1 1
Estonia 23 62 48 34 50 59 2 7
Finland 24 62 26 15 66 71 9 14
Hungary 16 16 82 54 15 39 3 7
Italy 11 35 41 37 28 35 30 27
Mexico 13 84 12 10 9 28 79 62
Netherlands 31 52 47 50 46 40 7 11
New Zealand 32 85 3 1 91 91 6 8
Norway 17 53 24 29 56 47 20 24
Poland 11 45 71 46 27 50 2 4
Romania 10 25 76 40 24 59 1 1
South Africa 15 61 8 3 90 95 3 1
Spain 7 40 23 22 49 58 28 20
Sweden 18 56 30 37 50 22 20 42
Switzerland 20 45 43 48 34 31 23 20
Yugoslavia 13 13 84 75 10 14 6 10
Sources: Own calculations based on sources documented in Appendix 3A.
Note: All values are given in percentages. Column 1 is based on data for 1929. Column 2 on data
for 1927.
However, even across these three markets, exports were all but diversified.
The following six columns show the relative share of each of the three main eco-
nomic powers in the small country’s export markets for 1927 and 1933.34 Com-
bining these shares with the data in the first two columns also allows us to get an
idea of the relative importance of large countries for the smaller ones. For exam-
ple, around 9 % of the South African GDP were exports to the United Kingdom.
Denmark exported 26 % of its GDP to Germany and Great Britain. Mexico’s econ-
omy, in turn, heavily depended on exports to the United States, which made up
around 8.5 % of her GDP. In short, economic conditions in a larger economy ab-
sorbing a significant share of a small economy’s exports could have severe effects
34These shares are normalised by the XTop3 to improve the readability across rows.
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on these countries.
Why was there such little diversification in terms of export markets? At first
glance, history seems to have mattered for trade patterns as the cases of Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa suggest. They traded relatively in-
tensively with their colonial metropole Great Britain. Likewise, the table sug-
gests that geography mattered. For example, the American share in Mexico’s
export market is relatively large. The same holds true for the German share in
Czechoslovakian exports. Estimating a gravity model in the later part of this sec-
tion confirms these casual observations. History and geography determined the
locus of the main export market during this period. Consistent with the gravity
literature, export portfolios between 1927 and 1933 changed relatively little.
Chapter 2 demonstrated that the course and depth of the Depression varied
substantially across the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. Combining
this insight with the patterns of export markets shown in this section suggests
that the small open economies could have been affected to different degrees by
the global Depression through the trade channel. This is in line with what the
League of Nations (1931, p. 236) reported as early as 1931. The first summary
on the “course and phases of the World Depression” suggested that the depth of
the Depression for each individual country did, amongst other factors, heavily
depend on the situation of its “chief customers.” Moreover, the League’s report
stated that “countries selling largely to others which have been seriously affected
have tended to suffer, while those whose customers have enjoyed favourable con-
ditions have in general been able better to maintain their economic activity.” It is
worthwhile to formalise these observations by constructing the appropriate mea-
sure.
3.3.4 Constructing the Measure of Foreign Demand
Based on the trade share data in Table 3.1 and the economic activity estimates in
Chapter 2, I build the following measure of foreign demand.
YFi,t =
n=3
∑
j=1
wji,1927 ∗Y jt (3.12)
where YFi is the foreign demand for the small open economy i in quarter t. Y
j
t
is the quarterly GDP per capita index of j in quarter t. j = 1, 2, 3 are the United
States, United Kingdom, and Germany. Finally, w is the export share of i in 1927
with trading partner j. The shares are normalised such that ∑w
j
i,1927 = 1.
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FIGURE 3.2: Varying exposure to foreign demand shocks due to
composition of export markets
Source: Own calculations based on trade shares from Statistisches Reichsamt (1936) and the eco-
nomic activity indices from Chapter 2.
Figure 3.2 highlights the variation of this measure over time across countries.
The solid line emulates a synthetic country that exports to each of the large coun-
tries to the same degree ( w1i,1927 = w
2
i,1927 = w
3
i,1927 =
1
3 ). The other indices
are based on the actual trade data in Table 3.1. It becomes apparent that the ex-
posure to the Depression varied substantially across countries. Mexico traded
mostly with the United States. As the Great Depression was the deepest in the
United States among the three economic powerhouses, the drop in foreign de-
mand for Mexico was very large. In contrast, New Zealand benefitted from the
fact that Great Britain was its chief customer, absorbing exports worth about 24 %
of her GDP. Foreign demand dropped relatively little because the Depression
was least severe in Great Britain among the three main global importers. Fi-
nally, Czechoslovakia exported foremost to Germany. The German Depression
was neither as deep as the one in the United States nor as mild as the one in Great
Britain. This meant that the intensity of the foreign demand shock was milder
than in Mexico, but more pronounced than in New Zealand. Figure 3.2 suggests
that the variation in foreign demand for each of the small countries was indeed
large. It stems solely from the historical and geographic trade patterns as the
GDP data used for all three large countries is the same for every small economy.
How did this variation in foreign demand affect export opportunities?
Figure 3.3 shows the conditional correlation between the growth of foreign
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FIGURE 3.3: Relationship between exports and the foreign demand
measure
Note: Conditional correlation of the growth of real exports with foreign demand as defined above.
Controls include: inflation, gold adherence, foreign exchange controls, country fixed effects and
year fixed effects. This graph is based on the balanced sample (1928Q3-1932Q1). Number of
observations: 345.
demand and real exports.35 The relationship is significant in statistical and eco-
nomic terms. A 1 % percent change in the growth of the foreign demand index
increased the growth of real exports by around 3.3 %. It is fair to assume that this
variation is exogenous for the small country. First, it is unlikely that the small
country influences the large country’s economy to a significant degree. Second,
the time fixed effect in the conditional correlation shown above controls for global
economic conditions. The identifying variation comes from the combination of
the course of the Depression in the three large countries and the trade patterns
in 1927. These patterns themselves were deeply rooted in history and geography.
They changed relatively little in response to the Depression. Given these desir-
able features, the relationship displayed here will thus constitute the first stage of
the instrumental variable strategy chosen in this study.
3.3.5 Estimating the Trade Multiplier
For the estimation of fiscal multipliers, the literature has moved towards the anal-
ysis of time series data covering either one or multiple countries. Yet, the latter
panel data approach cannot deal with the inherent identification problems either.
35 The set of control variables includes (wholesale price) inflation, dummy variables for gold
adherence and foreign exchange controls, and country and time fixed effects. The time fixed effect
ensures that the identifying variation only comes from the variation in foreign demand at a given
point in time.
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Thus, the causal identification of the multiplier is either achieved by restrictions
in a vector autoregression analysis or by instrumental variable approaches (see
Ramey, 2011, for a concise and excellent review). In the following paragraphs,
I present two specifications common in the fiscal multiplier literature but repur-
posed for the analysis of the trade multiplier. To the best of my knowledge, no
other recent study adapts the instrumental variable approaches from the fiscal
multiplier literature in this way.
The first specification follows the panel regressions by Almunia et al. (2010):
yi,t − yi,t−1
yi,t−1
= β1
XPi,t − XPi,t−1
XPi,t−1
+ βxX′ + ci + tt + e (3.13)
in which yi,t−yi,t−1yi,t−1 denotes the GDP growth rate in country i, X
′ is a vector of
controls, including inflation, a dummy capturing gold adherence and the impo-
sition of foreign exchange controls.36 ci denotes a country fixed effects country i.
As the equation is estimated in growth rates, the country fixed effects account for
structural reasons that might affect growth rates. One such factor could, for ex-
ample, be industrial development (see Chapter 2). Finally, tt is a time fixed effect
for quarter t. This fixed effect captures global economic conditions.
The term XPi,t−XPi,t−1XPi,t−1 captures real export growth. Note, that in this setting
the coefficient β1 is not interpretable as a multiplier. Instead it is the elasticity of
income with respect to changes in exports. In order to facilitate the interpretation
as a multiplier, we have to divide the coefficient by the median ratio of exports
to GDP in the sample (mx =
β1
(˜ XGDP )
).37 Because various dimension of endogene-
ity such as reverse causation and omitted variable bias loom large, estimating
the above equation with the one stage OLS estimator is unlikely to produce rea-
sonable estimates for the coefficient of interest.38 This calls for an instrumental
variable approach. As argued above, satisfying the exclusion restriction and rele-
vance conditions, we can isolate exogenous changes in a small country’s exports
in this panel setting by the following first-stage regression:
36The gold standard adherence and foreign exchange control indicators are from a variety of
sources (League of Nations, 1941; Wolf and Yousef, 2007; Bernanke and James, 1991; Crafts and
Fearon, 2013a). The wholesale price inflation is calculated from the data in Chapter 2. In ro-
bustness tests, I also add the lagged dependent variable yi,t−1−yi,t−2yi,t−2 to mitigate serial correlation
concerns.
37This procedure is equivalent to the fiscal multiplier literature, where one divides the coeffi-
cient by the public spending to GDP ratio. Almunia et al. (2010) use the median, whereas Riera-
Crichton et al. (2015, p. 19) use the mean. Using either does not make a large difference in the
case of this study.
38One of such confounding factors could be the well-documented capital flow reversals during
this period, which might affect exports and GDP (Accominotti and Eichengreen, 2016).
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XPi,t − XPi,t−1
XPi,t−1
= β1
yFi,t − yFi,t−1
yFi,t−1
+ βxX′ + ci + tt + ei,t (3.14)
where
yFi,t−yFi,t−1
yFi,t−1
captures the growth rate in foreign demand. This setup pro-
vides us with a causal estimate of the foreign trade multiplier. Note that the time
fixed effect ensures that the identifying variation of the instrument comes from
deviations in foreign demand based on the pre-crisis trade patterns, not the world
demand itself.
In an alternative specification, I apply the approach put forward by Barro and
Redlick (2011), estimating fiscal and tax multipliers for the United States. The
advantage of this approach is that the coefficient can be interpreted as a multiplier
without any further conversions. This is achieved by basing the changes in real
exports on the GDP in t− 1 such that the variable of interest becomes XPi,t−XPi,t−1yi,t−1 :
yi,t − yi,t−1
yi,t−1
= β1
XPi,t − XPi,t−1
yi,t−1
+ βxX′ + ci + tt + e (3.15)
where the calculation of export growth in terms of GDP XPi,t−XPi,t−1yi,t−1 facilitates
a straightforward interpretation of β1 as a multiplier. Corresponding to the Al-
munia et al. specification above, the first stage is estimated by the following equa-
tion:
XPi,t − XPi,t−1
yi,t−1
= β1
yFi,t − yFi,t−1
yFi,t−1
+ βxX′ + ci + tt + e (3.16)
A potential problem for this setup is that the (lagged) left-hand side variable
now features in the denominator on the right-hand side, which could induce en-
dogeneity. Reassuringly, as we shall see, both specifications yield virtually the
same result.
In this study, I focus on the size of the impact (contemporaneous) multiplier.
Future research should also aim to estimate a more dynamic version of this mul-
tiplier, for example by using the local projection approach proposed by Jordà
(2005). This approach has recently gained prominence in the fiscal multiplier lit-
erature (Ramey and Zubairy, 2018).39 If dynamic effects are taken into account,
the multiplier would most likely increase. Yet, other problems potentially emerge
39Earlier estimates of the dynamic multiplier relied on VAR approaches in the vein of Ilzetzki
et al. (2013).
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and thus this approach is not followed here.40
On the other hand, we might want to correct for trade-balance effects. So far,
we have abstracted from the adjustment of the trade balance entirely. This may or
may not be warranted in a short-run analysis such as this one even though a full
adjustment of the trade balance is not a given during this period.41 If there was
no adjustment at all, we could just interpret the multiplier as it is. In a national
accounting sense, however, trade is neutral. It is useful to distinguish contempo-
raneous φ and long-term adjustment (γ=1-φ) such that the trade balance-adjusted
impact multiplier mTBx becomes:
mTBx = mx − (1− φ) (3.17)
If there is full within-period trade balance adjustment (φ = 1), no adjust-
ment of the trade multiplier is necessary and thus mTBx = mx. This is because
the growth in imports is already fully reflected in the contemporaneous GDP
growth - the dependent variable in Equation 3.15. If there is zero contemporane-
ous adjustment of the trade balance (φ = 0), the impact multiplier would become
mTBx = mx − 1. Fortunately, estimating (φ) is very straightforward. Another way
to express φ is the within-period elasticity of imports M with respect to a change
in exports, which can be estimated by the following equation:
Mi,t −Mi,t−1
yi,t−1
= φ
XPi,t − XPi,t−1
yi,t−1
+ ci + tt + e (3.18)
Using the same instrument for exports as in Equation 3.16, Appendix 3B.2
provides the corresponding estimate for the within-period adjustment φ ≈ .53.
The conservative lower bound estimate for the foreign trade multiplier would
thus be mTBx = mx − .47, assuming full future trade balance adjustment and no
impact of the multiplier other than the contemporaneous one. Another natural
way to think of mTBx is the part of the multiplier that purely captures the gains
from trade, many of which were lost during the period under consideration.
40In particular, the large number of fixed effects essential for my identification strategy could
impose problems. Typically, the panel local projections are not estimated with time fixed effects
(see e.g. Jordá et al., 2017).
41See Appendix 3A for plots of the annual trade balance in terms of GDP for each country.
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3.3.6 The Omission of Tariff Rates and the Measure of Foreign
Demand
Even though the instrumental variable strategy should mitigate omitted variable
bias and endogeneity concerns, some caveats of the measure of foreign demand
are worth mentioning. So far, we have abstracted from changes in tariff barriers.
If tariff barriers rose to the same degree in all three countries throughout the pe-
riod, this would not pose any difficulties for the identification per se. As we know
from previous research (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010), this was not the case as the
world crisis progressed in the 1930s. Germany became more restrictive than the
United Kingdom and the United States in the 1930s. If the evolution of tariff bar-
riers across the three large countries diverged, this could weaken the instrument
as the weighting of the foreign GDPs is time-invariant.
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FIGURE 3.4: Average protection rates in Germany, the United King-
dom, and the United States
Source: Clemens and Williamson (2004)
Notes: The average protection rate is defined as tariff revenue over imports.
However, Figure 3.4 demonstrates that the growth in protectionism across the
three large countries only started to diverge significantly after 1932. Moreover,
other forms of import restrictions such as quotas and exchange controls became
more common in response to the financial crisis of 1931 and the collapse of the
gold standard at the end of that year (Mitchener and Wandschneider, 2015; Gor-
don, 1941, p. 35f). Given these observations, we should restrict the sample until
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1932.42 As for two countries of the countries in the sample, the GDP data are only
available from 1928 onwards, a balanced subsample between the second quarter
of 1928 and the first quarter of 1932 will thus serve as the preferred sample.43
3.3.7 A Placebo Test: Shutting Down History & Reversing Ge-
ography
The insight that trade flows are persistent in the short and medium term mo-
tivates the creation of the foreign demand instrumental variable. It also paves
the way for a placebo test to verify the results of the analysis. As the observed
pre-crisis trade shares are a function of history and geography, we can experi-
ment with a historical and geographical counterfactual. Simulating the absence
of (colonial) history and rotating the distance of countries to the main economic
powers, what would the trade shares in 1927 have looked like? If we use these
counterfactual trade shares to construct the foreign demand measure, do we still
obtain significant results in the instrumental variable estimation? If so, this would
cast doubts on the validity of the results.
To investigate this question, we start by creating a “miniature gravity model”
including the exports of the 23 small countries in the sample to the three large
importing nations. Specifically, I estimate the following equation:
XPi,j = β1ln(Dij) + β2Cij + γi + δj + e (3.19)
XPi,j are the exports from the small economy i to the large economy j in US-
Dollars, Cij indicates if a colonial relationship exists, and γi and δj are exporter
and importer fixed effects respectively. Di,j is the distance between small country
i and large country j.44
Table 3.2 displays the results using the two most common estimators for this
miniature gravity model. As OLS is biased when applied to trade data, the PPML
estimator is preferred (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The results are all but
surprising. Countries farther apart traded less, but having a colonial tie had a
positive effect on trade. The high value for the Pseudo R2 indicates the power of
geographical and historical forces in shaping commercial relationships.
42As the Import Duties Act became effective in March 1932 in the United Kingdom, the first
quarter of 1932 seems a reasonable cut-off date within that year.
43 Appendix 3C, however, demonstrates the robustness of the results for the full sample.
44Distances for the estimation of the gravity model were taken from Gowa and Hicks (2013).
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TABLE 3.2: RESULTS FROM A MINIATURE GRAVITY MODEL
Estimator OLS PPML
Dep. Variable LN(Exports) Exports
LN(Distance) -0.821∗∗∗ -0.434∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.115)
Colonial Tie 2.590∗∗∗ 2.424∗∗∗
(0.715) (0.345)
Observations 69 69
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.856 0.908
Note: See text for data sources. A constant, importer and exporter fixed effects are included, but
not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
With these elasticities at hand, we can now build our counterfactual world.
The historical part of this world will be the absence of colonial ties by setting
β2 = 0. For the geographical counterfactual, I rotate the distances between trad-
ing partners.45 The country that was farthest away now becomes closest, the
country that was second farthest now becomes the farthest away, and the closest
country would now be in the middle of the two. Based on this reversed geog-
raphy and the coefficients from Table 3.2, I then predict trade. This allows me
to construct the relative trade shares in the three export markets akin to Table
3.1. Table A3.24 in the appendix compares the actual and counterfactual trade
shares in 1927. In turn, these counterfactual trade shares allow us to construct a
“placebo” measure of foreign demand for each country. The calculation of this
measure strictly follows the one for the actual foreign demand measure outlined
in Section 3.3.4. It only differs in that it employs the counterfactual trade shares
rather than the actual ones.
3.3.8 Accounting for the Importance of the Fall of Trade
The causal estimate of the export multiplier allows us to assess the role of trade
destruction for the initial phase of the Great Depression in small open economies.
Rather than using a metric such as the peak-to-trough loss, it is helpful to calcu-
late the cumulative loss in the vein of the analysis in Chapter 2. This measure has
the salient feature of being comparable across countries by ensuring that the same
45An alternative would be to randomise the distances entirely, but for the sake of the argument
and precise replicability of the results, the rule-based rotation of countries is preferred.
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time horizon is used across the sample. A further advantage is that an exception-
ally good (or bad) quarter in terms of exports at the end of the three-year period
has less influence on the result than a good (or bad) quarter at the trough when
calculating the peak-to-trough loss. The cumulative loss relative to the peak is
calculated by:
GDPL =
12
∑
t=1
GDPP+t − GDPP
4
/
GDPP (3.20)
where GDPP is the quarterly GDP and P denotes the quarter, in which the final
pre-Depression peak of the GDP occurred between 1928 and 1931. Dividing the
integral between a horizontal line from the peak and the observed actual GDP for
first three years (= 12 quarters) of the crisis by 4 and then by the peak-GDP allows
us to express the initial loss in terms of annualised peak-GDPs. Correspondingly,
the loss in real exports46 in the first three years is calculated in the following way:
XPGDPL =
12
∑
t=1
XPP+t − XPP
4
/P+12∑
t=1
GDPP+t
12
(3.21)
in which, like above, P refers to the quarter in which GDP peaked. The term
P+12
∑
t=1
GDPP+t
12 ensures that the cumulative loss in exports (
12
∑
t=1
XPP+t−XPP
4 ) is expressed
in terms of the average GDP for the three years following the last GDP peak. We
can then combine our estimate of the export multiplier mTBx with the cumulative
loss in exports XPGDPL to calculate GDPTD - the GDP loss that is due to the fall in
exports (trade destruction).
GDPTD = mTBx XP
GDP
L (3.22)
Finally, dividing the trade-induced income destruction GDPTD by the total
decline GDPL provides us with the share of total income loss caused by trade
destruction:
STD =
GDPTD
GDPL
(3.23)
46I use the GDP deflator for this accounting exercise as the interpolation from annual to quar-
terly observations, unlike for the regressions, seems to be harmless here. Given the objective of the
accounting exercise, the effect of the loss of exports on the domestic economy, converting nominal
exports to real exports employing the GDP deflator seems the most appropriate procedure.
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As long as the terms XPGDPL and GDPL are not positive (meaning a cumulative
gain in either GDP or exports), STD must be greater than zero.47 It can also be
larger than one, implying that, in the absence of the loss in exports, the country’s
economy would have grown ceteris paribus.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Estimating the trade multiplier
Table 3.3 reports the results of the IV estimation for the balanced sample of 23
countries running from the third quarter of 1928 until the first quarter of 1932. All
regressions include a set of controls comprising wholesale price inflation, gold
standard adherence, imposition of foreign exchange controls, country and time
fixed effects. For expositional clarity, their display is omitted in the below table.48
TABLE 3.3: IV RESULTS (BALANCED SAMPLE - 1928Q2–1932Q1)
Specification Almunia et al. Barro-Redlick Placebo
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
xp y xpGDP y xpGDP y
xp 0.19∗∗∗
(0.05)
xpGDP 1.20∗∗∗ 1.28
(0.39) (1.55)
yF 3.36∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 1.45
(0.75) (0.10) (1.47)
Observations 368 368 368 368 368 368
Countries 23 23 23 23 23 23
Partial F 20.22 26.37 0.98
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the country level. Controls included, but
not shown: wholesale price inflation, gold standard adherence, imposition of foreign exchange
controls, time and country fixed effects. The median ratio of exports to GDP for this sample is .161.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
47Only in the case of Bulgaria, exports do not fall cumulatively during the first three years of
the crisis. Export quantities increased heavily due to two exceptionally good harvests in 1930 and
1931 (Methorst, 1938, p. 47). Bulgaria is thus omitted from this exercise. An interpretation would
naturally be that in the absence of the gain in trade, the Depression would have been even worse.
48The respective coefficients are shown in Appendix 3C. Given that during this period almost
all countries were still on the gold standard and foreign exchange controls were the exception
rather than the rule before 1932, they are of little interest.
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The first two columns show the specification in the vein of Almunia et al.
(2010). The instrument is very strong as signalled by the partial F-statistic well
above 10. To interpret the elasticity of income with respect to changes in exports,
we have to divide the estimate for the export variable xp by the median ratio of
exports to GDP such that the export multiplier is mx = .193.161 ≈ 1.19. This value
is virtually the same as the estimate of the specification in the vein of Barro and
Redlick (2011) shown in column four (1.20). In the case of the Barro and Redlick-
specification, the coefficient for changes in xpGDP can be interpreted without fur-
ther transformation. As for the Almunia et al.-specification, the partial F-statistic
in the first stage suggests that the instrument is relevant and strong. Based on
these estimates, we can conclude that the foreign trade multiplier mx was about
1.2 in the period under consideration. This estimate is reassuringly close to an-
other, though domestic, demand-shock based estimate of the multiplier during
this period. Rather than analysing a foreign demand shock, Almunia et al. (2010,
p. 247) use domestic defence spending shocks on government expenditure. Their
(fiscal) multiplier takes a value of 1.6.
We can convert the estimated impact multiplier into the trade-balance ad-
justed multiplier by mTBx = 1.2 − .47 ≈ .73. This provides us with the most
conservative estimate for the foreign trade multiplier, assuming for full future
readjustment of the trade balance and neglecting any potential dynamic effects.
This effect is still large. For every percentage point of exports lost (in terms of
GDP), GDP declined by .73 %. Again, mTBx corrects for all accounting-related
effects and simply captures the lost gains from trade. As the next section will
demonstrate, this multiplier is large enough to have severe implications for our
understanding of the spread and depth of the Great Depression.
The results presented here are robust against a number of specifications. The
last two columns of Table 3.3 estimate the Barro and Redlick-specification with
the placebo foreign demand rather than the actual one. As expected, the first
stage indicates that the counterfactual foreign demand is no predictor of the crisis.
The second stage thus naturally leads, as it should do, to insignificant results.
This non-result provides an important verification of the multiplier estimate. It
shows that the finding is not driven by unobserved global movements.
Further robustness checks are included in Appendix 3C. The results change
little when (i) errors are clustered along the country and time dimension and (ii)
a lagged dependent variable is included to mitigate serial correlation concerns.
While the instrument becomes weaker as the trend in the erection of trade barri-
ers diverges in the mid-1930s, the results also hold (iii) for the full (unbalanced)
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sample throughout the period. In fact, the estimated trade multiplier grows.
However, it is not clear whether this is due to a weak instrument problem or
in fact driven by the nature of the recovery of the 1930s. In specification (iv),
I estimate the same equation with the economic activity indices that were con-
structed without any trade and price data. Finally, specification (v) does employ
un-smoothed data for exports and prices. Naturally, the estimate is less precise
as the export data are very volatile for some countries. However, its economet-
ric and economic significance is comparable to the other specifications and the
F-statistic for the first stage remains close to the value of 10.
3.4.2 Accounting for the Importance of the Fall of Trade
How would the initial course of the Great Depression have looked like in small
open economies in the absence of the breakdown of opportunities to export? Ta-
ble 3.4 provides a guide to answer this question based on the GDP and export
data for each country and the causal estimate of the export multiplier from the
previous section. The countries are ordered by the explanatory power of the trade
channel.
The column GDPL displays the cumulative GDP loss in the first three years
after each country’s pre-Depression peak. Correspondingly, the column XPGDPL
shows the cumulative loss in real exports over the average GDP in the first three
years of crisis. For example, Belgium had lost 20 % worth of a year of its peak-
GDP in the three years following the pre-Depression peak. During the same pe-
riod, she had cumulatively lost 42 % of exports in terms of her average GDP
during these three years. The column GDPTD multiplies this latter value with the
trade multiplier showing the percentage amount of GDP lost to trade destruc-
tion.49 In the case of Belgium, this would imply a 30 % loss in terms GDP due
to the loss of export markets, whereas the actual observed one was 20 % (column
1). Finally, the column STD = GDP
TD
GDPL
divides the former by the latter, thus docu-
menting the share that trade destruction can explain in the total GDP loss during
the first three years of the crisis. In the Belgian case as well as for Estonia and
Denmark, the trade channel over-explains the drop in GDP. Put differently and
all other things equal, these economies would have grown in the absence of the
49A potential caveat of this method is that the estimate of the multiplier is not country-specific.
On the other hand, it is not ex-ante clear why the multiplier itself should vary greatly across coun-
tries. In any case, this accounting exercise rather than being a definitive statement in the sense of
a horse race on the causes of the Great Depression in small open economies shall illuminate the
relative importance of the trade multiplier.
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fall in trade. This accessible metric thus allows us to gauge, to a first approxima-
tion, how important the loss of export markets could have been for the course of
the Great Depression in small open economies.
TABLE 3.4: THE IMPACT OF TRADE DESTRUCTION ON INCOME
Country GDPL XPGDPL GDP
TD STD = GDP
TD
GDPL
Explanatory Power of the Trade Channel: > 100 %
Belgium -20 -42 -30 154
Estonia -6 -12 -9 152
Denmark -12 -18 -13 105
Explanatory Power of the Trade Channel: 50-99 %
Norway -9 -11 -8 90
Netherlands -25 -29 -21 85
Czechoslovakia -23 -26 -19 84
Hungary -16 -16 -12 73
Switzerland -16 -15 -11 71
South Africa -19 -16 -12 62
Austria -34 -28 -21 60
Finland -10 -8 -6 57
Sweden -25 -18 -13 52
Explanatory Power of the Trade Channel: < 50 %
Yugoslavia -26 -17 -13 48
Canada -42 -26 -19 46
Chile -64 -39 -28 44
Australia -24 -14 -10 43
Italy -16 -9 -6 38
Mexico -18 -8 -6 34
Spain -27 -11 -8 29
New Zealand -39 -15 -11 28
Romania -21 -7 -5 26
Poland -32 -5 -4 12
Source: Own calculations. All numbers are given in percentages.
Note: All calculations based on a trade multiplier of 0.73.
The second group contains countries for which at least half of the initial down-
turn can be explained by the loss of export markets. The fact that much, if not all,
of the initial depth of the Depression in the Scandinavian countries is explained
by the loss in export opportunities, resonates well with the large effects of interna-
tional fluctuations on the Scandinavian business cycles found in Klovland (1998,
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p. 335). Similarly, country-specific studies on Austria, Switzerland, Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia have emphasised the lack of world demand as an important
contributing, though not necessarily dominant, factor for the Depression.50 The
same holds true for the economies of the Netherlands and Belgium, which were
particularly vulnerable due to their openness (see van Zanden (1998, p. 109) and
Mommen (1994, p. 32).
The final group comprises countries for which the trade channel explains less
than 50 % of the downturn. However, it is still a large factor for the depth of
the initial crisis in countries such as Australia and Canada.51 The results for Italy
confirm the important role ascribed to the loss in foreign demand found in earlier
research (Mattesini and Quintieri, 1997, p. 279). Except for Poland, a relatively
closed economy (see Table 3.1), the trade channel can explain substantial parts of
the initial depth of the crisis even in this last group.
In sum, a number of countries would perhaps have avoided or nearly avoided
the first years of Depression altogether had there not been such a drastic fall of
export opportunities. For most other countries, the trade channel still serves as
an important explanation for the initial depth of the crisis. The effects presented
here are large, but they are not unrealistic. They are fully consistent with the
notion of contemporaries that, besides the gold standard, the exposure to the
global Depression determined the fate of the small open economies during the
interwar years. Furthermore, they are consistent with the importance of trade
linkages for business cycle comovement during this period.52 After all, trade
propagated the Depression to a significant extent.
3.5 Conclusion
This study resurrects the concept of the foreign trade multiplier for the analysis
of short-run macroeconomic fluctuations. Ironically, while nowadays the foreign
50 See Otruba (1968, p. 20) and März (1990, p. 413) for Austria, Woitek et al. (2012, p. 145)
for Switzerland, Berend and Ránki (1985, p.61–64 with a special emphasis on agriculture) for
Hungary, and Pryor et al. (1971, p. 46) for Czechoslovakia. This is of course not to say that other
factors were negligible or that trade is framed as the dominant driver of the Great Depression in
these countries. This is particularly true for the consequences of the Creditanstalt crisis in Austria
(Schubert, 1991) and the twin banking crisis in Hungary (Macher, forthcoming).
51See Valentine (1987) on the role of the fall in exports and export prices in Australia and Horn
(1984) on the role of the loss of foreign markets for the Canadian Depression.
52See Mathy and Meissner (2011).
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trade multiplier is at the centre of (mostly Keynesian) long-run development eco-
nomics, explaining short-run fluctuations is precisely what Harrod’s initial con-
tribution was intended for. The trade multiplier can explain large parts of the De-
pression in the small countries, at least in the initial stages. Some countries would
have even escaped this downturn altogether if it was not for the fall in trade. Or
to morph Dennis H. Robertson’s quip (Polak, 1956): If the industrial powerhouses
of the world had not sneezed, the rest of the world could have avoided catching
pneumonia. In reality, however, demand from the large importers for exports
dropped. Given the magnitude of the crisis emanating from them, it seems un-
likely that any small open economy could have escaped the Great Depression by
implementing better policies.
On the empirical side, future work should aim to provide dynamic estimates
of the multiplier. Furthermore, it should quantify the impact of the rise of tariffs
on the destruction of income in a more formal manner. Finally, it would be in-
teresting to investigate the relative importance of prices and demand. One could
argue that for some countries the increasing real exchange rate relative to that
of other exporters who had left the gold standard was the dominant force for
the fall in trade during the later phase of the Depression. If so, the gold stan-
dard naturally plays a role. However, the mechanism is quite different from the
ones operating through the real wage (Bernanke and Carey, 1996), domestic fi-
nancial (Bernanke and James, 1991), and international financial channel (Temin,
1993; Accominotti, 2012b; Accominotti and Eichengreen, 2016). In this study, I
have avoided this question by dealing only with the first phase of the Depres-
sion. Most countries in the sample were still on the gold standard during this
episode.
These empirical questions aside, the economic policy implications are perhaps
the most thought-provoking ones. The magnitude of the effects presented in this
study calls into question the idea that policymakers in small open economies had
much leverage to counter the crisis. Much of their countries’ fate seems to have
depended on the course of the Depression elsewhere. While these countries could
rely on currency devaluation or active fiscal policies in order to boost aggregate
demand, there was a limit to the efficacy of these policies in the initial stages of
the Depression. A large share of the fall in demand faced by small countries in
the early 1930s was just a mechanical consequence of the economic recession in
the world’s core economies and, thus, was beyond their control. These findings
also suggest that countries with a more diversified export portfolio are less likely
to be hit severely by Great Depression-type events.
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3.6 Appendices
Appendix 3A Data
The following appendix summarises the data used in this study and sources
thereof. Annual export, nominal GDP, real GDP, and export prices have been
gathered from a variety of sources as detailed in the following appendix. Beyond
these “source tables,” it provides graphs for the exports to GDP ratios and the
trade balance in terms of GDP for each country as referred to in the main text.
Furthermore, it contains figures showing the raw, seasonally-adjusted, and
seasonally-adjusted and smoothed monthly export data. These data are shown to
underscore the importance of seasonal adjustment and smoothing. Upon inspec-
tion of the individual country graphs, it becomes apparent that in some coun-
tries, exports exhibit very strong seasonal variations. Not correcting for those
would introduce so much noise in the estimations that any attempt to estimate
them would be fruitless. As in Chapter 2, the X-13-ARIMA algorithm is used to
remove the seasonal components from the series. The graphs also suggest that
even seasonally-adjusted data in some cases shows very large month-to-month
variation due to a large irregular component. These could be, for example, due to
a frozen harbour, dock strikes or measurement error. Typically, in the following
month such changes are fully compensated as the export goods are stored and
then simply accounted for the next month. In the case of the smoothed data, the
MCD smoother is applied as in Chapter 2. In the specifications shown in this
study, the smoothed data are thus used in the the preferred specification. While
using the seasonally-adjusted data introduces more noise into the estimation and
weakens the instrument, it does not affect the results in significant manner.
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3A.1 Data Australia
TABLE A3.1: DATA SOURCES: AUSTRALIA
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP 2010 Aus-
tralian Dollars
Hutchinson and
Ploeckl (2016)
GDP
Nominal GDP Australian Dollars Hutchinson and
Ploeckl (2016)
GDP
Nominal Ex-
ports
Current Dollars Butlin et al.
(2014, p. 573)
Data was converted
into calendar years.
Nominal Im-
ports
Current Dollars Butlin et al.
(2014, p. 573)
Data was converted
into calendar years.
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1966 = 1) Butlin (1977, p. 82) Index was converted
into calendar years.
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FIGURE A3.1: Trade Ratios - Australia
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FIGURE A3.2: Monthly Export Data - Australia
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FIGURE A3.3: Price Indices Data - Australia
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3A.2 Data Austria
TABLE A3.2: DATA SOURCES: AUSTRIA
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m 1937 Schilling Kausel et al.
(1965, p. 42)
GNP
Nominal GDP m Schilling Kausel et al.
(1965, p. 41)
GNP
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Schilling Kausel et al.
(1965, p. 41)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Schilling Kausel et al.
(1965, p. 41)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1929=100) Kausel et al.
(1965, p. 40 & 41)
Implicit deflator based on
nominal and real exports.
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FIGURE A3.4: Trade Ratios - Austria
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FIGURE A3.5: Monthly Export Data - Austria
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FIGURE A3.6: Price Indices Data - Austria
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3A.3 Data Belgium
TABLE A3.3: DATA SOURCES: BELGIUM
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP 1936-8 m Bel-
gian Franc
Buyst (1997)
Nominal GDP Belgian Franc Buyst (1997)
Nominal Ex-
ports
Belgian Franc Buyst (1997)
Nominal Im-
ports
Belgian Franc Buyst (1997)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1929 = 1) Buyst (1997) Implicit export deflator based
on the estimates by Buyst (1997).
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936
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FIGURE A3.7: Trade Ratios - Belgium
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FIGURE A3.8: Monthly Export Data - Belgium
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FIGURE A3.9: Price Indices Data - Belgium
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3A.4 Data Bulgaria
TABLE A3.4: DATA SOURCES: BULGARIA
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m 1939 Lev Bank of Greece
et al. (2014)
Nominal GDP Current Lev Bank of Greece
et al. (2014)
Nominal Ex-
ports
Current Lev Bank of Greece
et al. (2014)
Nominal Im-
ports
Current Lev Bank of Greece
et al. (2014)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1939 = 100) In the absence of a better alter-
native, I use the GDP deflator.
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FIGURE A3.10: Trade Ratios - Bulgaria
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FIGURE A3.11: Monthly Export Data - Bulgaria
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FIGURE A3.12: Price Indices Data - Bulgaria
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3A.5 Data Canada
TABLE A3.5: DATA SOURCES: CANADA
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP 1971 Dollars Mitchell
(2003b, p. 763)
GNP: I calculate the growth rate
of the GNP series in 1920 prices to
project the GNP of 1925 backwards.
Nominal GDP m Dollars Dincecco and
Prado (2013)
GDP at factor cost
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Dollars Mitchell (2014)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Dollars Mitchell (2014)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1929=100) Statistics Canada
(1983(2016, p.
K31),League of
Nations (1939a)
I splice the series by League of Na-
tions (1939a) into the export defla-
tor by Statistics Canada (1983(2016,
p. K172-183) for before 1927.
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936
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FIGURE A3.13: Trade Ratios - Canada
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FIGURE A3.14: Monthly Export Data - Canada
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FIGURE A3.15: Price Indices Data - Canada
Chapter 3. The Trade Channel of the Great Depression 219
3A.6 Data Chile
TABLE A3.6: DATA SOURCES: CHILE
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m 2003 pesos Díaz et al. (2016)
Nominal GDP m new pesos Díaz et al. (2016)
Nominal Ex-
ports
m new pesos Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1936),
League of Na-
tions (1939a)
As exports are only available from
1927 until 1933. I use the value index
by the League of Nations (1939a) to
calculate the nominal exports for the
rest of the years. I convert the val-
ues to new pesos by dividing them
106 in order to be consistent with the
GDP data, which is in new pesos.
Nominal Im-
ports
m new pesos Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1936),
League of Na-
tions (1939a)
As imports are only available from
1927 until 1933. I use the value index
by the League of Nations (1939a) to
calculate the nominal imports for the
rest of the years. I convert the val-
ues to new pesos by dividing them
106 in order to be consistent with the
GDP data, which is in new pesos.
Export Price
Deflator
Index (2003 = 100) Díaz et al. (2016)
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FIGURE A3.16: Trade Ratios - Chile
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FIGURE A3.17: Monthly Export Data - Chile
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FIGURE A3.18: Price Indices Data - Chile
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3A.7 Data Czechoslovakia
TABLE A3.7: DATA SOURCES: CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m 1929 Czech
Crowns
Pryor et al.
(1971, p. 47)
Nominal GDP m Crowns Pryor et al. (1971,
p. 47), Klasing and
Milionis (2014)
I employ the 1929 benchmark es-
timate from Pryor et al. (1971)
and use the growth rates from
the nominal GDP estimates by
Klasing and Milionis (2014).
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Crowns Mitchell (2014)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Crowns Mitchell (2014)
Export Price
Deflator
Indewx
(1929 = 100)
Mitchell
(2014),Pryor
et al. (1971, p. 49)
I build the implicit deflator from
the real and nominal export series.
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FIGURE A3.19: Trade Ratios - Czechoslovakia
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FIGURE A3.20: Monthly Export Data - Czechoslovakia
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FIGURE A3.21: Price Indices Data - Czechoslovakia
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3A.8 Data Denmark
TABLE A3.8: DATA SOURCES: DENMARK
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m 1929 Dan-
ish Crowns
Bjerke (1955) From 1931 onwards, I splice in the of-
ficial GDP series in constant 1935 dol-
lars (Statistiske Departement, 1951).
Bjerke noted that his deflation method
would certainly underestimate the
fall in output. Indeed the fall is more
pronounced in the official series.
Nominal GDP m Danish Crowns Bjerke (1955)
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Crowns Bjerke (1955)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Crowns Bjerke (1955)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1929=100) Statistiske De-
partement (1951)
In the absence of a better alternative,
the export deflator is the GDP deflator
as Bjerke (1955) did in his GDP calcu-
lations. The price index by the League
of Nations (1939a) seems flawed, sug-
gesting increases in trade during the
harshest Depression years. In contrast,
the volume index of exports shown in
Statistisches Reichsamt (1936) sug-
gests a drop by about 30 percent.
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FIGURE A3.22: Trade Ratios - Denmark
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FIGURE A3.23: Monthly Export Data - Denmark
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FIGURE A3.24: Price Indices Data - Denmark
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3A.9 Data Estonia
TABLE A3.9: DATA SOURCES: ESTONIA
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m 1929 Esto-
nian crowns
Valge (2003)
Nominal GDP m Estonian crowns Valge (2003)
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Crowns Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1936, p.
75), League of Na-
tions (1937, p. 218)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Crowns Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1936,
p. 75),League of
Nations (1939a)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1929 = 100) Valge (2003)[p. 74] The index from the League of Na-
tions (1939a) seems flawed, which
is why I use the GDP deflator.
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FIGURE A3.25: Trade Ratios - Estonia
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FIGURE A3.26: Monthly Export Data - Estonia
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FIGURE A3.27: Price Indices Data - Estonia
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3A.10 Data Finland
TABLE A3.10: DATA SOURCES: FINLAND
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP 1926 Prices
in m Marka
Smits et al. (2009)
Nominal GDP m Finish Marka Hjerppe
(1989, p. 203)
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Finish Marka Hjerppe
(1989, p. 260)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Finish Marka Hjerppe
(1989, p. 260)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1927 = 100) League of Na-
tions (1939a)
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936
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FIGURE A3.28: Trade Ratios - Finland
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FIGURE A3.29: Monthly Export Data - Finland
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FIGURE A3.30: Price Indices Data - Finland
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3A.11 Data Hungary
TABLE A3.11: DATA SOURCES: HUNGARY
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP 1938/1939 Pengös Eckstein (1955) NNP: Compounding interpolation for
1921-1923. Data had to be adjusted
from fiscal years to calendar years.
Nominal GDP m Pengös Eckstein (1955) NNP: Compounding interpolation for
1921-1923. Data had to be adjusted
from fiscal years to calendar years.
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Pengös Mitchell (2014)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Pengös Mitchell (2014)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1927 = 100) League of Na-
tions (1939a)
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
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0.13
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b) Trade Balance-GDP Ratio
FIGURE A3.31: Trade Ratios - Hungary
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FIGURE A3.32: Monthly Export Data - Hungary
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FIGURE A3.33: Price Indices Data - Hungary
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3A.12 Data Italy
TABLE A3.12: DATA SOURCES: ITALY
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m 1938 Lira Baffigi (2011)
Nominal GDP m Lira Baffigi (2011)
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Lira Baffigi (2011)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Lira Baffigi (2011)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1938 = 1) Baffigi (2011) Implicit export deflator
from Historical National
Accounts by Baffigi (2011).
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FIGURE A3.34: Trade Ratios - Italy
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FIGURE A3.35: Monthly Export Data - Italy
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Pr
ic
e 
In
de
x 
(19
29
=1
00
)
Wholesale Prices
Export Price Deflator (Interpolation)
FIGURE A3.36: Price Indices Data - Italy
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3A.13 Data Mexico
TABLE A3.13: DATA SOURCES: MEXICO
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m 1960 Pesos Cárdenas
(1987, p. 190)
Nominal GDP m Pesos Cárdenas
(1987, p. 190)
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Pesos Cárdenas
(1987, p. 230)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Pesos Cárdenas
(1987, p. 241)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1929 = 100) Cárdenas
(1987, p. 190)
In absence of better alternatives,
I use the GDP deflator which I
derive from the real and nomi-
nal GDP estimates by Cárdenas
(1987, p. 190). I rebase it to 1929.
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FIGURE A3.37: Trade Ratios - Mexico
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FIGURE A3.38: Monthly Export Data - Mexico
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FIGURE A3.39: Price Indices Data - Mexico
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3A.14 Data Netherlands
TABLE A3.14: DATA SOURCES: NETHERLANDS
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m 1913 Guilders Smits et al. (2009)
Nominal GDP m Guilders Bakker et al.
(1990, p. 201)
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Guilders Mitchell (2014)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Guilders Mitchell (2014)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1929 = 100) Mitchell
(2014),Bakker
et al. (1990, p. 204)
Implicit deflator based on ex-
port volume and value index.
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FIGURE A3.40: Trade Ratios - Netherlands
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FIGURE A3.41: Monthly Export Data - Netherlands
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FIGURE A3.42: Price Indices Data - Netherlands
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3A.15 Data New Zealand
TABLE A3.15: DATA SOURCES: NEW ZEALAND
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m 1911 Pounds Rankin
(1992, p. 61)
Nominal GDP m Pounds Statistics New
Zealand (2016)
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Pound Mitchell (2014)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Pounds Mitchell (2014)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1929 = 100) Mitchell (2014) I build the implicit deflator from
the nominal and real exports. The
index by the League of Nations
(1939a) seeems to overempha-
sise the fall in prices, leading to
a strong growth in real exports.
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FIGURE A3.43: Trade Ratios - NewZealand
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FIGURE A3.44: Monthly Export Data - New Zealand
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FIGURE A3.45: Price Indices Data - New Zealand
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3A.16 Data Norway
TABLE A3.16: DATA SOURCES: NORWAY
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m Kroner
(1938 prices)
Central Bureau
of Statistics Nor-
way (1952, p. 128)
Nominal GDP m Kroner Central Bureau
of Statistics Nor-
way (1952, p. 104)
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Kroner Mitchell (2014)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Kroner Mitchell (2014)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1927 = 100) League of Na-
tions (1939a)
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FIGURE A3.46: Trade Ratios - Norway
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FIGURE A3.47: Monthly Export Data - Norway
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FIGURE A3.48: Price Indices Data - Norway
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3A.17 Data Poland
TABLE A3.17: DATA SOURCES: POLAND
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m 1929
Zlotys
Roses and Wolf
(2010, p. 190), Broad-
berry and Klein
(2012), Landau (1976)
GDP: I interpolate between the years
1925 and 1929 as no estimates are
available. For this I use the 1922 es-
timate in Roses and Wolf (2010, p.
190) and GDP data from Broadberry
and Klein (2012) for 1929 onwards.
While this linear interpolation is far
from perfect, it corresponds well with
the growth path of industrial pro-
duction estimates Mitchell (see 2014).
Finally, I scale the estimate on the
1929 Benchmark value by Landau.
Nominal GDP m Zlotys Laski (1956, p. 90),
League of Nations (1940,
p. 236), Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1936, p. 222).
Constructed based on the GDP
deflator and the real GDP.
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Zlotys Mitchell (2014) Includes gold movements until 1926.
However, the difference for the year
where both are given is very small.
Nominal Im-
ports
m Zlotys Mitchell (2014) Includes gold movements until 1926.
However, the difference for the year
where both are given is very small.
Export Price
Deflator
Index
(1929 =
100)
Laski (1956, p. 90),
League of Nations (1940,
p. 236), Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1936, p. 222).
In the absence of a better alter-
native, I use the GDP deflator.
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FIGURE A3.49: Trade Ratios - Poland
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FIGURE A3.50: Monthly Export Data - Poland
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FIGURE A3.51: Price Indices Data - Poland
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3A.18 Data Romania
TABLE A3.18: DATA SOURCES: ROMANIA
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m 1929 Lei Savoiu and Manea
(2014),Bank of
Greece et al. (2014)
I rebase the real GDP estimates
given in Savoiu and Manea (2014)
on the 1929 nominal GDP given
in Bank of Greece et al. (2014).
Nominal GDP m Lei Bank of Greece
et al. (2014)
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Lei Bank of Greece
et al. (2014)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Lei Bank of Greece
et al. (2014)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1929 = 100) Savoiu and Manea
(2014),Bank of
Greece et al. (2014)
In the absence of a better alter-
native, I use the GDP deflator.
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FIGURE A3.52: Trade Ratios - Romania
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FIGURE A3.53: Monthly Export Data - Romania
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FIGURE A3.54: Price Indices Data - Romania
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3A.19 Data South Africa
TABLE A3.19: DATA SOURCES: SOUTH AFRICA
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m 2011 US $ Bolt et al. (2018) I take the GDP per capita from the
Madisson database and multiply
it with the population estimate
by Frankema and Jerven (2014).
Nominal GDP m Rand Mitchell
(2007, p. 1062)
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Rand Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1936),
League of Na-
tions (1939a)
Excludes gold. Converted
into Rand (1 : 2).
Nominal Im-
ports
m Rand Mitchell
(2007, p. 1062)
Converted into Rand (1 : 2).
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1927 = 100) League of Na-
tions (1939a)
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FIGURE A3.55: Trade Ratios - SouthAfrica
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FIGURE A3.56: Monthly Export Data - South Africa
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FIGURE A3.57: Price Indices Data - South Africa
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3A.20 Data Spain
TABLE A3.20: DATA SOURCES: SPAIN
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m Euro
(2010 prices)
Prados de la Es-
cosura (2016)
Nominal GDP m Euro (current) Prados de la Es-
cosura (2016)
Nominal Ex-
ports
Euro (current) Prados de la Es-
cosura (2016)
Nominal Im-
ports
Euro (current) Prados de la Es-
cosura (2016)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (2010 = 100) Prados de la Es-
cosura (2016)
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FIGURE A3.58: Trade Ratios - Spain
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FIGURE A3.59: Monthly Export Data - Spain
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FIGURE A3.60: Price Indices Data - Spain
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3A.21 Data Sweden
TABLE A3.21: DATA SOURCES: SWEDEN
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m Swedish
Crowns
(1913 prices)
Johansson
(1967, p. 153)
Nominal GDP m Swedish
Crowns
Johansson
(1967, p. 151)
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Kronor Mitchell (2014)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Kronor Mitchell (2014)
Export Price
Deflator
Inde (1927 = 100) Mitchell (2014),
Johansson
(1967, p. 141)
Implicit deflator based on
nominal and real exports. I
then base this index to 1927.
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FIGURE A3.61: Trade Ratios - Sweden
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FIGURE A3.62: Monthly Export Data - Sweden
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FIGURE A3.63: Price Indices Data - Sweden
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3A.22 Data Switzerland
TABLE A3.22: DATA SOURCES: SWITZERLAND
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m 1925
Swiss Frank
Gerlach and
Gerlach-Kristen
(2005), Histor-
ical Statistics
of Switzerland
(2016a, Q.16a)
I base the real indicator of Ger-
lach and Gerlach-Kristen (2005)
on the 1925 GDP Historical Statis-
tics of Switzerland (2016a, Q.16a).
Nominal GDP m Swiss Frank Gerlach and
Gerlach-Kristen
(2005), Histor-
ical Statistics
of Switzerland
(2016a, Q.16a)
I base the nominal indicator of Ger-
lach and Gerlach-Kristen (2005)
on the 1925 GDP Historical Statis-
tics of Switzerland (2016a, Q.16a).
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Swiss Frank Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1936),
League of Na-
tions (1939a).
As data are only available from 1927
until 1933, I use the value index by the
League of Nations (1939a) to calculate
the nominal exports for 1931-1937.
Nominal Im-
ports
m Swiss Frank Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1936),
League of Na-
tions (1939a).
As data are only available from 1927
until 1933, I use the value index by the
League of Nations (1939a) to calculate
the nominal exports for 1931-1937.
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FIGURE A3.64: Trade Ratios - Switzerland
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FIGURE A3.65: Monthly Export Data - Switzerland
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FIGURE A3.66: Price Indices Data - Switzerland
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3A.23 Data Yugoslavia
TABLE A3.23: DATA SOURCES: YUGOSLAVIA
Variable Unit Source Note
Real GDP m Dinar
(1938 prices)
Bank of Greece
et al. (2014)
Nominal GDP m Dinar Bank of Greece
et al. (2014)
Nominal Ex-
ports
m Dinar Bank of Greece
et al. (2014)
Nominal Im-
ports
m Dinar Bank of Greece
et al. (2014)
Export Price
Deflator
Index (1926=100) Bank of Greece
et al. (2014)
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FIGURE A3.67: Trade Ratios - Yugoslavia
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FIGURE A3.68: Monthly Export Data - Yugoslavia
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FIGURE A3.69: Price Indices Data - Yugoslavia
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Appendix 3B Calculations
3B.1 Estimates of Counterfactual Trade Shares
TABLE A3.24: ACTUAL AND COUNTERFACTUAL TRADE SHARES WITH THE THREE LARGE
ECONOMIES
Germany United Kingdom United States
placebo actual placebo actual placebo actual
Australia 34 17 32 73 34 10
Austria 35 73 38 15 27 12
Belgium 36 45 34 30 30 24
Bulgaria 37 94 39 4 24 2
Canada 32 5 36 44 32 51
Chile 33 14 34 47 34 39
Czechoslovakia 34 66 36 21 30 14
Denmark 34 26 37 73 29 1
Estonia 36 48 38 50 26 2
Finland 35 26 36 66 30 9
Hungary 36 82 39 15 25 3
Italy 35 41 35 28 30 30
Mexico 32 12 35 9 33 79
Netherlands 37 47 35 46 29 7
New Zealand 35 3 32 91 34 6
Norway 35 24 36 56 29 20
Poland 34 71 37 27 28 2
Romania 35 76 36 24 29 1
South Africa 34 8 33 90 33 3
Spain 36 23 34 49 30 28
Sweden 35 30 36 50 30 20
Switzerland 36 43 35 34 29 23
Yugoslavia 37 84 39 10 24 6
Source: See Appendix 3A for the underlying trade data. The miniature gravity model employed to
derive these shares is discussed in Section 3.3.7.
Note: All values are given in percentages and based on trade data for 1927.
Chapter 3. The Trade Channel of the Great Depression 256
3B.2 Adjustments of Imports
TABLE A3.25: ADJUSTMENT OF IMPORTS
Estimator OLS IV
mGDP mGDP
xpGDP 0.46∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.19)
Time FE No Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Observations 368 368
R2 0.20 0.34
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the country level.
Instrument is foreign demand as in all other regressions (partial F first stage: 15.07)
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Appendix 3C Robustness checks
3C.1 Results - Two-way Clustering
TABLE A3.26: IV RESULTS (BALANCED SAMPLE) - TWO-WAY CLUSTERING OF ERRORS
Specification Almunia et al. Barro-Redlick Placebo
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
xp y xpGDP y xpGDP y
xp 0.19∗∗∗
(0.05)
xpGDP 1.24∗∗∗ 1.12
(0.42) (1.81)
yF 3.36∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 1.46
(0.85) (0.11) (2.08)
Control Variables
pi -1.18∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗ 0.21
(0.36) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.27)
GS -0.07∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.01∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.01∗ 0.01
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
XC -0.07∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 368 368 368. 368 368 368
Partial F 15.66 22.63 0.49
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors clustered at the country and time dimension using the partial out option for the time fixed effects .
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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3C.2 Results - Including Lagged Dependent Variable
TABLE A3.27: IV RESULTS (BALANCED SAMPLE) - INCLUDING LAGGED DEPENDENT VARI-
ABLE
Specification Almunia et al. Barro-Redlick Placebo
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
xp y xpGDP y xpGDP y
xp 0.19∗∗∗
(0.05)
xpGDP 1.17∗∗∗ 0.22
(0.38) (1.17)
yF 3.41∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 1.42
(0.74) (0.10) (1.50)
Control Variables
pi -1.35∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 0.05
(0.30) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.17)
GS -0.08∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.01∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
XC -0.06∗ 0.01∗ -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
L.y 0.77∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.08 0.21∗∗∗ 0.07 0.28∗
(0.28) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.15)
Observations 345 345 345 345 345 345
Partial F 21.46 27.94 0.90
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors clustered at the country level.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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3C.3 Results - Full Sample
TABLE A3.28: IV RESULTS - FULL SAMPLE
Specification Almunia et al. Barro-Redlick Placebo
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
xp y xpGDP y xpGDP y
xp 0.23∗∗
(0.10)
xpGDP 1.77∗∗ -7.45
(0.87) (64.51)
yF 1.10∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.07
(0.36) (0.07) (0.60)
Control Variables
pi -0.60∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ 0.10∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.54
(0.15) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (4.53)
GS -0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.00∗∗ 0.00 -0.00∗∗ -0.03
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20)
XC -0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.00∗∗ -0.03
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20)
L.y 0.33∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.84
(0.17) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (3.97)
Observations 963 963 963 963 963 963
Partial F 9.03 4.42 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors clustered at the country level.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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3C.4 Results - Based on Economic Activity Indices Excluding
Trade Data
In this sample, Bulgaria, Estonia and New Zealand are dropped as the economic
activity indices excluding trade data were not available (minimum 5 indicators
to base the monthly estimates on).
TABLE A3.29: IV RESULTS (BALANCED SAMPLE) - BASED ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY INDICES
EXCLUDING TRADE DATA
Specification Almunia et al. Barro-Redlick Placebo
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
xp y xpGDP y xpGDP y
xp 0.20∗∗∗
(0.07)
xpGDP 1.34∗∗ 2.59
(0.53) (3.08)
yF 3.51∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 1.45
(0.96) (0.13) (1.65)
Observations 320 320 320 320 320 320
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20
Partial F 13.50 18.13 0.77
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the country level.
Controls included, but not shown: wholesale price inflation, gold standard adherence, imposition
of foreign exchange controls, time and country fixed effects.
The median ratio of exports to GDP for this sample is .161
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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3C.5 Results - Un-smoothed Data & Two-way Clustering
In this specification, neither the export data nor the wholesale price inflation data
are smoothed before aggregating it into quarterly data. Two-way clustered stan-
dard errors are applied.
TABLE A3.30: IV RESULTS (BALANCED SAMPLE) - UN-SMOOTHED EXPORT & PRICE DATA
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
xp y xpGDP y xpGDP y
xp 0.15∗∗∗
(0.04)
xpGDP 1.05∗∗∗ 0.42
(0.39) (0.62)
yF 4.24∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 4.26
(1.35) (0.17) (2.64)
Control Variables
pi -1.23∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ -0.15 0.15
(0.46) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
GS -0.07 0.02∗∗ -0.01 0.02∗∗ -0.01∗ 0.01
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
XC -0.05∗ 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 368 368 368 368 368 368
Partial F 9.90 12.46 2.60
Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors clustered at the country and time dimension using the partial out option for the time fixed effects .
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Chapter 4
Currency Devaluations and
Beggar-my-neighbour Penalties:
Evidence from the 1930s
Abstract
The currency devaluations of the 1930s facilitated a faster recovery from the Great
Depression in the countries depreciating, but their unilateral manner provoked
retaliatory and discriminatory commercial policies abroad. This paper explores
the importance of the retaliatory motive in the imposition of trade barriers by
gold bloc countries during the 1930s and its effects on trade. Relying on new and
existing datasets on the introduction of quotas, tariffs, and bilateral trade costs,
the quantification of the discriminatory response suggests that these countries
imposed significant discriminatory beggar-my-neighbour penalties. The penal-
ties reduced trade to a similar degree that modern regional trade agreements fos-
ter trade. Furthermore, the analysis of contemporary newspapers reveals that the
devaluations of the early 1930s triggered an Anglo-French trade conflict marked
by tit-for-tat protectionist policies. With regards to global trade, the unilateral cur-
rency depreciations came at a high price in political and economic terms. These
costs must have necessarily reduced their benefit to the world as a whole.
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4.1 Introduction
The currency depreciations of the 1930s were a precondition for the recovery from
the Great Depression. While their effect on the initiating countries was unques-
tionably positive, their deflationary effect on those who stayed on the gold stan-
dard prevented them from being beneficial in a strictly Paretian sense (Eichen-
green and Sachs, 1985, 1986). Furthermore, they had strong implications for trade
policy. Policymakers abroad perceived the widespread exit from gold in 1931 as
a commercial policy tool.1 At the forefront, French policymakers retaliated by
targeting their own commercial policy weapons specifically at those countries
that had left the gold standard.2 Other gold bloc countries reacted similarly. Bel-
gium, Italy, Switzerland, and the Netherlands introduced discriminatory quotas,
antidumping tariffs, or both.3 Precisely because of their unilateral manner and
beggar-my-neighbour character, the devaluations had provoked a wave of retal-
iatory and discriminatory trade policies.
This novel type of protectionism, a “pernicious” bilateralism (Irwin, 1993b, p.
109), has become exemplary for the disintegrating commercial world in the inter-
war period.4 It was emblematic for the last of three stages of interwar protection-
ism. (Roorbach, 1933). It differed not only in the tools — quantitative restrictions
gained importance — but in scope from the previous two stages. In the first phase
of the Depression governments followed the classical protectionist motive and
imposed tariffs to reduce competition for domestic producers (Roorbach, 1933, p.
224). In the second phase, they resorted to more protectionism, now including
quotas, to balance their budgets and to protect their currencies. When countries
started to leave the gold standard, this latter constraint became less binding and
countries with depreciated currencies tended to become relatively less protection-
ist (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010). However, the very action of leaving the gold
standard gave way to a third stage of protectionism, in which countries staying
1See for example, Irwin (2012, p. 22-35). Like now, at the heart of this view was the argument
that the country deliberately undervaluing her currency significantly gained at the expense of
others. A lower real exchange rate would stimulate exports, which in turn would create current
account problems abroad (Goldstein and Lardy, 2006, p. 423-425).
2This commercial policy episode is often mentioned anecdotally. See, for example, Eichen-
green and Irwin (2010, p. 877). Shamir (1989, p. 121-137) refers to it as the Franco-British trade
war.
3See Heuser (1939, p. 30-33) and Irwin (2012, p. 25).
4This resonates with the view of contemporaries as exemplified by League of Nations (1936b,
Chapter 6). Kitson and Solomou (1995) are critical of this notion. The gravity literature can be
interpreted in a similar manner (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1995; Wolf and Ritschl, 2011; Gowa and
Hicks, 2013).
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on the gold standard resorted to discriminatory commercial policies (Roorbach,
1933, p. 230). In contrast to the previous two stages, the quotas, tariffs, and ex-
change controls were often directed at specific countries. Such discrimination
provided the breeding ground for trade wars. The devaluations had nurtured a
protectionism of a new kind with new commercial weaponry and, more impor-
tantly, a strong discriminatory element.
This study explores the significance of the retaliatory motive in protectionism
during the 1930s and discusses implications for our assessment of the economic
effects of unilateral currency depreciations. Consistent with Shamir’s (1989, p.
121–137) narrative, the qualitative analysis of contemporary newspapers reveals
a change in public discourse, in which retaliatory sentiment gained momentum
after the devaluations. Furthermore, it documents how French commercial pol-
icymakers imposed discriminatory trade policies. These were a direct response
to the unilateral currency depreciations, which gold bloc countries perceived as
a beggar-my-neighbour policy. Henceforth, such policies are thus referred to as
beggar-my-neighbour penalties. To gauge their relative importance, the empiri-
cal assessment widens the scope of the study geographically by including more
countries and thematically by assessing penalties’ effects on trade. Relying on ex-
isting trade cost data for a number of countries (Jacks et al., 2011) as well as novel
datasets on Swiss quotas and French tariffs, it empirically distinguishes beggar-
my-neighbour penalties from non-discriminatory trade cost increases. Across
datasets and specifications, the analysis suggests that the penalties were impor-
tant by modern and historical standards. Likewise, their effects on trade were
economically significant. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that they
reduced the gold bloc’s imports from devaluing countries by between 16 and
22 %. Such magnitudes correspond well to the effects found for modern regional
trade agreements – just with the opposite sign.5
How does accounting for the negative commercial policy externalities change
our understanding of the unilateral currency devaluations of the 1930s? Incor-
porating these costs necessarily widens the gap between potential and realised
benefits to the world as a whole. In light of the limited space to manoeuvre in the
interwar policy arena, it probably remains true that unilateral devaluations were
the only available policy option (Eichengreen, 2013). Yet, while the economics of
currency valuations and discriminatory tariffs might remain the same, policy en-
vironments change. In a climate different from the one in the 1930s, other options
5Being in the range of the trade-creating effect typically found for the EU, they are slightly
smaller than those found for NAFTA (Head and Mayer, 2014, p. 160).
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might prevail as second-best solutions.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Focusing on the calculus
of potential and realised benefits, Section 4.2 discusses recent and contemporary
scholarship on the currency depreciations of the 1930s and their link to commer-
cial policies. With a focus on the Anglo-French relationship, Section 4.3 provides
a qualitative account of the link between devaluations and discriminatory protec-
tionism, highlighting the escalating economic nationalism and rhetoric of retali-
ation. Equipped with the lessons from the qualitative analysis, Section 4.4 quan-
tifies the force of the retaliatory response and investigates the effects on trade.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Parity Choices and Commercial Policy Conse-
quences
As previous research on the interwar period suggests, one cannot treat commer-
cial and exchange rate policies independently in this episode. This section dis-
cusses recent scholarship, which links the rise of protectionism to the gold stan-
dard. Countries that had left the gold standard early felt less pressure to become
protectionist. However, devaluations like those of the 1930s can be beggar-my-
neighbour and might thus exacerbate general protectionist tendencies by provok-
ing retaliation. Indeed, contemporary scholars made a strong connection between
the devaluations, the following retaliation, and the corresponding increase in the
overall level of protectionism. Incorporating this consideration into the analysis
of the net benefits of the devaluations necessarily changes the calculus.
Inspired by the theoretical and empirical work by Eichengreen and Sachs
(1985, 1986), a broad consensus on the positive effect of the devaluations for the
depreciating countries emerged (see e.g. Bernanke, 1995; Campa, 1990; Mitch-
ener and Wandschneider, 2015). Countries that had left the gold standard early,
tended to recover faster. For those who stayed, Eichengreen and Sachs point out
two counteracting effects. On the one hand, they would lose competitiveness
as their exports would be relatively more expensive. On the other, gold inflows
from devaluing countries could ease monetary conditions. This could outweigh
the demand shift and “thus, a devaluation under a gold standard may or may
not be beggar-thy-neighbor[...]” (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1986, p. 70). However,
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Eichengreen and Sachs conclude that the devaluations were in fact beggar-my-
neighbour as depreciating countries on average acquired gold stocks in the after-
math of the devaluations. Hence, the devaluations were a double-edged sword.
This initial characterisation of the currency devaluations of the 1930s is illu-
minating, balanced, and highlights their unfulfilled potential. This study shall
be as much a restatement as an extension of the initial cost-benefit analysis by
Eichengreen and Sachs for two reasons. Firstly, the succeeding literature focuses
on the shiny edge of the double-edged sword for the devaluing countries and
largely ignores the gloomy one for those staying on the gold standard.6 Secondly,
the devaluations had important commercial policy externalities. These should
be accounted for when assessing the net benefits of the devaluations. As for the
monetary consequences, it is useful to highlight the asymmetric effects on gold
standard countries and floaters.
For explaining the “trade policy disaster” in the interwar period, Eichengreen
and Irwin (2010) and Irwin (2012) advance a modified macroeconomic trilemma
illustrating the policymakers’ constraints. They could choose only two of the fol-
lowing three policies: a fixed exchange rate, open trade, and independent mone-
tary policy. Bound by their gold standard orthodoxy, i.e. the refusal to leave the
gold standard, some resorted to protectionist policies such as quotas and tariffs
to protect the value of their currency rather than reducing it. The trilemma ex-
planation provides us with a powerful framework to understand what probably
had set the general protectionist movement in motion besides the more classical
motives such as unemployment. Furthermore, it illuminates why countries with
depreciated currencies were, on average, less prone to become more protectionist.
On the other hand, gold standard countries did not simply become more
protectionist, but the very nature of their commercial policies changed. Facing
increased competition on international markets, countries responded with dis-
criminatory restrictions against those who had left the gold standard rather than
across-the-board tariffs and quotas. They retaliated against what they thought of
as unfair competition. The contemporary academic discourse serves as a credible
witness for this link between currency depreciations and discriminatory protec-
tionism.
6Typically studies only highlight the positive aspects of the currency depreciations (Bernanke,
1995, e.g.) or stress the theoretical outcome of them not being beggar-my-neighbour per se
(Campa, 1990, e.g.) but do not acknowledge their beggar-my-neighbour character. Given that
these and other studies reference their study without or little qualification, it is important to point
out that Eichengreen and Sachs (1985, p. 946) criticise both, the reluctance of some countries to
leave the gold standard and the failed coordination of the devaluations.
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It was in the 1930s that Joan Robinson (1937) popularised the “beggar-my-
neighbour” term7 by comparing the commercial policy environment to the fa-
mous card game with explicit references to the devaluations. She (1937, p. 210f)
described what economists nowadays call a non-cooperative game:
“In times of general unemployment a game of beggar-my-neighbour
is played between the nations, each one endeavouring to throw a
larger share of the burden upon the others. As soon as one succeeds in
increasing its trade balance at the expense of the rest, others retaliate,
and the total volume of international trade sinks continuously [...]. ”
Robinson’s stance was far from isolated. Other contemporary economists em-
phasised the negative commercial policy consequences. Amongst other reasons
for the rise of protectionism, Liepmann (1938, p. 361–364) pointed to retaliation
for exchange rate depreciation. In his free trade manifesto, Findlay (1934, p. 31)
bemoaned the retaliation of twenty other nations after the devaluations, partic-
ularly emphasising paradigm shifts away from free trade such as in the Nether-
lands. Roorbach (1933, p. 89f) argued explicitly that the devaluation “resulted
in a movement for still further restrictions of imports by the gold standard coun-
tries” or in the words of MacKintosh (1936, p. 1): “The protectionist plea is most
likely to be heard when he [the producer] is asking to be protected against a fresh
threat to his position.”8
When assessing policy options in the mirror of history, it is important to take a
balanced view of the past. The recent literature emphasises the positive effects of
the devaluations based on the framework of Eichengreen and Sachs even though
these authors themselves highlighted their beggar-my-neighbour character. With
respect to commercial policy, subsequent literature has highlighted a positive ef-
fect as devaluing countries became relatively less protectionist. In contrast, con-
temporary academics pictured the devaluations themselves, and their unilateral
manner in particular, as toxic for the commercial policy environment. According
to them, they led to discriminatory trade policies. Ceteris paribus, such policies
must have reduced the large potential benefits of the devaluations to the world
as a whole. Before we empirically explore their magnitude and effects on trade,
7See Irwin (2012, p. 125). Sometimes, it is also referred to as “beggar-thy-neighbour,” but not
so in Robinson’s work.
8Naturally, there were also some sceptics. While acknowledging that the “fear of exchange
dumping” increased trade barriers, Graham and Whittlesey (1934, p. 411) argued in line with Ir-
win’s (2012) trilemma that “it is at least equally probable that the attempt to maintain the nominal
exchange value of a currency will lead to the erection of almost unscalable [trade] barriers.”
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the subsequent section documents the toxicity in the interwar commercial pol-
icy arena and explores the means through which countries discriminated against
trading partners.
4.3 The Rhetoric of Retaliation - A Qualitative Ac-
count
Abstracting from quotas for the moment, the importance of retaliatory commer-
cial policies over time is perhaps best summarised by Figure 4.1. It presents key-
word counts from the Manchester Guardian for expressions related to either re-
taliation or tariffs more generally. It suggests that, while the tariff question was
relevant throughout the 1920s with about 260 counts per year, retaliation became
more topical in the beginning of the 1930s. While it was mentioned a mere 17
times per year from 1920-29 on average, the corresponding average for 1930-33 is
104. The increase in 1930 is clearly in response to the Smoot-Hawley legislation,
but it trails the magnitude of retaliatory sentiment in 1932 by far. In this year, ar-
ticles with the word combination “tariff” and “retaliation” appeared on average
almost every other day.
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FIGURE 4.1: Frequency of keywords in the Manchester Guardian
Source: Own calculation from the Manchester Guardian digital archive by ProQuest.
Notes: “Tariffs” includes hits of “tariff” or “tariffs” in combination with “exports” or “imports.”
Retaliation includes hits of “retaliation” or “retaliatory” in combination with “tariff” or “tariffs”
or articles containing the expression “tariff war.” Advertisements are excluded. It is important
to note that some of these counts might include coincidental hits. Yet, the margin of error seems
small.
Chapter 4. Devaluations and Beggar-my-neighbour Penalties 270
To add substance to these data and to characterise the general political cli-
mate, the following section discusses the Anglo-French commercial policy rela-
tionship based on articles from the Manchester Guardian, the Financial Times and
The Economist. One can periodise this episode into three acts. In the prelude to
the devaluations, the protectionist idea was gaining momentum in France. How-
ever, policy measures were more likely to meet leniency in Britain before 1931
and hopes for cooperation were still present. In the second phase starting with
the devaluations, the rhetoric shifted towards a more nationalistic and retaliatory
tone. Finally, this culminated in a perpetuating tit-for-tat game illustrated in the
final part of this section.
Prelude
The move towards protectionism had already been visible in France before
the crisis of 1931. She fought a tariff war with Australia in 1930 and 19319 and,
like other countries, France considered retaliation immediately after the Smoot-
Hawley bill was passed in June 1930.10 France urged for negotiations and called
the American MFN treatment into question.11 While this threat did not materi-
alise, France discriminated against the United States when she introduced a more
draconian quota for American coal than for coal of other origins in July 1931. In
light of the 89 % reduction of the American quota, the 6 % reduction on British
coal seemed modest.12 It may have been this comparison that provoked leniency
in Britain. The Secretary of Mining, Shinwell, pointed out that the French quota
did not aim to “embarrass” Great Britain, but was an effort by the French govern-
ment to protect coal workers. Instead of calls for retaliation, there were calls for
cooperation of the mining industries across Europe.13
Tariff proposals in Britain remained of “revenue nature” before the end of
1931. In September, the Chancellor of Exchequer, Phillip Snowden, proposed a
revenue tariff on luxury goods.14 As this was a large industry across the chan-
nel, this suggestion was met with “outstanding anxiety” in France.15 The rhetoric
began to change. Criticising the proposed measures, Rollin, French Minister of
9Manchester Guardian (1931d, p. 16).
10Manchester Guardian (1930a, p. 8).
11Manchester Guardian (1930b, p. 15).
12Manchester Guardian (1931b, p. 12).
13Manchester Guardian (1931b, p. 12).
14Manchester Guardian (1931l, p. 12).
15The Economist (1931g, p. 517).
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Commerce, emphasised that tariff increases should only be legitimate as counter-
measures against unfair competition such as dumping.16 A British commentator
hoped that the tariff menace could lead to new negotiations about a tariff truce,
which had been initiated two years earlier but failed.17 Such hopes did not ma-
terialise, especially after September 20, 1931, when the British devaluation “fell
like a bombshell on the [French] market.”18 Economic nationalism and tariff war
rhetoric soon replaced international sympathy and leniency. The spirit of cooper-
ation and diplomacy came under strain.
Immediate Reactions to the Devaluations
The devaluation provoked “great surprise and consternation in French indus-
trial and business circles” according to Naudau, president of French Chamber
of Commerce in London.19 The same was true for policymakers. Nevertheless,
there was the hope that this would stop the British tariff plans. French Minister
of Commerce Rollin commented, “it goes without saying that if the British Gov-
ernment have been thinking of new tariff measures, now that the depreciation
in sterling constitutes an important bounty for British exporters, they must have
given up the idea.”20 Once again, this illustrates that exchange rate and commer-
cial policies were linked to the extent that policymakers would equate them.
In the initial weeks after the devaluation of the pound, the public did not per-
ceive the float as a permanent situation. French newspapers speculated whether
the pound will return at par or about 20 % below it.21 Neither this hope nor the
one concerning the tariffs materialised. In Britain, the tariff question became a
dominant topic in the run-up to the general election, with Labour opposing and
the Conservative Party favouring protection.22 The conservatives won the elec-
tion by a large margin indicating the substantial public support for protectionist
policies.23
After the devaluations, small instances could trigger intense debates. When
Britain announced the ban of French potatoes due to the Colorado Beetle, the
Journée Industrielle considered this a protectionist measure and called for tariff
16Manchester Guardian (1931g, p. 11).
17Manchester Guardian (1931c, p. 12).
18French correspondent in The Economist (1931c, p. 550).
19Financial Times (1931b, p. 5).
20Manchester Guardian (1931f, p. 12).
21Manchester Guardian (1931m, p. 13).
22“At the very moment that a tariff has become not only a superfluity but an absurdity we are
to have a general election, it is generally believed, on that question alone” (Manchester Guardian,
1931p, p. 8).
23Manchester Guardian (1931q).
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reprisals.24 About a month later, the French Minister of Agriculture threatened
to ban coal, tea, and whiskey from Britain if the embargo was not lifted.25 In the
meantime, France had banned certain foodstuffs from early October until the end
of the year.26 In the case of butter and beef, this mainly hit two other depreciators,
Denmark and Argentina.
In November, France reacted on a large scale to the devaluations. The sur-
tax on goods from countries with depreciated currencies came into effect on 14
November 1931.27 Certain goods such as grain and tea were exempted from this
tariff and this list would be modified over time. The surtax in its initial form
employed different rates across countries: 15 % for Great Britain, Australia, Den-
mark and Sweden, 10 % for Uruguay and Argentina, 8 % for Norway, and 7 %
on British India and the Native States.28 A month later the surtax was fixed at
15 % for all of these countries. However, given the many exceptions to it, the
change of the tariff level against the individual country would not be equal to
this amount.29 Nevertheless, the British Mining Association reported immediate
effects materialising in the cancelation of orders, because British coal exporters
had become relatively more expensive for French importers.30
Because of this apparent level of discretion and the fact that no other large coal
exporter went off the gold standard, the British industrialists suspected that the
surtax unfairly targeted Great Britain.31 The chamber of commerce argued that
the surtax violated the MFN clause, which both countries had agreed upon.32
To such criticism, the French Minister of Commerce Louis Rollin responded that
the 15 % would still not be enough to compensate for the competitive advantage
gained by British manufactures through the devaluations.33 Moreover, a French
correspondent argued that the new exchange rate resembled a 50 % ad valorem
24Manchester Guardian (1931n, p. 9).
25Manchester Guardian (1931a, p. 23).
26Manchester Guardian (1931e, p. 12).
27 The Economist (1932b, p. 5f).
28The Economist (1931f, p. 956).
29 While the bilateral tariff rate against countries such as Sweden and Denmark indeed in-
creased by more than 15 % ad valorem between 1930 and 1932, the same measure for Great Britain
“only” doubled from 5 to 10 % ad valorem. This seems to be due to the extensive use of exemp-
tions of certain goods from the surtax (e.g. coal at a later point of time) as a bargaining device.
Britain, however, was the exception rather than the rule. The quantitative section discusses the
average effects taking into account all tariff measures rather than only the surtax.
30Manchester Guardian (1931h, p. 9).
31Manchester Guardian (1931i, p. 9).
32Manchester Guardian (1931j, p. 11). We shall later see, that the MFN treatment was actually
more of an unspoken rule and no such contract existed.
33The Economist (1931h, p. 1006).
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tariff. Regarding new proposed British tariff legislation, the correspondent stated:
“The loss to France and to other countries will be very heavy, and many people
here do not hesitate to say that the action of the British Parliament amounts to
a declaration of economic war.”34 Clearly, the French industrialists had not hes-
itated to fuel this war. They insisted that the Minister of Commerce should not
lose any time “in taking up the matter with the British government and, if nec-
essary, to start retaliatory measures.”35 In sum, the last bits of leniency vanished
after the devaluations and agitation took over in press and politics. The imme-
diate reactions anticipated an increase in protectionism, which is documented in
the following paragraphs.
The Upward Spiral of Retaliation
While trade continued to fall, retaliation spiralled further upward. Before the
introduction of the General Tariff in early 1932,36 the British parliament passed
the Abnormal Importations Act on 17 November 1931.37 It empowered the Pres-
ident of the Board of Trade, Runciman, to impose duties on wholly or mainly
manufactured goods of up to 100 % for a duration of six months. One justifi-
cation for the tariff was the French surtax. Referencing France’s return to gold
at one fifth of its pre-war parity, a commentator argued that Great Britain could
have imposed a tariff of 400 % in 1928.38
With the new tools at hand, retaliation was discussed quite openly in the
House of Commons. Members of parliament considered whether it was legal
within the current treaty status to place special tariffs on French luxury goods
and agreed they could. These discussions also made clear that while Great Britain
had received most favoured nation treatment under an old French law, no bind-
ing treaty existed and thus any French tariff imposition would be legal.39
Tariff increases did not remain hypotheticals. Three decrees were issued un-
der the Abnormal Importations Act. These fixed mostly prohibitive duties of
50 % on a variety of goods. While not aimed at specific countries per se, the
tariff affected the United States, France, Germany and Holland the most as the
34Manchester Guardian (1931o, p. 9).
35Financial Times (1931a, p. 5).
36See Kitson and Solomou (1990) for a discussion of the effect of the General Tariff.
37The Economist (1932b, p. 5f).
38The Economist (1931a, p. 944).
39House of Commons (1931-1932c, col 1025). See also O’Connor’s comment concerning the
surtax: “Will not the best possible representation [regarding the French surtax] be made when we
have a tariff of our own?” (House of Commons, 1931-1932a, col 841).
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details of the first,40 second41 and the third42 schedule demonstrate. Accord-
ing to The Economist the schedules were a small concession to protectionism in
statistical terms but not in principal and hence the commentator concluded that
Runciman was playing a “dangerous game.”43 Despite criticising the French sur-
tax and discrimination, Runciman pointed out “there is no connection whatever
between that decree and our orders, or the legislation which preceded them.”44
Considering the parliamentary debates and his own introduction of the speech,
this statement does not appear overly credible.
French reactions to these emergency tariffs included the reduction of the quota
on British coal less than eight days after the passage of the law,45 which was
“designed to restrict entries of British and other foreign fuels.”46 However, until
the British General Tariff was introduced in the end of February 1932, France also
made some concessions. She lifted the surtax on coal in order to obtain favourable
treatment for some agricultural products.47 This bargaining failed, at least at a
large scale. It did not affect the British introduction of the General Tariff of 10 %
ad valorem (Import Duties Act), which came into effect on 29 February 1932.48
Interestingly, the second section of the General Tariff provided the Board of
Trade with powers “to impose supplementary duties in case of foreign discrim-
ination” on top of the General Tariff.49 While the final decision remained with
the House of Commons, recommendations were made by the Import Duties Ad-
visory Committee and it appears that the House always followed those (Capie,
1981, p. 160). Each of the 135 recommendations50 issued between 1932 and 1936
included not only one but a list of goods on which additional tariffs should be
charged. Despite its name, the General Tariff thus included discretionary ele-
ments.
40The Economist (1931d, p. 994).
41The Economist (1931j, p. 1061).
42The Economist (1931i, p. 1221).
43 The Economist (1931i, p. 1220-1223).
44House of Commons (1931, p. 1473). According to The Economist (1931i, p. 1120–1123), the
third schedule was probably not aiming at one specific country.
45The Economist (1932b, p. 5f).
46The Economist (1931e, p. 1006f). A report from the Manchester Guardian (1931k) demon-
strates, that demands for retaliation were not unique to the Anglo-French relationship as experi-
ences in other countries illustrate.
47Manchester Guardian (1932a, p. 15).
48The Economist (1932c, p. 725f).
49House of Commons (1931-1932b, Bill 33, 1931–1932, p. I.645).
50Counted in the House of Commons Archive provided by ProQuest (in 1932: 9 recommenda-
tions, 1933: 23, 1934: 36, 1935: 35, 1936: 32). For a more detailed account of this part of the Act,
see also the work by Capie (1981).
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France responded to the General Tariff with the introduction of new quotas in
“rapid succession.”51 A particularly draconian example was the quota on British
textile machinery, which reduced import allowances to less than 10 % in 1931
terms.52 These new quotas also covered cotton yarn and piece goods.53 In the
following two years, the above characterisation as a tit-for-tat game remains true
for Anglo-French commercial relations. For instance, a new anti-dumping bill in
December 1932 was introduced, which allowed France to super-impose tariffs of
up to 50 % on all merchandise from countries treating her less favourably than
their other trading partners.54 In 1933, there were still British demands for retali-
ation against the surtax.55 This demand became even stronger, when France did
not apply the surtax against the United States after the dollar devaluation. The
Manchester Guardian argued that France had “fear of annoying the U.S.”56 The
surtax against Britain was only suppressed from January 1934 onwards.57 The
quotas remained in place.
Focusing on the Anglo-French commercial policy relationship, this section
has demonstrated the importance of retaliation following the devaluation of the
pound in terms of rhetoric and actions taken. French policymakers understood
the unilateral devaluations as a protectionist measure and retaliated. This led
to similar reactions abroad. The “potato instance” vividly illustrates that small
actions could provoke severe threats. This qualitative analysis informs the quan-
titative assessment in two ways. First, trade policy had indeed discretionary el-
ements. Policymakers raised tariffs against certain countries by targeting their
main export goods and by introducing a surtax on depreciated currencies. Sec-
ond, quotas soon became the commercial policy tool of choice, which might ren-
der post-1932 tariff rates of secondary importance.
4.4 Discriminatory Commercial Policies - A Quanti-
tative Account
The qualitative evidence suggests that French policymakers perceived the deval-
uations as a beggar-my-neighbour policy and retaliated accordingly. How large
51Manchester Guardian (1932c, p. 4).
52Manchester Guardian (1932b, p. 11).
53Manchester Guardian (1932b, p. 11).
54The Economist (1932d, p. 1081).
55Manchester Guardian (1933b, p. 12); Manchester Guardian (1933c, p. 4).
56Manchester Guardian (1933a, p. 9).
57Manchester Guardian (1934, p. 13).
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was this beggar-my-neighbour penalty? How does this commercial policy re-
action generalise to other gold bloc countries? From the newspaper evidence on
France as well as from other qualitative sources for the remaining gold bloc coun-
tries,58 we know that quotas and tariffs were the prime commercial weaponry
in gold bloc countries. The fact that data on these are rarely recorded on the
bilateral level makes it particularly challenging to identify discriminatory trade
policies.59 To overcome this difficulty, this section introduces three pieces of ev-
idence. Firstly, it links increases of a synthetic trade cost measure to the devalu-
ations. Secondly, the analysis of novel Swiss data on quotas and French data on
tariffs elucidates the precise mechanisms of discriminatory import restrictions.
Employing the estimated changes in trade costs, the final part of this quantitative
assessment speculates about the effects on trade.
4.4.1 Evidence From Bilateral Trade Costs
In a data scarce environment, bilateral trade costs can be proxied by a synthetic
measure (Novy, 2013). While the derivation is not trivial, its intuition is easily
summarised. Based on data on internal trade of two countries as proxied by
the respective tradable GDPs and a parameter assumption about the elasticity
of substitution, one can calculate two hypothetical bilateral trade flows in a fric-
tionless world. The difference between such hypothetical flows and the observed
ones constitutes the trade costs. Conveniently, the resulting measure can be in-
terpreted in ad valorem equivalent terms.60
How can we isolate commercial policy repercussions to the currency deval-
uations from these data? By construction, the trade cost measure does neither
indicate what these trade costs are composed of nor which of the two countries
is responsible for them. Fortunately, a set of fixed effects can partially alleviate
58The United States Tariff Commission (1934, p. 5, 21, 24) provides an overview about the legal
aspects of commercial restrictions for other gold bloc countries. The Belgian government had the
power to apply countervailing duties to countries with depreciated currencies and quotas against
unfair competition. Italian law provided the opportunity to impose quotas and tariffs by decree
against unfair competition of all sorts. In 1933, a new law with explicit reference to depreciated
currencies was passed. The Dutch government passed antidumping and clearing acts in 1931
and 1932 respectively, introduced a quota system in December 1931, and established monopoly
control for a large number of agricultural goods in 1932.
59This is reflected in the scarcity of studies using bilateral tariff data. Among the few works that
come to mind are Dedinger (2012) and Varian (2018) on the late 19th century as well as Hayakawa
(2013) on modern trade data.
60See Novy (2013), for details on the derivation of the measure. Whether the ad valorem equiv-
alent interpretation holds strictly true for historical data is — given the imprecision of historical
national accounts — unclear.
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the former and fully address the latter of these two caveats. Firstly, pair-specific
fixed effects account for most of the important trade costs such as distance and
language similarity, which do not vary over short periods of time.61 Secondly,
time-varying country fixed effects account for the change of the trading partners?
average trade cost levels. The remaining variation in trade costs stems from pair-
specific changes over time. Can the devaluations help to explain this variation?
The following equation addresses this question by employing an available trade
cost dataset (Jacks et al., 2011):
ln(1+ τi,j,t) = βGSo f f + γi,t + ψj,t + φi,j + tt + ei,j,t (4.1)
in which ln(1 + τi,j,t) is the logarithm of the mark-up due to trade costs τ
between countries i and j at year t. GSo f f takes the value of 1 if at least one
country is off the gold standard. γi,t and ψj,t are time-varying country fixed effects
for i and j respectively, φi,j a pair-specific fixed effect, and tt a time fixed effect. If
countries staying on the gold standard imposed beggar-my-neighbour penalties
against devaluing countries, trade costs would increase for country pairs which
were not linked by the gold standard relative to those who were. Hence, we
would expect the coefficient β to be positive and significant.
While reverse causation concerns can be easily dismissed on historical
grounds,62 exchange rate volatility could potentially confound results of this
specification due to its strong correlation with the gold standard variable.63 The
concern is thus that the β coefficient for GSo f f , rather than capturing a discre-
tionary protectionist response, picks up potential negative effects of exchange
rate volatility. Using different samples and specifications allows us to gauge the
importance of this factor. Firstly, one can compare the period, in which countries
joined the gold standard, with the one, in which many countries left it. If the β
coefficient had the same magnitude in both samples, the effect would be driven
by exchange rate volatility. Secondly, one can analyse the role of exchange rate
61It is true that transport costs, unlike distance, vary over time. However, the general variation
of transport costs is captured by the time fixed effect. While uncontrolled for, the differential effect
on bilateral transport costs is unlikely to correlate with the gold standard adherence variable in
the main specification. Countries around the world had left the gold standard in 1931, while
others stayed on it at least until 1933. For a thorough discussion of the effect of transport costs on
trade, see Chapter 5.
62For example, see Wolf (2008) for a discussion about the structural reasons and Accominotti
(2012b) for the trigger for the exit from the gold standard.
63In contrast, the inclusion of a variable indicating the imposition of exchange controls by at
least one trading partner did not affect the results. As the coefficient for this variable was in-
significant, potentially due to strong multicollinearity with the time-varying country fixed effect,
it is omitted from the presentation.
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volatility by alternating the reference group. Specifically, one can compare coun-
try pairs with asymmetric exchange rate regimes GSas, i.e. one trading partner
on and one off the gold standard, with those in which both countries had either
left or stayed on the gold standard. Finally, dropping the gold standard group,
the corresponding regression compares only country pairs affected by exchange
rate volatility. Yet, only one of them received the beggar-my-neighbour penalty.
Table 4.1 illustrates the results. To improve expositional clarity, the lower part
of the table documents the reference group for the indicator variable of interest.
The results in column 2 suggest that trade costs increased by e0.045 − 1 ≈ 4.6%
for country pairs which were no longer linked by the gold standard during the
period 1930-34. Column 3 repeats the same exercise by focusing on the change
from 1930 to 1932. The fixed effects included in the above equations facilitate
an interpretation within a difference-in-differences framework, in which 1931 is
dropped as the year in which the treatment occurred. Arguably, this specification
represents the cleanest estimate of the beggar-my-neighbour penalty. It implies
an ad valorem equivalent penalty of e0.0498 − 1 ≈ 5.1%.
TABLE 4.1: DISCRIMINATORY PROTECTIONISM IN BILATERAL TRADE COST DATA
Dep. Variable: Trade Cost: ln(1+ τ)
Specification Off Gold Asymmetric Regime
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample 1925–1929 1930–1934 1930 / 1932 1930 / 1932 1930 / 1932
GSo f f 0.00764 0.0450∗∗∗ 0.0498∗∗∗
(0.63) (2.88) (3.28)
GSas 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0409∗∗∗
(3.28) (2.71)
Reference Group
Off Gold – Off Gold 3 3
Off Gold – On Gold
On Gold – On Gold 3 3 3 3 (dropped)
R2 0.558 0.707 0.852 0.852 0.854
N 740 740 296 296 264
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; Confidence intervals: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Country-pair,
time, and time-varying country fixed effects are included but not shown. Standard errors are robust. The
underlying balanced sample of 148 country pairs per year is from Jacks et al. (2011). Gold bloc countries
in the sample include Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Switzerland. The results are robust to the
exclusion of country pairs containing France.
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Column 1 suggests that this effect is not driven by exchange rate volatility. In
the period 1925-29 many countries joined the gold standard, but the effects on
trade costs were insignificant. If exchange rate volatility was playing an impor-
tant role, we would expect an effect of similar magnitude and significance for this
period. The specifications in column 4 and 5 lend further support to this notion.
They focus on country pairs with asymmetric exchange rate regimes, meaning
that one of the trading partners was on the gold standard while the other one
was not. As only the reference group changes in column 4, the R2 remains iden-
tical and large. On the other hand, the size of the coefficient changes - reducing
the effect to e0.0249 − 1 ≈ 2.5%. This is not particularly surprising as the reference
group now contains very heterogenous country pairs. The final column drops
country pairs, in which both countries were on the gold standard. It thus com-
pares two groups for which exchange rate volatility could have played a role. The
effect of an asymmetric exchange rate regime is e0.0409 − 1 ≈ 4.2%. Compared to
the point estimate of 5.1 % from the main specification, this allows some role for
exchange rate volatility. Yet, it also implies that exchange rate volatility is not
driving the effect. Taking tariff reductions through modern regional trade agree-
ments as a point of reference,64 the estimated size between 4.1 and 5.1 % implies
that the beggar-my-neighbour penalty constituted a significant barrier to trade.
TABLE 4.2: NON-DISCRIMINATORY TRADE COST INCREASES IN GOLD BLOC
COUNTRIES
France Belgium Italy Netherlands Switzerland ∅
τNDi,1932 2.02 5.21 2.33 1.21 0.55 2.26
Pairs 24 21 13 12 3
To gauge its significance for this commercial policy episode in particular, Ta-
ble 4.2 provides the non-discriminatory increase of trade costs ∆τNDi,1932 in gold
bloc countries for a comparison. ∆τNDi,1932 follows directly from the time-varying
country fixed effects γi,1932 in the difference-in-differences specification in column
3.65 The lower part of the table shows the number of country pairs, in which the
64Burfisher et al. (2001, p. 127) report pre-NAFTA trade-weighted ad valorem equivalents of
4 % for the United States and 10 % for Mexico.
65Specifically, ∆τNDi,1932 = e
γi,1932 if the specification is estimated without t1932. Equivalent in
the resulting coefficient and standard errors when t1932 is included, ∆τNDi,1932 can be calculated as
∆τNDi,1932 = e
t1932
2 +γi,1932 . This is because the reference group now contains a pair of countries rather
than a single one.
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respective gold bloc country is included. Given the small sample size, the esti-
mates of these country-specific intercepts are subject to considerable uncertainty.
It thus seems prudent to take the average non-discriminatory trade cost increase
in gold bloc countries as a point of reference. Amounting to around 2.3 %, it is
smaller than the beggar-my-neighbour penalty. Most conservatively, the largest
non-discriminatory increase (Belgium) was about as large as the penalty. Hence,
the beggar-my-neighbour penalty was substantial even in the high-tariff environ-
ment of the 1930s.
In sum, the analysis of trade costs suggests that the beggar-my-neighbour
penalty was economically significant by historical and modern standards. While
the qualitative evidence suggests that tariffs and quotas were the most common
commercial policy weaponry, the synthetic trade cost measure is mute on how
trade costs rose. The following part of this quantitative assessment thus eluci-
dates the precise mechanisms underlying the changes in trade costs by analysing
the introduction of Swiss quotas and French tariffs.
4.4.2 The Mechanisms - Evidence from Swiss Quotas
Quota and licensing systems were widely adopted in the 1930s (United States Tar-
iff Commission, 1934; Heuser, 1939; Irwin, 2012). Typically, they covered a num-
ber of goods that were specified either by a special commission or the relevant
trade authorities. As such, they could be used to discriminate a certain country
group by imposing restrictions on goods, which were predominantly imported
from it. A country imposing such restrictions was Switzerland. As opposed to
France, she was a small open economy and had been an ardent proponent of free
trade for as long as she could. Studying the introduction of licensing and quotas
in Switzerland thus constitutes a complementary case with respect to the country
size, general protectionist attitude, and the protectionist measure employed.
Having passed the corresponding legislation in December 1931, the Swiss
government began to impose quotas and to require import licenses for certain
goods from 1932 onwards. A council proposed a list of goods, which was then
subject to approval by an industry commission and finally passed by the federal
assembly (United States Tariff Commission, 1934, p. 34). An important justifi-
cation was the protection of the trade balance (Heuser, 1939, p. 31). As such,
these quotas were most effective when directed against countries that devalued
their currency. Furthermore, a convincing case for a quota or license had to be
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made before the commission. This was most easily done if producers faced “un-
fair competition.” While such institutional arrangements make discrimination
likely, the words of Switzerland’s chief commercial diplomat provide direct evi-
dence. When Stucki defended the introduction of the quota system at the World
Economic Conference in London in 1933, he made explicit references to the exit
from gold by Great Britain via depreciation and by Germany via the introduction
of exchange controls (League of Nations, 1933a, p. 94). Even more illuminating,
because undisclosed at the time of their writing, are the American memoranda
from the negotiations of a new Swiss-American trade treaty in 1935. Stucki ex-
plained the introduction of quotas with the devaluations and “frankly admitted
that Swiss quotas discriminated against American commerce” (U.S. Department
of State, 1952, p. 751).66 Such statements indicate that the Swiss licensing and
quota system was introduced in a discriminatory manner.
Gauging the extent of Swiss discrimination against devaluing countries re-
quires a variety of data. Firstly, the de facto gold adherence was coded for all
Swiss trading partners.67 Secondly, import data by trading partner at the good
level from 1931 allows one to calculate the share of imports for a given good from
countries that would eventually devalue. As it proved impossible to transcribe
the universe of trade flows for 1931, a list of goods typically traded in Europe
from the Austrian National Committee of the International Chamber of Com-
merce (1927) was used to determine the sample.68 The bilateral import flows for
the according items were transcribed from the Swiss trade statistics.69 Employ-
ing import data from a year prior to the actual implementation of the quota and
licensing system in 1932 ensures that the results are not confounded by the effects
of restrictions themselves. Thirdly, information on the introduction of import re-
strictions can be found in the tariff section of the 1933 issue of the Swiss trade
66See also his complained that “Switzerland being a gold standard country with high purchas-
ing power served as a mecca for foreign companies from countries with devaluated currencies.”
(U.S. Department of State, 1952, p. 751).
67Data on gold adherence are from League of Nations (1941); Wolf and Yousef (2007); Bernanke
and James (1991); Crafts and Fearon (2013a).
68This list was initially compiled to compute approximate tariff levels for a number of European
countries. It contains 402 goods, of which 262 are unique items in the Swiss tariff code. One item
(newspapers) was omitted as the total value of imports was a mere 10 franc.
69Specifically, the 1927 and 1931 issues of the Statistique annuelle du commerce extérieur de la Suisse
by the Direction Générale des Douanes Fédérales. The cross-section for 1927 was transcribed to
control for the price changes. The nonzero bilateral import flows total 2,710 in 1927 and 2,728 in
1931. For more details on the dataset, see Chapter 5 and specifically Appendix 5A.3 for a list of
goods.
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statistics.70 With these data at hand, the following equation specifies a probabil-
ity model for the introduction of quotas and licenses:
Rg = β1SO f f gold, g + β2ln(Mg) + β3∆Pg + Ii + eg (4.2)
in which Rg is an indicator taking the value one if import controls were intro-
duced on good g, Mg is the total value of imports for good g in 1931, ∆Pg is its
average price change between 1927 and 1931, and Ii is a fixed effect for industry i.
The variable SO f f gold, g is defined as the share of imports from countries that will
devalue between the end of 1931 and 1933. Most accurately, this specification is
estimated by a logit model as likelihood functions are seldom strictly linear. As
results from such model differ little from those of a linear probability in this case,
however, the linear probability model is chosen for ease of interpretation.
TABLE 4.3: DISCRIMINATION IN SWISS QUOTA SETTING
Dep. Variable: Introduction of restriction/licensing
Sample Full Excluding agricultural goods
SO f f gold, g 0.200∗ 0.204∗∗ 0.173∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗
(1.86) (2.08) (1.66) (2.76) (2.77) (2.38)
Import Value 0.0911∗∗∗ 0.0837∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.1000∗∗∗
(7.28) (6.15) (8.16) (7.04)
∆27−31 Price -0.128∗∗ -0.118∗ -0.126∗∗ -0.111
(-2.51) (-1.83) (-2.34) (-1.57)
Fixed Effects
Industry 3 3
R2 0.01 0.18 0.24 0.03 0.22 0.29
N 261 261 261 213 213 213
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; All standard errors are robust. Confidence intervals: * p <
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 4.3 suggests that the discriminatory element in the introduction of Swiss
quotas was strong. The first specification suggests that moving the share of coun-
tries with depreciated currencies for an imported good from zero to one would
70The data can be found on pages 5 to 35 in section C of the 1933 issue of the Statistique annuelle
du commerce extérieur de la Suisse by the Direction Générale des Douanes Fédérales.
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have increased the probability of the imposition of an import restriction by about
20 %. This magnitude is hardly affected when the change in prices, the total value,
and industry fixed effects are controlled for.71 The remaining three columns show
the results when agricultural goods are excluded. The coefficient of interest be-
comes stronger in both economic and statistical significance, suggesting that the
protection of farmers, a traditionally well-represented group, was another impor-
tant motive for the introduction of quotas. Especially for non-agricultural goods
though, Swiss policymakers applied the quota and licensing system in a pro-
foundly discriminatory manner against countries that had left the gold standard.
4.4.3 The Mechanisms - Evidence from French Tariffs
Yet, quotas were not the only commercial policy weapon employed in a dis-
criminatory manner. As discussed in Section 4.3, French policymakers retaliated
against countries with depreciated currencies by imposing retaliatory tariffs. The
manner, in which French statisticians recorded tariff revenues, provides a unique
opportunity to quantify this response. To the best of the author’s knowledge, they
were the only ones among the main economic powers to record tariff revenues by
trading partner during this period. It is thus possible to empirically distinguish
discriminatory and non-discriminatory tariff increases.
French data on bilateral import values and tariff revenues by trading partner
for the years 1926 until 1933 were transcribed from various issues of the Tableau
général du Commerce de la France.72 From these data, we can calculate the average
bilateral protection rate tri,t =
Ri,t
Mi,t
where R is the tariff revenue and M is the value
of imports from trading partner i at year t spanning the period 1926–33. If data
permitted, it would have been preferable to employ even more disaggregated
tariff data on the country-good level.73 However, the aggregate counterpart of
the bilateral protection rate, the average protection rate, usually provides a good
71They are also comparable to the logit results, which are available upon request.
72For unknown reasons, the French statisticians halted their data collection efforts after 1933.
This is not of great concern for this analysis as it focuses on the cross-sections of 1930 and 1932.
Another caveat of the data is worth mentioning. Unfortunately, the Tableaus themselves do not
include any information on whether revenues from the surtax are included (see Section 4.3). How-
ever, a government memorandum from 1933 suggests so (Ministère des Finances, 1933, p. 133 &
427).
73For its potential relevance, see the now classic and then fierce debate between Nye (1991) and
Irwin (1993a).
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proxy for protectionism (see e.g. O’Rourke, 2000, p. 462).74
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FIGURE 4.2: Heterogeneity in tariff setting
Source: Tableau général du Commerce de la France, issues: 1926–1933
A first glance at the data (Figure 4.2) illustrates the important difference
between this and many other studies on protectionism (e.g. Clemens and
Williamson, 2004; Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010). Covering virtually all French
imports, the left panel plots the mean tariff rate and its standard deviation for
a balanced panel of 72 French trading partners for the period 1926-1933. Most
studies on protectionism focus on a measure similar to the solid line above: the
average protection rate.75 In contrast, this study focuses on the variation around
the mean as captured by the annual standard deviation in the graph. This vari-
ation can be thought of as the level of discretion applied by policymakers and
the figure demonstrates how it increased substantially over the years. The right
panel of Figure 4.2 provides another way to understand this intuition. It plots ker-
nel densities, a form of smoothed histograms, for three different cross-sections.
Suppose that French policymakers, just as their British counterparts, would have
introduced a general ad valorem tariff of 10 % in 1932. Ignoring potential substi-
tution effects between goods, this would have simply shifted the distribution of
74The use of bilateral rather than aggregate trade and tariff data should further mitigate one of
the most serious concerns against this measure. The composition of imports by trading partner is
not likely to change drastically from one year to the other.
75 Conventionally, researchers define the average protection rate T as the sum of tariff revenues
tr of country i from n trading partners j divided by the sum of i’s imports M from n trading
partners j. Hence it represents a trade-weighted average T =
n
∑
j=1
trj/
n
∑
j=1
Mj. In contrast, the
graph takes the (unweighted) average of the protection rate against all countries in the sample,
which is T =
n
∑
j=1
trj
mj
n .
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1930 along the x-axis by 0.1 without altering its shape. However, the distribution
of bilateral protection rates for 1932 is substantially flatter than the one for 1930.
Hence, the discretion in the imposition of tariffs must have increased.
Did the beggar-my-neighbour-penalty drive this evolution of bilateral pro-
tection rates? Akin to the analysis of the trade costs, the structure of the data
facilitates a difference-in-differences approach. Dropping 1931 as the year of the
treatment, the following model compares the cross-sections of 1930 and 1932:
ln(1+ trit) = α+ βGSo f f , i,t + ci + tt + eit (4.3)
where trit is the bilateral protection rate against trading partner i and ln(1 + tr)
the logarithm of the corresponding mark-up. GSo f f , i,t is an indicator variable
capturing whether a country had left the gold standard. It is zero for all coun-
tries in t = 1930 and one for the treated countries in t = 1932.76 ci and tt are
country and time fixed effects respectively and α the constant, which make the
above equation a difference-in-differences approach. The time fixed effect t1932
captures the non-discriminatory tariff increase, whereas β measures the beggar-
my-neighbour penalty. Comparing the two coefficients shall inform us about the
relative magnitude of retaliatory tariff policies in response to the devaluations.77
TABLE 4.4: THE MAGNITUDE OF THE FRENCH BEGGAR-MY-NEIGHBOUR PENALTY
Dep. variable: ln(1+tr) Imports
Estimator (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (PPML)
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Restriction None No Colonies Import share>0.5 % Restrictions (2&3) None
GSo f f 0.0903∗∗∗ 0.0736∗∗ 0.0911∗∗ 0.0680∗ -0.301∗∗
(3.95) (2.47) (2.71) (1.94) (-2.22)
t1932 0.0334∗∗∗ 0.0501∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗ 0.0489∗∗∗ -0.441∗∗∗
(2.74) (2.22) (3.15) (4.34) (-3.72)
N 120 86 56 40 120
R2 0.519 0.545 0.509 0.529
Pseudo R2 0.986
t statistics in parentheses. Country fixed effects and constant included but not shown. Robust standard errors applied
(clustered at trading-partner level). Confidence levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
76For a clean difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of the 1931 devaluations, the few
countries that either devalued earlier or were not on the gold standard during this period at all
are excluded.
77 This model does not take retaliation against foreign tariffs into account. However, countries
leaving the gold standard became relatively less protectionist as Eichengreen and Irwin (2010)
show. Hence, any bias arising from this omission should thus bias strongly against finding sig-
nificant effects for the retaliation against currency depreciation.
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Table 4.4 displays the results for various subsamples. The estimates for the full
sample imply a beggar-my-neighbour penalty of e0.0903 − 1 ≈ 9.5% ad valorem.
Columns 2-4 introduce various sample restrictions to analyse the robustness of
the result.78 The coefficient for the treatment variable GSo f f , i,t ranges from about
0.07 to 0.09 across specifications and remains significant throughout. The point
estimate is smaller when the French colonies are excluded as this drops the part
of the control group facing low tariffs. Depending on the point of view, their
inclusion might lead to an overestimation of the retaliatory effect. Thus, the more
conservative estimate in column 2 is preferred. It implies a beggar-my-neighbour
penalty of e0.0736 − 1 ≈ 7.5% ad valorem.
Across specifications, the coefficient for the time fixed effect capturing the
non-discretionary tariff increase is consistently smaller than the penalty. The pre-
ferred specification implies a non-discriminatory tariff increase of et1932 − 1 ≈ 5%.
Given the relatively small sample size, we should not overemphasise this dif-
ference of the point estimates. Yet, their comparison suggests that the beggar-
my-neighbour penalty was at least as large as the non-discriminatory increase in
protectionism. The French beggar-my-neighbour penalty was thus sizeable and,
just like in the case of the trade cost estimation, comparable in magnitude to the
average tariff reductions achieved by modern trade treaties.
4.4.4 The effects on trade
If the penalty was important for the increase in protectionism, what were its ef-
fects on trade? For the French data, we can test its significance directly. Column 5
shows the estimate of the treatment effect on imports using the PPML estimator
(Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The specification mirrors the one for tariffs and
can be thought of as a simple import demand function by countries. The coeffi-
cient is -0.3 and significant at the 5 % level thus suggesting a relative reduction
of imports by e−.3 − 1 ≈ −26%. Yet, this exercise may fall short to properly cap-
ture the beggar-my-neighbour penalty’s effect on imports. Firstly, the estimation
is not theory-consistent, which might lead to biased coefficients.79 Secondly, it
only measures the relative effect. Thirdly and most importantly, it is confined to
78The coefficient of interest remains stable when (2) colonies are dropped, (3) small trading
partners are excluded, or (4) both of these restrictions are applied. The parallel trend assumption
is met to a reasonable degree for most subsamples and particularly for the most restrictive sample
(4). For the corresponding graphs, see Appendix 4A.
79It misses the usual setting of fixed effects, which capture the multilateral resistance term.
These time-varying fixed effects for each trading partner would also control for other variables
such the competitiveness gained through the devaluation, exchange rate volatility or the trading
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the case of France. To gauge the effects of the penalty on trade across gold bloc
countries, it is thus more promising to employ the estimated tariff and trade cost
changes in a back-of-the-envelope calculation.
Such a calculation has been used to verify the consistency of estimates for the
effects of regional trade agreements, tariff elasticities and tariffs in the empiri-
cal trade literature.80 Analogously, we divide the world into group (OG) suf-
fering the beggar-my-neighbour penalty of 7.5 % and (G) just paying the non-
discriminatory tariff increase of 5 % in 1932. Both groups face the following cost
τG,OG1930 for exporting a good to a gold bloc country in 1930:
τG,OG1930 = 1+ κ + tr1930 (4.4)
in which κ = 0.36 captures the ad valorem equivalent of the home prefer-
ence81 and tr1930 captures the initial tariff level.82 In the second period (1932),
group G stays on the gold standard and pays only the non-discriminatory tariff
increase tr1932 on top of τ
G,OG
1930 :
τG1932 = 1+ κ + tr1930 + tr1932 (4.5)
In contrast, group OG now faces the additional beggar-my-neighbour
penalty η:
τOG1932 = 1+ κ + tr1930 + tr1932 + η (4.6)
Assuming a price elasticity e = −5.383 , the decrease of the gold bloc country’s
imports from the respective groups in 1932 relative to 1930 can be calculated as:
ρ1932G = e(ln τ
G
1932 − ln τG,OG1930 ) (4.7)
and
ρ1932OG = e(ln τ
OG
1932 − ln τG,OG1930 ) (4.8)
partner’s GDP. Excluding them might lead to biased estimates as we know from the gravity lit-
erature. Including them, however, is not possible as their inclusion would leave no variation to
base the estimate upon. See Head and Mayer (2014) for a discussion of gravity specifications.
80Except for a small extension, the following calculation mirrors the one by Head and Mayer
(2014, p. 165) for a regional trade agreement.
81This is a standard parameter taken from Head and Mayer (2014, p. 164).
82For countries other than France, initial tariff levels are taken from Clemens and Williamson
(2004) and, where unavailable, calculated from the tariff revenue and trade data by Mitchell
(2014).
83The median point estimate from the meta study by Head and Mayer (2014).
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The effect of the beggar-my-neighbour penalty on imports of the gold bloc
country from group OG relative to group G is thus captured by:
ρrelativeBTN = e(ln τ
OG
1932 − ln τG1932) (4.9)
For ease of interpretation, it is useful to convert the ρ-coefficients into percent-
age terms: ∆Mr = eρ
relative
BTN − 1. The corresponding absolute fall of imports ∆Ma
for the gold bloc country can be captured by weighing the respective fall of trade
for the two groups with the import shares mG1930 and m
OG
1930
84:
∆Ma = mG1930 (e
ρ1932G − 1) + mOG1930 (eρ
1932
OG − 1) (4.10)
Naturally, the counterfactual fall in absolute imports in the absence of the beggar-
my-neighbour penalty can be calculated as as ∆Mc f by setting η = 0.
TABLE 4.5: THE EFFECT ON TRADE - A BACK-OF-THE-ENVELOPE CALCULATION
Country Import share Trade cost parameters Effects on trade
mOG1930 tr1930 tr1932 η ∆Mr ∆Ma ∆Mc f ∆Mobs
Simulation based on tariff data
France 63 10 5 7.5 -22 -27 -16 -28
Simulation based on trade costs
Belgium 52 5 5 5.1 -16 -24 -17 -34
Italy 63 11 2 5.1 -16 -17 -8 -40
Netherlands 69 3 1 5.1 -16 -15 -4 -32
Switzerland 58 11 1 5.1 -16 -11 -2 -15
Notes: Own calculations. Parameters: mOG1930: import share of countries that will go off the gold stan-
dard in 1931 as of 1930; tr1930: initial tariff level in 1930; η: beggar-my-neighbour penalty; ∆Mr: relative
fall in imports for countries receiving penalty; ∆Ma: absolute fall in trade as predicted by calculation;
∆Mc f : counterfactual fall in trade in absence of beggar-my-neighbour penalty; ∆Mobs: observed fall in
imports. Data sources: see text.
Table 4.5 presents the data and results for the simulation based on the French
tariff data and trade cost data for the other gold bloc countries. Reassuringly
close to the empirical estimate, the results suggest that the beggar-my-neighbour
penalty reduced French imports from those who left the gold standard relative to
those who did not by ∆Mr ≈ 22%. The corresponding effect for the remaining
gold bloc countries is around 16 %. Albeit a bit smaller, the penalty’s magnitude
84The shares are calculated for 1930 on the basis of the data from Gowa and Hicks (2013). Coun-
tries that will go off the gold standard by 1932 are grouped under mOG1930.
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is comparable to the one of the effects found for regional free trade agreements in
the gravity literature (Head and Mayer, 2014, p. 164f).85
Beyond analysing the relative effects as is common in the trade literature, dis-
cussing absolute effects is informative in its own right. Ultimately, two factors de-
termine the importance of the beggar-my-neighbour penalty for the fall of trade
in the 1930s: the force of the penalty and the number of countries receiving it.
The column ∆Ma displays the absolute loss of imports as predicted by the back-
of-the-envelope calculation. It is particularly informative to compare these effects
to the column ∆Mc f , which draws out the relevant counterfactual — the change
in total imports in the absence of the beggar-my-neighbour penalty. In the case of
France, absolute imports would have dropped 11 % less than they actually did.
For the trade cost data, the corresponding effects on total imports range from 7
to 11 %. These results suggest that the penalties in response to the devaluations
did not only have large relative effects. Given that many countries received them,
their effects on overall imports were substantial. Beggar-my-neighbour penalties
in the 1930s contributed significantly to the fall in trade.
The final column contrasts these simulation results with the observed fall in
imports.86 Even though such comparison is approximate at best,87 it provides
a useful plausibility check and highlights the significance of the results. In the
case of France, Belgium, and Switzerland the observed fall corresponds reason-
ably well to the results from the simulation. On the other hand, the simula-
tion underestimates the fall of imports in the Netherlands and Italy substantially.
One among many possible reasons is that assuming the same parameter for the
85Given the large dispersion of estimates of the price elasticity, there is a degree of uncertainty
in this estimate. However, the same applies to CGE models estimating the effect of free trade
agreements as Hillberry and Hummels (2013) point out.
86 In order to ensure consistency with the trade cost data, the nominal import data was tran-
scribed from Statistisches Reichsamt (1936) and deflated by the U.S. GDP deflator by Johnston
and Williamson (2018).
87Two main effects other than protectionism affect the observed change. Firstly, income losses
translate into a decrease of imports. Secondly, overvaluation, present and indeed a huge prob-
lem in gold bloc countries, increases import demand. Both effects work into different directions
with respect to the fall in trade and thus the overall effect is unclear. Switzerland may serve as
an illustrative case. Real GDP fell by about 7 % between 1930 and 1932 according to (Jacks et al.,
2011). The real exchange rate against the pound fell by about 25 % between in the same period
(Zurlinden, 2003). Let us assume the same rate for all other countries leaving the gold standard,
whereas for those who stay we assume no change. Weighting the real exchange rates accordingly
and multiplying the resulting sum with .5, a recent estimate of the elasticity for (export) trade
with respect to the real exchange rate (Fitzgerald and Haller, 2018), would suggest that the over-
valuation boosted import demand by around 7.5 %. Assuming an income elasticity of 1, the effect
of the fall income is thus nullified by the overvaluation effect.
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penalty across gold bloc countries may not reflect the heterogeneity of their re-
sponses.88 Nevertheless, the fact that the actual fall is under- rather than overes-
timated suggests that these effects are plausible in magnitude even if they cannot
fully explain the fall in trade.
In sum, the beggar-my-neighbour penalties in response to the 1931 devalua-
tions were fierce and their effects on trade were large. Across the gold bloc, the
penalty ranged between 5 and 7.5 % ad valorem whereas the general increase in
tariffs amounted to 2.3 to 5 %. The corresponding decrease of imports from those
receiving the penalty relative to those who did not varied between 15 and 20 %.
The respective reductions of total imports were between 6 and 11 %. Because
1932 marked a first plateau rather than the culmination of protectionism, the cu-
mulative effects of the subsequent retaliatory tit-for-tat policies certainly added
to this significant initial fall in trade.
4.5 Conclusion
In response to the currency depreciations of 1931, countries remaining on the gold
standard introduced discriminatory trade policies. The estimated size of these
beggar-my-neighbour penalties was large by historical and modern standards.
Their magnitude was comparable to the contemporary non-discriminatory in-
creases in protectionism. Furthermore, it corresponds well with the tariff reduc-
tions achieved by modern regional trade agreements. Correspondingly, their ef-
fects on trade were considerable in both, relative and absolute terms. What are
the historiographical and political implications of these findings?
Firstly, they provide a complementary explanation for the rise of protection-
ism during the interwar period. From a commercial policy perspective, the de-
valuations were a doubled-edged sword. Whilst facilitating a faster recovery and
less protectionism in devaluing countries, they directly fostered protectionism
abroad and opened doors for a third phase of commercial warfare. In this phase,
protectionism shifted from a general to a discriminatory nature. This is not to
question the trilemma framework by Eichengreen and Irwin (2010), but rather to
provide a complementary explanation for protectionism in the 1930s and perhaps
88They include that (i) real exchange rate effects and demand effects due to the falling GDP do
not cancel out each other, that (ii) the data limitations of the trade cost data affect the estimation of
the non-discriminatory increase in a substantial manner, and that (iii) the imprecision of historical
national accounts introduces a large measurement error in the calculation of trade costs changes.
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to clarify why the previous literature and contemporaries have painted a much
more chaotic picture of this commercial policy episode.
Secondly, the magnitude of economic and political costs caused by the de-
valuations raises doubts about their unqualified benevolent assessment in the
literature, which Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) had initially cautioned against.
Acknowledging the large difference between the potential and realised gains for
the world as a whole leads to a more pessimistic view than common in the liter-
ature. The devaluations were a success and failure at the same time. A success,
because their net benefit was certainly still positive89 and perhaps they were the
only available option.90 A failure, because the costs of non-cooperation, the gap
between potential realised gains, was so large. When drawing policy implica-
tions from this period, it is thus important to keep their success and failure in
mind. The economics underlying overvalued currencies, deflation, depreciation,
and retaliation may remain broadly the same, but policy environments change.
Thus, unilateral devaluations may or may not be the second-best policy option in
circumstances other than the 1930s.
89This conjecture emanates from considering the large positive effects for devaluing countries
(Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985; Bernanke, 1995). For the world as a whole, these effects are likely
to have outweighed the loss of the countries staying on the gold standard and the externalities
on trade policies highlighted in this study. In consequence, their net effect would be positive.
However, testing this conjecture in a formal manner lies beyond the scope of this study.
90Convincingly, Eichengreen (2013, p. 431) makes the point that “effective international coordi-
nation was impossible to achieve.”
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4.6 Appendix
Appendix 4A Pre-treatment Trends
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FIGURE A4.1: Pre-treatment trends
Notes: The upper two panels show the trends without colonies (the left one with the further restriction
of excluding small trading partners). The lower left panel excludes only small trading partners and
the lower right one shows the trends for the full sample. The graphs show that the parallel trend
assumption is met only to a lesser degree for the samples including colonies. For this reason, much
of the discussion in the article focuses on the results excluding them. All graphs also contain the
trends with and without Cuba and Poland, which constitute outliers. Poland and France signed a new
commercial agreement in 1929 as documented in the American Journal of International Law (American
Journal of International Law, 1929, p. 641). The Cuban tariff rate drops from 50 to 10 percent within
one year, most likely due to the change in the tariff on sugar.
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Chapter 5
Transport Costs, Tariffs, and the
Interwar Distance Puzzle
Abstract
This study analyses the relative importance of tariffs and transport costs for the
fall in world trade during the interwar period. While micro-data on freight rates
indicates an increase in distance-related transport costs, the changes were rela-
tively small compared to those in tariffs when accounted for in ad valorem equiv-
alent terms. Paradoxically, estimates from a structural gravity model even sug-
gest a decline of the importance of distance for European trade. This finding con-
stitutes the interwar distance puzzle and mirrors the missing globalisation puzzle
of international trade for the post-war period. Taking into account internal trade
solves the puzzle, because it provides a measure of the importance of political
trade barriers relative to physical trade barriers. Theoretical considerations and a
novel micro-dataset highlight two potential mechanisms which influence the im-
portance of distance for international trade: the number of import varieties and
the magnitude of tariff changes.
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5.1 Introduction
Trade faces two main types of friction: transportation costs and political trade
barriers such as tariffs and quotas. Conventional wisdom holds that the latter
were the main driver of the fall of world trade during the interwar period.1 In a
seminal study, however, Estevadeordal et al. (2003) claim that the rapid increase
in transport costs was a, if not the, major cause for the trade bust associated with
the Great Depression. This study joins a chorus of research critical of this conjec-
ture,2 but introduces a new melody by analysing their relative significance and in-
teraction through the lenses of micro-data and the gravity model of international
trade. Data on freight rates for and prices of wheat suggest that real transport
costs were indeed increasing. Paradoxically, estimates of the distance elasticity
of international trade suggest the opposite. Understanding the roots of this in-
terwar distance puzzle and solving it helps us to assess the relative importance
of transport costs and tariffs during the interwar period. Accounting for internal
trade and distances, Yotov’s (2012) solution to the missing globalisation puzzle
for the post-war period, solves the interwar distance puzzle within the gravity
framework. However, internal trade and distances are not necessarily compara-
ble with their international counterparts. Furthermore, the precise mechanism
solving the puzzle remains unexplored. To shed further light on the latter, the-
oretical considerations highlight that the distance elasticity depends on tariffs.
A novel good-level dataset on Swiss imports allows me to test this mechanism
empirically. Indeed, tariffs made distance less important for international trade.
After all, political trade barriers, not transport costs, brought down world trade.
The literature on the question whether or not transport costs were increasing
during the interwar period is ambiguous (Hynes et al., 2012, p. 37). While the
data by Mohammed and Williamson (2004) suggests a slight fall in real maritime
transport costs, Estevadeordal et al. (2003) argue that they were increasing. To
bring new evidence to this question, the first part of this study draws on novel
micro data on wheat prices and freight rates. The limited data available indeed
suggests that transport costs were increasing. However, when accounted for in
ad valorem terms, arguably the only relevant metric when comparing trade costs,
1For example, see Irwin (2012) for a comprehensive exposition of this view. See Madsen (2001)
for a quantification of the effect of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on world trade during this period.
2Hynes et al. (2012) and Irwin (2012) have argued that real transport costs were probably
falling according to the freight cost series by Mohammed and Williamson (2004). This precludes
the possibility that transport costs could have caused the fall in trade. However, Hynes et al.
(2012) also state that there is some ambiguity with respect to the course of transport costs during
this period.
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these increases in transport costs are dwarfed by the changes in tariffs. This is
all the more important as the focus on a low-value bulky good such as wheat
provides an upper bound estimate for such a calculation. Relative to political
trade costs, transport costs thus became less important.
Estimating the distance elasticity of international trade within the gravity
framework provides an alternative way to assess the role of transport costs. If
transport costs and thus the cost of delivering goods to distant trading partners
increased, one would expect the distance elasticity to indicate an increase of the
importance of distance.3 In spite of increasing transport cost, however, the ab-
solute value of the distance elasticity declined. This result strikingly mirrors the
so-called missing globalisation or distance puzzle for the post-war period. Ac-
cording to this finding, the absolute value of the elasticity of aggregate trade flows
with respect to distance increased from the 1960s onwards even though globalisa-
tion is an indisputable fact and transport costs declined (Coe et al., 2002; Disdier
and Head, 2008).4 Conversely, rising transport costs and the falling importance of
distance coincided in the period under consideration. This finding constitutes the
interwar distance puzzle. Solving it is key to understand the relative importance
of tariffs and transport costs.
A number of studies aim to explain the post-war distance puzzle. Most of
them focus either on econometric mis-specifications, long-run changes in the
structure of trade, or the heterogeneity of changes in the distance elasticity of
trade between low- and high-income countries.5 Among those, Yotov (2012) and
Bergstrand et al. (2015) have pointed to a mis-application of the gravity model
in the international trade literature. They propose to include proxies of internal
trade and distances in line with the original micro-founded formulation of the
gravity model (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Indeed, this also solves the
interwar distance puzzle. This solution highlights the importance of distance-
related trade costs relative to non-distance related trade costs for the estimation
3For the rest of the study, it is helpful to define some properties of the distance elasticity. The
distance elasticity is negative and typically estimated to be around −1.1 (see Head and Mayer,
2014, p. 160 for results from a meta study). As such, it measures the sensitivity of trade with
respect to distance. If it increases (decreases in absolute terms), distance becomes less important
as friction for trade. Conversely, if it decreases (increases in absolute terms), distance becomes
more important as a friction for trade.
4According to Hummels (2007), they remained stationary between 1952 and 1970, increased
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and entered a slow but steady decline thereafter.
5See Carrère et al. (2013) for an excellent early review of this fast-growing literature.
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of the distance elasticity. Yet, the precise mechanism remains ambiguous, as in-
ternal distances and trade flows are not necessarily comparable with their inter-
national counterparts. In fact, they might just proxy the domestic market size. If
so, any such proxy for market size would “solve” the distance puzzle.
The derivation of a simple import demand function illustrates a potential
mechanism for solving the puzzle. Employing an Armington demand function
and a trade cost function featuring transport costs and a tariff in the vein of Hum-
mels et al. (2009), one can show that the distance elasticity depends on tariffs.
As tariffs increase, the importance of distance should fall.6 To test the proposed
mechanism, this study relies on a novel hand-collected micro-dataset on Swiss
bilateral import flows. Choosing Switzerland as a case study has desirable fea-
tures. Being a small open economy, she refrained from making changes to her
specific (per unit) tariffs. Hence, any change in the tariff was due to global price
swings exogenous to Swiss demand. The granularity of the data allows me to
estimate 240 distance elasticities for individual goods and to assess the effect of
tariffs on those. The results suggest that changes in the distance elasticity in-
deed depended positively on tariffs. To a lesser degree, they also depended on
the number of varieties that import businesses can choose from. However, more
research is needed. Including a larger number of countries would facilitate a
gravity-theory-consistent estimation, which would provide more robust evidence
for this channel. Nevertheless, these results suggest that increasing tariffs drove
the changes in the distance elasticity.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 5.2 illustrates
the evolution of real transport costs and compares their magnitude to those of
tariffs. Section 5.3 establishes the macro puzzle by discussing different specifica-
tions. Section 5.4 presents a solution to the distance puzzle by relying on existing
research (Section 5.4.1). It then tests the proposed mechanism theoretically (Sec-
tion 5.4.2) and empirically (Section 5.4.3). Section 6 concludes and provides an
outlook.
5.2 Transport Costs in the Interwar Years
This section critically discusses the existing available data on maritime freight
rates and presents new high frequency data on grain freight rates. To gain an
impression of the movement of non-maritime transport costs, it analyses a novel
6This is closely related to the Alchian-Allen conjecture (Hummels and Skiba, 2004).
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series on German railway freight rates. The evidence suggests that, while nom-
inal rates were falling, real costs were increasing. Neither the public railway
monopoly in Germany nor international shipping companies were able to adjust
their freight charges as quickly as prices fell. Finally, the last part of this section
compares increases in maritime transport freights and tariffs in ad valorem equiv-
alent terms. By this metric, tariffs increased much more than transport costs.
5.2.1 The Existing Literature
While there is a consensus that nominal transport costs were falling in the in-
terwar period, there is considerable disagreement about the course of their real
counterparts. This section discusses the inconclusive available evidence, which
motivates the gathering of further evidence on transport costs.
The available transport cost series for the interwar period (Isserlis, 1938; Mo-
hammed and Williamson, 2004) are largely based on British in- and outbound
shipping freight rates initially compiled by Angier (1921–1951). Estevadeordal
et al. (2003) deflate the nominal Isserlis series by the British consumer price in-
dex. Based on the resulting real series, the authors claim that freight rates were
increasing. Hynes et al. (2012) highlight three weaknesses of this approach: (i) Is-
serlis’ original weighting and computation, (ii) the deflation by consumer prices
rather than the respective commodity prices, and (iii) the endogeneity of the ship-
ping sector. According to Hynes et al. (2012), Mohammed and Williamson (2004)
substantially improve upon the first two of these issues by relying on a more
representative sample and route-specific deflators.
The resulting indices for real maritime transport costs, averaged over five
years in the published version of the study, reverse the results found by Este-
vadeordal et al. (2003). They suggest that real transport costs were roughly 10 %
lower during the period from 1930 to 1934 than during the period from 1925 to
1929 (Mohammed and Williamson, 2004, p. 188). This result is particularly sur-
prising with respect to the criticism of the deflator. It is not clear why the deflation
by consumer (Estevadeordal et al.) rather than commodity prices (Mohammed
and Williamson) should bias real costs upwards. Wholesale prices, and prices for
commodities in particular, fell on average faster than consumer prices.7 If any-
thing, deflation by a consumer price index rather than commodity prices should
thus bias real transport costs downwards for the period under consideration.
7Among commodities, this is particularly true for grain prices. We shall see that wheat prices
typically fell more than two thirds between 1925 and 1932. More generally, the differential be-
tween commodity and consumer prices can be shown using data provided in Chapter 2.
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There are two further potential problems with respect to the series presented
in Mohammed and Williamson (2004). Like Isserlis, Mohammed and Williamson
(2004) almost exclusively rely on the shipping data originally compiled in the
January issue of the Fairplay Magazine (Angier, 1921–1951). First, the underlying
price and freight rate data are at annual frequency. Hence it matters when the
shipment took place and what type of price was recorded. The latter information
cannot be recovered from the primary source (Angier, 1921–1951). This problem
is aggravated by the composition of their sample as it comprises a large num-
ber of agricultural commodities for which prices varied substantially through-
out the year. The second problem relates to the averaging. As Mohammed and
Williamson (2004) focus on the long-run evolution of shipping costs, such aver-
aging is naturally warranted for their research question. However, it introduces
a second ambiguity into the series. Because the first average is for 1925-1929, it
includes the British coal strike in 1926, which led to severe price distortions and
increases in the freight market (Wickizer, 1938, p. 71).8 Such price movements
would bias the 1925-1929 average upwards relative to the 1930-1934 one. Hence,
relying on five-year-averages could lead to severe mis-interpretations.
The annual deflated indices from the Mohammed and Williamson (2004)
study draw a different picture than that shown by the five-year-averages pre-
sented in the published version.9 Real freight rates increase until 1931, thereafter
enter a steady decline until 1935, and reach a new high in 1936 (Figure 5.1). This
graph is surprising in two respects. Firstly, real maritime freight rates stay above
their 1929 level throughout the 1930s. Secondly, the coal strike of 1926 does not
seem to substantially impact the data. Both are at odds with what one would
expect. Mohammed and Williamson (2004) focus on the long-run evolution of
transport costs. Such inconsistencies might thus be of less importance. However,
the contradiction between the five-year-averages in the published version and the
annual raw data matters for this study. If real transport costs were falling from
1925 to 1933, this precludes the possibility that they were a driver of the fall of
world trade (Hynes et al., 2012, p. 136).
Conjecturing that there is a certain ambiguity with respect to the evolution
of freight rates, Hynes et al. (2012, p. 136-138) propose an alternative metric to
gauge the movement and importance of transport costs during the interwar pe-
riod. While not at the centre of their study on market integration, they present
8Freight rates for some goods tripled for a period of 6 months, because most ships were em-
ployed to meet the demand for transporting coal (Wickizer, 1938, p. 72).
9Jeffrey Williamson kindly provided me with the data.
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FIGURE 5.1: British maritime shipping costs with 8 Regions
(1900=100)
Notes: The graph is an unweighted average of 8 regions of the index by Mohammed and
Williamson (2004). The results do not change with the inclusion of the Bengal region, for which a
year is missing. The 5-year-averages in their study differ for unknown reasons.
one route-specific real transport cost series. For this series, they match the freight
rate for grain on the Winnipeg-London route with the price for the corresponding
variety transported on this route. This allows them to express the importance of
freight costs in ad valorem equivalent terms. While this one series indicates in-
creasing real transport costs, the relative magnitude to other trade costs appears
to be small. This is a promising approach, but the focus on one route precludes a
generalisation at this point.
In sum, the available evidence on maritime freight rates is inconclusive. The
existing indices suffer from various problems such as rapid changes in commod-
ity prices, within-year fluctuations, and the difficulty of choosing the appropriate
deflator. These problems do not prevent a sensible interpretation of long-run
changes in these series per se. However, they caution against putting too much
faith into their changes over relatively short time periods. In contrast, the ex-
act matching of freight rates and prices constitutes a promising approach with
respect to the problems described above.
5.2.2 New Evidence on Maritime and Overland Transport Costs
As the previous section identifies a lack of conclusive evidence on the movements
of real maritime transport costs, this section provides new evidence on these. Fur-
thermore, it provides indicative evidence on the movement of overland transport
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costs. Both types of data indicate that real transport costs were increasing.
Real Maritime Freight Rates
How can we cope with deficiencies in the indices discussed in the previous sec-
tion? Extending the work by Hynes et al. (2012), this section uses high-frequency
data on freight rates and wheat prices matched by quality. The focus on grain is
strongly dictated by data availability. Naturally, it comes at the cost of failing to
cover a larger basket of goods. Beyond data availability, however, there are four
reasons for focussing on grain freight rates.
Firstly, increases in freight charges only have a minor impact on high-value
manufactured and semi-manufactured goods as they typically constitute a very
small part of the overall price of such goods. Thus, any results presented here
provide an upper bound for the magnitude of transport costs. Secondly, a large
share of the volume of international seaborne trade is in low-value bulky goods
of which grain constitutes an important part. Wickizer (1938, p. 77) guesstimates
that 20 % to 25 % of the actual volume of world trade in tons was in grains dur-
ing the interwar period. Thirdly, “with negligible exceptions all grain contracts
in the international trade are ‘c.i.f.’ (cost, insurance, freight) contracts by which,
for a stated price, the seller agrees to provide the commodity and deliver it to
the ship in the port of shipment, to insure it, and to pay the freight on it to the
port of destination” (Wickizer, 1938, p. 81). Hence, most of the actual transport-
related charges are accounted for. Finally, data for other commodities such as
coal and pig iron could potentially be used. However, as prices for these goods
are typically recorded without mentioning the quality, and given that large qual-
ity differences exist, choosing the appropriate deflator is almost impossible. In
contrast, prices for different wheat varieties and the respective freight rate data
can be unambiguously linked to calculate ad valorem equivalent transport costs.
The Monthly Crop Report and International Yearbook for Agriculture by the In-
ternational Institute of Agriculture and the Statistisches Reichsamt (1936, 1937)
provide monthly wheat price data. The prices for the varieties (e.g. “Manitoba
wheat”) recorded therein can be precisely matched with grain freight rates. Wick-
izer’s (1938, p. 116–118) article in Wheat Studies provides the data for routes to the
United Kingdom. The Statistisches Reichsamt (1926–1937, Verkehr section) pro-
vides corresponding data for the New York and Odessa routes to Germany.10
10See Appendix 5A.2 for a more detailed account of the sources, conversions of weights, and
currency conversion for the German series.
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FIGURE 5.2: Nominal maritime transport costs
Notes: see text for sources.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the movement of nominal maritime transport costs from
1925–1936 for six different routes in US cents per bushel. Freight rates on all
routes were decreasing. The spike from mid-1926 to early 1927 is caused by the
British coal strike, which led to new business opportunities for tramp ships usu-
ally employed in grain trade (Wickizer, 1938, p. 71 & 78). Small idiosyncrasies
and the coal strike aside, nominal freight rates had roughly halved from 1925 un-
til 1932 and started to recover thereafter. Naturally, the series differ in their levels
based on the distance between the ports, but they exhibit a stark pattern of co-
movement upon visual inspection. They are thus likely to be influenced by the
same market conditions.
Wickizer (1938) focused mainly on the relationship between shipping and
grain markets. In contrast, this analysis is concerned with the effect of transport
costs on trade. Therefore, we are ultimately interested in the magnitude of the
wedge that real transport costs drive between the domestic and foreign market.
This wedge itself and its evolution are best measured in ad valorem terms (Finger
and Yeats, 1976). The ad valorem transport freight rate is simply defined as the
transport cost per bushel in US-$ divided by the respective wheat variety’s price
per bushel in US-$ at the place of origin. In this context, employing the price at
the place of origin rather than the one in the destination market is more accurate,
because the latter might also capture tariff and marketing costs.
Figure 5.3 plots the ad valorem equivalent transport costs for four routes.
With the exception of the La Plata-Europe series, real transport costs remained
virtually stationary until 1929. As prices were falling much quicker than freight
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FIGURE 5.3: Ad valorem maritime transport costs
a) New York - Hamburg b) North Atlantic - United Kingdom
c) La Plata - United Kingdom & Continen-
tal Europe
d) Australia - United Kingdom & Conti-
nental Europe
Note: Observations affected by the coal strike in 1926 are left out for illustrational purposes.
rates during the period from 1929-1933, real transport costs increased rapidly. In
mid-1933, the New-York-Hamburg and the North Atlantic-United Kingdom se-
ries settle slightly above their pre-Depression levels. In contrast, Australian and
Argentinian freights peter out at a much higher level compared to pre-Depression
rates. How large were these level changes?
The level shifts in the non-American series amount to roughly 10 % ad val-
orem.11 If we had built an index with 1925 as the base year rather than ad valorem
equivalents, we would conclude that the changes were 300 % (La Plata - Europe)
11With increases of up to 30 % and 20 % ad valorem, the year 1931 was very abnormal for
Australian and Argentinian freight rates. Most likely, the exceptionally good harvest in Australia
was responsible for these movements. The yields almost doubled in comparison to 1929–1930
(The Economist, 1932a, p. 27), which depressed prices. As prices enter the denominator, this led
to a stark increase in the real freight rate.
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and 60 % (Australia - Europe) respectively. In contrast to the non-American series,
the series for the New York - Hamburg and the North Atlantic - United Kingdom
suggest a much smaller shift in transport costs. Their level shifted at most 1 % ad
valorem in the long run, which corresponds to 20 % if calculated as a real index.12
In fact, these graphs show that real maritime transport costs were increasing,
especially for the period 1930-1933 corresponding to the phase of deepest reces-
sions in many countries. If measured in percentage terms, all these increases seem
exceptionally large. Abstracting from 1931, however, they seem rather modest
when accounted for in ad valorem terms. Note that analysing a low-value bulky
good such as wheat provides the upper bound for such ad valorem equivalent
changes.
Railway Freight Rates
As a substantial amount of international trade was carried out on railways
throughout Europe, the focus on long-distance tramp shipping rates could be
misleading. This section sheds light on the development of real railway prices
of the biggest continental European economy of the time. Germany had a well-
developed railway network that spanned large parts of Europe (Wolf et al., 2011).
As in many other countries, the rail network was monopolised. It thus provides
a useful case to highlight some features of the evolution of overland transport
costs.
The Statistisches Reichsamt (1926–1937) provides the freight schedule for the
German national railway service, the Reichsbahn. As one would expect from a mo-
nopolised public enterprise, the price adjustment was very slow. In fact, the rail-
way freight schedule of the Reichsbahn only changed four times during the period
1925-1936. The schedule categorised goods into of seven different types (A-G),13
for which different fees had to be paid depending on ten distance brackets. To
get a general idea of the movement of railway freights, I take the arithmetic aver-
age of the good types by distance bracket and then arithmetically average across
good types. To assess real transport costs, I deflate the resulting value in pfennig
by the German wholesale price index (Chapter 2). Both the averaging and the use
12In the period 1930-1933 the highest change lies between 6 % and 8 % in ad valorem terms
corresponding to a 150-200 % if expressed as an index number.
13I omit the good types “single items” and “reduced-price single items”. The schedule in effect
from 1924–1927 consisted only of 6 good types (A-F). Railway freight schedules across Europe
were also used for protectionist motives by subsidising certain good classes and taxing others
(Gabriel, 1935).
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of a wholesale price index are imperfect solutions. However, they should provide
us with a general idea about the evolution of overland transportation costs.
FIGURE 5.4: German railway freight rates
Notes: Real cost calculated by deflating the nominal cost by the German wholesale price index.
For sources, see text.
Figure 5.4 plots both the nominal average rate in Reichspfenning per ton kilo-
metre (right axis) and the “real cost” of railway transportation indexed to 1925
(left axis). The revision of the schedule in 1927 decreased nominal costs by around
10 %. Most of this reduction was nullified with another tariff revision in 1930.
Only in 1932 a significant downward adjustment of about 20 % took place. Yet,
for all we know about the evolution of prices during this period, this adjustment
must have been too small to compensate the fall in prices. In consequence, real
costs must have increased. If anything, employing a general wholesale price in-
dex like in the figure above probably rather under- than overstates the increase
in real freight rates. Prices for agricultural goods, which were presumably the
most common freight on railways besides coal, fell more rapidly on average than
those for other wholesale products. Indeed, the real series indicates that the costs
of transporting goods on railways increased by roughly 40 % between 1929 and
the end of 1931. Despite a sharp drop in 1932 due to the new railway sched-
ule, real costs for transporting goods on railways remained well above their pre-
Depression levels throughout the rest of the period.
In sum, the evidence suggests that real costs were increasing for both modes
of transport. Why shipping companies and railway monopolies were slow to
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adjust their rates to falling prices remains an open question. Estevadeordal et al.
(2003, p. 378) argue that this could have been due to slower TFP growth in the
transportation sector relative to the one in the economy as whole, rising labour
militancy or increased cartelisation. Given the heavy fall in commodity prices,
however, it seems at least as likely that the increase in real transport costs was
simply due to the inability to offer transportation services at lower prices. More
important for assessing the potential role of transport costs in the fall of world
trade, however, is their magnitude relative to other trade frictions.
5.2.3 The Relative Importance of Transport Costs
To gauge the relative importance of physical and political trade frictions, Finger
and Yeats (1976) suggest comparing tariffs and transportation costs in ad valorem
equivalent terms.14 On a much smaller scale, I replicate their exercise for the in-
terwar period by calculating ad valorem equivalent rates for maritime transport
and tariffs for selling Canadian wheat in Europe. This exercise suggests that tar-
iffs rather than transport costs were the dominating force for changes in trade
costs.
An analysis of changes in tariffs requires gathering data on wheat duties for
two cross-sections. For the first one, I draw information on duties for 1928 pub-
lished in a report prepared for the Assembly of the League of Nations by Ohlin
(1931, p. 324f) and on a hitherto neglected compilation of European tariff levels
by the Austrian National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce
(1927, p. 22).15 A second cross-section is given in the Monthly Crop Report and
Agricultural Statistics by the International Institute of Agriculture (1932). Unfor-
tunately, the geographical coverage varies by cross-section. To make a compari-
son over time, it is thus necessary to drop various countries. Furthermore, some
countries either monopolised (e.g. Sweden and Norway) or prohibited wheat im-
ports in certain years (e.g. Spain).16 Others maintained free trade for wheat until
early 1932 (United, Kingdom, Netherlands) or introduced modest ad valorem
14Specifically, they focus on post-war US data. They find that the latter form of protectionism
was at least as important as the former one during the time of the post-Kennedy round tariffs.
15The tariff data in the League report is given in gold franc per metric quintile (100 kilograms) . I
convert these data into US cents per bushel wheat by employing information provided in Auboin
(1955, p. 4), Statistisches Reichsamt (1936, p. 91), and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (1943, p. 670). The data in Austrian National Committee of the International Chamber of
Commerce (1927, p. 22) is given in Austrian Gold Kronas per 100 kg, which I convert by using the
exchange rate provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943, p. 663).
16See Ohlin (1931, p. 325) for details.
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tariffs (such as Belgium’s 2 % tariff). These do not feature in the comparison of
nominal tariff rates for 12 European countries in 1927 and 1932 in Figure 5.5.
FIGURE 5.5: Nominal tariffs on wheat in European countries
Notes: Countries either imposing no specific tariffs throughout the period, monopolising wheat
trade or for which only data for 1932 exist are excluded.
The data suggests that tariff restrictions grew in nominal terms in most of the
countries included Figure 5.5. Germany increased her tariff from about 20 cents
per bushel to 160 cents per bushel. In no other country tariffs for wheat reached
such excessive heights, but the protectionist turn was far from modest elsewhere.
Significant tariff increases occurred in Italy, France, Spain, and Poland. Roma-
nia and Austria, hitherto low-tariff countries with respect to wheat introduced
specific rates far beyond 60 cents per bushel.
Based on the nominal freight and tariff data, we may ask how important trans-
port costs could have been relative to the height of tariffs. Potential German
wheat imports from Canada in 1932 serve as a truly excessive but illustrative ex-
ample. The freight rate for wheat was about 5 cents per bushel, whereas the Ger-
man tariff amounted to 162 cents for the same quantity. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests that instead of paying the German tariff, the Canadian ex-
porters could have shipped the wheat more than four times around the globe.17
Naturally, this calculation does not lend itself to suggesting that transport costs
were of overarching importance.
17Assuming the ship could travel the simple great circle distance.
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FIGURE 5.6: Ad valorem equivalents of freight rates and tariffs for
wheat
Notes: Norway is left out as it monopolised trade but there is no tariff recorded. Only the basic
duty (not the additional ones) are used to calculate the ad valorem equivalent tariff such that this
figure provides a lower bound for many countries.
To generalise this point, Figure 5.6 shows the ad valorem equivalent tariffs
for a cross-section of European countries as well as the corresponding maritime
transport costs. The prices and freight rate for Manitoba wheat serve as the ba-
sis for this graph, whereas the tariff data is from the sources outlined above.
While by early 1932 the classical free-trading nations such as the Netherlands
and Britain had not imposed tariffs on wheat, in many European countries tariffs
were a substantial fraction, if not multiples, of its price. In comparison, transport
costs, even though they accounted for 8.5 % ad valorem in 1932, were modest.
In ad valorem equivalent terms, freight costs seemed to have mattered rela-
tively less than tariffs when looking at one point in time. How does the picture
change if we analyse changes instead? Except for countries in which the initial
level of freight costs was higher than the specific tariff18 any downward move-
ment in price must mechanically increase the importance of tariffs in ad valorem
equivalent terns. To illustrate this point, consider the following example. From
the data used in the previous section we know that the average price of Mani-
toba wheat in 1927 was about 144 cents per bushel. Let us assume a hypothetical
specific tariff of 20 cents per bushel by a European country. This corresponded
to an ad valorem equivalent tariff of about 14 % in 1927. The freight rate was
18Ad valorem tariffs as such were rare exceptions as the data in a report by the Austrian Na-
tional Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce (1927) illustrate.
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about 5 % of the price. Hence the overall trade costs were 19 % ad valorem. By
1932, the average price of the Canadian wheat variety had dropped to 53 cents
per bushel. Without any change of the tariff code, this translates into a new ad
valorem equivalent tariff of 37 %, a change of 23 % ad valorem. In contrast, the
ad valorem equivalent cost for shipping grain from North America and Canada
to European ports doubled from 5 % to 10 %, a change of only 5 %. In part, the
change is smaller because of the endogenous response by shipping companies,
which adjusted their nominal freight rates downwards. In part, it is mechanical.
Even if there was no downward adjustment of the nominal rate, the counterfac-
tual ad valorem equivalent freight rate would have been 15 %, a change of 10 %
ad valorem.19 This is less than half of the 23 % ad valorem change due to the
tariff. Naturally, in every case for which the initial specific tariff level is higher
than the nominal freight rate, any movement of prices would lead to a higher ad
valorem equivalent change in the tariff than in the freight rate.
In sum, the importance of physical trade costs relative to political trade fric-
tions declined in the interwar period. While the evidence presented here draws
on wheat prices only, there are good reasons to generalise this result. As argued
above, transport costs are only an important part of the overall price in the des-
tination market for low-value bulky commodities such as wheat. For semi- and
fully manufactured goods, the relative importance of tariffs in overall trade costs
must have been even larger. Under such conditions, any price movement me-
chanically leads to a larger change in the ad valorem equivalent of a specific tariff
compared to the ad valorem equivalent of the transport cost. Estevadeordal et al.
(2003) were right to point out that, most likely, real transport costs were increas-
ing. However, their relative importance as a trade friction declined. Prima facie,
this makes it unlikely that they became an important driver for the fall of world
trade in the 1930s.
5.3 The Falling Importance of Distance in the Inter-
war Period
Another way to assess the evolution of transport costs is the distance elasticity of
international trade. The previous section demonstrates that transport costs were
increasing, albeit to a lesser extent than tariffs. If the distance elasticity only cap-
tures the importance of distance-related costs, one would expect it to increase
19This is the average freight rate of 1927 divided by the average of 1932 Canadian wheat prices.
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in absolute terms under such circumstances. On the contrary, the estimates pre-
sented below suggest that distance became less important over time during the
interwar period. This finding constitutes the interwar distance puzzle.
5.3.1 The Empirical Model
The gravity model is the workhorse model in empirical research on international
trade (see Head and Mayer, 2014, for an excellent review of the gravity litera-
ture). The following equation originates in the micro-founded formulation of the
gravity model by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003):
mi,j = βDi,j + η′x′i,j + αi + γj + ei,j (5.1)
in which mi,j are the imports of country i from j, D is the logarithm of distance
between the two, x′ is a vector of bilateral controls, α an importer fixed effect and
γj an exporter fixed effect. The vector of bilateral controls includes a standard set
of dummies for this model class as well as indicator variables for pegs and ex-
change controls, which ought to have a large impact on trade during this period
(see e.g. Irwin, 2012). All these controls are described in the data section (5.3.2) in
more detail. Also note that country-specific variables such as remoteness or in-
come are not separately identified but controlled for by the importer and exporter
fixed effects. β is the coefficient of interest as it measures the sensitivity of inter-
national trade with respect to distance. If we repeat the estimation of the above
equation for multiple years, changes in the distance elasticity β should inform us
if distance, and thus ultimately transport costs, became a more important friction
for international trade.
The above formula is estimated by the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
estimator (PPML). The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator, on which many
of the estimations that substantiate the post-war distance puzzle are based upon,
has been subject to critique. In the presence of heteroscedasticity and due to
Jensen’s Inequality, the OLS estimator can become inconsistent. Therefore, San-
tos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) propose the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
estimator (PPML), which yields consistent estimates even in the presence of het-
eroscedasticity.20
20While the OLS estimator has been subject to critique, the PPML estimator has problems to
converge when a large number of fixed effects is included in the model. This problem is most
severe when one wants to include dyadic fixed effects. As argued by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006)
this can be important in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Hence, Figure A5.3 in
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5.3.2 Data & Sample
Whereas Section 5.2 combines materials from a number of primary sources to
sketch the development of transport costs in the interwar period, the estimation
of the gravity model relies on a number of existing datasets. The dependent vari-
able – import flows in US-$ – was compiled by Gowa and Hicks (2013). They col-
lect import data from country-level sources (official trade statistics) and a number
of other sources.21 They reach a remarkable coverage for trade in the interwar pe-
riod covering substantial parts of all continents except for Africa.
FIGURE 5.7: Geographical distribution of the sample
Note: Colours indicate the percentage of dyadic observations, in which the country appears.
Historical trade statistics are usually quite comprehensive and precise. Nev-
ertheless, they come with a number of problems, which make various sample
restrictions necessary. For an optimal trade-off between cross-sectional and time-
series coverage, I balance the sample for the period 1925-1936.22 This excludes
the hyper-inflationary period of the early 1920s, for which a considerable amount
Appendix 5B.2 presents an alternative OLS panel estimate with dyadic fixed effects. These es-
timates measure the importance of distance relative to a defined base year (1936), as they are
year-dummies interacted with the distance variable. Naturally, time-varying country and time
fixed effects are included such that all identifying variation comes from pair specific changes over
time.
21Alternatively, one could use the new TRADHIST dataset recently made available by Fouquin
and Hugot (2016b). However, with the same restrictions (see below) the sample size reduces to
1112 observations. For this specific period (and purpose), the TRADHIST dataset has thus a lower
coverage.
22Balancing the sample is important as one does not want the observed patterns to be driven
by changes in the composition of the sample.
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of data is missing, as well as the immediate years before World War II. It cov-
ers the main period of interest surrounding the Great Depression by including
pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis trade flows. Employing a balanced sample of
non-zero trade flows, this study analyses the intensive margin of trade only. This
results in 1704 import flows per year for the global sample and 1222 flows per
year for a sample (Figure 5.7), in which at least one of the trading parties is a
European country.
The focus on the intensive margin by excluding flows with zero trade is dic-
tated by data availability and the way trade statistics were recorded.23 Firstly,
historical trade statistics do not always refer to well-defined polities. For exam-
ple, the Swiss authorities would include destinations like “other countries of the
Near East” (Direction Générale des Douanes Fédérales, 1924). Not only did such
regional categories differ across countries, but they would often vary over time
within one country. In the Swiss case, the above destination would become Syria
without any further explanation in the years following. Secondly, historical trade
statistics would typically have a residual category for countries with whom they
trade very little. Because of these two reasons, it is virtually impossible to know
whether countries did not trade or the trade flow was not recorded. Hence one
can simply not analyse the extensive margin of trade for this period in a consis-
tent manner.24
Throughout the discussion, I rely on a sub-sample of trade flows, in which at
least one country is European. This is true for around 72 % of the global sample
or 1222 dyadic observations per year. The reason for this restriction is the aim
of measuring the importance of transport costs for trade by analysing changes in
the distance elasticity of trade. The inclusion of intra-developing country trade
can severely disturb such a measure (Melitz, 2007). Typically, countries outside
of Europe traded very little among each other. The reason for this pattern lies
in their colonial history and factor endowments.25 Most economies in the South-
ern Hemisphere heavily relied on commodities. The main consumers of these
products were European countries. The resulting North-South trading pattern
23See Felbermayr and Kohler (2006), Hillberry and Hummels (2008) and Head and Mayer (2014)
for the definition of the extensive and intensive margins of trade.
24This is not to question that the extensive margin matters for trade in the medium- to long-run
run. However, it is unlikely that it is of much relevance for this study given the short period
under consideration (12 years). That a reversed version of the post-war distance puzzle appears
in the short sample period subject to this study casts doubts on solutions to the post-war distance
puzzle based on the extensive margin (see Felbermayr and Kohler, 2006, for such an approach).
25For a discussion of the factor endowment argument using post-war data, see Melitz (2007).
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meant that almost all of their trade was biased towards very long distances.26 In
this case, changes in the distance elasticity might not reflect changes in transport
costs but changing trade opportunities (Melitz, 2007, p. 986). Put differently, with
few markets for their goods in proximity, changes in transport costs could simply
not re-direct trade towards closer markets. Most of the change in the distance
sensitivity in international trade for those countries is then necessarily driven by
the demand from the industrialised countries.27 These considerations make it
reasonable to focus on a sample, in which at least one trading partner is Euro-
pean. While one would not necessarily expect this, the results hold to a limited
degree in the global sample.
In terms of covariates, this study relies on a variety of sources available in elec-
tronic format. Great circle distances between the capitals are taken from Gowa
and Hicks (2013). As an alternative, Mayer and Zignago (2011) provide popula-
tion weighted distances.28 These have the attractive feature of being comparable
with internal distances (Yotov, 2012), which will become important when solving
the puzzle. Beyond the bilateral distances, a number of bilateral variables might
influence trade. Mayer and Zignago (2011) provide colonial tie and common lan-
guage dummies. While the dummy for adherence to the gold standard provided
by Gowa and Hicks (2013) captures officially pegged currencies, it does not ac-
count for other pegged currency arrangements after the breakdown of the gold
exchange standard in 1931. However, instead of exercising the newly acquired
freedom of monetary policies, a large number of countries pegged their curren-
cies either de facto or de jure against the dollar or pound.29 In order to account
for such pegs, I calculate a modified version of the peg measure by Shambaugh
26Peru serves as an illustrative example. Imports from her five neighbouring countries alto-
gether were far below 1.5 % of the total imports (own calculation based on data by Gowa and
Hicks, 2013). Her most important trading partner in South America in terms of imports in 1929
was Argentina, accounting for 3.3 % of her imports. At the same time, she was receiving 3.9 % of
her total imports from Belgium (Statistisches Reichsamt, 1936, p. 481), which was much smaller,
had a different official language, and was thousands of miles away.
27This is because the distance elasticity is ultimately identified from the relative share of long-
distance trade.
28These distances are computed with modern population weights, not historical ones. How-
ever, given Zipf’s law and the general persistence of the relative sizes of cities (see e.g. Davis and
Weinstein, 2002), using this dataset seems a warranted simplification. The alternative would be to
collect a whole new dataset on city sizes around the world during this period and re-estimating
internal distances.
29For de jure pegs, see League of Nations (1939b, p. 220). This overview by the League of
Nations is incomplete as it does not account for de facto pegs. A prime example is the case of
Sweden, which is documented by Straumann and Woitek (2009). Urban (2009) provides corre-
sponding cross-country evidence for de facto pegs.
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(2004) as suggested by Mathy and Meissner (2011). Details can be found in Ap-
pendix 5A.1.
5.3.3 Results
Table 5.1 displays the results of the gravity estimation for three cross-sections in
two specifications for the European sample. The first column for each year shows
the estimate that is only conditioned on the logarithmised distance and a set of
importer and exporter fixed effects. The second column for each year confirms
the results by including additional covariates. Among the covariates, colonial
ties and contiguity are obviously closely correlated with the distance between
countries. As these coefficients vary over time in the repeated cross-sections, the
first specification might be thought of as a “cleaner” representation of the puzzle
albeit omitting important control variables.
TABLE 5.1: THE INTERWAR DISTANCE PUZZLE - EUROPEAN SAMPLE
1925 1931 1936
Distance -0.733∗∗∗ -0.526∗∗∗ -0.636∗∗∗ -0.490∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗
(-6.34) (-5.26) (-6.03) (-6.01) (-4.59) (-3.21)
Colonial Tie 1.258∗∗∗ 1.111∗∗ 1.234∗∗∗
(3.33) (3.02) (4.21)
Contiguity 0.907∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗
(6.66) (4.80) (4.47)
Peg -0.177 0.632∗∗∗ 0.0256
(-1.20) (6.47) (0.21)
Imp. & Exp. FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
N 1222 1222 1222 1222 1222 1222
Pseudo− R2 0.81 0.89 0.74 0.86 0.68 0.76
Notes: Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001;
z statistics in parentheses. Robust Standard errors applied.
Both specifications document the decaying importance of distance. From 1925
until 1936, this change accounts to 0.2. A 10 % increase in the distance, the model
predicts, would lead to 7.3 % less trade in 1925 but only to 5 % less trade in
1936. Similarly, the second specification also suggests that a country would trade
2 % more with a country 10 % further away in 1936 than it would have done
in 1925. Interestingly, these magnitudes correspond well with the finding of the
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meta study by Disdier and Head (2008, p. 43), which popularised the post-war
distance puzzle.
Moreover, the coefficient for contiguity in the second specification accentuates
the notion of the falling importance of distance throughout this period. As conti-
guity is positively correlated with distance, a falling coefficient must necessarily
indicate that distance has become less important. In contrast, the coefficient for
colonial ties oscillates. Its magnitude is not significantly different in 1936 from
the one in 1925. This lends support to the hypothesis that policymakers were
unable to “defy” gravity with pro-empire policies (Jacks, 2014). However, it is at
odds with other recent research suggesting the opposite (Gowa and Hicks, 2013;
Bromhead et al., 2017).
In light of the existing literature on large trade-creating effects of the classical
gold standard (e.g. López-Córdova and Meissner, 2003), the evolution of the co-
efficient for Peg is surprising. It suggests that countries with pegged currencies
did not trade more in two out of the three years shown above. More generally, the
coefficient in the other years (not shown) is relatively unstable in sign, magnitude
and significance until the breakdown of the gold standard in 1931. This finding
warrants closer examination, but doing so lies beyond the scope of this study.
The Pseudo-R2 is large, but decreases over time in both specifications. This
indicates that the model becomes less powerful, potentially due to the advent of
more bilateral (pair-specific) trade policies. Not only quotas gained momentum
in the 1930s (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010; Irwin, 2012), but so did retaliatory
tariffs (Jones, 1934).30 Unfortunately, the gravity literature typically omits this
variable due to the absence of adequate data.31
With regard to the distance elasticity, the variable of interest, Figure 5.2a) il-
lustrates the results in a more accessible way by plotting the distance coefficient
for the baseline specification without controls over time. The decline is smooth
and steady until 1933, when it reaches its new plateau. Figure 5.9b) confirms this
result when population-weighted distances rather than capital-capital distances
are used.32 This baseline result holds qualitatively and quantitatively after the
30These are quantitatively explored in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
31In the only exception known to this author, Hayakawa (2013) finds no serious bias stem-
ming from the omission of bilateral tariff data in gravity models. However, his study employs
only post-1990 data. This is problematic as, a priori, one would expect little or no bias given
an environment dominated by low tariff levels and the WTO’s enforcement of rules regarding
non-discriminatory trade policies.
32As a further robustness check, Appendix 5B.1 presents results for a specification, in which the
distance variable categorised in quartiles. These can be thought of as short-, medium-, long- and
very long-distance trade. The differences in levels are marginal.
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inclusion of the control variables mentioned above.
FIGURE 5.8: The interwar distance puzzle
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Note: Distance elasticity estimates from repeated cross-sectional PPML gravity estimation of a
balanced panel of 1222 intra- & extra European trade flows per year. No controls but importer
and exporter fixed effects are included
The interwar distance puzzle is also prevalent in the full sample as Figure
A5.2 (PPML) and Figure A5.3 (OLS with dyadic fixed effects) in Appendix 5B.2
reveal. The OLS estimates indicate an evolution of the distance elasticity similar
to the European sample. In contrast, the PPML estimates for the full sample draw
a somewhat different picture. From 1925 to 1931, the distance elasticity increases
from .6 to .7 in absolute terms and falls to .5 thereafter. However, the data section
discussed in detail why we would expect a much weaker effect, if any, for the full
sample.
In sum, the gravity estimations suggest that the importance of distance for
European trade was declining throughout the interwar period. This result is ro-
bust in a number of specifications including several potentially relevant control
variables. It holds to a lesser degree for a global sample. What mechanisms could
explain the fact that, despite rising transport costs, distance was losing impor-
tance for European trade?
5.4 A Solution to the Distance Puzzle
The previous section has revealed a puzzle. While Section 5.2 suggests that trans-
port costs were increasing, the estimates of the distance elasticity in the gravity
framework indicate that trade became less sensitive to distance. This finding mir-
rors the post-war distance puzzle which highlights the coincidence of an increas-
ing distance elasticity (in absolute terms) and falling transportation costs (Disdier
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and Head, 2008). A natural starting point is thus making use of available strate-
gies, which aim to solve the puzzle in the post-war data. Among those avail-
able,33 a solution based on the slow secular decline of non-distance related trade
cost would represent a particularly promising candidate. Tariff barriers shot up
quickly in the interwar period, but it took decades to dismantle them.34 In con-
sequence, such an explanation would be compatible with both, the interwar and
post-war distance puzzle. Yotov (2012) proposes to measure the importance of in-
ternational distances relative to intranational distances. This solves the puzzle be-
cause it indirectly takes the declining trade barriers into account. Applied to the
interwar period, this approach (Section 5.4.1) indeed solves the puzzle. A priori,
however, it is not clear that the proxies for internal distance and trade are com-
parable with their international counterparts. Nor is the mechanism explicitly
outlined in Yotov’s solution. To elucidate the latter, Section 5.4.2 provides theo-
retical considerations. These suggest that the distance elasticity depends, among
other factors, on tariffs. In the vein of Berthelon and Freund (2008), Section 5.4.3
tests the proposed mechanism with Swiss good level import data. Indeed, tariffs
changed the sensitivity of trade to distance.
5.4.1 A Macro Approach
Yotov (2012) points out that gravity models solely relying on international trade
flows measure the importance of some international trade costs such as distance
relative to other international trade costs. With reference to the micro-founded
formulation of the gravity model by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), he states
that internal trade flows and distances should be included in the gravity model
to capture the importance of distance adequately. This leads to the following
empirical specification:35
mi,j = βinternational ln(Di,j) + βinternal ln(Di,i) + αi + γj + ei,j (5.2)
33See Carrère et al. (2013) for an early review.
34According to Klasing and Milionis (2014), trade openness only reached its 1913 level in 1974.
35In a follow-up study, Bergstrand et al. (2015) lay out a panel version including a further di-
mension of fixed effects (flow-specific bilateral fixed effects). Because of a number of computa-
tional constrains and for the sake of brevity, I follow the original cross-sectional formulation by
Yotov. Nevertheless, I am confident that my results would hold in the panel setting. The inclu-
sion of bilateral fixed effects seems particularly important in unbalanced samples as they, to some
degree, account for changes in the composition of the sample over time. My sample, however, is
balanced.
Chapter 5. Transport Costs, Tariffs, and the Interwar Distance Puzzle 317
in which βinternational captures the importance of all international distances Di,j
between countries i and j. For all countries i 6= j, the logarithm of population
weighted distances between countries is employed. For internal trade, the log-
arithm of the international distance is set to zero. Conversely, internal distances
for international trade flows mi,j are set to zero, whereas those for internal trade
flows mi,i are computed as the logarithm of internal distances.36 The importance
of distance for international trade relative to internal distance is then captured by
βˆinternational − βˆinternal.
How does one measure internal trade? Yotov (2012) suggests to simply take
the difference between nominal GDP and exports as a proxy. Unfortunately, nom-
inal GDP data is not universally available for this period. For the exercise at hand,
however, it seems appropriate to rely on the short-cut nominal GDP estimates
by Klasing and Milionis (2014).37 In contrast to the GDP data, aggregate export
data in US-$ is readily available. Federico and Tena-Junguito (2016b) provide a
well-documented online database (Federico-Tena World Trade Historical Database).
With these data, we could implement Yotov’s empirical setup for the period un-
der consideration. However, Fouquin and Hugot (2016a) point out that GDP is
a value-added concept whereas international trade is not. The comparable met-
ric would be gross output, which includes intermediary goods. When assessing
internal trade, Fouquin and Hugot (2016a) thus scale the nominal GDPs up by a
factor of 3.16 to proxy gross output.38 Internal trade for country i is thus proxied
by:
mi,i = (3.16 ∗ GDPi)− Xi (5.3)
This one-size fits all approach is somewhat unsatisfactory. In the absence of
a better alternative, however, the same technique is followed in this study. Ulti-
mately, the focus lies on changes over time. This should render this lack of detail
an unfortunate omission rather than crucial for the results.
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.9 present the results for the macro-solution to the
36Internal distances are defined as the population-weighted great circle distances between cities
(Mayer and Zignago, 2011).
37Yet, not even the short-cut GDP estimates are available for all countries in the sample. The
sample size decreases by 15 % (from 1222 to 1054 trade flows) due to the inclusion of internal
distances and trade flows. As an alternative, Fouquin and Hugot (2016a) provide a collection of
“proper” country-specific estimates. However, their coverage is less comprehensive and would
lead to a much smaller sample.
38This factor is derived from post-war data.
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distance puzzle. Indeed, the importance of distance (βˆinternational − βˆinternal) in-
creased slightly from 1930 until 1936 when internal distances are accounted for.
This is precisely what one would expect based on the evidence regarding the
evolution of transport costs discussed earlier. While the results generally lend
support to Yotov’s solution, they also reveal a potential culprit. Surprisingly, the
sign of the internal distance coefficient is positive.
TABLE 5.2: A MACROSOLUTION TO THE INTERWAR DISTANCE PUZZLE
Without Internal Flows With Internal Flows
1925 1930 1936 1925 1930 1936
International Distance -0.99∗∗∗ -0.88∗∗∗ -0.67∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.51∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗
(δˆinternational) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Internal Distance 0.60∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗
(δˆinternal) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
δˆinternational − δˆinternal -1.00 -1.01 -1.12
Imp. & Exp. FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
N 1054 1054 1054 1099 1099 1099
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
This result casts doubts on the comparability of the internal trade flows and
distances with their international counterparts. After all, the elasticity for inter-
nal distances should still exhibit a negative sign. Ceteris paribus, transporting
goods from city A to city B is more expensive as the distance between them in-
creases. This should hold irrespectively of whether A and B are cities in the same
country or different polities. It is reasonable to assume that there exists a strong
positive correlation between the size of the market and internal distances. What
the internal distance variable might thus capture is the importance of the domes-
tic market relative to the international market at any given point of time. If so,
replacing βˆinternal in βˆinternational − βˆinternal with any variable capturing domestic
market potential would solve the puzzle.
In sum, the interwar distance puzzle can be solved by taking internal dis-
tances and trade flows into account. However, there is a certain ambiguity as to
whether the internal distance coefficient actually captures distances. It is more
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FIGURE 5.9: The macro solution to the interwar distance puzzle
Note: The distance elasticity taking into account internal trade flows is calculated as the difference
between the elasticities for international and internal trade (βˆinternational − βˆinternal) as in Yotov
(2012).
likely that it measures the importance of the domestic economy relative to in-
ternational trade. This does not invalidate Yotov’s solution per se. However, it
might just be that the emergence of the puzzle and globalisation (the decreasing
importance of the internal market) are two secular and unrelated trends in the
post-war period. Prima facie, the emergence of the interwar distance puzzle as
documented in this study renders this unlikely. Nevertheless, more evidence is
needed. The following two sections highlight a potential mechanism that ren-
ders distance less important in periods of de-globalisation and more important
in periods of increased globalisation.
5.4.2 Insights from an Import Demand Function
This section illustrates how changes in transport costs and tariffs affect the dis-
tance elasticity. It derives the distance elasticity from a demand function for im-
ports, which realistically assumes the presence of a non-distance related trade cost
component. It then shows that the distance between countries becomes a larger
friction as transport costs increase.39 Moreover, the theoretical considerations im-
ply that increasing tariffs decrease the importance of distance.40
39 While highly intuitive, Bosquet and Boulhol (2015, p. 3) challenge this proposition.
40These considerations shown here are not embedded in a full trade model. For such a deriva-
tion, see an unpublished manuscript by Días (2011). Instead, the mechanism highlighted here is
similar to the one underlying the Alchian-Allen conjecture. This conjecture states that the intro-
duction of a per-unit cost increases the demand for the high-quality varieties of a good as these
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To illustrate the argument, I follow the very basic assumptions and deriva-
tions of the model in Hummels et al. (2009). In a world of N countries the repre-
sentative consumer i, having a taste for variety, derives the following utility from
an Armington-differentiated good:
Ui = qii +
N
∑
j=1
q
(σ−1)
σ
ij (5.4)
where qii is i’s numeraire good (and produced at home) and qij is the variety
of j imported by i. σ is the elasticity of substitution between goods and positive
(σ > 0). To analyse the effect of different types of trade costs on the distance
elasticity, I assume the following trade costs structure that is added to the price
pj for an imported variety having the price pij:
pij = pj + τ + δDij (5.5)
where τ is a specific tariff, δ the per kilometre shipping cost for a unit of qij and
Dij the distance between i and j. If we focus on the case of the i’s consumption of
the imported good qij, the relative marginal utility from the numeraire qii and qij
must equal the ratio of the prices of the two goods such that:
σ
σ− 1q
1
σ
ij =
pii
pij
(5.6)
rearranging, expressing the price pi,j of good qij in terms of the numeraire, and
substituting the expression for pij from 5.5 yields
qij =
[
σ
σ− 1(pj + τ + δDij)
]−σ
(5.7)
The elasticity of the demand for qij with respect to the distance Dij is thus:
ED =
∂qij
∂Dij
Dij
qij
=
−σδ
pj + τ + δDij
(5.8)
To better understand the impact of a change in transport costs on the distance
elasticity, we take the partial derivative of the distance elasticity with respect to
the unit transport costs δ and find that it is negative:
∂ED
∂δ
=
−σ(pj + τ + δDij) + δ(−σDij)
(pj + τ + δDij)2
=
−σ(pj + τ)
(pj + τ + δDij)2
< 0 (5.9)
become relatively cheaper. Hummels and Skiba (2004) provide empirical evidence for this mech-
anism focusing on transport costs.
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This suggests that a marginal increase in transport cost leads to a decrease in
the distance elasticity. As the distance elasticity is negative, this translates into a
larger absolute value of the distance elasticity signalling a rising importance of
distance. It is puzzling that we observe the opposite in the distance elasticity esti-
mates presented above. However, the formula for the distance elasticity derived
in equation 5.8 illustrates that the role of distance for trade is not solely deter-
mined by transport costs. To analyse the effect of a marginal increase in tariffs,
we take the partial derivative of the distance elasticity with respect to τ and find
it to be positive:
∂ED
∂τ
=
σδ
(pj + τ + δDij)2
> 0 (5.10)
This suggests that tariff increases lead to an increase in the distance elasticity
(or decrease in absolute terms), signalling the decaying importance of distance.
To gauge the intuition underlying this finding, consider the following example.
A consumer in Switzerland wants to import wine from Spain and Australia that
have the same price if picked up at the winery in the respective country. Ideally,
as she likes both varieties of the wine, she would import them to the same degree.
However, transport costs are higher for the Australian variety. This decreases the
observed demand for this variety. Now the government of Switzerland intro-
duces a specific tariff that she has to pay irrespective of the variety she is import-
ing. This increases the price for both varieties in absolute terms. However, the
Australian variety has become cheaper relative to the Spanish one. This is because
transport costs are now a smaller part in the overall trade costs. In consequence,
we would observe that the consumer imports more Australian wine.41 Distance
has become less important through the introduction of the tariff.
How do these insights relate to the estimates of the gravity equation and to
Yotov (2012)’s solution presented above? First of all, the derivation of the dis-
tance elasticity in this simple import demand framework suggests that the dis-
tance elasticity is ultimately a composite elasticity. It depends on both the level
of tariffs and transport costs. One interpretation stemming from these theoreti-
cal considerations would be that the “tariff effect” on distance might have been
stronger than the “transport costs effect,” leading to the overall empirical result
of a declining importance of distance in the standard gravity model. In other
41Note that this mechanism is closely related to the Alchian-Allen conjecture (Hummels and
Skiba, 2004).
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words: while transport costs drive the world apart and thus increase the effec-
tive distance between countries, the erection of higher tariff barriers might have
“shrunk” it by a larger amount. This could lead to the effect that goods travel
longer distances despite de-globalisation and increasing transport costs.
5.4.3 Evidence from Disaggregated Trade Data
While the macro-solution to the distance puzzle remains ambiguous with respect
to the precise mechanism, the theoretical insights highlight tariffs as a poten-
tial determinant of the distance elasticity. This section takes the hypothesis to
disaggregated import data for Switzerland. While this comes at the cost of be-
ing unable to provide gravity-consistent estimates,42 some advantages stand out.
Firstly, and in contrast to gravity models, the granularity of the import data al-
lows me to embed tariffs explicitly in the estimation. Secondly, the variation in
the tariff rates can be assumed to be purely exogenous. A small open economy
such as Switzerland had no impact on world prices. At the same time, the Swiss
tariff code remained unaltered between 1927 and 1931.43 As virtually all tariffs
were specific, the global fall in prices created exogenous variation in their ad val-
orem equivalents. Finally, the disaggregated data allows me to analyse trade on
the good rather than aggregate level. This provides ample variation to test the
hypothesised effect of tariffs on the distance elasticity.
The Data
Swiss import and tariff data are available in the Statistique annuelle du commerce
extérieur de la Suisse. The data have been manually transcribed for the years 1927
and 1931. As it was impossible to transcribe the entire universe of import data
for both years, a rule of how to choose which goods to include was necessary.
Fortunately, the Austrian National Committee of the International Chamber of
Commerce (1927) had collected the national tariff classification number and spe-
cific tariff for 402 goods for a number of European countries. The authors of the
study paid much attention to collect these specific tariffs and classification num-
bers such that for each industry a reasonable number of goods was included.
However, it is hard to tell to what extent this list of goods is representative of Eu-
ropean or even world trade. On the other hand, the proposed mechanism should
42Gravity models require bi-directional trade data.
43Furthermore, quantitative restrictions were only introduced in 1932 (Häfner, 1934, p. 36).
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not be very sensitive to such representativeness concerns. Furthermore, employ-
ing such a list of goods makes it possible to easily extend future work to other
countries within the framework outlined below.44
As a substantial number of the 402 goods is not separately classified in the
Swiss tariff and not enough trading partners existed for some goods,45 the actual
number of goods is reduced to 248. A further eight goods are excluded because
they are grains. From which countries Switzerland imported them depended to
a large degree on the harvest in the cultivating countries, not on trade costs. Be-
cause the quantities are so large, including grains has undue influence on the
results.46 As the grain trade is not the focus of this study, they are thus omitted
from the analysis. The final list of 240 items covers a wide range of imports rang-
ing from commodities other than grain, to semi-manufactured and manufactured
goods.47
For each of the 240 goods, there are, in principle, 61 potential trading partners
for two years. This results in 29,280 potential observations. Naturally, many of
these observations are zero. Furthermore, trading flows below the value of 500
franc were, at least in some cases, subsumed in a residual category. Unfortunately,
the rule for when those were included and when not, is not given in the trade
statistics. For consistency reasons, it is thus necessary to drop all trade flows that
do not meet this threshold in either year. Finally, 4762 import flows remain above
if the threshold.48
Empirical Strategy
In the first step the disaggregated data allows me to confirm the puzzle by esti-
mating the following equation:
44Alternatively, one could follow the approach by Bromhead et al. (2017), who build SITC clas-
sifications for historical trade data.
45For a meaningful analysis of changes in the distance elasticity, it is necessary that a good was
imported from multiple trading partners. As a rule to be included in the estimation, it was re-
quired that at least eight non-zero import flows exist. The results are not sensitive to changing this
threshold to four or six import flows. A threshold of two would lead to dropping the observation
in the model presented on the following page due to perfect collinearity with the good-year fixed
effect.
46In fact, the noise introduced is so strong that it renders the results for the first specification in
Table 5.3 insignificant. In the less rigid specifications (second and third column), the coefficients
even flip and become significant. In contrast, including the grain data has no effect when good-
specific elasticities are estimated (Section 5.4.3). In that exercise, their influence is limited because
they comprise only 8 of the 248 observations.
47A full list is given in Appendix 5A.3.
48Dropping this sample restriction, one retains a total of 6166 observations for 251 goods. The
results remain virtually the same, except for one specification (see Appendix 5B.4).
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mg,i,t = β∆ln(disti) ∗ t1931 + αgi + ηg,t + tt + eg,i,t (5.11)
in which mg,i,t is the import in Swiss franc of good g from country i in year
t. Interacting, the logarithmised distance ln(disti) with the time dummy for 1931
t1931 allows me to capture the change of the distance coefficient between 1927 and
1931.49 The corresponding coefficient of interest is denoted β∆. Trading partner
specific characteristics are captured by the country-product fixed effect αgi . In-
cluding this fixed effect is of particular importance as it captures, for example,
how large the industry producing good g in the trading partner’s country is. ηg,t
denotes a good-time fixed effect. It captures the Swiss demand for a certain prod-
uct in each year. This makes sure that all identifying variation comes from the
geographical composition of imports on the goods-level over time.
Berthelon and Freund (2008) show that the change in the distance sensitivity
varies across goods. They thus propose to estimate the distance elasticity on the
industry level. This study adapts their approach to the data gathered for this
study. Rather than industry-specific estimates, it provides good-specific estimates
for the change of the distance elasticity βi for each of the i goods by estimating
the following equation:
mg,i,t = β∆,gln(disti) ∗ t1931 ∗ Gg + αgi + tt + eg,i,t (5.12)
in which Gg is an indicator variable for each good. As before αgi is a trading
partner-good fixed effect. tt denotes a time fixed effect capturing the general
decline of demand from 1927 until 1931.50
This approach allows us to analyse the distribution of the 240 good-specific
estimates of the changes of distance elasticity β∆,g. Specifically, we can analyse
the mean and distribution of the changes in the distance elasticity. If the mean of
these 240 distance elasticities is positive, this signals that, on average, distance has
become less important.51 Furthermore, the variation across varieties provides us
with the opportunity to analyse the drivers of the distance elasticity. Specifically,
I estimate:
49Tracking the changes of the distance coefficient this way is common in the trade literature
(Bergstrand et al., 2015).
50In an alternative specification (not shown), I replace the time fixed effect tt with the good-
specific time fixed effect ηg,t. Unfortunately, the number of trading partners is too small for cer-
tain goods such that this leads to two extreme outliers. However, the main result of this study,
the sensitivity of the distance coefficient with respect to tariff changes, remains qualitatively un-
altered.
51Recall that the distance elasticity is negative per se. If it increases (decreases in absolute
terms), this means that distance has become less important.
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β∆,g = β1ln(Product Varieties) + β2∆ln(1+ τg) + β3∆ln(Pg) + ei (5.13)
in which Product Varieties denotes the the number of product varieties (num-
ber of total trading partners) from which the good is imported. ∆ln(1 + τg) de-
notes the ad valorem change of the tariff for good g between 1927 and 1931. Fi-
nally, ∆ln(Pg) captures changes in the average price of the good. As argued be-
fore, the price changes and thus the changes in the tariff are exogenous as Switzer-
land could not influence the price of individual goods on the global market.
Confirming the Decreasing Importance of Distance
Table 5.3 reports the results for the first empirical specification outlined above.
This specification includes country-product and product-year fixed effects. The
former ensures that the general size of the trading partner’s industry is controlled
for. The latter captures the Swiss demand for each good in each year. This renders
the inclusion of two other potential fixed effects, a product group/industry-year
and a time fixed effect, obsolete as they would be perfectly collinear with the
product-year fixed effect. Because of the included fixed effects, all identifying
variation for the coefficient of interest stems from changes in the geographical
composition of trading partners at the good level.
TABLE 5.3: THE CHANGING IMPORTANCE OF DISTANCE - AN IM-
PORT DEMAND FUNCTION APPROACH
Imports Imports Imports
Distance x Time1931 0.18∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Fixed Effects
Country-Product 3 3 3
Product-Year 3
Product Group-Year ( 3) 3
Year ( 3) ( 3) 3
N 4762 4762 4762
Products 240 240 240
Notes: The symbol (3) indicates that the fixed effect is collinear with another fixed effect and
thus accounted for in the estimation. Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗
p < .01
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The coefficient reported in the first column suggests that the distance elastic-
ity changed by .18 from its level in 1927. As the level of the distance elasticity is
negative, this implies that distance must have become less important (a level elas-
ticity closer to 0). This estimate does not only confirm the change of the distance
elasticity in the disaggregated trade data. It also corresponds well to the magni-
tude of .2 found in the aggregated trade data (Section 5.3.3). The second and third
column in Table 5.3 report alternative specifications with less restrictive fixed ef-
fects. The second column includes fixed effects at an industry level.52 Thus only
the industry-specific demand is controlled for. Finally, the third column replaces
this fixed effect with a time fixed effect. In consequence, only the general fall in
Swiss demand between 1927 and 1931 is controlled for. The magnitude and the
precision of the estimates for these less restrictive specifications decrease slightly,
but the results qualitatively and quantitively similar. While the first specification
is preferred for the reasons outlined above, it is re-assuring that these specifica-
tions confirm the result that distance became less important for trade between
1927 and 1931.
0
2
4
6
8
De
ns
ity
-.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Change in Distance Elasticity
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0095
Kernel density estimate
FIGURE 5.10: Distribution of changes in distance elasticities
Note: Own Calculation.
As outlined above, an alternative way to answer the question whether the
importance of distance declined during this period is to estimate good-specific
elasticities. Based on the estimation of equation 5.12, Figure 5.10 plots the kernel
density of the 240 good-specific estimates of the changes in the distance elasticity.
While not perfectly so because of the relatively small number of observations, the
52The classification follows the one in the source material (Austrian National Committee of the
International Chamber of Commerce, 1927).
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distribution of the changes of the distance elasticity looks remarkably Gaussian.
This is reassuring as Berthelon and Freund (2008) find the same for their sample
based on modern data. Moreover, it shall give us confidence when interpreting
the mean increase in the good-level elasticities: β¯∆,i ≈ .17. It indicates that, aver-
aging across all goods, distance has become a less important friction for trade.
In sum, estimates derived from good-level data from Switzerland confirm the
declining importance of distance. Not only is the qualitative result identical, but
the magnitudes are very similar to those found when using aggregate bilateral
trade data. In contrast to the macro-level results presented in this study, the gran-
ularity of the data allows us to identify the drivers of the change in the importance
of distance during this period.
What drives changes in the distance elasticity?
Table 5.4 displays the results from estimating equation 5.13. The dependent vari-
able is the estimated change in the distance elasticity from 1927 to 1931. This
change is regressed on three variables. The coefficient for the number of existing
product varieties is expected to be positive. As the number of trading partners
increases, it becomes more likely that one or a number of them are significantly
further afar. Only substituting a variety from a (geographically) close trading
partner for one from a trading partner further away and vice versa will affect the
distance elasticity.53 The second independent variable ∆ Tariff is the change in
the ad valorem equivalent tariff. The third variable ∆ Price captures changes in
the average price of the good.
As expected, the three specifications show a positive effect of changes in tariffs
and the number of product varieties on the distance elasticity. A 10 % change
in the ad valorem equivalent tariff, roughly corresponding to the mean change
across all goods,54 increases the distance elasticity by .13. This implies that tariff
increases made distance significantly less important in statistical and economic
terms. The coefficient for the number of varieties is .04. Because the variable is
expressed in logarithms, the estimated effect is no longer linear. It is thus helpful
to relate it to the standard deviation (≈ 4.5) and mean (≈ 10) of the sample. The
mean number of varieties was 10 and the standard deviation around 4.5. For
goods with one standard deviation (14.510 − 1 = 45%) more of varieties than the
53To be less abstract, consider the following example. If Switzerland imports a good from 20
different countries, the probability that at least one of the varieties does not come from its neigh-
bours is one. If Switzerland imports varieties from only four countries, this is not the case.
54The sample mean for the variable ∆ Tari f f is .11, reflecting a mean change of 11 % ad valorem.
Chapter 5. Transport Costs, Tariffs, and the Interwar Distance Puzzle 328
sample mean, the distance elasticity increased ln(1.45) ∗ .004 ≈ 0.015. Relative
to the effects of the number of varieties, the changes in tariffs were thus the more
important driver of the changes in the distance elasticity.
TABLE 5.4: DRIVERS OF THE CHANGES IN THE DISTANCE ELASTICITY
∆ Elasticity ∆ Elasticity ∆ Elasticity
ln(Product Varieties) 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆ Tariff 0.13∗∗ 0.11∗
(0.06) (0.06)
∆ Price -0.00
(0.00)
N 240 240 240
R2 0.06 0.08 0.08
Notes: ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Appendix 5B.3 shows the plots for the conditional
effects of tariff changes and the number of varieties.
In contrast to the number of varieties and changes in tariffs, price changes do
not serve as a good predictor for changes in the tariff elasticity. This is perhaps
not too surprising. While the level of the price might signal quality, and higher
quality goods might be less sensitive to transport costs in general, this signal does
not necessarily apply to price changes.55
For the model as a whole, the R2 suggests that the variables included in the
estimation can only explain a small part of the variance of the dependent variable.
This is not necessarily concerning as it does not inevitably imply that important
variables have been omitted. In the framework presented here, the dependent
variable itself is an estimate. This introduces a further element of noise, which is
then reflected in the low R2.56 One obvious solution to this problem is to simply
add more data. While the cost of collecting such data are high, this seems the
appropriate strategy to make the above findings more robust by increasing the
model fit.
55Another reason may be some collinearity with the tariff variable.
56Slightly higher R2 values in similar regressions are found by Berthelon and Freund (2008).
Most likely, this is because they (i) estimate the elasticity at the industry-level rather than the
good-level and (ii) can draw on a much larger dataset.
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In sum, the estimates shown in this section lend support to the hypothesis
that the increase in tariffs caused the decline in the importance of distance. In
statistical terms, the number of varieties available to Swiss importing businesses
is also significant. In terms of economic magnitude, however, this effect is small.
After all, tariffs were the main driver of the changes of the distance elasticity.
5.5 Conclusion
This study offers new insights into the relationship between physical and political
trade frictions in the interwar period from three different perspectives. All of
them prove fruitful, especially when combined.
The macro evidence suggests that distance became less of an obstacle to trade
during the interwar period. This is puzzling as the micro-data on transport costs
substantiates the claim by Estevadeordal et al. (2003) that, if anything, real trans-
port costs were increasing. When internal trade and distances are accounted
for the puzzle disappears. Theoretical considerations illuminate the mechanism
through which this result, most likely, appears. Increasing tariffs make varieties
from countries afar relatively cheaper. Thus, the magnitude of the distance coef-
ficient does not depend on distance alone but also on non-distance related trade
costs. When tariffs increase it seems like the world is becoming closer, as trans-
port costs matter relatively less.
Exploiting exogenous variation in tariff rates for Swiss good-level import data,
the final part of the study confirms the validity of the mechanism. The increase
in tariffs limited the importance of distance. This causal evidence corroborates
insights from the comparison of the relative magnitudes of changes in tariffs and
transport costs. Those render it unlikely that transport costs played a major role
for the fall in world trade. Measured by real price indices and thus relative to
previous values, increases in transport costs seem very large. However, this met-
ric teaches us little about the changing size of the transport wedge for interna-
tional trade. Ultimately, the ad valorem equivalent magnitude matters. If ac-
counted for in such terms, the changes in tariffs are much larger than those in
transport costs. Hence, political trade barriers, not transport costs, must have
brought down world trade in the 1930s.
The implications of this study are not limited to the role of trade frictions
during the interwar period. They also provide fresh evidence for the debate sur-
rounding the post-war distance puzzle, a prominent topic in the international
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trade literature. In fact, they lend support to Yotov’s (2012) insight: whenever
we measure the distance elasticity of trade in international data, we measure the
importance of distance relative to other trade costs.
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5.6 Appendices
Appendix 5A Data
5A.1 Peg Measure
Exchange rates for all countries vis-a-vis with the US-$ (ei,us) are provided by
Global Financial Data (2015). I transform these to bilateral exchange rates via
cross-calculation to the bilateral exchange rate e between countries i and j:
ei,j =
[
ei,us
ej,us
]−1
(5.14)
To determine whether a country pegged its currency, I follow Mathy and
Meissner (2011) and calculate for every month of a year whether the exchange
rate remained within a two percent band relative to the annual exchange rate:
Peg(ei,j,m) = ln(ei,j,m)− ln(
12
∑
m=1
ei,j,m
12
) (5.15)
IPegij =
{
1 i f Peg ∈ [−0.02, 0.02]
0 i f Peg /∈ [−0.02, 0.02]
If the indicator variable IPegij equals 1 in eleven of twelve months for a given
year, the bilateral exchange rate regime between i and j is classified as a de facto
peg.
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5A.2 Grain Prices and Freight Rates
This part of the Appendix presents briefly the sources for all routes and prices
presented in the paper:
New York - Hamburg
Freight Rates: various issues of Statistisches Reichsamt (1926–1937). The monthly data is
recorded in the “Verkehr” section.
Prices: St. Louis quality is assumed and the prices are taken from various issues of International
Institute of Agriculture (1925–1937a).
Exchange Rates: Global Financial Data (2015)
Conversions: Freight rates are in tons. One bushel is 27.216 kilogram (U.S. Department of Com-
merce, 1994).
North Atlantic - United Kingdom
Freight Rates: Wickizer (1938, p. 116)
Prices: Average price calculated from St. Louis and Manitoba Wheat from International Institute
of Agriculture (1925–1937a,-).
Exchange Rates: Global Financial Data (2015)
Conversions: No conversions necessary.
La Plata - United Kingdom & Continental Europe
Freight Rates: Wickizer (1938, p. 117)
Prices: Weekly prices for 1925–1926 in Paper Pesos were taken from the 1928/1929 publica-
tion ofInternational Institute of Agriculture (1925–1937a, p. 476). These were then converted
to monthly averages. Thereafter monthly averages in gold francs per quintal were taken from the
1931/1932 (p. 640) and 1935/1936 (p. 858) publication of International Institute of Agriculture
(1925–1937b).
Exchange Rates: Global Financial Data (2015) and the 1935/1936 publication of International
Institute of Agriculture (1925–1937b, p. 857)
Conversions: Paper Pesos are converted using the GFD exchange rate. Thereafter conversion
factors are given in International Institute of Agriculture (1925–1937b, p. 857).
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Australia - United Kingdom & Continental Europe
Freight Rates: Wickizer (1938, p. 117)
Prices: Monthly Prices are taken from Statistisches Reichsamt (1936, p. 529) Statistisches Reich-
samt (1937, p. 178) and are given in shillings and pence.
Exchange Rates: Global Financial Data (2015)
Conversions: Prices are converted into Pounds. 12 Pence are one Shilling and 20 Shillings are one
Pound.
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5A.3 List of Items - Disaggregated Trade data.
TABLE A5.1: ITEMS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Item name ∆ln(1 + t) (in %) Number of ex-
port markets
Agricultural produce
Malt 3.05 10
Wheat flour 9.86 7
Alimentary pastes 20.11 4
Figs 0.31 11
Lemons 8.44 7
Oranges 19.80 7
Grapes 20.91 15
Apples 2.81 15
Plums 6.03 7
Apricot-Marmalade 33.91 23
Onions 14.63 12
Potatoes 10.51 16
White cabbage 14.63 12
Sugar 22.40 7
Cacao, powdered 26.79 5
Chocolate confectionery 18.13 25
Confectionery 18.13 25
Cattle, oxen 9.08 10
Meat-Swine 20.85 8
Beef, fresh 13.96 7
Ham 13.84 17
Sausages 12.63 12
Eggs of poultry 7.37 22
Cheese 8.08 11
Butter, fresh 4.63 18
Lard 10.98 11
Olive oil 3.89 4
Arachis oil (sweet oil) 7.39 12
Fish oil 1.08 11
Bone oil 1.08 14
Linseed oil 7.39 12
Meats preserved 23.07 15
Vegetables canned 23.06 13
Tomato paste 26.49 5
Table continues on the following page
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ITEMS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS (CONTINUED)
Item name ∆ln(1 + t) (in %) Number of ex-
port markets
Sardines in Oil 7.47 18
Beer 26.80 4
Wine 38.17 14
Wine Brandy (French Cognac) 13.78 10
Chemical produce
Colophony 0.57 5
Turpentine oil 0.46 5
Creams for shoes 15.77 10
Soap common 21.99 4
Soap, toilet 22.12 11
Stearin candles 13.98 6
Ochres 4.03 12
Earth colours 9.40 6
Minium 8.67 5
Zinc-white 2.32 8
Ultramarine blue 4.71 6
Mono-azo dyes 2.45 9
Printer’s ink 6.71 8
Enamel lac white (interior) 11.01 11
Lead-pencils 4.93 8
Superphosphates 8.43 7
Nitrogen of potash 8.43 7
Sulphuric acid 8.78 5
Nitric acid 4.14 4
Hydrochloric acid 20.90 4
Tartaric acid 0.91 7
Caustic soda 2.05 6
Sodium sulphate 5.25 7
Sodium bicarbonate 1.96 6
Permanganate of potash 0.87 7
Chlorate of potassium 4.61 5
Blue vitriol 9.97 5
Superoxide of hydrate 4.61 6
Carbolic liquid Acid 1.54 12
Glue 7.21 9
Dextrine 8.77 6
Perfumes 16.64 13
Dynamite cartridges 25.19 6
Matches 27.93 8
Textiles
Cotton yarn, nr. 20 3.35 6
Cotton yarn, nr. 80 5.83 7
Cotton sewing thread 6.79 8
Linen yarn, nr. 18 3.27 10
Linen yarn, nr. 30 4.84 9
Table continues on the following page
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ITEMS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS (CONTINUED)
Item name ∆ln(1 + t) (in %) Number of ex-
port markets
Jute yarn, nr. 6 7.16 4
Twists of hemp, more than 1 mil-
limetre diameter
12.98 10
Worsted yarn, nr 16, metric 4.04 8
Worsted yarn, nr 52, metric 1.88 8
Hand-knitting yarn of wool 6.35 9
Artificial silk, coloured and
twisted
8.98 6
Molletons, raw, first quality 19.00 9
Cottons, raw, medium class 12.02 8
Fine shirtings (calicoes),
bleached
15.77 9
Linings, black cloth 14.53 11
Blues of cotton 10.08 12
Zephyrs (shirtings) 15.01 10
Cotton velvet 3.57 9
Cotton ribbons 10.24 10
Oil cloth 10.66 8
Linen, raw 7.41 8
Linen ticks, plain 9.17 8
Linens, medium class, bleached,
plain
10.21 6
Linen damasks 12.73 11
Water-proof clothes 9.84 7
Jute bags and sacks 23.69 4
Hemp hoses 10.31 4
Double woollens 8.45 13
Worsted, figured 2.24 15
Linings of silk 5.09 23
Ribbons wholly of silk 3.84 7
Gents’ vests 13.91 12
Cotton gloves 4.79 5
Cotton stockings, American 6.75 12
Wool stockings 8.17 12
Knitted wool gloves 5.73 8
Ladies’ pullovers 9.70 15
Stockings of artificial silk 10.21 11
Knicker trousers of artificial silk 11.26 12
Boot and shoe laces 14.46 7
Galloons of artificial silk 7.27 8
Buttons of linen yarn 10.40 21
Lace curtains 7.54 5
Laces, cheap quality 8.61 7
Machine embroideries, cotton 7.06 7
Jute floor coverings 17.79 9
Wool carpets 11.47 30
Linoleum 22.62 6
Table continues on the following page
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ITEMS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS (CONTINUED)
Item name ∆ln(1 + t) (in %) Number of ex-
port markets
Leather & rubber produce
Hair felts for soles 7.73 7
Polishing felts 14.13 9
Paper felts 10.20 8
Gents ’ wool hats 8.04 8
Gents fur hats 4.60 9
Ladies fur hats 4.98 7
Collars for shirts 10.61 6
Shirts, white 11.20 9
Overcoats of double woollens 9.23 17
Suits of cheap cheap cheviots 2.73 12
Ladies’ costumes of woollens 6.89 12
Ladies’ dresses of crepes de
Chine
4.39 15
Ladies’ fur mantles 3.48 19
Artificial flowers 3.60 4
Neckties 7.26 8
Rubber heels 5.73 12
Patent rubber hose 2.08 9
Rubber balls 14.88 14
Overcoats of rubber 10.53 11
Neat’s sleek leather 11.42 5
Upper-leathers Box-calf 3.17 12
Gents’ boots of box-calf 9.60 20
Children’s boots and shoes,
nailed
9.59 4
Trunks of vulcan fibre 21.43 9
Sheep skin Ladies’ bags 6.06 21
Ladies’ gloves 4.27 10
Leather driving belts, sewn 9.48 12
Wood & wooden ware
Round timber, oak 1.25 29
Round timber, fir 7.31 10
Sawn timber, beech, unsteamed 9.54 22
Sawn timber (Fir or Pine) 14.79 15
Plywood, raw 11.58 17
Carpenters’ work 20.35 7
Oak-wood barrels 18.93 6
Softwood kitchen furniture 14.76 14
Bentwood chairs 21.11 7
Bedroom furniture 15.30 19
Bottle corks 9.07 8
Celluloid 0.59 18
Artificial resin, raw 0.54 20
Table continues on the following page
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ITEMS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS (CONTINUED)
Item name ∆ln(1 + t) (in %) Number of ex-
port markets
Carving materials and goods made thereof
Cellulose, bleached 11.22 9
Wrapping paper 11.84 6
Printing paper, medium quality 25.84 13
Tissue paper, white 20.32 10
Carbon paper 15.79 9
Note paper with envelopes in
blotting book
22.15 7
Note books in Artificial Leather
Cover
21.33 12
Cigarette paper in booklets 19.63 11
Stone, earthenware & glass
Portland cement 35.17 5
Quick lime 17.28 7
Magnesite Bricks 20.72 8
Asbestos 16.05 9
Carborundum grinding disks 15.04 10
Grinding paper in sheets 19.00 6
Earthenware floor-covering 13.77 6
Earthenware plates, white 20.95 9
Porcelain plates, white 17.78 18
Porcelain insulators 9.29 10
Plate glass 13.42 6
Beer bottles 10.62 7
Tumblers with cut edges 9.43 13
Pressed glass 16.75 11
Iron and iron goods
Steel iron, raw 4.63 11
Bar iron, round 8.82 9
Black iron-plate 14.69 10
Tin plate 6.58 8
Rolled hoop iron 5.71 10
Iron wire, unwrought 1.84 9
Iron wire, coasted with zine 11.07 10
Wire for binding flowers 19.15 9
Cast iron tubes 14.32 7
Gas tubes of wrought iron 2.41 13
Water conduit tubes 12.78 11
Fittings for gas pipes 5.11 9
Street canal grates 15.92 7
Cog wheel material of steel cast-
ing
12.98 11
Axles 20.01 10
Mine ropes 15.76 6
Cans of tin plate 14.80 11
Cans for milk-transport 15.82 12
Enamelled goods for household
use
22.76 9
Table continues on the following page
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ITEMS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS (CONCLUDING)
Item name ∆ln(1 + t) (in %) Number of ex-
port markets
Scythes 5.97 7
Files 12.33 7
Spiral borers 8.18 11
Planes 14.23 11
Wire tacks 16.81 5
Iron screws with nuts 24.55 6
Link chains 25.52 6
Bedstands of steel tubes 11.07 10
Pocket knives 5.51 13
Pens 6.07 12
Goods made of metal other than iron
Zinc plates 3.30 5
Copper plates 4.68 10
Aluminium plates 20.21 4
Copper Wire, 3.5mm 6.53 6
Wire for electric conduct 9.92 10
Lead pipes 4.92 5
Metal fabrics 4.40 4
Water conduit cocks 12.01 21
Tin tube 10.06 11
Electric reversible lamps, cast 17.38 10
Aluminium cooking Utensils 17.44 12
Alpaca Knives, Forks and
Spoons, not silver-plated
9.83 10
Alpaca Knives, Forks and
Spoons, silver-plated
4.23 12
Machines, vehicles & instruments
Steam boilers 11.27 5
Threshing Machines with Beat-
ing Device
16.70 11
Ploughs for animal traction 12.77 8
Milk separators 6.02 9
Cotton weaving looms 9.92 7
Home sewing machines 18.07 8
Lever switches 5.25 14
Wall telephones 3.15 16
Electric flat irons 17.02 4
Electric glow lamps 6.84 12
Motor cycles 12.48 8
Bicycles 21.04 8
Typewriters 3.45 10
Pianos 4.59 8
Gramphones 21.34 12
Alarm Clocks 9.20 4
Note: Item names are given as in the original source. Some translations might thus sound somewhat
antiquated.
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Appendix 5B Robustness
5B.1 Quartile Distances
FIGURE A5.1: The European Interwar Distance Puzzle
a) Single Distance Elasticity b) Distance Elasticity by Quartile
Distance elasticity estimates from repeated cross-sectional PPML gravity estimation of a bal-
anced panel of 1222 intra- & extra European trade flows per year. No controls but importer
and exporter fixed effects are included
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5B.2 Estimation with full Sample
FIGURE A5.2: The Interwar Distance Puzzle - Full Sample (PPML)
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Repeated cross-sectional PPML gravity estimation of a balanced panel of 1704 global import
flows per year.
FIGURE A5.3: The Interwar Distance Puzzle - Full Sample (OLS)
Repeated cross-sectional OLS gravity estimation of a balanced panel of 1687 global import
flows per year with dyadic fixed, time-varying country, and time fixed effects.
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5B.3 Graphical Representation of Conditional Effects of Tariffs
and Varieties on Changes of the Distance Elasticity
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a) Conditional Effect of Tariff Change
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FIGURE A5.4: Conditional Effects of Tariffs and Varieties on the Dis-
tance Elasticity
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5B.4 Robustness when including trade flows smaller than 500
Franc
TABLE A5.2: THE CHANGING IMPORTANCE OF DISTANCE - AN IMPORT
DEMAND FUNCTION APPROACH
Imports Imports Imports
Distance x Time1931 0.18∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
N 6166 6166 6166
Products 251 251 251
Fixed Effects
Country-Product 3 3 3
Product-Year 3
Product Group-Year ( 3) 3
Year ( 3) ( 3) 3
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Note: The symbol (3) indicates that the fixed effect is collinear with another fixed
effect and thus accounted for in the estimation.
TABLE A5.3: DRIVERS OF THE CHANGES IN THE DISTANCE ELASTICITY
∆ Elasticity ∆ Elasticity ∆ Elasticity
ln(Product Varieties) 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆ Tariff 0.11∗ 0.10
(0.06) (0.07)
∆ Price -0.00
(0.00)
N 251.00 251.00 251.00
R2 0.12 0.13 0.13
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
5B.3 shows the plots for the conditional effects of tariff changes and the num-
ber of varieties.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion & Implications
“I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression. You’re right,
we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.”
Bernanke (2002)1
Abstract
The conclusion of this thesis draws implications for the economic history and
macroeconomics literature. Moreover, it lays out some wider policy implications.
Even though we might not be able to learn from history what to do, studying the
Great Depression suggests that history may teach us what not to do.
1On Friedman’s 90th birthday referring to the FED’s policy mistakes during the Depression.
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This concluding chapter will not repeat the motivation, analysis, results and con-
tribution included in each of the chapters. Instead, by synthesising the presented
work, it briefly outlines implications for the academic and political discourse and
highlights avenues for future research.2
6.1 Implications for Economics and Economic His-
tory Debates
The following paragraphs draw out two major implications for economic history
research and then present two broader implications for the trade and macroeco-
nomic literatures.
A “real” link between the “old” and “new” views of the Great Depression
Eichengreen (2004, p. 1) distinguishes the “new” (global) and “old” (US-centric)
views of the Great Depression. A consensus view would admit the relevance
for both, the faulty international monetary system and national policy mistakes.
Such a view has to specify the transmitter of the crisis, which not only ties
the “old” and the “new” view but indeed countries around the world together.
Eichengreen highlights financial and monetary links. Complementarily, this the-
sis provides evidence for another powerful link, which could explain the variance
in the Great Depression around the globe: the trade channel. Of course, it is not
a substitute for the gold standard view of the Depression. It cannot, and in fact
does not aim to, explain the Depression in the core industrialised economies. Nor
does question the importance of leaving the gold standard for the recovery or the
importance of financial contagion, the latter of which even focuses on other out-
come variables. Yet, a salient feature of such trade view on the Great Depression
is that it has the potential to explain much of the heterogeneity of the Depression’s
onset around the globe, its severity and timing in particular. In doing so, it shifts
the role of crippling export markets from being a consequence to being an impor-
tant contributing factor. This holds particularly true for small open economies.
Inevitably, such view poses another question.
2The views presented here emanate from my reading of literature and the analysis presented
in this thesis. To improve readability for this concluding chapter, only key references are given.
As such, this part of the thesis should not be read as a “stand-alone-chapter.” The reader is kindly
referred to the respective chapters for more detailed references.
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The contribution of protectionism to the Great Depression
If the fall of trade contributed a great deal to the Great Depression in small coun-
tries, what was the role of the rise in protectionism for the fall in incomes? Not
least because any answer to this question will remain necessarily speculative at
this point, Chapter 3 has largely circumvented it. Yet, the concluding chapter of
a thesis seems the appropriate space for such speculation.
The work on the trade channel provides the key ingredient – the estimate of
the trade multiplier – to come closer to an answer. In light of the scale of inter-
war protectionism, it is surprising that, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the
only attempt to quantify the effect of protectionism in the 1930s on global GDP
is Irwin’s (2012, p. 111f) back-of-the-envelope calculation. The below calcula-
tion generally follows his approach but introduces two important modifications.
Firstly, it estimates the fall of global trade caused by protectionism using the same
framework used in Chapter 4.3 Secondly, it applies the trade multiplier identified
in Chapter 3.4 Table 6.1 provides the corresponding parameters and results.
TABLE 6.1: THE EFFECT OF PROTECTIONISM ON GLOBAL GDP:
A BACK-OF-THE-ENVELOPE CALCULATION
Observed changes in tariff level and GDP data Implied fall of trade due to
protectionism
trglobal1929 ∆tr
global
1929−32 X
global
1929
/
Yglobal1929 ∆Y
global
1929−32 ∆X
global
1929−32 ∆X
global
1929−32
/
Yglobal1929
15 % 8 % 11 % -12 % -23 % -2.51 %
Trade multiplier Effects on income
mTBx ∆YProt ∆YProt
/
∆Yglobal1929−32
0.7 -1.76 % 15 %
1 -2.51 % 21 %
Notes: trglobal1929 : global tariff level in 1929; ∆tr
global
1929−32: Change in global tariff level between 1929
and 1932; Xglobal1929
/
Yglobal1929 : Export to GDP ratio for 1929; ∆Y
global
1929−32: Change in global GDP;
Xglobal1929
/
Yglobal1929 : predicted fall in world trade between 1929 and 1932 based on changes in tariffs
(see text); ∆Xglobal1929−32
/
Yglobal1929 : Change in exports over 1929 GDP; m
TB
x : Trade multiplier; ∆GDPProt:
Fall in world GDP due to protectionism; ∆YProt
/
∆Yglobal1929−32 : Share explained in total fall of global
GDP.
3In contrast to Irwin’s calculation, this circumvents the problem that the observed fall of trade
in a certain time period is endogenous to the fall in income during this period.
4 Irwin employs Feyrer’s (2009) estimate for the elasticity of income with respect to trade,
which he identifies from the closure of the Suez canal.
Chapter 6. Conclusion & Implications 347
The world tariff level was tr1929 ≈ 15% in 1929 and reached tr1932 ≈ 23% at its
peak in 1932 (Clemens and Williamson, 2004).5 It is important to point out that
these values constitute a lower bound and must necessarily underestimate the in-
crease in protectionism.6 Plugging the initial tariff level and the change from 1929
to 1932 into a system of equations, such as in Chapter 4, suggests that the rise of
protectionism caused global trade to fall by 23 % between 1929 and 1932.7 Given
an approximate global export to GDP ratio of 11 % in 1929,8 it follows that trade
must have fallen by about 2.5 % in terms of the 1929 GDP due to protectionism.9
Multiplying this fall with the impact multiplier of .710 implies that the increase
in world protectionism led to a fall of 1.8 % in global GDP. Allowing for some
dynamic effects by assuming a multiplier of around 1 implies a fall of around 2.5
% in global GDP. Given a 12 % fall of global GDP between 1929 and 1932,11 these
magnitudes imply that protectionism could explain around 15-20 % of the global
downturn.
Though very conservative assumptions have been made throughout this
back-of-the-envelope calculation, the very nature of such calculation is explo-
rative rather than definitive. The fact that the estimated effect is likely to be a
lower bound estimate should be as much as an illumination of the relevance of
trade for the Depression as an agenda for future research. Much more systematic
work is required. Firstly, it should incorporate trade costs other than tariffs. Sec-
ondly, it should investigate the phase of the recovery more closely rather than fo-
cusing on peak-to-trough values. Finally, the inclusion of the United States hides
the large asymmetries in the impact of protectionism across the globe. Given
its dominance in the sample and its status as a large but relatively closed econ-
omy, the effects of the rise of protectionism on small open economies must have
5This constitutes the unweighted average of a balanced sample of 31 countries.
6Because of its ex-post nature, taking the tariff-revenue-to-import ratio ∑ Revenue∑ Imports does not ac-
count for the role of prohibitive tariffs (O’Rourke, 2000, p. 462). Furthermore, it does not include
non-tariff barriers to trade such as quotas and exchange controls. Given their rise and importance
during the 1930s, this proxy must thus necessarily underestimate the increase in protectionism.
7Specifically, I compare the world in 1929 to the one in 1932 in the same vein as equations 4.4,
4.5, 4.7 do.
8See Federico and Tena-Junguito (2017). Their estimate is consistent with the one by Klasing
and Milionis (2014, Figure 5), who rely on a larger sample but apply a shortcut method to estimate
nominal GDPs.
9 Given an observed 5-6 % total fall of the global export-to-GDP ratio, this number corresponds
well with the work by Madsen (2001). He attributes about 50 % of the fall in world trade to
increased protectionism.
10See Chapter 3.
11Global GDP is defined as the sum of all available GDPs (51 countries) from Maddison (2007).
Including the estimates for the Soviet Union reduces the fall from 11.74 % to 10.5 %.
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been much larger in these than reflected by the global average. While the esti-
mates above call for further research on this question for the Great Depression
period, they also have broader implications for the trade literature. In particular,
they pose the question whether or not the gains from trade are time- and state-
dependent?
The theoretical and empirical gains from trade - statics and dynamics
The above calculation represents an estimate of the “lost” gains from trade. It thus
mirrors what the theoretical trade literature refers to as the gains from trade. In a
recent seminal paper, Arkolakis et al. (2012) demonstrate that the below formula
for measuring the gains from trade follows from a large class of trade models:
∆Wd = ∆λ−
1
e (6.1)
where ∆Wd is the change in real income, ∆λ denotes the change in domestic
expenditure,12 and e the trade elasticity. With such few data constraints, it is
possible to calculate the gains from trade in terms of GDP. The formula can then
be employed for an ex-post welfare evaluation of a certain policy or for assessing
the gains from economic integration relative to autarky.
Indeed, Federico and Tena-Junguito (2017) provide such estimates based on a
large new dataset covering the period 1830 to 2007. Despite using a trade elas-
ticity that would over- rather than understate the gains from trade,13 the “lost
gains” from trade as identified in their study are around a mere 1.4 % for the
years 1929-1932. At first sight, such magnitude is broadly consistent with the
back-of-the-envelope calculation above (Table 6.1). Yet, it is important to note
that in that calculation most conservative assumptions have been made in order
to bias the results against finding a large importance for protectionism. There
are two ways to interpret this result. Firstly, Federico and Tena-Junguito (2017)
choose the right estimate of the trade elasticity even though it does not necessar-
ily represent the most common one. Secondly and perhaps more likely, there is
the possibility that there are important differences between the gains from trade
12Also defined as 1 minus the import penetration ratio.
13They apply a trade elasticity of 3.78 rather than the median point estimate of 5.13 by Head
and Mayer (2014). As they concede, this biases the resulting welfare gains substantially upwards
(Federico and Tena-Junguito, 2017, p. 618). Arkolakis et al. (2012, p. 95) report that the trade
elasticity is typically estimated in the range between -5 and -10. As noted earlier in this thesis,
subsequent research has provided a more precise “average” estimate of the trade elasticity. Head
and Mayer (2014) report −5.13 in their meta analysis of a large number of gravity studies.
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in static and dynamic environments. As vice and virtue, the gains from trade
formula by Arkolakis et al. (2012) does neither take the structure of the economy
and exports nor the time dimension into account. This is a virtue as it allows to
calculate the gains from trade with very little data. Yet, it is a vice because it does
not take into account that sudden increases of protectionism might lead to more
dislocations than if the same change had occurred in a less rapid manner.
By providing a framework to estimate the export multiplier, this thesis lays
the foundation to better address the dynamic aspects of sudden changes in pro-
tectionism and the associated lost gains from trade. Future research should thus
aim to draw out this distinction more conceptually by investigating the precise
mechanisms and providing more empirical evidence.
The importance of bilateral trade costs & the iceberg assumption
A response to the final broader implication for the macroeconomic literature
would require more theoretical and empirical solutions rather than more ev-
idence. When structural gravity models gained importance after the seminal
contribution of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the relevance of differences
in bilateral tariff levels across trading partners had already declined. This led
to conclusions such as that the omission of bilateral tariff levels is not “serious”
(Hayakawa, 2013). What holds true for modern data, however, does not necessar-
ily do so for past episodes. Since the end of World War II, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade and later the World Trade Organisation have levelled tariffs
across trading partners through the MFN mechanism. This resulted in a status
quo, in which the omission of bilateral trade costs is unlikely to considerably bias
coefficients of interest in gravity models. Before this levelling, however, trade
costs differed substantially across trading partners. What does this mean for the
application of gravity models to historical data?
To the extent that the omitted bilateral trade costs are not correlated with the
variables of interest, the distinction between bilateral trade costs and their aver-
age14 might be considered a niche topic in the trade literature. However, this is
unlikely to be the case in practice. It seems inconceivable that the variation of
bilateral trade restrictions is random with respect to policy variables such as the
conclusion of regional trade agreements. When economists derive policy conclu-
sions from their work, the economic magnitudes of the effects — and thus the
14This average is captured by the fixed effects in structural gravity models.
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extent of the bias — matter. To understand the magnitude and direction of such
biases better, seems an important matter for future research.
Finally, the chapter on the distance puzzle points to a related and well-known
problem15 of gravity models: trade costs are modelled as iceberg-type costs. Pic-
turing this necessary modelling assumption as a reflection of reality is neither
innocent nor innocuous. As soon as a non-proportional cost such as a specific
tariff is introduced, one can observe significant effects on the geography of trade.
Hence, future work should further explore the relevance of bilateral trade costs
and modifications of the iceberg assumption.16
6.2 Policy Implications
As economic history is ultimately a study in historical political economy, some of
the conclusions for the academic discourse lead to policy implications that can be
viewed in light of recent post-Great Recession debates.17 Those emanating from
this thesis may rectify some judgements about the status quo. If we think of a
counterfactual mirroring the 1930s, one is likely to become an optimist these days.
The moaning about the slow progress of the World Trade Organisation seems
ludicrous, the complaints about the instability of the political and economic cli-
mate perhaps premature, and the criticism about the inaction of policymakers in
smaller countries during the crisis out of place. If we think instead of a counter-
factual mirroring the Golden Age, the world is a dark place. Most likely, the truth
lies somewhere in between. Policy as well as judgements about it should thus be
based on counterfactuals on both ends of the spectrum. As the current discourse
has developed a strong taste for pessimism, the following paragraphs focus on
the optimistic view.
To begin with, it is important to contrast the short-term political or economic
gain with the long-term economic and political costs. Once done, it is prudent to
establish institutions that moderate change. A very characteristic of such institu-
tions is that they are slow-moving. This vice in a Golden Age world can become a
virtue in a Great Depression state of affairs. The judgement about the effectiveness
of policies and institutions, however, should not only depend on a counterfactual
15See, for example, Hummels and Skiba (2004).
16Of course, this not to say that no such work exists.
17This insight lies at the heart of Eichengreen’s (2014) analysis in the “hall of mirrors.”
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through time. It should also be understood, and in fact communicated, by the
actual ability of policymakers to change economic outcomes.
Breaking up is costly and hard to reverse
While economists might disagree on the precise desirable level, and more impor-
tantly, speed of trade liberalisation, no serious economist would advocate for the
levels of protectionism witnessed in the 1930s. In light of that consensus, this
thesis provides an important lesson for policy. It took until the mid-1970s to re-
cover pre-World War I openness levels.18 Yet, the beggar-my-neighbour game
contributing to interwar protectionism meant that the trade barriers were erected
only in a few years time. Once granted, it took decades to unravel the protection-
ist privileges for whole economic sectors. This implies that a break-up of global
trade integration is not only costly in the short-run. If one accepts the premise that
freer trade, on average, leads to higher welfare, the costs of disintegration accu-
mulate massively over time. When making decisions that put a relatively liberal
trade order at risk, such long-term considerations should enter the calculus.
The value of safeguards & slow-moving institutions
Especially before 2007, countless political commentators19 as well as academics20
pictured institutions such as the European Union and the World Trade Organisa-
tion in a dire state. At the heart of the criticism was that the procedural barriers
within these institutions prevented faster progress. This might have led some to
even call into question the value of such institutions more generally.21 While lim-
ited to the realm of commercial policy, this thesis provides an important insight
for such critics. When assessing formal institutions like the above ones, it is im-
portant to take the state-dependency of the judgement into account. Depending
on whether the economic environment is crisis-ridden or prosperous, the very
18 See Klasing and Milionis (2014) for this metric. The work on the distance puzzle can be
interpreted in a similar manner: It was only when the trade barriers from the 1930s were fully
unravelled that distance gained importance.
19For example, see Martin Wolf’s (2003) criticism on how France and India caused the collapse
of the WTO ministerial meeting in Cancún in the Financial Times.
20Baldwin (2006) makes the argument that the complexity of the rules, the proliferation of bilat-
eral and regional free trade agreements, the shift in bargaining power, and an increased emphasis
on “fairness” make reaching the goal of progress in liberalisation more difficult. See also Sally
(2004) for a similar critique focusing on the institutional barriers in the WTO decision-making
process.
21Even though the authors argue against such a view, the title “Is the WTO passé?” of the recent
literature review by Bagwell et al. (2016) provides testimony of that.
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attribute of being “slow-moving” can have asymmetric effects for the fulfilment
of the mandates of these institutions.
The progress of trade liberalisation as orchestrated by the World Trade Or-
ganisation provides a prime example of such state dependency. Many bemoaned
the slow progress in trade liberalisation at a time in which the average protec-
tion level in WTO countries was about 4 %.22 Historically speaking, the barriers
were already incredibly low and thus the potential gains from pushing liberal-
isation further limited. This does not imply that the slow progress was some-
thing positive per se. However, it was the very inability to change the status quo
quickly and the general commitment to liberal trade policies associated with a
WTO membership that made an outbreak of 1930s style protectionism unlikely in
the recent crisis. As much as the same inflexibility slows the World Trade Organ-
isation in fostering trade integration, it facilitates to fulfil better another mandate
– guarding against globalisation backlashes.
That the vice of prosperous times becomes the virtue in crisis times shall thus
remind us of a core difference between large intergovernmental or supra-national
institutions and independent treaties or bilateral contracts. As Irwin (2012, p.
171) points out, these formalised institutions represent a commitment device for
the countries participating. Contrary to bilateral agreements, ending such com-
mitments would incur very large costs. This might explain why the commercial
policy experience of the Great Recession is so different from the one of the Great
Depression. No such institution for commercial policy was present during the
latter period. The incurring economic and political costs of this absence, a cen-
tral theme of this thesis, mirror the economic and political value of institutions
such as the World Trade Organisation. Slowing change in times of uncertainty
is one of their major achievements. Not least, this characteristic is important for
economies that heavily depend on the large economic players and for which a
move towards economic autarky is even more costly.
Openness & policy space in small open economies
This thesis demonstrates the great importance of the fall of foreign demand for
small open economies in the 1930s. In light of this finding, one might want to
recast some judgements about policy responses of small countries during global
economic crises. One lesson emanating from the analysis is that their power to
22The trade weighted average amounted to 4.1 % and the arithmetic one to 3.9 % (World Trade
Organization, 2008, Appendix Table 7).
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influence the own economic fate is limited. Whatever policymakers do — or fail
to do — might only influence the observed fall in economic activity to a small
extent. This shall not absolve them from making appropriate fiscal and monetary
policy decisions to stem the tide. However, the judgment about their success
requires the relevant counterfactual and contextualisation of their policy space.23
Communicating the magnitude of this space remains a major challenge.
23Albeit in the German and thus quite different context, such an implication also stems from
Borchardt’s (1991) controversial hypothesis on Brüning’s economic policy during the Depression.
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